Heike M. Grimm   *Editor*

Public Policy Research in the Global South

A Cross-Country Perspective

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Foreword

For my generation, scholars of public policy were analogous to immigrants. We were typically educated in a traditional academic discipline, such as political science, sociology, or economics. Our research topic, however, led us to depart from our comfortable academic homeland to the new, unknown, and unexplored terrain of the unchartered territory of public policy. The scholars venturing into this new territory of public policy brought with them the academic values, norms, and methodologies from their native discipline. What did it take to be a public policy scholar? As in many other important manners, the answer was provided by the giant of a scholar, poet, writer, and philosopher, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, some two centuries ago, "The greatest thing a father can give his son is roots. The second greatest thing is wings to escape those roots."

On a good day, public policy research exhibited diversity, tolerance, creativity, and a coming together of the different views, perspectives, and academic disciplines inherent in public policy research and thinking. On a bad day, it was more like the Tower of Babel.

This book shows how far public policy research has come. As the editor, Heike Grimm, makes clear in her introductory chapter, public policy has emerged as an academic discipline. Thanks to the development of formal and systematic research and education, programs such as the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt have spawned a new generation for which public policy research is their native academic discipline. Skeptics looking for a common methodology and approach, as has been claimed to be the gold standard of academic disciplines such as economics, will be disappointed. However, as the author Mark Twain once responded that "rumors of my death have been greatly exaggerated," so too perhaps the primacy of a common methodology and approach has been overstated. Back when Heike and I were colleagues in the Max Planck Society, my concern about a paucity of methodological coherence in public policy research led me to ask two colleagues, one in physics and the other in chemistry, what actually constitutes a *bona fide* academic discipline. Without hesitation, the answer from the natural sciences was, "It's obvious—money and interest."

There is no shortage of interest in public policy issues, challenges, and problems. However, as this book makes clear, most of the resources, i.e., "money," have been skewed towards addressing the problems and challenges confronting public policy in the developed countries, or the North. Even while the globalization of the past two decades has convinced us that no man or country is an island, public policy research remains fixated on the North. This book breaks the mold by providing a gateway to a fertile new frontier and context for public policy research—the South.

Public policy research consists not just of theory and methods but also context. This book not only ushers in the emergence of public policy as a *bona fide* academic discipline, but also a new context which has been ignored for far too long for public policy research—the South. It has been a long time coming but will, without doubt, be appreciated for a long time.

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Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the many individuals that, in various ways, have supported me in composing and publishing this book. First, my gratitude goes to the authors of the chapters of this volume; they have always responded straight away when submitting their chapters and revising them. Without their commitment to and enthusiasm for the idea and mission of this publication, the project would not have been realized. Some authors displayed great patience during the publication process because we aimed for the best results. Thank you for your collegiality and patience.

My deep appreciation goes to Richard Rose and David B. Audretsch for contributing to this volume and for supporting the endeavor in creating a platform for researchers from the Global South. Both scholars stand out as distinguished scholars who further developed public policy research in the last decades in an innovative and trail blazing way in different fields. Richard Rose taught us about the lesson-drawing approach in policy designing and policy making decades ago, which served as an eye opener to me when I started teaching students in a public policy program, often coming from the so-called less-developed and fragile countries. Instead of giving standardized and, therefore, rather useless recommendations, the art of lesson-drawing helped to grasp severe and complex problems in very specific contexts for which there are no easy solutions. David B. Audretsch advanced entrepreneurship, growth, and public policy research in all dimensions and facets during the last decades, and it was always such an honor and a pleasure to participate in some of the many projects he pursued and pushed forward. He has pointed to the magic and importance of entrepreneurship and start-ups for job creation and development since the early 1990s. Quite a few countries of the so-called Global South managed to develop substantially in the last years due to bottom-up entrepreneurial activity without depending on state or donor support and advice from the Global North. His excellent and profound research influenced this process, demonstrating that entrepreneurship results in development, at last.

I thank Donovan Gregg for revising the contributions with care and diligence and an amazing sense of language. It was quite some task to align all contributions from diverse backgrounds and countries to one style. Donovan managed to succeed

without influencing and changing the streaming of writings and style of the papers. With patience, constructive comments, and friendly reminders, he supported our publication outcome a lot. Without Donovan, this volume would not have been finalized in such a professional way.

I would further like to express my appreciation to Johannes Glaeser from Springer for his enthusiastic support of this book and his valuable advice and effort in guiding the process from idea generation to a final publication.

Finally, I thank my family for their continuous encouragement and unparalleled love and support. This journey would not have been possible if not for them, and I dedicate this personal milestone to them.

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Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research in the Global South

Heike M. Grimm

1 Purpose

What is the purpose of the book and what does the editor hope to achieve? After teaching and researching at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany, since 2002 in an international program which attracts foremost young, mature, and ambitious students from the Global South, I continuously and increasingly faced the challenge that the standard literature rarely provides answers to the most pressing challenges of the South. Furthermore, access to research and publications from colleagues from the South is often denied or at least difficult to obtain; a substantial number of scholars face difficult conditions in higher education institutions and are often challenged by the frustrating consequences of censorship or corruption. Nevertheless, their knowledge is important if not crucial for policy making specifically in contexts that are characterized by volatile conditions.

The goal of this book is, therefore, to present topical research about the emergence of public policy as a field of research and as an academic discipline in countries of the Global South to enhance the portfolio of academic literature beyond the Global North's perspective and paradigm. When teaching and discussing public policy theory and practice, we first and foremost draw on academic literature of scholars from the Global North which is without any doubt mostly excellent and very useful for solving policy problems in certain contexts and under specific conditions; but we face the drawback that transferring this knowledge to highly different political, social, economic, cultural, and, above all, fragile contexts has severe limitations for policy making and decision taking by public organizations and politicians and can even cause damage and regression. Every place has its own context and its own unique

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situation which is important to consider and analyze before drawing lessons for policy designing and policy making.

Public policy has been established and acknowledged as an academic discipline during the last decades in many of the so-called developed countries. Nonetheless, the rise of the new, interdisciplinary academic discipline was often traced with skepticism in the early years with the consequence that it was acknowledged in some countries earlier than in others. Nonetheless, we observe the rise of public policy as an academic discipline in countries worldwide although we still know little about the experts and knowledge in the field including the various facets of public policy theory and practice from many country perspectives. This is specifically true for so-called less developed and fragile countries where transformations take place rapidly and knowledge about public policy in general and tools and techniques of policy making specifically are significant for development, recovery, and reconstruction. From my standpoint, the acknowledgement of public policy as an academic discipline by political leaders and educators can play a vital role for professional and accountable policy making, for political advocacy, and for the development of institutions specifically in countries of the Global South which are often challenged by growing societal, economic, and environmental problems.

Cognizant of the deeply interdisciplinary nature of public policy, the book considers aspects of history, economics, political science, governance, sociology, and law as components of public policy theory development and investigates how these theories have influenced policy making and agenda setting in countries of the Global South. The contributions cover a wide range of policy issues in many fields including democratization, migration, emigration, integration, corruption, economic development, environment, education, and entrepreneurship and integrate theories of the policy process such as the Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon 2002) or the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2014).

2   The Global South and the Brandt Commission

The Global South is a term which is highly debated in academia and political discussions. I agree with the critique stating that the term has deficiencies, but it is from my point of view better suited than its predecessors to describe places under certain conditions. The reference point in this volume is context and conditions rather than the geographical boundaries of the Global South which are a source of ongoing discussions for good reasons (Wolvers et al. 2015).

The conditions of countries in the Global South are often described as economically poor and politically fragile as well as by social inequalities, endemic corruption, high crime rates, etc. which are labels and generalizations that are misleading, sometimes wrong, and even derogatory if applied to the Global South in its entirety. In this book, we will demonstrate how multifaceted the conditions are in places of the Global South and how important it is to contextualize them before drawing lessons for public policy agenda setting and policy making. The research and case

studies further underline the considerable advancement of public policy research in the Global South.

The terminological predecessors pinpointed, to a high degree, to the economic status of countries in the Global South referring to less developed, lower developed, or undeveloped countries while generalizing and assuming a high degree of poverty across all places in these categories. The same was expressed with the term Third World summarizing all poor countries in contrast to the First World (the capitalist countries) and the Second World (socialist or communist countries). With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the naïve tripartition vaporized quickly. At about the same time, the newly industrializing countries and tiger economies demonstrated that Global South countries have the potential to grow substantially over a short time period. The city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore, for example, ranked among the poorest in the world after World War II and developed impressively due to a variety of innovative economic policies transferring manufacturing industries into innovation hot spots (Audretsch 2015). Also, China does not fit into any category and is, nonetheless, classified as a Global South country. These few examples show that the Global South is diverse and dynamic (Rigg 2015).

Olaf Kaltmeier (2015) points to another advantage of introducing and using the term Global South; he emphasizes that it opened up a new research vein reintegrating studies from Africa, Asia, and Latin America into the research field. This book demonstrates that his statement is justified in highlighting contributions from diverse countries of the Global South. Kaltmeier nevertheless sees limitations similar to those of the Third World concept because of the assumed geographical North-South divide. The advanced research integrated in this volume by scholars from the Global South shows that the divide is getting smaller; the expertise and academic professionalism of the contributors rather indicate that the Global South and the Global North have much in common.

The South is a term brought forward, among others, by the Brandt Commission Reports published in 1980 and 1983 which promoted the North-South dialogue to overcome mainly economic disparities identifying a North-South line, also known as Brandt line (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980, 1983).[1] Although published many years ago, the thoughts and statements by Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of Germany from 1969 to 1974 and Nobel Prize laureate in 1971, and the commission are highly relevant today:

> Waste and corruption, oppression and violence, are unfortunately to be found in many parts of the world. The work for a new international order cannot wait until these and other evils have been overcome. We in the South and the North should frankly discuss abuses of power by elites, the outburst of fanaticism, the misery of millions of refugees, or other violations of human rights which harm the cause of justice and solidarity, at home and abroad. (Brandt 1979, p. 7)

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[1]Juliane Corredor Jiménez contributes a chapter about the topicality of the Brandt Reports in this volume.

This quote of Willy Brandt from 1979 is highly topical and makes politicians even doubt whether any progress has been made. The former Vice Chancellor of Germany, Sigmar Gabriel, for example, points out:

> Reading the Commission's reports makes one wonder what we've been doing for the past 40 years; for these reports deal with paths out of poverty, with halting arms races, with environmental degradation, population growth, fair global trade and steps away from development aid towards a true partnership between the countries of the North and those of the South.[2]

"The courage to act" (Quilligan 2002, p. 62) is one of the main themes of the Brandt Reports, and taking action is, by definition, linked to entrepreneurial activity. "The best way to predict the future is to create it." This quote by Willy Brandt along with his global perspectives in solving complex issues became the leading theme of the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany, which was named after him, and from which a considerable number of authors in this volume received their graduate and doctoral degrees. Brandt's vision was to "create the future" by developing, implementing, and assessing innovative policies rather than transferring policies without prior efforts in lesson-learning or geographic, cultural or, political contextualization (Rose 1991). How can the future be created? How can local, national, and global problems be analyzed, addressed, and solved? How can decision-makers in policy making and politics be trained and supported in reaching goals while sticking to Willy Brandt's vision?

The Brandt School in Erfurt aims to answer these questions. With the majority of students coming from countries of the so-called Global South, the traditional approach in teaching public bureaucrats turned out to have severe limitations in the context of accelerated globalization. The concepts, methods, and tools in policy making known and applied in the Western hemisphere turned out to have shortcomings when transferred to developing or fragile contexts. In this context, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt, in 1980, pointed to the limitations of just transferring large-scale resources from North to South on the basis that a restructuring of the global economy will allow developing countries to facilitate and determine their own ways of economic growth and development.

3   A Brief Global North Perspective: What Is Public Policy?

The definitions of public policy are various, and there is no unanimous consensus about the term. Public policy can be described as an overall framework within which government actions are translated and realized to achieve public goals and to create public value (Moore 2013; Meynhardt 2009). Cochrane and Malone (2014, p. 3)

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[2]Speech by former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel at the conference #Brandt2030, 31.8.2017, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/170831-bm-brandt-kommission/292232, accessed on September 25, 2018.

suggest a working definition of public policy "(...) being the study of government decisions and actions designed to deal with a matter of public concern." They focus strongly on purposive government actions dealing with perceived problems and questions. Policy analysis tries to examine and answer these questions with the goal to consult and inform governments and political decision-makers using scientific insights and investigations and to help formulate a decision that is ideally suited to the needs of the public and all interest groups involved. An academic discipline striving to master this challenging task and to develop consensus must inevitably build bridges across politics, administration, citizens, social groups, and science (Lasswell 1951, 1956; Ostrom 2005).

Thomas R. Dye (1972) explained that public policy is a form of governing that adheres to certain motives for action and brings about change ("What governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes"). Dye also stressed that public policy can mean refraining from action (ibid., p. 2). A policy is a consciously made government decision, particularly when not only the solution proposal but also the change affected by the policy is of interest (Howlett et al. 2009, p. 4). In order to summarize the nature of public policy, DeLeon used three key words: effective public policy must be problem-oriented, multidisciplinary, and value-oriented (DeLeon 2006, p. 40).

Public policies go through a policy cycle and process including problem definition and agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legislation, policy implementation, and—to a lesser extent—policy evaluation which may result in policy change as the outcome of a full policy cycle. This book puts special emphasis on policy formulation and agenda setting of the policy cycle assuming that bringing complex issues into the agenda is linked to the emergence of public policy in general.

But can public policy really make a difference? Yes, it can. Audretsch (2015, p. 104) refers to the divergent developments of two neighboring states in the United States, North and South Carolina, one of which turned into a high-tech location, while the other one remained trapped in old manufacturing industries. The reason for the striking difference lies in public policy; policy makers in North Carolina designed and emphasized policies to transfer the state from its dependence on unskilled labor in manufacturing into putting emphasis on knowledge and entrepreneurship (Link 1995). Such a phenomenon can be observed worldwide; Singapore and Hong Kong are the most prominent cases being driven by strong state policy to bring about the modernization of a city-state in a successful manner.

The academic study of public policy emerged as a subfield within the discipline of political sciences in the United States in the 1950s. While in the Anglo-American world public policy education was established from the 1960s onward, policy consultation and public policy research and education developed comparatively late in the European countries. In Germany, for example, the study of political science was re-established guided by the Anglo-American equivalent after the Second World War. As a result, political scientists used the concept of government as the starting point of scientific research. Thus, the scientific field of comparative government was established, addressing institutions and procedures of political rule and decision-making and addressing public administration challenges (Schuppert 2003). The German scientist Wilhelm Hennis critically analyzed this phase of

reorientation of political science in his 1965 treatise *Aufgaben einer modernen Regierungslehre* (tasks of a modern government). For him, the main focus of political science was not on government as an institutionalized order but on the art and tools of governing and the analysis of governing techniques. He pointed to the questions which emphasized content (policies) as well as structures and processes. He formulated the aim of a new political science which aimed at looking at structure, processes, and procedures as well as content emphasizing that:

> (. . .) we urgently need political scientists who possess scientific knowledge of significant matters such as healthcare, infrastructure, defense, education, and who by virtue of their background in political science are able to view these matters as public tasks, i.e. in relation to governing technique and political decision-making. (Hennis 1965, p. 413)

Hennis, therefore, was the first one in postwar Germany to formulate the agenda of a policy-oriented political and administrative science and, simultaneously, policy-oriented training for public service (Hennis 2000). This new focus on public policy and governance emerged due to the fact that political and administrative procedures were increasingly seen as problem-solving processes which were coined by the shaping and transformation of political institutions and administrative structures in the 1980s and 1990s (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Moreover, the increasing complexity of coping with social problems and creating new solutions for social problems lead, in return, to the question of good governance. These topics became increasingly important in political science (Benz 2003; Jann 2003), which also explains the increasing demand for consultation.

This short review of the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in Germany shows that it took many years before it was established and acknowledged by scholars, politicians, policy makers, and the public in a country of the Global North. This book will emphasize countries of the Global South to further enhance our knowledge of the role and establishment of public policy as an academic discipline in an inclusive way.[3]

The reasons for this approach are manifold, among them, that the importance of policy analysis and policy studies further increased globally in the last several years which is reflected by the rising number of published academic articles and official documents as well as organized conferences and activities and associations emerging that focus on public policy or policy issues. Reflecting on the extraordinary global changes, we face new challenges in policy making which affect public policy and social sciences in theory and practice. Due to new political parameters, debates, and threats to liberal democracies as well as the renaissance of populist parties and actors, increased migration, financial crises, endemic corruption, climate change, digitalization, and the perceived next industrial revolution, long-lasting warfare in fragile states, and far more issues, the demand for interdisciplinary, transformative, solution-oriented policy analysis is high. Hence, more research from the Global South is needed to cope with the many and complex policy issues on our policy agenda.

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[3]Lamin O. Ceesay explains the meaning of public policy from a Global South perspective in this volume.

4 Who Is Contributing and Which Topics Are Addressed?

The book presents research by young scholars and leading senior professors from all over the world. They have diverse backgrounds and have made significant contributions to public policy research while working on a vast array of policy issues. Each contributor has had complete freedom to address a topic of high policy relevance that best fit his or her individual or contextual expertise. To decrease the risk of fuzziness and a high variance of topics, the book was split in two parts. The first part aims at contributing to theory building; the second part includes a selection of country case studies which focus on the emergence of public policy, on the one hand, and agenda setting, on the other hand. In other words, the book has a strong emphasis on the early stages of public policy designing. Understanding how a policy agenda is set, when, and by whom is a prerequisite to comprehend how policy is agreed on and implemented (Zahariadis 2016, p. 4).

In a nutshell, the focus is on the emergence of public policy and the role of agenda setting for policy making in countries and regions of the Global South. The authors selected diverse topics of policy concern which are very relevant for public policy research, among them, the role of civil society and think tanks for democratization; the question what promotes democratization, how to sustain it, and how this is linked to public policy programs offered by higher educational institutions; the driving forces of economic and civil development and, in that context, the influence of multinational organizations; the role of donor agencies for community development; the causes of migration and the impact of migration on host countries; wider effects of emigration and labor migration on home families; the relationship between environmental policy making and media coverage; the role of education policy for lower developed countries; and the emergence of entrepreneurship education as driving force for development. Furthermore, the authors applied theories of the policy process for their analyses such as the Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon 2002) or the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2014) and could further enhance the transfer of this theory to research in a Global South context. The authors applied innovative qualitative and quantitative methods and focused on policy issues in a global context as well as on country cases, in particular, on Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Ghana, the Gambia, and Kazakhstan. Some authors presented a first draft of the included contributions at the International Public Policy Associations' conference in Singapore participating in the panel titled *The Emergence of Public Policy and Agenda Setting: Case Studies from the Global South*, on June 29, 2017.

The book is addressed to scholars, students, and practitioners. On the one hand, scholars and graduate students of public policy and related topics will receive firsthand analyses on selected policy issues that matter in Global South countries. On the other hand, practitioners, managers, and consultants will find in-depth information and knowledge from scholarly experts who offer professional research while taking into consideration context, historical trajectories, and geographic

peculiarities. One thing that all of the case studies have in common is that they were analyzed with cultural empathy and respectful consideration for context and environmental variables.

5   Organization of Parts and Chapters

The first part of the book contributes to theory building and a better understanding of terms and terminologies and looks at selected policy issues, namely, corruption and migration, from a global perspective. In the second part of the book, the authors present case studies focusing on public policy agenda setting and designing specifically while examining, among others, education, environmental, economic, entrepreneurship, and other important fields of policy making across countries. The question and importance of democratization and the role of civil society play a crucial role in most of the contributions and seem to be of prime importance for the development and for policy making in the Global South.

The second chapter is titled *Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications of the North-South Divide from Today's Policy Perspective* and builds on the introduction of this volume while further exploring and explaining the concept of the Global South.[4] Juliane Corredor Jiménez refers to different terminologies which were applied in the past to describe the division of the world into "poorer" and "wealthier" countries. Parting from the two Brandt Reports as reference points, she argues that the concept of a Global North and Global South is still relevant today, as it conceptualizes global differences in economic power and political representation. She further underlines that it is important to acknowledge different needs and interests among the two poles and, furthermore, to take into consideration the context and diversity of places for developing smart and sustainable public policies. From her standpoint, ignoring the divide may lead to ineffective policy outcomes.

In the chapter entitled *Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts*, the authors Richard Rose and Caryn Peiffer review theories about the definition, causes, and consequences of corruption in the Global North and the Global South. Once these parameters are established, the authors compare various assessments of different country's levels of corruption around the globe and ultimately conclude that grouping countries according to geography or culture fails to accurately capture this nuanced and multifaceted problem. Thereafter, the authors present nine key principles for reducing retail corruption that hold a high practical value, in particular when it comes to the practice of moving the delivery of services away from face-to-face model and toward an electronic model in order to reduce the chances for corrupt behavior to occur.

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[4]I am grateful to Donovan Gregg for his thoughtful comments and contributions summarizing the individual chapters.

The next contribution is written by Anja Mihr, entitled "*Glocal*" *Public Policy in Times of Global Migration*, and explores the ways in which policies around the world are growing both more local and more global simultaneously, in particular with regard to the ways that migrants of all types are being treated while themselves impacting on public policy making. She argues that all variants of migrants, be they working migrants, asylum seekers, trafficked persons, or refugees, are key actors and advocates within the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The chapter addresses how more space can be made in the public sphere and discourse for migrants to participate in the political process if global norms and standards are abided at a local level as well.

Atif Ikram Butt discusses the very recent ideational turn in new institutionalism in his contribution titled *Public Policy and Ideation*. Recent theoretical advancements in ideational institutionalism have created a fundament on which institutional analysis could be sufficiently carried out in countries of the Global South that do not necessarily present facets of pluralistic societies or of well-established liberal democracies. This introductory chapter advances theoretical application of ideational institutionalism by developing conceptual clarity about types of ideas, their origin, and the mechanisms through which they affect public policy outcomes. It further presents an ideational framework of public policy for understanding the mechanism through which ideas originate and affect public policy outcomes. The framework allows for categorization of different types of ideas as per their influence on the policy process and its outcomes.

The second part of the volume starts with the chapter entitled *The Rise of Policy Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia* presented by Jorge Sellare, Juan David Rivera Acevedo, and Lina Martínez. It focuses on democratization and economic and civil development and traces the history of public policy in Colombia by looking at the key national and international actors and institutions that have shaped the policy making process as public policy evolved into an academic discipline. The chapter shows which actors in the agricultural sector as well as which multinational development banks and agencies played a pivotal role in shaping decision-making in Colombia. The authors further demonstrate that the country frequently adopted foreign development models to apply in its own context serving as the basis for its own policies and subsequent demand for policy analysts as the field of public policy grew.

Raphael Zimmermann Robiatti contributes with his chapter *Re-Democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic Discipline in Brazil: Push or Pull?* and discusses the recent emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in Brazil. It traces this development from the 1960s onward while specifically taking into consideration the roles of re-democratization, social participation, and state reformation after the end of the military dictatorship. Further, he investigates the role of historical, social, and political factors in influencing the studies in this area of knowledge, citing state reforms and the reopening for social participation as the two main driving forces that contributed to the offset of public policy as an independent academic discipline in Brazil. The chapter concludes with an overview of Brazilian public policy, public management, and public administration study programs which were established in course of acknowledging public policy as an academic discipline in this country.

The following contribution is written by Mergen Dyussenov and entitled *Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic Diversification in*

Kazakhstan Throughout 2011–2016. The chapter seeks to better flesh out the discussion surrounding the agenda setting phase of the policy cycle of Kazakhstan by discerning who exactly sets the agenda in regard to economic diversification. The author identifies two ways that the existing literature has been hitherto insufficient, namely, that they have not empirically established who sets the agenda for a certain policy issue, nor have they employed internet research methods. Upon examination, the author finds that think tanks are the primary agenda setters when it comes to policies related to economic diversification in Kazakhstan and that the government itself is more directly in control of shaping the debate about these policies thereafter.

In the following, Kow Kwegya Amissah Abraham presents the chapter *The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory Governance in Ghana*. He explores the growth of Ghana's democracy and civil society actors, since 1994. In particular, the author analyzes the growth of think tanks and the activities that they pursue in order to promote citizen participation in governance. After a systematic analysis of the themes and activities developed and employed by these think tanks, the author concludes that there appears to be a link between the activities undertaken by policy think tanks and citizen awareness and/or participation in governance and policy making.

The chapter written by Lamin O. Ceesay focuses on the influence and interventions by donor organizations at different stages of the Gambia's local government reform and decentralization policy making processes. It pays particular attention to a community-driven development program and how experiences and lessons gathered from international intervention have influenced local government structures and practices in the Gambia. Before focusing on the case, the author presents a treatise of the nature of the policy processes from a developing country perspective. He offers an introduction to the question what a policy is as well as the origin of policies and the actors that set the agenda, formulate, and implement public policies in developing countries. He then applies his theoretical framework to his case study and demonstrates what influence supra-institutions exert on decentralization and community development referring to the emergence of new governance structures, administrative functions, and funding models.

The next chapters of the book look into different perspectives on emigration and immigration as they relate to public policy and the Global South. The first lens through which these phenomena are examined offers the chapter *Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither "Asian Values" in the Emigration Policies of the Philippines* by Exequiel Cabanda and Meng-Hsuan Chou. The scholars explore how governments reconcile the positive utility of promoting labor migration and the wider effects that emigration has on the families left behind, specifically focusing on the case of nurses in the Philippines. The authors analyze the problem within the context of "Asian values" and trace policy makers' policy narratives in the design process of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 and reveal how the debates revolved around securing the market for the Philippines' nurse-migration industry. They conclude that though the country belongs to the cultural heritage of Asia, its governance structure and regulatory practices have reconfigured Asian values to promote and prioritize economic growth over the core values of the family in terms of women's central role.

The contribution entitled *Afghan Migration and Pakistan's Policy Response: Dynamics of Continuity and Change* chooses instead to focus not on a government

actively promoting the expatriation of its own people but on the policy responses of a government that is dealing with a large influx of migrants. Anwesha Ghosh highlights that population movement has become one of the defining aspects of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, looking specifically at Afghan migration to Pakistan, since 1979. By reviewing Pakistan's policies toward this group of migrants, the author seeks to identify the major factors influencing these shifts, lastly trying to determine the potential role of Afghan refugees in the Pakistan context.

The next piece of research deals with water pollution, environmental policy, civic engagement, and the role of media coverage finally resulting in policy and political change in India. Maitreyee Mukherjee examines when and how the issue of polluting the Ganges River was given public attention covering a time period of three decades (1985–2016). Her contribution entitled *Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program Through the Lens of Multiple Streams Framework* discusses the pollution of the Ganges River during this time frame. She applies a discourse analysis and shows how Kingdon's multiple streams approach materialized over the period of investigation and subsequently resulted in the opening of a favorable policy window, in 2014. The opening of this policy window was facilitated by carefully planned collective action of few political entrepreneurs and actors sharing similar political ideas and ideologies. The deteriorating and devastating condition of the river and the continuous failure of the government to tackle this severe environmental issue finally allowed the opposition party to create a national sentiment followed by media coverage then resulting in political change.

The final chapters of this book look at what is widely considered to be one of the fundamental pillars of development and growth, education. The first chapter examines the effectiveness of one of the latest waves in pedagogical theory, namely, entrepreneurial education, and is entitled *Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Start-ups: The Case of Pilar, Paraguay* contributed by Fernando Luis Ramirez Gonzalez. The chapter attempts to add further empirical analysis to a particular type of entrepreneurship education program (EEP), called "Education through Entrepreneurship," in order to discern if EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward start-up development increase significantly after having completed the program. From the results of the empirical analysis, the author supports the findings of other studies that have found statistically significant increases in EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and perceived behavioral control and a positive, yet not statistically significant, effect on EEP participants' personal attitude.

The last chapter builds on the introductory chapter on ideational institutionalism contributed by Atif Ikram Butt in this volume and analyses the role of ideas in policy formulation. It draws attention to discursive practices in policy making. The author examines the passage of the 2012 Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act of Pakistan by assessing the ideational traces for the Act. He finds out that historical context matters as much as the colonial past and the British constitutional heritage. He further concludes that the legislation was mainly the result of international pressure and the expectations placed upon the government of Pakistan because of its international commitments. The analysis confirms, among others, that actors in the policy process are strategic and that they rely on multiple criteria for favoring

certain strategies over others. The author shows that ideas at the normative level are rather used for the justification of new public policy prescriptions, while ideas at the cognitive level are used in the foreground of policy formulation.

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Part I
Theoretical Considerations and Global Public Policy Implications

Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications of the North-South Divide from Today's Policy Perspective

Juliane Corredor Jiménez

1 The North-South Dichotomy

In the years after World War II and in the course of decolonization, the "Global South," first, in geographic terms referring to the region below the equator, gained what was a prerequisite of visibility and representation in global politics: statehood. The emergence of new state actors was embedded in a new global political order shaped by the United Nations organization and the Bretton Woods institutions as well as the increasing globalization of trade. In this historical context, different terminologies emerged to describe the now tangible divide between the "North" and the economically poor and less developed states in the Southern hemisphere—a representation of the imbalance of powers in the international system. Among the most prominent of the various categories were "Third World" coined by Alfred Sauvy (1952) in reference to *le tiers état* describing the group of people not belonging to the clergy and nobility at the time of the French revolution; "the under-developed countries," later "developing countries"; and the concept of "centre, semi-periphery and periphery" (Wallerstein 1974).

The term "Global South" was conceptualized by Oliver Shewell Frank, while the concept of "North-South Dialogue" was later used in reference to the Conference on International Economic Cooperation of 1975–1977 (see Williams 1984). As illustrated by William Clark, the dichotomy between North and South emerged to fill the void left when the two poles of the East and West diminished after the end of the Cold War:

> (. . .) during the Cold War, the world had become accustomed to a division into two political blocs, but the existence of a third segment—developing nations—was now becoming increasingly obvious, and hence it was perhaps better to see the world as divided into 'North' and 'South'. (Clark 1965 in Solarz 2014, p. 122)

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The "North-South" dichotomy owed its rapid rise in popularity and widespread recognition in particular to the report by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues. This commission and the reports it issued were also named after its chairman, Willy Brandt, and established on the initiative of the World Bank in 1977. The "Brandt Reports" (North-South: A Program for Survival published in 1980; Common Crisis: North-South Cooperation for World Recovery published in 1983) were "widely hailed as the world's first internationally representative proposals on global development and economic interdependence" (Quilligan 2002, p. 5). Yet, the term "North-South" has been legitimately criticized by several authors for its geographical and political imprecision (Duck 2015). The Independent Commission on International Development Issues themselves criticized the term in 1980, remarking that the Brandt Line's[1] division into a North and South was too simplistic, acknowledging that two rich industrialized countries (Australia and New Zealand) were actually situated in the "South" (Brandt et al. 1980). Other authors disapprove the North-South Divide because it considers a division on the basis of national categories, assuming that the states belonging to the South and North, respectively, constitute a unity (Thérien 1999, p. 734; Solarz 2014, p. 133).

While the Brandt Line as a division of the world into poor and rich countries on the basis of a geographical distinction might challenge its proper legitimacy, the basis upon which it was drawn remains a political and social reality today. Besides being a graphical illustration of the global distribution of economic power, the Brandt Line also represented the South's dependence on the North which dominated "the international rules and institutions for trade, money and finance" (Quilligan 2002, p. 1). Throughout the 1990s, the Brandt Line can be drawn on the basis of "the North as the OSCE and EAPC," "the North as the OECD," or "the South as the G-77" (Solarz 2014, p. 140) illustrating its significance in today's policy making.

The economic and resulting social imbalances between the South and the North, fostered by protectionist regimes, unequal terms of trade, economic hegemonies, and increasing privatization, still divide the world into "haves" and "not haves" and hindered economic development in poor countries (Brandt et al. 1980). Arrighi et al. (2003) emphasize the continuing hegemony of the North, represented by membership in the OECD (with exception of Chile who joined in 2010): "(. . .) if an unequal income distribution is characterized by little long-term upward or downward mobility, it can be taken as underlying hierarchy of wealth, for wealth is nothing but 'long-term income'" (Harrod 1958 in Arrighi et al. 2003, p. 5). In Ankie Hoogvelt's words, the relationship between core and periphery is becoming a social relationship, and no longer a geographical one (Hoogvelt 1997, p. 145). This is consistent with the literature that suggests that OECD countries constitute a "convergence club" (Arrighi et al. 2003, p. 4). Milanovic reiterates that the trend

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[1]The Brandt Commission identified a North-South line (or Brandt Line), a geographical convenience based on the fact that most of the poor world lies in the South latitude 30° North (Rigg 2015; see also Brandt et al. 1980).

after the 1970s "reinforced the strong domination of Western countries at the very top of the income distribution" (Milanovic 2005, p. 61). While polarizing tendencies between rich and poor are still at work, they are increasingly obvious within rather than across countries (Arrighi et al. 2003).

The divide between North and South is still a relevant concept today. We apply the term "Global South" in this book deliberately as a symbolic acknowledgment that, despite changing distribution patterns and emerging regional powers (Grugel and Hout 1999), there still exists a divide between the economically poor and rich countries which should not be ignored (Lees 2011; Boatca 2015).

2   The Brandt Reports

As mentioned beforehand, the Brandt Reports constitute a representative proposal on economic development (Quilligan 2002), so we consider it worthy to analyze their recommendations and implications for public policy making at this point. In the introduction to the first report Brandt writes:

> It [the report] discusses North-South relations as the great social challenge of our time. We want to emphasize our belief that the two decades ahead of us may be fateful for mankind. We want responsible world citizens everywhere to realize that many global issues will come to a head during this period. But we also raise problems to be dealt with at once, long before we have come to the end of the century. (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 7)

Cooperation was seen as a principal tool to enhance worldwide development with development being defined as "to lead to self-fulfillment and creative partnership in the use of a nation's productive forces and its full human potential" (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 23). Aiming at reviving a failing economic system, the commission advocated a large-scale transfer of resources from North to South also with a view to allowing developing countries to promote their own development and economic growth paths.

The reports identify mutual interests shared by North and South and undermine the fact that both poles depend upon each other. Yet, the reports also emphasize that public knowledge and political acceptance of this mutual interdependence are very limited. The concern over mutual interests was generally shared by the North, whereas the argument as to why the North needs Southern cooperation centered around food security, economic benefits, and potential security threats (see Ehrlich 1980). At this point, the Brandt Reports emphasize that the North's self-interest must be sacrificed in order to ensure their own and the South's survival and avoid reciprocal impoverishment of the world at large.

Parallel to the works of the Brandt Commission, the Global South first united as G77 during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which has hence served the South as an effective instrument to join forces in international negotiations. As expressed by Mendez (2015), "(. . .) South-South cooperation is coming to occupy an important place in the changing theory and

discourse of development." The united Global South later demanded for a "New Economic World Order" in concordance with the recommendations of the Brandt Reports (Amuzegar 1976, p. 550). Yet, the South-South Dialogue assessed that "while the South had succeeded in giving a high political visibility to its concern for an equitable world order, the concrete results of the North-South Dialogue (. . .) had been extremely disappointing," lamenting that the North had started to reject the South's proposals for change without offering any creative solution. The North was reluctant to change its negative attitude "unless the South could become better organized for dialogue and negotiation" (South-South Dialogue 1979, p. 117).

The North's approach to a dialogue with the South was primarily motivated by economic issues. As expressed by Arrighi et al. (2003, p. 6):

> catching up with the standards of wealth of first world countries [remained] the generally accepted objective of Third World developmental efforts, but the narrowing of the industrialization gap between Third and First World countries was just as generally considered to be the most essential and effective means in pursuit of that objective.

This argument is shared by Thérien, who states that between the two competing paradigms of world poverty, the one understanding poverty as "a temporary misadaptation of markets" and focusing on "(. . .) get[ting] poor individuals to adapt to [the existing economic system]" is generally the predominant one (Thérien 1999, p. 730). The author gives an alternative paradigm, called the UN Paradigm, according to which the divide between North and South is, unlike as seen by the competing Bretton Woods paradigm, not being bridged. As expressed by Thérien, the UN Paradigm "offers the most coherent narrative on world poverty, and aligns with the recommendations made by the Brandt Reports as it emphasizes the need for a strengthened cooperation among North and South" (ibid.). Arrighi et al.'s findings provide further evidence that, against the widely made claim, the North-South Divide has not diminished. They found that "(. . .) convergence in the degree of industrialization (. . .) has not been associated with convergence in levels of income enjoyed on average by residents of the two groups of countries" (Arrighi et al. 2003, p. 3). The authors further argue that this contention is based on the false identification of "industrialization" with "development" and "industrialized" with "wealthy" (ibid.). This statement is consistent with reflections of scholars from the South who assert that "the real objective of the North-South Dialogue (. . .) [should be] the economic decolonization of the Third World, as (. . .) a continuous liberation from the past patterns of economic, cultural and political dependency" (South-South Dialogue 1979, p. 118), which illustrates that instead of finding new patterns of economic development, different terms are applied to preserve the existing patterns.

Quilligan (2002) assesses the state of implementation of recommendations made in the Brandt Reports under a so-called report card. According to the author, efforts to improve issues such as "hunger, poverty, armaments and security, money and finance, global negotiations" all failed, while issues such as "trade, technology and corporations, debt, aid, women" are poorly performing (graded "D"). The author's evaluation hints at a general failure of international development politics. Lees states that "thirty years [after the Brandt Reports] on, international relations theory has

chosen to ignore the Brandt Line" (Lees 2011, p. 1), while the divide between North and South continues to "form one of the central cleavages in the international system" (ibid.).

3 Implications of the North-South Dichotomy for Current Policy Making

The ignorance of the Brandt Line constitutes a growing threat to stability for both Global North and South. In this part we will point out the divide's implications for today's political landscape.

Quilligan concludes that the economic system seeks "global wealth without globalization of benefits" and understands globalization short as "global privatization," resulting in the determining question of "who wants to be the lender of the last resort?" (Quilligan 2002, p. 33). Latin America's crisis in the 1980s, Asia's foreign direct investment crisis in the late 1990s, and the global financial breakdown of 2007–2008, to mention just a few, undermine the legitimacy of the Brandt Commission's claims for a more inclusive and balanced global economic system.

Especially as to how the global threat of climate change and the challenge of attaining a sustainable development as defined by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals[2] are concerned, global cooperation has proven to be indispensable. Ignorance of the North-South Divide leads to even more ineffective policy outcomes because only consideration of all the diverging needs and interests linked to this issue will bring about the desired solution. As the first Brandt Report emphasizes:

> the strain on the global environment derives mainly from the growth of the industrial economies, but also from that of the world population. It threatens the survival and development opportunities of future generations. All nations have to cooperate more urgently in international management of the atmosphere and other global commons, and in the prevention of irreversible ecological damage. (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 148)

The first and the second Brandt Reports both conceptualize climate change and environmental politics. The first report dedicates a chapter entitled "Population-Growth, Mobility and Environment" to environmental concerns. The second report stresses a need to coordinate food and energy production of all countries, taking into account different needs from a global perspective (Brandt 1983). Sanwal argues that "disproportionate burdens on the global ecosystem require a policy focus not only on globalized material flows and related scarcity but also on the social, economic, and environmental systems that structure society's use and distribution of natural resources" (Sanwal 2015, p. 211). Strong reiterates that a "unifying theme of all commissions [on North-South and development issues] is that growing global

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[2]See official website of the UN SDGs https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ accessed on 9 September 2018.

interdependence needs now, as never before, a high level of international cooperation" (Strong 1993, p. 306).

When the environment emerged as a new political priority during the 1980s, several authors identified it as an area of North-South confrontation (Hurrell and Kingsburry 1993) but the environmental debate above all diluted the "distinctive character of Third World collective interests" (Thérien 1999, p. 726). The Brundtland Commission did recognize that "developing countries (...) endure most of the poverty associated with environmental degradation" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, part IV, p. 103); "but its chief message was that environmental challenges are characterized first and foremost by their "integrated and interdependent nature"" (Thérien 1999, p. 726). While characterized as a North-South confrontation, the environment also constituted the opportunity for North and South to come together around a common concern, as illustrated by Richard Sandbrook before the Brundtland Commission: "it has not been too difficult to push the environment lobby of the North and the development lobby of the South together. (...) they are coming to have a common consensus around the theme of sustainable development" (WCOED 1987, p. 64).

Global debates over the distribution of resources forged the concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (see UNFCCC 2015; United Nations 1998). Analogous to this approach, the Kyoto Protocol distinguished the degree of responsibilities and legally binding targets through a distinction between Annex B and Non-Annex countries which generally corresponds to North and South as defined by the Brandt Line (United Nations 1998). While this distinction represented an attempt to distribute costs of climate change and development justly, the respective responsibilities defined in the Kyoto Protocol did not balance out the unjust distribution of real damages and losses the South faced due to climatic and developmental conditions. In the Paris Agreement, the Brandt Line was dissolved with Nationally Determined Contributions that would leave flexibility for each country to define thresholds according to its capacity and necessity.

In theory, when two parties depend upon a common ground that finds itself in danger, the logical assumption is that they will both work toward saving their own and consequently their common survival. Unfortunately, awareness of the mutual dependency in issues related to climate protection is not very high. Landes and Porcher (2015) argue that the choice of a threshold of 2 °C in international climate negotiations condemns island states to suffer from severe land loss and is a reflection of unequal power relations (p. 16), again pointing to a divide between policy objectives of the North and the South. The authors go even further and claim that, contrary to a logical supposition of jointly protecting a common public good like the climate, leaders and executives choose to deny climate change and give it only secondary attention (ibid.).

If we look at the debates around sustainable development in particular, the importance of issues varies across North and South, influenced by factors such as economic wealth and development stage but also geographic and climatic conditions. As Bo Kjellén described the negotiations toward the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), countries from the South (mainly African

countries), which are directly affected by desertification and droughts caused by a rise in temperatures, faced a certain reluctance from the North. The latter were more interested in the protection of their own biospheres, such as forests, for example (Kjellén 2008). After long negotiations, the convention was established, in 1994, as a legally binding international agreement, aiming to achieve "Land Degradation Neutrality"[3] but its implementation is still far from being accomplished.

Sylvia Karlsson points out a dimension of the North-South Divide with important implications for sustainable development. She claims that an existing global knowledge divide between South and North reinforces power structures in international negotiations, since the South often lacks scientific data to back up the arguments necessary for the defense of its interests (Karlsson 2002). Karlsson advocates for assisting the Global South in developing resources for native research and development, fostering partnerships between Northern and Southern research and teaching institutions, and encouraging Northern researchers to include the South in their research designs. Beyond Karlsson's recommendations, the idea of transfers as pronounced in the Brandt Reports has proven unfeasible and thus unsuccessful in alleviating the North-South Divide. While technological and financial transfers in particular constitute a crucial part of the negotiations and implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as Deputy Executive Director of the Green Climate Fund, Javier Manzanares admits transfers are still not sufficiently executed (Manzanares 2018).

Landes and Porcher (2015) argue that the blind confidence in market mechanisms has proven to be ineffective in leading to sustainable development. Moreover, ineffective policies counteract sustainability efforts vividly illustrated by the fact that fossil fuel energy companies received subsidies 20 times the entire investments in renewable energies in 2014 (Landes and Porcher 2015, p. 27). This reiterates the aforementioned discourse about the ineffectiveness of the Bretton Woods paradigm to solve the world's development issues (see Thérien 1999). By now, finance institutions of South-South cooperation (such as BRICS Bank, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, or Silk Road Bank) apply different concepts of development cooperation as traditional North-South development finance institutions (like the IMF or World Bank) which might eventually constitute a positive leverage for sustainability (Cui 2016).

As alternatives to transfers we propose bottom-up initiatives incentivizing innovation, research, and entrepreneurship. Incentivizing entrepreneurship has the potential to help attain various Sustainable Development Goals at a time. Above all, entrepreneurship can help local actors strengthen their autonomy and lead to improved local networks that benefit communities and that can adapt to local needs. Furthermore, we advocate for increased sharing of experiences and lessons learning especially in hindsight of capacity building for the South (Rose 1991; see also chapter "'Glocal' Public Policy in Times of Global Migration" in this volume). The South-South Dialogue remarked that "a major weakness of the South (. . .) had

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[3]See https://www.unccd.int/convention/about-convention accessed on 9 September 2018.

been the lack of an appropriate organizational framework to provide adequate and sustained technical support to Southern policymakers and negotiators" (South-South Dialogue 1979). In addition, the South itself recognized that the responsibility for its development lies essentially with them and their own efforts (South-South Dialogue 1979; Strong 1993, p. 310). While the adjustment of international treaties and terms of trade would be highly beneficial to bridge the North-South Divide, it is also highly unlikely to succeed. Even a change of terms of trade is no longer sufficient but rather a global transition toward trade, production, and consumption patterns that favor sustainability has become indispensable. Such a transition would necessarily embrace the global substitution of GDP as an indicator for development and progress (see Landes and Porcher 2015, p. 48; Stiglitz et al. 2009).

Perhaps Brandt's most emblematic vision was to maintain "the earth in balance." In the first Brandt Report, the Commission writes that while "the divide between North and South (. . .) has not been noticed as a decisive driving factor of the Global Crisis," "humanity is slowly realizing how (. . .) in one world economy, South and North depend upon each other" (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 41). There should be, on the one hand, efforts at international level and, on the other hand, internal political and economic reforms in order to reach a more balanced world order (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 160). Both the Northern and Southern perspectives have their relevance and implications on how to solve global poverty and respond to the sustainability challenge. As a conclusion, we have to ask "whether or not *this* generation and the *next* (. . .) can come to terms with the political realities of an economically divided North-South world?"(Amuzegar 1976, p. 549) and, if the answer is no, how will we come to common terms?

4   Conclusion

This contribution attempts to take the Brandt Reports as a thematic reference point in order to develop converging worldviews. It attempts to make a contribution to bridging the knowledge divide as mentioned by Sylvia Karlsson by taking on perspectives from both North and South. A central question remains: What do the Brandt Reports imply for today's policy making? As demonstrated, ignoring the Brandt Line jeopardizes development policy objectives, in particular the fulfillment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. While there has been some convergence between North and South, a number of issues maintain the North-South Divide, such as (to mention only one example) interests and decisions related to climate change adaptation and mitigation. The ultimate goal of the North-South Dialogue is to achieve cooperation on issues that are of common interest to the entire world community. The knowledge divide and the inequality between the amount of data on "South"- and "North"-related affairs should be reduced in order to make respective policy decisions on a more equal basis. Instead of a focus on research transfers as pronounced by the Brandt Commission, the authors advocate for bottom-up initiatives that foster entrepreneurship and local development. In the spirit of the

Brandt Reports, public policy should be sensitive to the North-South Divide and act toward a convergence of the two poles as it serves global peace, sustainability, and prosperity.

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Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts

Richard Rose and Caryn Peiffer

1 Introduction

Social scientists offer a multitude of definitions of the word corruption, and there is no agreement on a standard meaning. Without standards for defining these terms, the result is confusion. In countries where the payment of bribes for public services is not a matter of everyday life, the academic conclusion may be that the term is useless or even that there is no such thing as corruption. But it is a luxury to ignore corruption in countries where the illegal payment of money to get access to public services can affect millions of people who rely on government to deliver education, health care, and personal security. Corruption can also affect the award of government contracts worth billions to those private enterprises and multinational corporations that benefit (Rose and Peiffer 2019).

How the process of governance is evaluated reflects the standards used to define corruption, as well as how public officials behave. When ordinary Russians describe politicians as corrupt, they usually have in mind officials abusing their public office for private gains that can be worth billions of rubles. When Britons refer to politicians as corrupt, they often have in mind behavior that would be unacceptable among friends, such as making misleading statements. When dictators in poor countries are accused of corruption by taking money in return for awarding public contracts to private enterprises owned by their relatives, they may claim they are

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simply following their country's traditional practice of supporting their extended family.

The first challenge of public policy is to define corruption in a sufficiently clear way that it can be used to diagnose the abuse of public authority and, where this is a problem, to make policy prescriptions to reduce corruption that wastes money and deprives citizens of benefits to which they are entitled by law. Making the definition of a concept relative to national context or loading it up with a dozen or more different meanings risks stretching it to the point at which it is no longer scientifically useful.

To compare good and bad governance in countries around the world today, a definition of corruption is needed that goes beyond accepting that whatever is done in a given national context is internationally acceptable. It is even more needed by intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, which annually spends many billions in trying to improve economic and social conditions in countries in which its efforts can be frustrated when its money is wasted and spent corruptly.

2 Corruption: A Word with Many Meanings

Corruption is a behavioral relationship between governors and governed. A narrow definition of governance is that it is about relations within government between principals, who decide what government institutions do, and public officials who act as their agents in the process of governance (cf. Peters and Pierre 2004). While these relationships are important for high-level politics, this focus ignores how public officials deal with the great mass of citizens living outside the national capital. Institutions provide the laws, money, and public employees that produce public services, while governance determines the experience that ordinary people have when they deal with officials delivering these services. These outputs include both the "good," goods of public policy, such as education and health care, and necessary but not always welcome services, such as court judgments.

Corruption differs in impact between capital-intensive goods that cost many millions to produce and public services that are retail in scale because they are relatively cheap to provide, such as birth certificates. Services also differ in who is involved. Capital-intensive activities such as building bridges or producing military aircraft involve a relatively small number of corporations that have the resources needed to produce such expensive high-tech goods. In countries where bureaucratic standards are weak, the prospect of big profits is an incentive for enterprises to offer big bribes for contracts and for groups of high-ranking politicians to accept them. Government negotiation of contracts for capital-intensive goods is handled over the heads of ordinary people.

Ordinary people are directly involved in retail services delivered by public employees based in schools, clinics, and other public agencies in their community. Public officials have the power to decide whether or not a person is entitled to receive a desired service or excused from meeting an obligation. Bureaucratic laws and

regulations set out in detail the procedures that public officials ought to follow when deciding whether a person is entitled or obligated to receive a service. The extent to which officials have discretion varies greatly between services. The decision about whether a woman is pregnant involves objective tests. A decision about whether a person has a mental illness entitling him or her to receive a disability benefit in cash or kind leaves officials with substantial discretion.

To describe governance in positivist language as the normal way in which public officials relate to citizens can be taken to mean that the way public officials usually behave is how they ought to behave. In countries where good governance tends to prevail, this can be a distinction without a difference. However, where officials often do not behave as they ought to, a positivist definition ignores the normative difference between good and bad governance. Where corruption is persisting, a behavioral characterization may interpret activities that appear corrupt by international standards as an equilibrium maintained by the holders of power delivering policies that benefit themselves and their supporters and that are accepted with resignation by people who lack the political influence to promote good governance (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).

Socially Constructed Definitions The meaning of corruption cannot be determined by citing whatever is recorded in a dictionary. It is socially constructed according to the context in which it is used and the normative standards of those using the term; these standards tend to differ between social scientists, journalists, and ordinary people. Review articles chronicle many different contemporary uses of the word (Kurer 2015). The number of meanings increases greatly when comparisons are made across time and space (see, e.g., Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002, Part One).

The English word corruption is derived from the Latin *corrumpere*, something that fails to meet a particular standard. A computer program can be described as corrupt if it does not meet the standard set by the computer's operating system. Corruption has a family of meanings with a degree of kinship; it also has family disputes. Because corruption invariably has negative connotations, it tends to be used as a synonym for bad governance.

Contemporary social science favors reducing the meaning of corruption to a single numerical scale that makes corruption a matter of degree. The scale can then be used in quantitative statistical analyses testing theories of the causes and consequences of corruption. This ignores the need to name things before counting them or assigning them numbers. A legal approach divides activities into two categories, those that are corrupt and those that are not. It relies on written texts that specify illegal practices in the delivery of public services. The only numbers employed are those used in enumerating the clauses of a law. Transparency International's definition of corruption is "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (www.transparency.org). Its anti-corruption glossary lists 60 entries with different examples of corruption; doing so undermines the concept of having a clear and consistent meaning. Yet the significance of corruption for governance means that it cannot be abandoned.

We stipulate corruption as having two fundamental criteria: the violation of formal bureaucratic standards and the violation of informal normative standards about how public officeholders ought to behave. Formal bureaucratic standards are

set out in laws and regulations. Violations of these standards can be assessed through normal legal processes and enforced by courts. Informal standards are norms about how governors ought to behave. These standards are "soft" laws. They are social psychological expectations held in the mind rather than recorded in statute books. If there is a consensus within a society that a public official has broken an informal standard, then he or she can be punished for corrupt behavior in the court of public opinion. A single political action can violate both standards.

When both formal and informal standards of political behavior are weak or lacking, then politicians decide for themselves how to behave. The breakdown of the Soviet Union led to the transformation of communist societies by behavior that appeared corrupt to Western advisors but was justified on the grounds of the "primacy of surviving by mutual social favours" (Sajo 2002, p. 2; cf. Rose 2009, Chap. 5). An economic theory based on the premise that individuals pursue their own self-interest can lead to public officials profiting surreptitiously from the sale of state-owned assets such as oil or diamonds or even "stealing the state" by transferring assets to a new breakaway entity that they control (Solnick 1998). Doing whatever is necessary to ensure survival is especially relevant in countries engaged in internal war. In the absence of a state with the effective power to enforce any standards, the optimal outcome is, in the words of an economist, "efficient predatory behavior in a lawless world" (Dabla-Norris 2002).

To describe the behavior of public officials as corrupt, there must be laws formally setting standards that public officials ought to apply impartially when making decisions. In other words, public officials should behave like bureaucrats in a modern state (Weber 1947). If they do not, then their behavior is corrupt. In a political system that has not adopted the bureaucratic rules of a modern state, corruption in this sense cannot exist. If an official shows favoritism in appointing relatives and friends to public jobs for which they are not qualified, in a given political system, such patronage may be considered normal. If an official is given money after delivering a benefit to an individual or waiving an obligation, in the absence of a law making this illegal, it is not bribery. Anthropologists describe this as a customary act of gratitude and economists as a rational transaction in which you get what you pay for.

Only by importing modern standards can customary behavior be described as corrupt. The introduction of bureaucratic institutions challenges the customary application of particularistic standards in which who you are and who you know are important to getting public services. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015, p. 24) describes particularism as acceptable behavior in societies in which people expect officials with whom they share identities to favor their own kind. In the words of an Indian anthropologist (Gupta 1995, p. 397), "a highly placed official who fails to help a close relative or fellow villager obtain a government position is often roundly criticized by people for not fulfilling his obligations to his kinsmen and village brothers." Although favoritism involves officials abusing bureaucratic standards, it is done not in exchange for money but as an expression of solidarity ties with those whom they favor.

Even if an action does not break a law, if it violates an informal normative standard of behavior, it can be labeled corrupt in the court of public opinion. Public

officials tend to be held to higher normative standards than people in charge of private sector enterprises in which making money is the standard that matters most. They are also held to higher standards than entertainment celebrities who shamelessly seek attention and judge their behavior according to the publicity that they gain.

Taking both legal and normative standards into account creates four different ways of evaluating whether public officials can be described as acting corruptly. Ideally, public services should be delivered in keeping with bureaucratic standards that stipulate under what conditions individuals are or are not entitled to receive a social benefit or obligated to comply with regulations. There is also informal agreement that impartiality, treating people in like circumstances in the same way, is the right way to behave. When these two criteria are met, the outcome meets both standards of good governance. By contrast, a system of governance is doubly corrupt if officeholders violate laws for their own advantage and their behavior is inconsistent with the normative values of a society.

When legal and normative definitions produce conflicting assessments, calling something corrupt is in dispute. Behavior that is illegal may be tolerated when legal standards are inconsistent with informal practices of a society. For example, laws that define speeding at a level that most drivers think is below that needed to ensure safe driving are regularly violated. Traffic police are expected to tolerate speeding on an empty road if this does not create the danger of an accident. The violation of a law can also be informally tolerated if it is regarded as a relic of out-of-date moral standards, for example, a law making same-sex relations illegal. In a country in which an authoritarian government represses critics, breaking repressive laws may be deemed a desirable weapon of subjects whose legal resources for opposition are weak.

Even if a public officially acts in accord with the law, their actions can informally be assessed as corrupt by informal normative standards. A governing party may accept a substantial sum of money from a business that acts in accord with laws about party finance that are written by politicians who benefit most from the loopholes that they contain. By definition this action is legal. However, if the government adds a special clause in a tax law that favors its financial donors, this will appear corrupt by the informal standards of public opinion. Likewise, politicians can be described as behaving shamefully if they proclaim standards in public and violate them in private, for example, emphasizing the importance of everyone paying taxes while sheltering their own income in a bank in a country with regulations that protect from exposure the bribes they receive.

Because corruption is a political issue, standards are often objects of political dispute. Politicians have the rhetorical skills to argue that accusations against them for corruption are false facts made up by their partisan opponents. Lawyers have professional skills to get a court to rule that there is nothing illegal in the way a politician has violated informal standards of behavior by taking money from a big business in exchange for favors. Even if evidence of breaking informal standards is acknowledged, if this does not lead to a conviction in a court of law, a politician can

argue that a formal investigation has cleared him or her of blame and dismiss charges as politically motivated.

The multiple meanings of corruption are increased by the term being stretched to describe as wrong anything that a person does not like. However, as more and more activities are labeled corrupt, the umbrella term becomes a vast shopping mall offering so many different definitions that the word loses any meaning.

3 Social Scientists Differ in Explaining Corruption

The variety of issues raised by corruption requires an interdisciplinary approach, but social scientists are divided into disciplines with different intellectual frameworks and methods. This results in a plurality of explanations that give priority to the assumptions of a single discipline rather than an integrated explanation. The following paragraphs review different propositions about major causes of how corruption varies between countries and within a country, between individuals. Discussing each explanation separately for purposes of exposition does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. A multiplicity of explanations may be empirically significant; however, the scale of their impact on corruption can differ substantially.

The history of a country is a given, and decisions and practices institutionalized in the past have created formal and informal procedures that influence governance today. This makes it difficult for reforms to alter established routines by enacting new laws. When international aid agencies seek to reduce corruption in developing countries by introducing legal and bureaucratic institutions, they have often met resistance from national political elites benefiting from traditional practices inconsistent with contemporary bureaucratic standards.

Theories of path dependence explain the persistence of both good and bad forms of governance (Pierson 2004). The persistence of a low level of corruption in Northern Europe is explained as a consequence of a nineteenth-century history in which structural changes in traditional methods of administration were replaced by bureaucratic institutions. What Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) has called "becoming Denmark," that is, achieving a high standard of governance, was a very lengthy process. Countries that began socializing public officials into bureaucratic practices long before mass welfare state services were introduced should therefore be low in corruption. By contrast, if major social benefits were introduced while traditional customs such as clientelism were still practiced, this can account for a government being deemed corrupt today. Historical differences can create a stable equilibrium that maintains good governance in Scandinavia and corrupt governance in places such as the successor states of the Soviet Union (cf. Hellman 1998).

Theories of political culture explain the presence of good or bad governance as a consequence of collective norms. Each new generation is socialized into a common understanding about how government works and the standards that adults ought to apply in their relations with public officials. Insofar as this happens, people regard the way in which government works as normal in both the behavioral and the

normative senses. Since cultural norms develop in a particular national and historical context, what is regarded as normal in South Africa can be different from what is regarded as normal in Sweden. In a country with relatively good governance, people are prepared to wait patiently in a queue for a service or to accept a refusal to provide it as fair, and cases of corruption are seen as exceptions to the rule. By contrast, in a culture where favoritism and bribery are regarded as a fact of life, behavior that appears corrupt by universalistic standards appears normal (cf. Persson et al. 2013; Manzetti and Wilson 2007).

Institutional theorists reject the idea of classical philosophers that the absence of individual virtue is the primary cause of corruption. Any tendency of politicians or their agents to practice corruption needs to be subject to monitoring by an independent audit office, an independent legal team with the power to prosecute those who break laws, and courts with the power to enforce laws against corruption. Theories of democratic institutions explain the absence of corruption as due to free elections giving voters the power to decide who governs. If the principals of a democratic government tolerate corruption, voters have an opportunity to vote them out of office. In anticipation of the threat of losing office, governors are expected to resist opportunities to abuse their powers for personal gain (cf. Potter and Tavits 2011).

Theories of sociology explain governance relationships as reflecting social status. Who you are and how you are perceived by others affect the way in which you are treated by public officials. Class differences in individual income and education may result in people of higher social status being more likely to experience good governance and those lower down the social ladder being bullied to pay bribes. People can protect themselves from the effect of corruption in a particular public service by having no contact with it. Individuals without children are not at risk of corruption in education because they have no children in school. However, older people are vulnerable to corruption in the health service because they cannot do without health care.

Social psychologists stress that expectations that people have about how they will be treated when seeking a public service explain how they behave. Expectations about how government ought to work and perceptions of how public officials actually behave can cue people to respond in opposing ways. People would like to experience good governance but may perceive political institutions as corrupt. If this is the case, they will be more ready to understand hints from public officials asking for bribes as a condition of giving them what they want.

In political economy it is a given assumption that economic conditions affect how a country is governed (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2011). However, this leaves open what specific features of an economy are important. A high correlation between a country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and its rating on the Corruption Perceptions Index is often interpreted to mean that the more prosperous a country is, the lower its level of corruption. However, when gross domestic product per capita is included in a multivariate statistical analysis testing potential determinants of national-level corruption, it fails to achieve statistical significance (Rose and Peiffer 2015, Table 6.2). Moreover, there are good theoretical reasons for interpreting economic prosperity as a consequence rather than a cause of a low level of corruption (cf. Lambsdorff 2007, p. 72ff). Freedom from corruption can

boost economic growth. Enterprises can invest with confidence because they are not harassed by public officials administering economic regulations in ways that are inefficient and arbitrary and require the payment of bribes.

There are theoretical reasons for expecting specific economic conditions to encourage corruption. The national government of a country rich in natural resources will enjoy a large inflow of money from multinational corporations wanting to extract its resources and export them at a profit. Corrupt governors may demand large payments be made to their private bank accounts overseas in exchange for giving them permission to do so. Moreover, in a country that is at a low level of economic development, foreign aid becomes a very important source of national income, and governors may want to divert a proportion of foreign aid for their private benefit, thus reducing the amount available to invest in actions of public benefit such as building roads and hospitals.

Rational choice economic theories disregard normative values; they assume that individuals are self-interested actors ready to pay for what they want. Where there is a choice between providers, people do not have to wait indefinitely in a queue or pay a bribe to receive what may be an inferior service. Instead, they may turn to an alternative provider, whether a not-for-profit or a profit-making enterprise, if they can afford to do so. Since many public services are monopolies, in a system of bad governance, the only choice that individuals may have is that of paying a bribe or going without a service they want. In such circumstances, a simple cost-benefit calculation can determine whether a bribe is paid.

A public policy explanation emphasizes that differences between services are important in determining whether a service is more or less likely to involve corruption. Collective goods such as military defense and the rate of inflation affect every individual and institution in a society. In the language of economics, collective goods are non-excludable, because everyone in the population is included in their impact (Samuelson 1954). Since this is the case, the officials making collective goods decisions cannot collect a bribe from individuals wanting to avoid their effects. Since every citizen shares in the risks of modern war, the only way in which a person can avoid this is to leave the country.

Although there are lots of theories offering explanations of corruption, there is limited statistical testing of the extent to which their hypotheses are supported by empirical analysis. One reason is that many do not specify clear testable links between cause and effect. Relatedly, many forms of corruption are portrayed as part of a complex syndrome of bad governance (Johnston 2014). Case studies of villages by anthropologists or of corrupt behavior by elites can be insightfully drawn from firsthand observation. However, narrowly focused case studies are often not fitted into a broader theoretical framework. Testing alternative theories of corruption requires comparable data about variations in national context, individual attributes, and different types of public services (see Rose and Peiffer 2019, Chaps. 3–5).

Capital-intensive corruption differs between continents and within, as shown by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International.[1] In

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[1] See https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi accessed on July 15, 2018.

Fig. 1 Big variations in corruption within every continent. Sources: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 176 countries, 2016. Anglo-American countries: New Zealand, 90; Canada, 82; Australia, 79; and the United States, 74. As reported in Rose and Peiffer (2019, Fig. 3.1)

recognition of uncertainties about the reliability and validity of any single source of evidence, the CPI uses multiple sources with different ways of making up its composition rating of a country. It places each country on a scale ranging from 0 to 100; this permits a far greater degree of differentiation than sorting countries into two categories, those that are corrupt and those that are not. Of the 176 countries assessed in the 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, Denmark and New Zealand have the highest rating, 90, while Somalia is lowest, 10. There is a tendency for bad governance to be more common; the median country has a CPI rating of 38, significantly closer to the most corrupt country than to the highest-rated country.

Comparing countries around the globe shows that generalizing about corruption in countries grouped according to geography or culture is misleading (Fig. 1). Variations in national context within continents are greater than differences between the mean ratings of continents. In Asia there is a spread of 72 points between Singapore and North Korea.

Asian values are neither conducive to corruption nor to high levels of integrity (Fukuyama 2001). African ratings likewise reject generalizations about continent-wide African cultural values (Ekeh 1975), because there is a range of 50 points between the CPI ratings of Botswana and Somalia. The range between countries in Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is likewise large. Soviet Union show the least variation around a mean of 31 points, with Georgia high

at 57 and Uzbekistan low at 21 points. This reflects their lengthy common experience of being governed by Communist principles rather than bureaucratic procedures.

High CPI ratings are not confined exclusively to countries with European values and culture. Among European Union countries, there is a spread of 49 points between the highest-ranking country, Denmark and Bulgaria, and 46 points between Denmark and Greece. Singapore has a better CPI rating than 24 member states of the European Union. Of the 68 countries that have a better rating than the lowest EU member states, 32 are developing or newly developed countries from outside Europe and the Anglo-American world.

There are also big differences in the risk of an individual paying a bribe. Contact is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this to happen. During the year more citizens have contact with the output side of politics, public services, than with the input side, voting for MPs. On every continent almost three-quarters annually have contact with at least one major service. Notwithstanding big differences in the economic capacity of governments, the extent of contact differs very little across continents. The average ranges from 78% in Asia to 69% in formerly communist EBRD countries.

Aggregate labeling of countries as corrupt implies that virtually everyone there who contacts public services pays a bribe. However, this is not the case, according to the evidence of the Global Corruption Barometer survey of 155,122 individual respondents in 122 countries around the globe (see Rose and Peiffer 2019, Chap. 4). The payment of bribes is confined to a minority of people. In West European countries, an average of only 2% reported paying a bribe in the past year. At an average level of 23% paying a bribe annually, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the region with the highest percentage of bribe payers, with Asia close behind at 21%. Yet even where bribery is high, it is the annual experience of less than half the population. Among the 73 countries surveyed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, there were only four—Haiti, India, Vietnam, and Liberia—in which a majority of respondents reported paying a bribe in the past year. On average, the Global Corruption Barometer found that bribery affects 18% of a country's population each year (Fig. 2).

Conventional geographical categories group together countries with very different levels of grassroots bribery. The gap is greatest in Asia, a difference of almost 61 percentage points between India and Vietnam compared to Japan. It is least among the 15 old member states of the European Union, where the range is just under 7% between Greece and two Nordic states, Sweden and Finland. In the new EU member states, the legacy of communism increases bribery, rising to 22% in Lithuania but as low as 2% in Slovenia.

Bribery varies between services too. Generalizations about corruption in public services imply that bribery is much the same for every service. This is not the case. The 2016 Global Corruption Barometer found that bribes are most often paid for the health service and for permits (Table 1). By contrast, the fewest people pay bribes for court services. The chief reason is that far fewer people have, or want to have, contact with the courts than with health and education. Controlling for contact gives a different rank order. Among people who contact the service, almost one-quarter pay bribes to the courts and to the police. The apparent high level of bribery for

Fig. 2 Bribery varies between and within continents. Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2016, as reported in Rose and Peiffer (2019, Fig. 4.3)

Table 1 Bribery for services after controlling for contact (percentages)

	No contact	Contact, no bribe	Contact, bribe	Bribe % contact
Health	42	49	9	16
Education	64	31	5	14
Permits	61	32	7	18
Police	75	19	6	24
Courts	87	10	3	23

Source: Global Corruption Barometer, 2016, as reported in Rose and Peiffer (2019, Chap. 4, Table 2)

health and education services is because these are much needed and used services. After controlling for contact, the percentage of users paying a bribe for health care or education is significantly lower than that of people paying bribes to law enforcement officials.

The more contacts people have with public services, the more likely they are to pay at least one bribe, but the increase is not proportional. Among GCB respondents using one service, 14% pay a bribe. However, when the number of services contacted doubles, the proportion paying a bribe increases by only one-quarter, and when it quadruples, the proportion paying bribes just doubles. Among heavy users of public services, the median respondent paid a bribe for only one service (see Rose and Peiffer 2015, Fig. 4.4).

Altogether, the experience that individuals have when contacting grassroots officials reflects a combination of three sets of influences: differences between people, between national contexts, and between specific public services (Rose and Peiffer 2019; Chap. 5). The need to contact public services such as education differs with stages in an individual's life cycle. The institutions that deliver these services differ in their national history and contemporary context. Differences between public services such as health care and policing affect whether an individual pays a bribe for one service but not another.

4   Reducing Corruption

Politicians who win control of the government with a promise to get rid of corruption are tempted to believe that their victory removes all the obstacles that are a legacy from their predecessors. However, overcoming obstacles to the reform of bad governance requires patience. Corruption in the body politic is a phenomenon that can take many forms. The diagnosis of corruption usually focuses on characteristics that are pervasive throughout the body politic as a whole. Prescriptions based on such a diagnosis do not take into account differences between public services. In order to reduce corruption, each form requires a diagnosis that identifies its distinctive characteristics, which part of the body politic it affects and what its specific causes are. Without doing so, any prescription will tend to fall back on general recommendations that have no specific application to the corrupt delivery of a particular public service.

When individuals and business enterprises pay bribes, they are not paid for public services as a whole. Bribes are paid to obtain a specific public service, and services differ in what is delivered and how much they are vulnerable to corruption. Public services delivered to individuals at the grass roots are vulnerable to bribes being paid far from the sight of policymakers in the national capital. By contrast, capital-intensive services are delivered by decisions about contracts made by high-level policymakers in the national capital.

Capital-intensive goods such as airports and electricity-generating stations are lumpy not only in physical terms but also economically. A large chunk of money is required to construct them. By contrast, retail public services such as a driving license or passport are literally pocket-sized and cheap to produce. The scale of capital-intensive projects makes it difficult for outsiders to evaluate whether paying hundreds of millions or a billion is a fair price to build a dam or a power station or whether it has been inflated to cover the cost of bribes that can be hidden behind opaque entries in a lengthy and complex budget. The individuals who make the decisions that commit their government to approve contracts paying millions to a private enterprise do not bear the cost. It is met from tax revenue and borrowing; in developing countries foreign aid can also bear a portion of the cost.

The supply of many capital-intensive goods is globalized, because of the amount of capital and technical skills required to produce such goods as military aircraft or

Table 2 Nine principles for reducing retail corruption

Repeal unnecessary laws, regulations, and processes that facilitate the collection of bribes
Increase the use of objective criteria for deciding eligibility for receiving services
Use computers to reduce citizens having to come into contact with public officials
Monitor entitlements and the delivery of services electronically
Give citizens easy access to public records about themselves
Supply services at a level that matches what citizens are entitled to and what the state is obligated to provide
Give citizens a publicly funded choice between obtaining a service from state and non-state organizations
Legalize payments for some public services
Align public laws with informal standards

Source: Summarized from Rose and Peiffer (2019, Chap. 9)

complex computer systems. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations promote codes of conduct that stigmatize transnational corruption. But such codes normally lack legal sanctions, and any notional reputation loss an enterprise incurs for shadowy dealings is more than offset by the profits from getting big-buck contracts. When capital-intensive corruption is transnational, this makes it difficult for a single national government to prevent it. Business enterprises determined to win contracts if need be by hook or by crook can pay bribes to foreign bank accounts of consultancy firms or family members acting as agents of corrupt policymakers in other countries. Anglo-American countries have adopted laws making it illegal for multinational corporations based on their jurisdiction to pay bribes to foreign government officials and imposing large fines as and when such behavior is revealed. National and intergovernmental aid agencies providing grants to finance capital-intensive projects have the right to monitor how aid money is spent and, if the political will is there, to suspend payments if evidence of corruption is revealed.

At the grass roots, the most effective way to reduce corruption is not by local protests but by national policymakers using their formal powers to disrupt laws and institutions that give corrupt local officials opportunities to use their public office for private gain. Table 2 sets out nine principles for reducing corruption in the retail delivery of services at the grass roots. Given the differences between services, some will apply to multiple services, and some services will be vulnerable to attack in more than one way.

Applying principles to reduce grassroots corruption does not require a change in the hearts and minds of public officials. Doing require such things as removing the need to pay bribes to some public officials by abolishing their post. Face-to-face contacts between claimants and officials can be eliminated by introducing computers that enable individuals to get what they want by the online completion of forms that follow bureaucratic rules consistent with good governance. Onerous laws and regulations requiring permits and licenses that give officials opportunities to collect

bribes can be repealed. Such actions not only reduce opportunities for bribery but also increase the efficiency and ease of using public services.

Breaking the low-level equilibrium trap that maintains a national economy at a subsistence level requires disruptive action to start a progressive process of improvements (Hirschman 1963). A strategy to disrupt corruption requires policymakers to make a visible and substantial change that can establish a political momentum leading to more changes. A bonfire of unpopular regulations that low-level public officials may use to extract bribes from ordinary people nationwide can stimulate public support. Introducing online services that people can access using free apps on their mobile phones cuts out public officials entirely. To be effective, disruptive changes must be targeted at particular services. Doing so will not bring about across-the-board abolition of corruption in all services in a world in which bribery is the price that 1.8 billion people pay each year for access to public services. Any actions that reduce bribery and increase the quality of public services are better than no progress, and removing the burden of bribery from 10% of those who now pay bribes will benefit 180 million people annually.

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"Glocal" Public Policy in Times of Global Migration

Anja Mihr

1   Introduction

In December of 2018, 164 UN Member States formally adopted the UN Global Compact on Refugees and Migrants. Many member states abtained due to domestic struggles and politics. This compact was one of many that the UN had initiated to address global challenges on migration over the past decades. This non-binding agreement had come into place as an urgent precondition for a global legal and politically binding treaty among all UN member states in 2018 and one that would deal with one of the world's most critical emerging challenges: how to handle and govern mass migration in the twenty-first century (Hurrel 2008). Migration is one of the most urgent global public policy issues, which differs from other global challenges such as climate change and cybersecurity because mass migration can be directly traced back to bad governance and ineffective (domestic) public policy regimes.[1] Thus, there is a level of state accountability that is directly linked to global governance (Held 2005). During mass migration, people are driven from their homes and communities by crises ranging from conflict, poverty, and drought. These mass migrations are often a direct result of governments and the decisions of policy makers in the affected countries.

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[1]The root causes for migration can range from climate change-induced migration, overpopulation and bad distribution of resources, poverty, labor situation for young people, war and conflict, ethnic, religious- and faith-based disputes, career options and social status, and female marriage migration due to male surplus—just to mention a few. But to tackle them, one has to include these people and the way and level on which this can be done, depending on the legal status of migrants, whether they are legal, illegal, documented, undocumented, labor, refugee, or slave.

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In this context, "glocal" public policy means to develop global norms for dealing with migration and to convert them into domestic and community-based policies, for example, when adapting the norms of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990 (2003), in domestic policies. Glocal public policy refers, on the one side, to a set of global norms and agreements generally defined by UN bodies, such as human rights and international law,[2] and on the other side local policy processes which aim to implement these norms and also deal with the consequences of migration at the end of the migration trail, namely, by providing adequate housing, health, work, education, and other forms of social and political inclusion measures. Therefore, glocal policy decisions often include international organizations on the one side and city mayors and councils on the other side. They also impact (local) private companies and their management decisions and civil society organizations (CSOs). They all are stakeholders of glocal policies on the international or global level. These are, among many more, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which all are part of the glocal policy regime dealing with different aspects of migration.

Referring to the commonly agreed UN definition, an international migrant is a person who has been living and working in a country other than his or her country of birth for over 3 years. Such a person is also defined by domicile or domestic state policies and principle (citizenship), meaning that someone who is not a citizen of the country in which he or she resides is considered a migrant (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs International Migration Report 2015). As highlighted above, a migrant can be an expatriate, a refugee, or an asylum seeker. However, although there are universal as well as different domestic and local norms and standards differentiating refugees, asylum seekers, or labor migrants, those standards are being dramatically modified and adapted by governments according to their own political or economic interests and popular mode. In other words, how a migrant is defined and what rights he or she may enjoy are in the hands of state governments and, as such, are part of the domestic public policy processes overall. However, this is dramatically changing at the time of mass migration, and the urge for global norms that are binding for domestic and local policy makers is rising.

Regardless of the root causes for migration and the level of responsibility that policy makers bear, all migrants share a common key characteristic, whereby they all leave one place for another (often to a destination abroad) and are thus uniting (foreign) governments in a common struggle to handle new settlements and mass migration of people—in particular transborder migration. Therefore, global migration impacts both domestic and local politics and policies, on the one side; and migration flows change global and international norms and standards, such as UN norms, by definition, on the other side. This makes migration today more "glocal"

[2]UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/CMWIndex.aspx (Accessed December 2017).

than ever. Hence, the endeavor to find the best modes to govern migration and peoples' mobility subsequently unites nations, countries, and governments as well as private and corporate actors such as civil society organization (CSOs) and businesses on local and global levels. This is where multilevel (i.e., agreements between international organizations and domestic and local governments) and multi-stakeholder governance approaches (i.e., agreements between governments, CSOs, business, and international organizations) shape glocal policy discourses and help to assess the way in which public policy regimes are shaped in light of migration (Mareck 2014).

More than ever, international security and stability are dependent on the capacity of states to manage migration. Conversely, it is almost, by definition, impossible for one government alone to manage or control migration either unilaterally or bilaterally or without the collaboration of local governments, CSOs, or private business (Hollifield 2012, p. 200). Glocal migration policy making is a joint, multilevel, stakeholder governance and policy endeavor. Because of its interdependency, migration policies became a central focus of global governance and public policy-related matters to also apply a multi-stakeholder approach when solving problems (UNDP 2012). This is largely because global challenge-related matters require global norms and standards to act as normative benchmarks and guidelines to set agendas, decide on solutions and pathways forward, and implement policies on national, local, or community levels (Held 2005). Local and community-related policy solutions require the involvement of all stakeholders and actors concerned, private businesses, CSOs, city councils, and mayors.

Consequently, global public policy-related matters, such as migration, can only be effectively dealt with in a glocal, multi-stakeholder, and multilevel governance-based approach. There is also an interlinkage between glocal migration policies and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), because social movements and advocacy groups not only help to assess public policy processes in this matter but also explain why and how glocal regimes. Migration shapes glocal policy processes by the adaptivity or incapacity of domestic policy makers to adapt a broader vision for policy making. The ACF explains how policy making depends on multiple actors and levels of (domestic) government and takes years of policy cycles to turn decisions into outcomes but also include experts, CSOs, and policy specialists. Since governments are part of international organizations, the ACF focuses on the long-term domestic policy change triggered by advocate coalitions, policy learning, belief systems, and political systems; these actors and modes are heavily influenced by global norms, external drivers such as migrations, and regime changes (Sabatier 1988). Therefore, mass migration does impact the outcome of policies within the ACF, as I will argue throughout this chapter.

2 Background

Despite the indisputable struggles to find common and global norms to govern migration that is poverty, gender, climate, and conflict induced, the matter of "legality" and citizenship of people who migrate is in the core of glocal migration policy. To have and be citizen of a country defines status and social well-being. The incoherence of governments on how to integrate and treat refugees and so-called "illegal" or "undocumented" migrants and their families divides governments and even within states on the level of municipalities and their respective policy solutions. The withdrawal of the US government from the migration-related UN compact is just one of many symptoms that show how difficult it is to agree on common global and normative standards on how to treat and deal with migrants at an international level. For example, this can include what legal status they enjoy, whether they are entitled to work and earn their own living, whether they receive language or other skill training, and whether their children have a right to go to school in the new country. Global standards, however, have to give benefits to all people alike regardless of the states they live in. But state policies vary from country to country and not only among those that either deploy—for whatever reasons—migrants abroad, the so-called sending states or countries of origin, because their national gross income often already depends on receiving remittances from those "being sent abroad," for whatever reasons. In 2016 alone, the UN estimated that migrants from developing countries are sending around USD413 billion in remittances home to their families on a regular basis (UN Migration Report 2017, p. 6). And these are only the official estimated numbers of remittances sent by those migrants with legal status in the country of destination. For example, in the USA alone, the estimate is that 11 million undocumented working migrants contribute to the economy in the country—surely without any form of protection or participation—and at the same time, they send millions of dollars to families and communities in their country of origin. Their economic impact and remittances surpass many national budgets, which in exchange, motivates many domestic governments in developing countries to encourage and even force women and men to go (illegally) work abroad instead of providing good education and working conditions in their home country.

Thus, and without a doubt, migration belongs to the top ten global challenges named by all UN member states in line with (1) climate change, (2) cybersecurity and Big Data, (3) health and epidemics, (4) justice and human rights, (6) poverty, (7) gender equality, or (8) food security.[3] However, in comparison to all the other challenges that unite governments and countries to find common glocal solutions, migration is one that triggers often exceptional governmental responses that lead on the one side to new global standards and on the other side to dramatic renationalization and popular nationalistic or state-centric policy outcomes. Therefore, national policies of refusal and to differentiate "valuable" from "unworthy"

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[3]Global Issues overview, 207, UN http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/global-issues-overview/ (Accessed December 2017).

people who may enter a country and seek better life is the rule, not the exception. Even in times in which borders are seen as obstacles to everyone's personal development, building walls and isolation camps in Australia, in Hungary or Macedonia, in Jordan, in Israel, or in the USA and expelling people from Thailand and Myanmar are only the peak of the iceberg but are nevertheless seen as an approbate domestic policy solution to hold back migration—often in light of no better and immediate alternative policy solutions. We have seen how populism, renationalization, and right-wing policies are fueling short-term public policy responses that have led governments in the EU and the USA also to unilaterally withdraw from international regime agreements or compacts. This response is also visible in other related subject matters, for example, mentioning the withdrawal of Burundi from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague and the dramatic expulsion of the minority group of Rohingyas from Myanmar to seek refuge in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and India. Additionally, the US government's withdrawal from the global compact on migration; the refusal of EU member states such as Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to adhere to the EU quota for distributing war refugees from Syria; and the closure of refugee harbors in France and Italy are just some of the many examples of exceptionalism in recent years that illustrate the helplessness of national governments to deal with global challenges (Simmons 2009). This is not due to the lack of global standards but that of different national migration policies.

After the withdrawal of key countries that receive migrants such as the USA, Austria, Italy, Australia and other UN Member State from the compact in 2017 and later in 2018, the chair of the UN General Assembly, Miroslav Lajčák from Slovakia, called upon the other member states to take this and other compacts more seriously and consider migration a global challenge that needs more multilateralism and multi-stakeholder and polycentric governance instead of more national exceptionalism.[4]

But these controversies illustrate the hopelessness of many current domestic public policy regimes if exceptionalism and nationalistic policies are the answers to global challenges. The lack of embracing globalization and all its related areas such as migration, for what it is, is becoming a day-to-day policy reality. Thus, dealing with migration has become one of the core indicators to assess whether and how sustainable and effective public policy regimes are today. And last but not least, it is often the civil society and the electorate in a country that determine how governments change and adapt their migration policies. And it is within this spectrum where we can see the changes for public policy systems.

Herewithin, the core message for this discourse is that global norms determine not only national and domestic policy processes but also local and community ones even in autocratic and more centralistic states such as China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Nigeria—all states that are heavily affected by internal or foreign migration that send and receive migrants. It is in these less or weakly democratic countries in which the multi-stakeholder approach comes into the game of multilevel

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[4]UNGA Resolution, 3 December 2017.

and polycentric policy diplomacy through the back door of autocratic governance practice, showing that this approach can facilitate communication and agreements among the stakeholders, private and public, international and local. Global or international norms and standards also ask for more transparency and accountability from all sides because the multi-stakeholder agreements are usually either public or made public. By doing that, many autocratic countries are forced up to global policy regimes, whether they like it or not. But the core question remains which of the countless and different stakeholders to include in the process of agenda setting and decision-making and later in the implementation and evaluation stages of the domestic, local, or global policy cycle (Aguirre 2006, p. 85). How legitimate are private or autocratic stakeholders versus those that are democratically elected? These questions remain, irrespective of the level of democracy of one's country. In democratic countries, stakeholder organizations of refugees and migrants are more likely to be invited to the table to present their needs and ideas than they are in autocratic and state-centric countries. And it is in these countries in which the ACF predominantly helps to explain certain policy outcomes. But this is changing. Local and international advocacy groups today are more involved in the decision-making processes, even in autocratic societies such as China and Russia, and not only because of internet-based communication technology. Businesses, city mayors, and even CSOs are also included based on how they present themselves as being useful and essential agents in upholding peace and security in the country.

If domestic public policy processes often fail to be effective in corrupt, traditional, or autocratic societies, then this also carries significant consequences for migration policies. It means that if a government does not involve migrants and their representatives in the policy cycle, these policies will be less likely to be successful in meeting their anticipated goals such as the integration of undocumented migrants. But to end human trafficking and illegal immigration, governments and cooperation should extend to migrants themselves and not only talk vis-à-vis governments. Consequently, to apply the multi-stakeholder process is a challenge not only for democratic countries but in particular for authoritarian regimes in which policy decisions are still predominantly matters of central governments and authorities.

Entrepreneurs of glocal migration policies emphasize, for example, the fact that fundamental freedom rights and social and economic human rights in terms of health, salaries, working hours, shelter and housing, education, and participation have to be guaranteed by all UN member states, regardless of what status the people living in that particular country have. Thus, these standards are also valid for migrants, regardless of the domestic legal status (Rasche and Kell 2010). However, on domestic levels, we still find over 190 states, each with different legislations responding in their own "traditional" ways to the challenges of labor migrants, refugees, illegal migrants, and stateless people. Some countries, like China, even title their own citizens migrants if they move from one city to another within their own territory, and by doing so they lose major citizen rights. More than ever, the legal status of a migrant depends on local and municipality policies as well as their social, political, and legal practice.

In terms of figures, however, migration is one dramatically growing number that poses various challenges to public policies. The IOM estimates that approximately 250 million people are currently on the move. They are uprooted, expelled, or otherwise driven to migrate outside their countries, homes, and communities.[5] If we add people who are forced to migrate and move within their own state borders for economic or security reasons, this group adds another 740 million people. All together this amounts up to almost one billion migrants out of a total world population of seven billion people. That means that one out of seven people in the world is at risk of becoming a migrant under precarious and disadvantaged circumstances or because she/he wants to migrate in the strive of more and better skill-based working and living conditions.

Out of these numbers, 75 million are officially refugees of some sort, forced to leave their homes (15 million transborder plus 60 million internal displaced persons). Even though the majority moves within their own country or region, moving homes and locations often deprives them from civic rights, entitlements, inheritances, and access to resources such as education or work and justice, as seen, for example, in Chinese internal migration policies. Therefore, people moving from one province to another lose their right of free education and basic health services for their children. They become "illegals" in their own country, and by unwillingly overstepping legal borders, they often get criminalized and then punished simply by having become a migrant against their own intention (Peilin and Roulleau-Berger 2013).

Today, there are three times more international migrants than in 1970, but relative to the population, it has remained stable over the last few decades; approximately 3.5% of the world's population are officially international forced or unwilling migrants (not including domestic ones). But even though world population has grown, each migrant person has a need that needs to be dealt with and thus requires policy solutions. Thus, the absolute numbers rise, but the state resources remain the same. Almost half of them (48%) are women, and today the average age of a migrant is 39 years of age. Among them, around 20 million people are trafficked and forced into labor or marriage, and out of this number, half are women, 20% men, 20% minors, and 10% infants. But there are no official numbers, and the actual numbers are much higher. More women (55%) are trafficked in total than males or infants. Human trafficking is one of the major global "industries" with an annual profit of USD150 billion for the traffickers. Consequently, human trafficking also increases illicit financial flows that also pose a challenge to domestic economies and taxation regimes and crime rate.[6] Parallel to the rising numbers of migrants, organized crime is a growing industry in close collaboration with corrupt governments that in return carefully either fuel conflicts or maintain poverty that force people to migrate. People who are trafficked and enslaved are mostly undocumented and forced into labor and

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[5] International Organization for Migration (IOM) Data Analysis Centre, https://gmdac.iom.int/ (Accessed December 2017).

[6] UNDOC https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2016_Global_Report_on_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf (Accessed December 2017).

slavery and are never even registered or appear in any official data set. That is even more worrisome for public policy processes, because they do not appear at any stage of the policy cycle. When we see that approximately 40% (120 million migrants) of all migrants move within the Global South and thus either move away and toward weak democracies, autocratic and corrupt regimes. Two of the top ten countries whose populations are made up of more than 50% migrants are Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Both countries are receiving migrants from India, the Philippines, Malaysia, and China. A much smaller number of migrants, 55 million, move North-North such as within Europe and North America. In 2015, two thirds (67%) of all international labor migrants were living in just 20 countries. Statistically and in total numbers, the largest group of international migrants (47 million) resides in the USA and Germany, and the Russian Federation host the second and third largest numbers of migrants worldwide (around 12 million each), followed by Saudi Arabia (10 million) (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs International Migration Report 2015). Hence, the largest part of all transnational and border-crossing labor or "economic" migrants (around 86 million) move from the South to North, particularly from the South to North America and from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia toward Europe.[7]

This North-South divide is also reflected by the countries which have or have not ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families from 2003. This UN Convention has been ratified almost exclusively by those countries which "send" migrants to Europe and to North America, such as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. In Africa, these countries are Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt Cameron, Senegal, Mali, and Togo, meaning that these countries by sending their labor forces to North America or Europe receive together billions in remittances per year, in return, which if otherwise they would need to provide labor and vocational training for their population. In Europe only Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Turkey have signed and ratified the treaty—again countries that send more labor forces abroad than receive them in return.[8] The convention was one of the first, after the end of the Cold War in 1990, that was tabled to the UN General Assembly upon the initiative by countries in the Global South who, for once, wanted to set the human rights-based agenda after decades of Cold War blockade policies (Krivenko 2017).

The lack of acknowledgment of the UN Convention and the suspicion by the countries of the Global North that countries of the South only wanted this convention in order to safeguard the rights of their citizens abroad and to secure remittances and financial flows from the North to the South led to the ineffectiveness of the convention. Nevertheless, this unsuccessful early attempt to govern glocal migrant

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[7]In comparison to the total figure of almost 90 million migrants moving to the North, 14 million migrants move from the North to the South, and the majority among them belong to an educated labor, skilled and contracted experts and ex-pad community.

[8]List of Ratification of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in 2017: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/StatRatCMW.pdf (Accessed December 2017).

policies through the UN Human Rights Treaty body regime also highlighted the deficits and challenges that global migration would pose in the decades to come.

Issues such as the sovereignty of states, legal entitlements, citizenship, and, consequently, full or not full participation of migrants in their "new home" countries had not been mentioned in the convention and yet would have to be of pivotal importance for countries that receive migrants in the present times.

3   Migration and Global Governance

If glocal public policy is the way in which governments design their policies according to global norms and standards and domestic interests, then the global migration regime and the UN global compact is a driving force to further shape glocal policy structures. Yet, in most parts, the glocal public policy regime largely remains fragmented between the levels of governance and stakeholders and without common norms, standards, and modes of governance. The right mix between top-down and bottom-up and the right balance between central, local, stakeholder, and global decision-making and implementation are yet to be experienced. There is a plethora of ideas—on global and domestic levels alike—on what rights and entitlements migrants have according to their status.

However, regardless of whether migration is the cause or a consequence of globalization and a domestic failure of good governance, the way most states deal with it in terms of residence rights, working permissions, family reunification, or refugee status is in almost all aspects at odds with international human rights norms. Even domestic migration policies within the EU countries vary greatly. EU migration policy is focusing less on global development but more on border control through Frontex, and migrants are mostly seen as a factor for economic growth or decline and less of a cultural or humanitarian aspect.[9] That is why in the context of globalization, Hay argues, public policy processes that deal with migration and immigration cannot be held to account publicly in domestic terms only, because cultural values, behavior, and adherence to norms are values that are held in equal regard to economic values (Ignatieff 2017). There are no global institutions, power regimes, or otherwise legal entities that could be held accountable when millions of uprooted people—for whatever reasons—get on the move. Yet, generally speaking, democratic and public policy-based societies are the ones that are on the receiving end of refugees in the Global North. But those migrants who illegally and economically speaking move among Global South countries, as the figures of the Gulf states show, enjoy even less or no civil rights and protection. This cannot be left aside in

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[9]EU Commission Migration policy priorities (2017) "Towards a European agenda on migration" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/migration_en (Accessed December 2017).

glocal policy processes because the level of democratic decision-making in migra-
tion policies will both determine the future outcome of the top ten global challenges
and their subsequent policy solutions.[10]

The major challenge thus remains, that migrants everywhere do not enjoy full
citizenship rights, and thus lack of political participation is global. Migrants are dealt
with under either asylum and refugee laws or under labor immigration laws, which
give them only limited access to participation and resources in policy making. This
also hampers the idea of free and shared responsibility and accountability when
implementing joint or multilevel stakeholder policies, let alone the ACF.[11] If one
doesn't have full access to participation, he or she can also not take up full respon-
sibility for any wrongdoing—in case it applies. Thus, globalization and the rapid pace
of cross-border mobility—willingly or unwillingly—challenges the policy making
capacity and sovereignty of the nation state (Hay 2008, p. 590) resulting in an urgent
delegation of functions from public institutions to civil society groups and private
enterprise (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006) including human traffickers and other criminal
offenders (Davies 2015).

Triggered by these massive global shifts and domestic realities, Ian Goldin (2011)
calls for a paradigm shift in public policy matters and sees these moves as a chance for
a "new civilization" based on global citizenship. Global citizenship challenges
domestic public policy making. It would guarantee all human beings the same rights
and entitlements and means to make a decent living. Furthermore, every human being
would be guaranteed free movement without many restrictions—irrespective of their
national citizenship or passport (Dower and Williams 2002). Thus, according to those
advocating global citizenship, exclusive national citizenship and passports should no
longer matter in determining who enjoys full civil, political, cultural, and economic
human rights regardless of national borders. Nevertheless, despite the vision of a
"global travel document" for all, people are still linked to local entities, cities, and
districts in which they have their residency and in which they can, on the one side,
actively participate in decision-making processes and, on the other side, be held
accountable for their actions (Mihr 2017). The basic idea is that mobility should no
longer depend on national borders or passports, and yet someone's entitlement to
participate in policy processes only depends on where he and she lives and has
residency and not on ones' citizenship. This global citizenship therefore is one that
plays according to the global and universal standards and rules (human rights) that are
implemented and enforced anywhere in the world (Goldin 2011).

In the light of global citizenship, the outline of the UN global compact for
migration states that the remaining 192 UN member states aim to find common
global rules for labor rights, women, child protection, and humanitarian assistance,
regardless of whether they are categorized as a migrant or a refugee. If at least one in

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[10]Center for Immigration studies, Washington DC. https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States (Accessed December 2017).

[11]SHARES project by the University of Amsterdam, http://www.sharesproject.nl/ (Accessed December 2017).

seven people will become migrants in their lifetimes, the likely trends indicate that this will soon become one in six or even one in five people in part because undocumented migrants or illegal refugees often pass their status to the next generation. Therefore, the strive for glocal solutions beyond national borders is stronger than ever.

It is most likely that labor policies in the local labor sector will change current migration policies. This is where migration is most visible in countries. Migrants' needs and demands change expectations of policy makers to pursue some course of action with the help and support of certain policy techniques and instruments such as campaigns, laws, guidelines, missions, doctrines to integrate migrants, and full citizens. These new policies ought to be based on values, visions, ideas, concepts, and strategies that are neutrally applied to both citizens and noncitizens (Lasswell 1958). However, these changes are predominantly driven by organized (local) migrant communities, such as refugee councils, faith-based organizations, cultural heritage groups, etc., as part of the stakeholder process. They may not carry the country's citizenship and thus cannot fully participate in democratic decision-making processes through elections, but they are a vivid part of the local community and business and can participate through other channels of community-based dialogues or through businesses and other stakeholder groups. Consequently, the plethora of migrants must adapt to democratic procedures through civic volunteer activism when aiming to influence policy making. Nevertheless, migrants trigger public debates and controversies and even change belief systems which are pivotal for ACF, in particular, in terms of values, habits, and religion. In order to achieve the anticipated outcome of more inclusion of their traditions and culture, migrants often form advocacy coalitions on local and transnational level, organize groups, and become an active part of policy making, despite their dispraised status (Lararson Schneider and Ingram 2007).

4 The Potential of Advocacy Coalition Framework Glocal Policies

The ACF helps to assess the shortcomings and possibilities of the glocal migration regime. This framework predominately describes the role of the state actors in policy making and explains the interface between public and private groups in developing and implementing public policies, which again impact local, domestic, or international regime development. Therefore, this framework is not only an assessment tool of policy processes, but it also helps to see how governance regimes are getting shaped over a period of time by the level of involvement and participation of different stakeholders (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 11). Willingly or unwillingly, the needs and desires of migrants and the simple fact that migration continues to happen trigger policy actors, business, and CSOs to organize pressure and interest groups that force policy makers to respond and issue policy reforms according to global human rights norms and standards. Yet, non-organized groups (apart from

celebrities) without connection to local policy makers remain unheard and hardly influence policy making in this respect.

If migrants themselves are excluded from the public policy making cycle due to lack of citizenship and legal entitlements or are excluded because of language impairment or for religious reasons, policy outcomes might be less inclusive and beneficiary for all than they otherwise would be if migrants were included. Therefore, the ACF explains this actor-specific process of change.

The ACF stands opposed to the narrative policy framework (NPF) that focuses on the deliberative powers that common narratives, debates, and knowledge transfer have on policy transfer (McBeth et al. 2014). However, one way of assessing the policy processes does not entirely exclude the other. As illustrated above in the context of global challenges, migration poses a unique challenge to global and local policies to which actors and stakeholders can be directly held accountable. In the context of migration, narratives only have a limited influence on policy making, although the rise of populism and xenophobia against migrants and refugees claiming them to be "terrorists" or criminals triggers less desirable policy processes and outcomes in terms of immigration laws.

On a less explanatory and narrative note, the ACF illustrates how migrants become policy brokers and, as such, shape domestic policies as they currently stand: among others they change policy making, subsystems, learning, and beliefs (Sabatier 1988). The fact that the UN Convention on working migrants was almost exclusively ratified by "sender" countries is one example that illustrates why governmental advocacy has not succeeded. The ACF assesses policies that are actor specific regardless whether these are governmental or not and thus includes a plethora of stakeholders such as CSOs and business, too. It does not matter whether the ACF pressure groups are domestic CSOs or NGOs, refugees, noncitizens, undocumented persons, or skilled workers. They share a common interest, namely, that of living and working in dignity in a different place other than their homes. One's dignity not only encompasses the human right to speak up and express opinions but also the fundamental right to participate freely, to start up an enterprise in the place of their new residence, and to enjoy access to public education and health facilities and thus inherently must also include the right to be heard and be included in the agenda-setting and decision-making processes of public policy. Different migrant groups have different interests that also depend on their legal status, and thus they are forming different organized coalition networks to interact with policy makers in order to change policies. Civil society, relief organizations, and local business that need migrant labor, as well as urban planners, mayors, city councils, hospitals, and school administrations, respond to these pressure groups, either through direct integration of migrants, for example, in schools and educational institutions, or through adaptation by providing housing or relief. However, policy reactions can also be driven by racism, xenophobia, and fear of "waves of migrants" that lead to exclusion and discrimination that the NPF would support. Many of these exclusionary policies are based on the lack of participation. Those who have no legal working status, for example, are less likely to be integrated and participate and may therefore be more inclined to survive on petty crimes, which in turn leads to the

vicious cycle of conflict and more exclusive policies (Massey et al. 2009). Despite these observations, the largest coalitions for migrants are cultural and value-based (i.e., Muslim religious communities, church and relief organizations, foundations, etc.) and not business or labor groups, despite the fact that migrants are seen mostly under the lenses of labor or economic cost-benefit assessment, which makes the cultural and value-based fact even more interesting to look at in terms of policy change.

Cultural, language, ethnic, or faith-based groups are policy brokers within the ACF shape that influence or change domestic values, even that of democracy, freedom, and rights. Migration is always cultural migration, too, which leads to many more conflicts and tensions, to which policy makers have to respond, than socioeconomic and labor integration. Religious habits, gender traditions, language impairments, and value systems often conflict with the ones in the country of new destination, whereas working habits, rules, and specific skills to complete tasks do not vary or do so to a much lesser extent. A nurse has to be able to complete certain tasks in such a manner that he helps the patient, just as a construction worker needs to satisfy his customer, regardless of his or her personal, religious affiliations. Thus, the reason for these problems is not the working place, the nature of different cultures, and habits where problems, tensions, and conflicts between migrants and nonmigrants and other citizens occur. These cultural tensions, however, are central to the future of local communities and their peaceful coexistence. That is yet another reason why local community stakeholders and majors are extensively involved in changing glocal migration policies.

Organized coalitions mostly can influence policy makers on all levels to change existing policies in order to make them reflect changing attitudes, sociocultural values, and social structures, as well as the constitutional setups of the destination countries, which may need to be reconsidered in light of these new, modern challenges (Weible and Sabatier 2007, pp. 124–125). However, whereas business actors, for example, lobby to change laws and regulations to allow for working permits and flexible labor policies for migrants, the same migrant, who is now part of the domestic labor system, does not have the same legal opportunity to lobby for his interests of political or cultural matters if they are not part of the citizen-based electorate. They work, pay taxes, and contribute to domestic income and business but cannot fully politically participate. But even in being forced to be passive, they are part of the ACF, through "nonparticipatory forced silence." Of course, there are other ways to raise one's voice and interest, but democratic elections remain outside of this scope.

The ACF addresses the difficult relationship between state-based power institutions and coalitions or CSOs which are used to form new parameters such as laws based on commonly agreed-upon rules and attitudes. This is similar to how these actors shape regimes, because these coalitions consider changes in ideas and perceptions as a central factor of policy shifts (Sabatier and Weible 2014). In the context of the current conversation on migration, the ACF conceptualizes local as well as global governance regimes, as seen in IOM or UN policy processes, and their ways to jointly set up new standards for migrant communities around the world in order to

best govern the dramatically transforming relationship between state and an increasingly multicultural, plural society. Migrant organizations of all sorts are part of the decision process. Local urban communities, cities, their policy makers, and CSOs are the key actors in these policy shifts because they not only have experience in how to govern migration, i.e., in sanctuary cities, but also they have to respond to local pressure and interest groups to solve problems and distribute resources on a day-to-day basis. Such communities and groups are today represented at such storied institutions as the World Economic Forum, at UN assemblies, and EU summits, and thus, they exercise their universal right to speak and participate despite their precarious status. Interestingly, it was the World Economic Forum and the UN that called for glocal policy solutions in the first place. Around the year 2000, and in the context of globalization, a dialogue about global migration started at the World Economic Forum followed by the UN (MDG/SDG). The UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families[12] that followed shortly was only ratified by 43 member states in the Global South. It indicated that the past approaches have partly failed because sending and receiving states were not on equal footing and did not have a dialogue about common standards.

Consequently, on the global level, the ACF can help to evaluate the practicability of how global norms, i.e., international conventions and guidelines set by the IOM or UN and EU, respond to current demands and how they can or cannot impact the swift and peaceful integration of migrants. The ACF also explains how policy brokers, such as migrant groups, change domestic public policy processes and make them more global and local at the same time.

5   Migrants as Policy Brokers

Advocacy groups are policy brokers and an important force, even in routine policy making and even more so in networked transnational societies. Social movements or mass movements, such as migrants, are advocacy groups in "self-styled" manner, as Goodin et al. (2006, p. 24) call them. Self-styled groups are slowly grown organized or less organized groups that represent interests and needs to which policy makers have to react. They differ from "duly elected" or state-based lobbyist groups. As this chapter illustrates, global movements and developments as well as organized migrants can thus change priorities in public policy matters, although, generally speaking, globalization is seen to challenge the public nature of domestic public policy by summoning a series of nonnegotiable, external, and largely economic imperatives. Thus, as Colin Hay (2008, p. 587) highlights, globalization is seen as

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[12]International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx (Accessed December 2017).

the enemy of policy process, public or otherwise, not only in economic terms but also in political, democratic value, and cultural terms. Globalization, similarly to global migration, leads to interdependencies that are associated with powerful tendencies to depoliticize, privatize, and technicize because the actors, beneficiaries, concerned persons, and non-state citizens are, generally speaking, outside the domestic public policy framework. Nevertheless, migrants dramatically impact all major public policy sectors and belief systems, such as the labor sector, the formal education and the health sector, as well as in housing, family, and community matters. Migration of whatever kind also impacts public debates about values and governance regimes and, as such, triggers civil engagement. The questions are not only around issues of integration into the labor or housing sector but also in terms of what a culturally diverse society should look like in the present and future. Advocacy coalition groups help to support integration and are often formed around language, religion, faith, or ethnic background. In these coalitions, migrants share common experiences. They become interest groups when negotiating the best deal for their migrant groups in the new country, regardless of whether these settlements are temporary or permanent. Apart from common values, faith, language, cultural, or other interests, they also need to engage to a nontrivial degree with the majority of society in order to achieve policy change (Weible and Sabatier 2007, p. 128). By engaging with the status quo society, migrant groups change public policies (Brettell 2012, p. 133).

Labor migrants, even within EU countries, for example, only have limited access to policy making in their "host" and new country of residency. Refugees, settlers, or migrant workers from outside national boarders (or EU borders) do not enjoy any, so they depend on framing partnerships and coalitions with citizen groups of that respective country. However, by doing that, the coalitions formed, for example, labor unions and faith-based or religious organizations that can have political influence. Full access to policy making in terms of voting or being elected is not among those legal entitlements and status. Whereas refugees may primarily seek security and basic work to survive and later return to their home country, labor migrants or skilled workers from the same country seek careers, the ability to exercise their mother tongue and faith, live with their families and practice their culture, and to participate in public life. Migration communities are highly fragmented, as is their status by definition and by law and consequently their access to policy making. Thus, a common global, normative, and legally binding framework, such as the UN compact, is needed to define the interests of all migrants, regardless of why they had to or wanted to migrate—namely, to work for a living, to live in peace and with dignity, and to maintain their core cultural identity.

Similar to public policy processes are international politics (still), state-centered and not necessarily multilevel or multi-stakeholder, let alone global. In other words, borders and state sovereignty still matter, despite climate change or global migration. Participation at the UN or in other international regimes, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or G 20, is based on member states and their governments, not on people. Some of them are democratically elected, but most are not and instead are highly corrupt. Thus, the level of legitimacy of these organizations is rather low.

Although multi-stakeholder, multilevel, and polycentric governance principles are entering all spheres of public policy as well as global governance (Enderlein et al. 2012), these regimes are far from being fully democratically legitimate. At the same time, the lack of democracy in many countries is the root cause for migration in the first place, such as from the DRC, Sudan, Bangladesh, or the Philippines. There is, nevertheless, a causal relationship between the lack of democracy, conflict, and migration within these countries.

On the receiving end, in the desired destination countries for refugees or working migrants, such as in Europe, the rule of law and fundamental lack of democracy are not the main problems. Interestingly, in the rule of law-abiding societies such as the EU member states, Australia, the USA, New Zealand, and Canada, migration poses a problem because their rule of law regimes are too state centric and leave little leeway to adapt to transnational and global policy issues. Henry Shue illustrates this step as the necessity of public policy actors to ask the question: "Who is in, and who is out?" (Shue 2008, p. 709). Shall public policy actors deal with global policy matters only if they are directly connected to domestic concerns or open up to those who are affected by the matter, even if it is future generations, stateless, or refugees on issues who do not seem to neither be part of foreign relations nor international politics at the first sight? Thus, are migrants only a domestic policy concern once an asylum seeker, a refugee, or economically driven person asks at one's border control center to enter the country? Can migration and migrants be considered as a global concern even if a country exempts from the discourse and refuses migrants to enter the country? Not surprisingly, along with the global mass migration, the perceptions of territorial state sovereignty, nation-states, and borders have dramatically shifted and so has the perception of who governs "borderless states" and fluid borders (Bens and Zenker 2017).

Every person who is not citizen is trapped in some sort of foreign or alien status which restricts him or her from full participation. Furthermore, democratic countries have to run elections and compete for public support. With the rise of anti-migrant sentiments and hostilities worldwide, populism emerges and asks governments to restrict not only entry visas but also levels of participation and mobility of non-citizens once they have entered the country. The mandate for their governments to negotiate a satisfactory glocal policy solution for all may move to a far distant future as seen in the case of the USA's backing out of the Paris Accords in 2017 and its immigration legislation against sanctuary cities. Due to the fact that democratic societies, civil society, and local governing bodies act more autonomously than in authoritarian regimes, they do integrate migrants in a much less conflict-prone but very bureaucratic way other than top-down autocratic regimes, such as the UAE or Singapore, which often react fast, restrictively and without consulting with CSOs. Thus, there is a chance that through means like the ACF, a bottom-up approach will form both domestic and global migration policies in the interests of all sides. Nevertheless, free and equal citizenship is the core of legitimate political decision-making and of ACF. At the same time, the political legitimacy of governments in receiving and hosting countries depends on defensible reasons, explanations, and accounts of public decisions. Hence, the key objective of coalitions is the

transformation of private preferences via the process of deliberation into positions that can withstand public scrutiny and testing (Held 2005, p. 237). This is the spectrum within which the ACF, in terms of migration, works and at the same time shapes the glocal accountability of governments and policy making bodies.

The glocal concept challenges state-centric public policy concepts by pushing national borders and rule of law regimes to the margins of their domestic governance spectrum. Global migration brings noncitizens into the center of governance and policy concerns in a way that many domestic constitutions, parliaments, and political regimes are not prepared for, as Hay argued (Hay 2008). It forces governments to think about citizenship and civic rights and to adapt to global norms to guarantee peaceful and sustainable development within the growing migrant-driven, culturally diverse society. Hence, the concept of domestic public policy is shifting, and policy makers are urged to, first, connect public services with the global norms and standards; second, adapt to cultural shifts brought in by migrants; and third, adopt flexible local public policy processes including multiple stakeholders to make effective decisions and implement international norms, such as sanctuary cities and glocal policy outcomes.

Migration-related global public policy solutions given by IOM, UN, or EU in terms of labor, health, education, political, and civil integration are directly linked to the possibilities and resources of local communities, city councils, and urban governance regimes. Today, the vast majority of migrants live and work in urban areas not rural ones. They are not farmers or fishers but factory, health, or service workers—except for seasonal workers in the food sector and in the case of exploitation of natural resources. Even if they come as refugees or without legal status, they aim to be integrated as soon as possible in the permanent labor market, even if they aim to go back to their country of origin one day. Personal security and contract guarantees for a better life are a top priority of these migrants. Thus, migration policies affect specific urban areas. Only after they are settled into local communities is their impact, i.e., economical or cultural, seen on the national level.

This is also due to the fact that over 250 million transborder migrants today do not fit into the two neat categories—if they ever existed in the first place—of (1) working migrants and settlers and of (2) refugees and asylum seekers. And regardless of whether they come as labor force, are trafficked, refugees, illegals, asylum seekers, or ex-pats, they do not enjoy immediate citizen rights in the country of destination, and thus their possibility of influencing and impacting domestic public policy processes are marginal with a tendency to zero.

Therefore, and not surprisingly, starting as far back as the 1990s when globalization first challenged state sovereignty and domestic public policy making, migration was already mentioned among the core triggers that would change domestic policy making in the decades to come. As early as 1997, Wolfgang Reinicke (1997) summarized in *Foreign Affairs* what later became a standard assumption among policy advisors, namely, that interdependence and multilateralism will lead to new forms of global governance and public policy regimes. However, as he argues, neither interdependence nor globalization can challenge the legal sovereignty of a state, only other states can. Today, one could add that it is domestic and local

pressure that challenges this sovereignty as well. So is the case with transnational migration moves, during which the sending state—intentionally or unintentionally—forces other states to change their migration policy. It challenges the operational sovereignty of a government, that is, its ability to exercise sovereignty in the daily affairs of policy making and thus politics, as Reinicke argued. The internal dimension of sovereignty is challenged by the external one by which states engage with and become members of global, international, or supranational regimes, such as the UN or the EU. In return, this also shapes the relationship between the state and civil society advocates.

By engaging in UN compacts and global human rights norms through human rights regimes, a government no longer has a monopoly of the legitimate power over the territory within which they operate. By no means does this imply that governments are no longer core players in policy making. Instead, they are advised to follow a different organizational logic which advises them to share power and sovereignty and thus decision-making with both international and global forces and with local ones in order to maintain their power within state boundaries. Thus, while globalization and migration integrate markets, they fragment policy processes at the global and the local level and within the private sector.

Consequently, these multilevel shifts of power from the national/domestic level to the global/international and to the local/community level as well as its interaction with multiple, private, governmental, and civil stakeholders threaten centralistic state sovereignty and power. Due to the increasing number of migrants in modern societies and industrial countries, policy making and elections without allowing migrants to participate on local or national level will cast doubt on internal sovereignty of the state. To permanently or systematically exclude approximately 10 or more per cent of population from fully participating can impede the quality of democracy or at least legitimacy of state institutions. Trust in institutions and policy makers who ignore the needs, claims of migrants because they are excluded, will face deficits.

6   Responses by Policy Makers

Democratically elected policy makers are predominantly bound to domestic law, the nation, the country, and foremost to their electorate—not to migrants that have no full citizenship or none at all. They respond to the challenges of domestic sovereignty threats in two ways, either (1) defensive or (2) offensive. Defensive interventions rely on economic or resource-related policy measures such as the type of aid, relief, or access the labor markets and public services that migrants can receive (Weible 2014, pp. 3–24). However, if these measures fail to obtain broad popular support, the responses are protests and public resistance, xenophobia, and even violence against migrants who are without any political protection except international regimes and organizations. Policy makers can also intervene offensively with subsidies or competitive deregulation for migrants in terms of a benefit and other

public support for their cultural values such as language, traditions, and religion. Under these circumstances, states themselves become global competitors within the migration regimes, seeking to become influential in changing or amending global norms, such as the UN compact for migrants.

Interestingly enough, and against this backdrop, in March 2017 at the World Economic Forum, Chinese Prime Minister LiKeqiang expressed his deepest concern that the "world is entering a period of political and economic upheaval," (The Guardian 2017) referring to the rise of unpredictable state leadership in world politics and the reluctance to respond to global challenges, such as migration, by withdrawing or ignoring globally adhered principles. His expression drew much intention, because it came from a policy maker who is neither democratically elected nor represents a country that stands for an open and democratic public policy process, let alone one that adheres much to global norms and standards. But it shows that local problems can more and more only be solved with the support of global regimes. His statement also raised the question who can be legitimate partner in global public policy issues such as trade or peace negotiation, when even democratically elected state leaders exempt from international agreements and hide behind national borders? His concerns were already shared during the forum meeting in 2016 by leaders pleading for firm and reliable global rule of law-based state commitments to face the ten biggest global challenges, both globally and locally.[13]

Obviously, domestic modes of governance, whether democratic or nondemocratic, have lost much authority and thus reliable and trustworthy leadership and much of their popular legitimacy to solve world's problems, let alone their own domestic ones. In a glocal world that requires collaboration among various actors, business, CSOs, and political leaders, governance has become a polycentric necessity, not a vision, and unilateral agreements no longer seem viable when solving problems. A hegemon can no longer make effective decisions to solve problems. The size of this legitimacy gap is also reflected in the SDG/Agenda 2030 which highlights migration as a core challenge and the way the UN has called upon all types of private and public institutions and actors to work jointly on facing this challenge,[14] and hence, shifts in the way legitimacy of governance and sovereignty of a state in relation to its leaders, citizens, and noncitizens is perceived (Cohen 2012).

In the midst of globalization, global mass migration forces less democratic societies to adapt other forms of policy making, including multilevel and stakeholder-based solutions. Parallel to these diametric developments, private and civil actors have become a valuable part of governance systems around the world,

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[13]The World Economic Forum (2016). Mastering the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Annual Meeting, Davos, 2016, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AM16_Report.pdf (Accessed December 2017).

[14]UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), New York, 2015, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ (Accessed December 2017).

infiltrating public policy processes. Businesses and CSOs integrate migrants through work and community services, churches are providing shelter, non-state actors such as Médicine Sans Frontièrs are providing first aid, companies such as Google are providing access to Internet, UNICEF fills the education gap, and mayors of sanctuary cities allow undocumented migrants to stay, work, and live within their city boundaries (OECD 2017).

Against this backdrop, the flow of migration and migrants will contribute to shift public policy frames democratizing by merging local actors and their problem-solving with global norms as seen in the UN SDG's Agenda 2030. Sanctuary cities are seen as an interim solution for local problem-solving when it comes to handling undocumented migration as well as migrant settlements in general (New York Times (2017, 6 February). Thus far glocal migration policies are dealt with on, first, horizontal and local levels, because migrants first meet local policy makers and not national governments once they are in the country. City councils are then often urged to a factual breach (and consequently end up in court) of existing domestic migration laws while solving problems and integrating, for example, undocumented minors. They ought to have flexible and catalytic migration practices (wage, temporary employment, giving permits, etc.). Secondly, they are dealt with on a vertical governmental level in terms of security of national borders and maintaining citizenship versus noncitizens. Thirdly, policy brokers come from the private and civic actors' coalitions. The ACF-specific approach explains that migrants have already shifted priorities in policy making from the domestic level to the global and the local. This is also highlighted by the "open-border" literature. It proposes similar approaches to migration. Bauder argues that the mobility of people across border is still highly controlled and limited, and thus borders remain a main source not only of labor inefficiencies but also of human suffering and injustices (Bauder 2015). He emphasizes the importance of policy shifts toward open-border and no-border practices as a chance for global development and mobility in a similar vein as Goldin argues from an economic and political point of view (Goldin 2011). A recognized no-border concept would help to overcome major obstacles of domestic public policy concerning the migration regime. This concept is ACF driven, namely, because it is locally driven by members of various (migration) coalitions regardless of their legal status; secondly, this concept accepts global norms as guiding principles for policy making.

7 Conclusion

The fear in many societies that migrants only aim to seek social benefits, impose new and alien cultural values and habits, abuse the welfare regime of the destination countries, and take jobs for lower wages has not ever been proven anywhere over the medium- or long-term run. Rather, the level of integration depends on whether, how, and under what concept migrants can be included in public policy making?

With distribution and settlement policies in the long run, however, migration figures are balanced out by the economic and cultural benefit these migrant communities pose to the resident society. Values change, but deliberately, not by force of imposition through mass migrants. It is at this point where the ACF helps to explain the shifts in glocal migration policies.

The inclusion of migration as one of the top ten challenges and policy issues to deal with globally and locally in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the aim to establish a global compact for migration and refugees in 2018 confirms and reinforces the important relationship between migration and development. By integrating migration, including forced displacement into the SDGs, the heads of state and governments acknowledged that migration needs to work for development and that development needs to work for migration as highlighted by the OECD (OECD Report 2017).

Nevertheless, labor migration, for example, remains rather stable in terms of numbers and world population (approximately 3.5%)—although not equally distributed among the world's countries—and has had a long-standing impact on the economic and societal development of the receiving country. Hence, the global migration regime within the frame for glocal policy solutions needs to be discussed under cultural and societal aspects and overall political participation aspects. Migration is overall the mobility of social capital, and this always has an impact on public sector such as health, values, human rights, good governance, and education, to name but a few public issues.

Even progressive and reformist governance attempts, such as by most member states of the EU since 2005 as part of their Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), in which they combined national migration politics, i.e., visa and labor policies, with development and aid policies in third sending countries, have their limits and are still state centric (European Commission 2017). Similarly, the EU's neighborhood policies are based on domestic migration policies, i.e., refugee and asylum policies. This policy is based on a rule of law-based domestic public policy system, although it aims to build trust between the EU and its member states in general and the sending countries out of which migrants come to the EU. However, it mostly ignores the need for more flexibility on local and city levels. The European migration regime focuses on business and labor issues, security threats and border control, and thus criteria to exclude and discourage migration toward Europe instead of guiding it. Despite many CSO-based ACF initiatives, the EU's migration regime is not a cultural and social and neither an inclusively political one (European Commission 2011, 8 November). However, as long as destination countries or regions, such as North America, Australia, and Europe condone the employment of illegal migrant workers and have no effective control over their borders, security, and safety policies (building borders and fences instead in Macedonia and the USA), it will remain a domestic policy problem of the receiving countries, not one of the source or sending countries (Koslowski 2004, p. 19). SDG goal number 11 on cities, for example, aims to respond to this shortcoming by referring to the potential and the benefits local communities and cities today have when welcoming and including migrants in the core sense of the medieval terms

"citizens," namely, those who live and work in cities and thus enjoy the same rights as all citizens of that city, regardless of their origin.[15]

For those on the public policy process that deal with global challenges, migration policy research can be seen as an intriguing investigation into a win-win situation, how, whether, and under what circumstances domestic policy actors open up to glocal policy solutions or not—beyond mere foreign relations. As illustrated, glocal developments and global movements impact regimes as well as domestic politics. Today's working migration and refuge seekers alike epitomize the following, namely, that these (1) people migrate to cities/urban areas to work, live, and share their skills and values which are not always free of conflicts and (2) in the case of socioeconomic and cultural disadvantages of participation, they move on to another place somewhere around the world (Pogge 2008).

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[15]SDG-related goals to migration: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/MProcesses/IOM-and-SDGs-brochure.pdf. See: The UN SDG aim to guide policy makers toward "glocal" and multilateral level and stakeholder shift by naming explicitly migrants and private actors and their contributions for development, for example, in Goal 3 on Good Health and Well-Being; 4 on Quality Education; 5 on Gender Equality; 8 on Decent Work and Economic Growth; 10 on Reduced Inequalities; 11 on Sustainable Cities and Communities; 13 on Climate Actions; 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions; and 17 on Partnerships for the Goals (Accessed December 2017).

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Public Policy and Ideation

Atif Ikram Butt

1 Introduction

Public policy as a concept is as old as the notion of government. The scholarly quest for the answers to how and why public policies evolve and their outcomes arise is also at least two centuries old. Yet, there is no unifying theory of public policy. The ones that exist either implicitly subscribe to the basic features of American pluralism or are limited by their origins in high-income democratic settings (Nelson 1998, p. 553; Osman 2002, p. 37; Smith and Ketikireddi 2013, p. 201). There is hardly any scholarly attention drawn to understanding the politics and environment of policy making in countries of the Global South. Part of this problem is the complex and multifaceted nature of the public policy process. The process often does not follow any standardized procedures or routinized approaches and has many actors and variables whose relationships span across time and issues (Cairney 2012, p. 12; John 2003, p. 481; McCool 1995, p. 398). As a result, existing theories of public policy present only some but not all of the facets of this process and its outcomes. Greenberg et al. elucidate this point and write, "Although the theories [of public policy] seemed perfectly applicable to the few cases used by their authors to illustrate them originally, the propositions did not fit so neatly when applied to a number of examples not expressly chosen for explanation and illustration" (Greenberg et al. 1977, p. 1532). Existing theories of public policy derived from developed countries are also of limited scope in the context of countries of the Global South due to their inability to transcend beyond any given structural and contextual variations in political systems and societal conditions.

In the last two decades, however, advances in the institutional perspective have come to take a central place in the understanding of political decision-making. These advances combine insights from across disciplines and utilize a multidimensional nature of inquiry. This has been loosely dubbed as "new institutionalism." The

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ideational turn in new institutionalism is by far the most recent and has the potential to examine public policy decisions regardless of political, societal, and socioeconomic conditions. The ideational turn gives supremacy to ideas in institutional analysis and contends that institutionalists can investigate both the path of institutional change and the origins of change itself. It may be argued that the ideational scholarship is still very much a work in progress and lacks a coherent school of thought. Recent theoretical advancements, however, have built enough foundation on which institutional analysis could be sufficiently carried out in countries, i.e., Global South, that do not necessarily present facets of pluralistic societies, i.e., the United States (US), or of well-established liberal democracies. This chapter contributes toward burgeoning interest in the role of ideas and discourse in policy studies. An attempt is made to overcome theoretical shortcomings in the application of ideational institutionalism by building conceptual clarity on types of ideas, their origin, and the mechanism through which they affect public policy outcomes.

2   The Ideational Turn in New Institutionalism

New institutionalism lacks a unified body of thought. There is, however, some degree of consensus that new institutionalism falls into three broad categories, those of rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalisms. These three schools of thought developed quite independently of one another, but they all have in common their discontent with the behavioral perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, while all three approaches agree that institutions matter, they disagree over the extent to which they matter. Rational choice institutionalists consider institutions to be only an intervening variable affecting individuals' choices and actions, while their strategic calculation remains the central pillar. They concede that institutions set parameters in regard to individuals' actions, but they are also the creation of utility-maximizing rationalists in order to overcome unpredictability (Koelble 1995, p. 232). Rational choice institutionalists, therefore, see institutions as a system of rules and incentives created by rational, profit-maximizing decisions. Historical institutionalists consider institutions to have a determinant role in individuals' actions, as their preferences are formed by the institutional context in which they calculate their interests. Interests, therefore, are the product of interaction among various groups, ideas, and institutional structures. Institutions, for historical institutionalists, are thus continuous and path-dependent. For sociologists, individuals' interests are a product of a broader institutional setting where culture, society, and organizational identity are all a contributing factor and where even institutions themselves are dependent on society and culture. For sociologists, institutions are a web of interrelated formal and informal norms that shape the parameters of choice and where actors are embedded in a network of personal relationships, which serves as an evaluation framework for their choices (Nee and Ingram 1998, p. 40). For all three established new institutionalisms, this effectively describes an ontological standpoint whereby institutions are seen in stable equilibrium, whether with fixed

rationalist preferences, self-reinforcing historical paths, or all-defining cultural norms, all of which serve as constraints on agents' actions. This deterministic view of institutions has led to difficulties for new institutionalists who seek to explain how such institutions can be changed (Bell 2011, p. 883). This predicament in new institutionalism explains the turn to ideas, applied as more of a corrective measure and even implying a tacit acknowledgment of their theoretical limitation in explaining institutional change (Schmidt 2008, p. 304). Blyth (1997, p. 229) calls this initial interest in ideas among the new institutionalists as "an ad hoc attempt to account for theoretical problems." This instrumental and functional treatment of ideas and an attempt to grapple with questions of institutional change served as the origin of a distinct body of scholarship within new institutionalism referred to here as ideational institutionalism (Schmidt 2006). At around the same time when the three new institutionalisms came to be recognized, there began an increasing impetus on bringing these three established schools of thought under comparative lenses. Ideas, on the one hand, became the bridge among different schools of thought within new institutionalism through which they sought commonalities and which resulted in erecting a distinct theoretical body—ideational institutionalism—in its own right.

Initially, the study of ideas in the work of new institutionalism was regarded as less than optimistic. Subsequent work on the role of ideas in explaining political change in the context of new institutionalism is now dubbed as the fourth new institutionalism, and in some of the latest compendiums on new institutionalist scholarship, the ideational school is now given a distinct space and recognition. The importance of ideational processes in policy making and the understanding of institutional change and continuity have now formed a distinct identity of its own. Different adjectives have been used to distinguish it from the three established new institutionalisms, i.e., ideational, discursive, and constructivist institutionalism. Here, the term ideational is preferred over other adjectives as the focus is on the role of ideas rather than the means, i.e., interpretive or interactive processes, through which institutions are created, sustained, and changed and policies are influenced, contested, and shaped. Regardless of the adjective one chooses to use, what they all have in common is the interest in the role ideas play and the practice of ontologically considering policy making a more dynamic process rather than a result of an equilibrium-focused outcome in a static, institutional setting. Its purpose lies in the desire to capture, describe, and analyze institutional disequilibrium. Before an attempt can be made to define institution within the ambit of ideational institutionalism, it is essential to first delineate what is meant by ideas.

3   Defining Ideas

In the institutional literature, there seems to be no general consensus among authors on what ideas are and what they constitute. The understanding of the concept of ideas is greatly influenced by one's ontological standpoint. For instance, the rational choice institutionalists ascribe to an understanding whereby they see ideas secondary

to interests and as justification, rationalization, and an instrument of persuasion (Fiorina 1995). Those who subscribe to historical institutionalism consider ideas to be purposes and projects which define the roles of individuals in relation to their institutional environment and constitutive of the self and also of the concepts of rationality, preferences, and interests (Smith 1995, p. 136). More recent definitions of ideas, however, are tending to be minimalist in their application. Such is the case with Lieberman (2002, p. 698), who considers ideas to be a "medium by which people can imagine (. . .) and such imaginings spur them to act to try and make changes." Similarly, Hay (2006, p. 63) understands ideas as perceptions comprising desires, preferences, and motivations that reflect a normative orientation. These various conceptions of ideas stem from a particular ontological standpoint and explore the concept from within the limits of their individual schools of thought. A noteworthy exception to this rule can be found in the advancements undertaken by John Campbell and Vivien Schmidt.

Building upon the work of Peter Hall on policy paradigms, Campbell (1998, p. 398) gives, for the first time, an elaborate conception of ideas as providing specific solutions to policy problems, constraining the cognitive and normative range of solutions that policy makers are likely to consider, and constituting symbols and concepts that enable actors to construct frames which legitimize their policy proposals. Campbell (1998, p. 398) here considers ideas to be serving as constraining structures on actors, which is in line with the arguments of the three established new institutionalisms. In a later article, Campbell (2002, p. 21) gives a more holistic definition of ideas, calling them "theories, conceptual models, norms, world views frames, principled beliefs and the like, rather than self-interests, affect policy making." In this case, Campbell clearly distinguishes ideas from interests and treats them as two distinctive concepts. Vivien Schmidt is the most revolutionary of ideational institutionalists and is among the forerunners of giving this particular offshoot in institutionalist debate a distinct identity. She writes of ideas as:

> simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning, which are internal to 'sentient' (thinking and speaking) agents whose 'background ideational abilities' explain how they create and maintain institutions at the same time that their 'foreground discursive abilities' enable them to communicate critically about those institutions, to change (or maintain) them. (Schmidt 2010, p. 4)

While synthesizing different definitions and conceptions of ideas, Schmidt also provides a functional understanding and distinguishes ideas as per their most base level of generality, i.e., specific to a particular policy, encompassing a wider program, or constituting an underlying philosophy, and in terms of its appeal, i.e., cognitive for constituting interests and normative to appeal to values and norms (Schmidt 2008, p. 321). Rather than bridging gaps and aiming to build a more holistic understanding of the term in order to connect different schools of thought in new institutionalism, Schmidt believes in the distinctiveness of ideas (ibid., p. 304). The understanding of ideas constructed by Schmidt in contrast to that of Campbell is revolutionary on two accounts. First, Schmidt does not consider ideas and interests to be two distinct concepts but rather holds that the former constitutes the later.

Second, ideas for Schmidt are both constraining structures as well as enabling constructs, and thereby she implies a much more dynamic understanding of the term than Campbell does. However, Schmidt's understanding of ideas as cognitive [what is and what to do] and normative [what is good or bad in light of what one ought to do] falls short of fully appreciating the subjective dimension constituting interests [what is one's gain or loss in view of what is], though she herself infers "interests are subjective and norm-driven" (ibid., p. 306, 318). The notion of ideas as frames is therefore a comparatively more comprehensive conception, which seems full of potential with its ability to link cognition to norms and understanding to action (Gooby-Taylor 2005, p. 4).

In a 1989 essay, Bruno Jobert (1989, p. 377) talks of ideas as a "frame of reference" and links them to the cognitive, instrumental, and normative dimensions of policy making. He explains cognitive dimension as a "common intellectual interpretative framework" (ibid., pp. 377–378) through which policy makers evaluate the probable effects of their actions. This instrumental dimension provides a set of recipes or policy instruments available to carry out intended action, and he describes the normative dimension as comprising political culture and values. Together with Surel, Muller (1998, p. 11) further elaborate this understanding of referential as "arrangements of intellectual, normative, or cognitive frames that simultaneously determine the tools with which societies can work on themselves and the arena of meaning within which social groups will interact." Jobert and Muller (1987) also use the term of mediator somewhat similar to the concept of epistemic community as presented by Hass (1989) or the advocacy coalition framework of Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993), but it is more broad-based in its membership, which includes the referential and comprises "the actor, as a group or an individual (. . .) considered as the truth at a specific moment." This viewpoint implies that cognitive frames are constructions from outside that are then used as intellectual and normative references by the policy maker to determine tools for problem-solving. For this, they need access to the political agenda and must be diffused in policy circles to become a reference for actions. This comprehension carries two limitations. First, it becomes overtly prescriptive, focusing less on the creations and change of institutions and more on the instrumental dimension of ideas. Second, it shuts itself off from the possibility of policy behaviors of an individual or a group of individuals acting in pursuit of their own interests using ideas to build incentive structures and to reduce uncertainties.

Nevertheless, understanding ideas as a frame of reference takes distinction over other conceptions of the term in the three established new institutionalisms as, on the one hand, it not only constrains actors' decision-making but also becomes "a tool to shape and modify reality" (Simoulin 2000, p. 334). It also differs in a sense that it implies a reciprocal relationship between ideas and public influencing the construction of each other as opposed to the univocal relationship as described by rational choice, historical, or sociological institutionalisms. Seeing ideas as a frame of reference to a public policy outcome is particularly useful, considering that policy makers usually operate at various levels, i.e., cognitive, normative, and subjective interpretations of interests, for the evaluation of their decisions. It is in this context

the term ideas is conceived as the basis for policy decisions, central to how policy makers conceive and evaluate their options and how and what they decide. Its construction is the result of exogenous factors, i.e., culture, norms, or scripts, or endogenous to organization, i.e., rule-like qualities, structure action, and regularized practices, or internal to actors as in subjective calculations of interests, intellectual determination of optimal course of action, or assumptions of public sentiments, or a mix of thereof.

4   Institutions in Ideational Institutionalism

In ideational institutionalism literature, there have been only a handful of attempts to define institutions and their relationship with ideas, and even that gives alternative accounts of what institutions are and what they constitute. Schmidt (2008, p. 305), who is among the pioneers of bringing an ideational dimension to new institutionalism, defines institution as "meaning structures and constructs that are internal to agents whose 'background ideational abilities' and 'foreground discursive abilities' make for a dynamic, agent-centered approach to institutional change." In an ideational context, as Schmidt (ibid., p. 304) elaborates, "institutions are therefore internal to the actors, serving both as structures that constrain actors and as constructs created and changed by those actors." Schmidt (ibid., p. 322) further explains that in ideational institutionalism:

> Agents' background ideational abilities [what goes on in individuals' minds as they come up with new ideas] enable them to act in any given meaning context to create and maintain institutions while their foreground discursive abilities [to reason, debate] enable them to communicate critically about those institutions and so to change or maintain them.

This is why Schmidt prefers to label this as discursive institutionalism, instead of ideational or constructivist, where ideas serve as substantive content of discourse and discourse is needed for an interactive process to convey ideas. She (ibid., p. 314) argues that in an ideational context, institutions are not only given but are also contingent upon agents, and therefore they are "internal to the actors." On the other hand, Schmidt (ibid., p. 314) does not rule out the possibility of "agents to think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them." Schmidt (ibid., p. 316) continues to make the case for the necessity of discourse for an ideational understanding to hold that:

> an interactive process is what enables agent to change institutions, because the deliberative nature of discourse allows them to conceive of and talk about institutions as objects at a distance, and to dissociate themselves from them even as they continue to use them.

Colin Hay prefers to call himself a constructivist institutionalist and argues along somewhat similar lines to Schmidt but does not talk of institutions as internal and rather considers them to be "codified systems of ideas and the practices they sustain"

(Hay 2006, p. 65). In contrast to historical institutionalism, he talks of "ideational path dependence," whereby he argues "it is not just institutions, but the very ideas on which they are predicated and which inform their design and development, that exert constraints on political autonomy." He continues that actors:

> perception about what is feasible, legitimate, possible and desirable are shaped both by the institutional environment in which they find themselves and by existing policy paradigms and world-views. It is through such cognitive filters that strategic conduct is conceptualized and ultimately assessed. (Hay 2006, p. 67)

Mark Blyth (2002), also among the ranks of the most influential ideational institutionalists, is mainly interested in the role of ideas in determining policy choice, especially in crisis situation with a goal to decipher relationship between institutions, interest, and ideas. For Blyth, ideas serve as blueprints for the design of new institutions and "to reduce uncertainty, propose a particular solution to a moment of crisis and empower agents to resolve that crisis by constructing new institutions in line with these new ideas [emphasis added]" (Blyth 2002, pp. 10–11). While Blyth does not subscribe to any particular adjective to distinguish himself, he is quite critical of instrumental and functional treatment of ideas in the three established new institutionalisms and contends "ideas have to be taken as more than an addendum to institutions" (Blyth 1997, p. 246); he writes and continues, "they must be conceptualized apart from pre-existing categories and epistemological commitments and treated as an object of investigation in their own right."

Although it is still in its nescient phase, ideational scholarship is not without criticism, which is imposed from theorists inside as well as from outside institutionalist scholarship. The most formidable of these criticisms comes from a fellow neo-institutionalist Stephen Bell who sums up differences in ideational discourse as varying "from postmodern accounts, where ideas, inter-subjective meanings and discourse are primitive and wholly define or constitute social and institutional life, to more ontological realist accounts, which admit that institutions and wider structures can have real effects" (Bell 2011, p. 889). He argues that Schmidt in her thesis "perceives only one dimension of the two-way dialectical interaction between agents and institutions", the latter he argues is "ontologically prior to the individuals who populate them at any given time" (ibid., p. 891). Bell is right in pointing out the weakness in Schmidt's analysis but therein also highlights the key difference between ideational institutionalism and the three established new institutionalisms. In ideational institutionalism, it is neither the institution nor ideas that are conceived ontologically prior to one or another. Rather, the design and development of institutions are based on ideas, which once developed affect their subsequent development as well as actors' perceptions about what is feasible, legitimate, possible, and desirable. In his defense of historical institutionalism, Bell (ibid., p. 899) conceives agents, institutions, structures, and ideas to be mutually constitutive in a dialectical manner. In ideational institutionalism, however, ideas are the blueprint of a dialectical relationship among agents, in effect becoming their cognitive filters which they use to interpret environmental signals, with institutions being built upon ideational foundations and structures serving as constraints shaping

options and strategies once formed but yet dependent on agent for its existence and continuity. Bell's third criticism is on the mechanism and origin of ideas in ideational scholarship, as he writes, "ideas do not operate in a vacuum but are instead 'embedded in a historical context and need institutional support to be effective' (ibid., p. 891)." This criticism holds true in the sense that there is scant written material either on the origin or the mechanism of ideas through which they operate, a subject taken in more detail in subsequent section. Though limited in number, substantial work does exist in discourse analysis on which the origin and mechanism of ideas can be operationalized.

How are we then to define institutions in ideational institutionalism? The answer may lie in looking for commonalities among ideational theorists. With slightly differing accounts, the main commonalities among ideational institutionalists and their major divergences from the three established new institutionalisms are primarily three. Firstly, ideational institutionalists imply a dynamic understanding of the relationship between institutions and agents in contrast to what Schmidt (2008, p. 313) calls the "sticky" definition of the same by the three established new institutionalisms, i.e., deterministic influence either through fixed rationalist preferences, self-reinforcing historical paths, or all-defining cultural norms. Secondly, and related to the first difference, the three established new institutionalisms treat institutions as given within which agents' actions are dictated; therefore, they serve mainly a constraining role conforming to a rule-following logic. This is one of the main reasons that the three established schools of new institutionalism have been better able to explain continuity but run into trouble when it comes to explaining policy change and must resort to explanations of exogenous shocks, dramatic events, or crisis situations. In ideational understanding, and as Schmidt argues, institutions are not only constraining structures but also enabling constructs. Furthermore, as Hay (2006, p. 65) elaborates, "institutions are built on ideational foundations which exert an independent path dependent effect on their subsequent development." Finally, actors in ideational understanding are both strategic and socialized, making their actions more flexible as their desires, preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact but rather ideational toward the context in which they are to be realized. In the words of Blyth (2002, p. 39), then it is ideas that make interests actionable meaning interests start determining our behaviors and/or decisions; or as Schmidt (2008, p. 303) argues that interests are neither objective nor material as they are subjective ideas. Within this context, institutions are thus defined as an interrelated collection of ideational constructs that is itself affected by its institutional environment for its subsequent design and development. Such constructs are internal to sentient agents that enable them to evolve, adopt, and innovate, but together they constitute external structures serving primarily as constraints. For example, they may be thought to embed history and political thought and to reflect, therefore, a set of traditions and practices, whether written or unwritten. Institutions thus can be interpreted as reflecting habits and norms, more likely to evolve than to be created. However, institutions also may be seen as architecture and as rules that determine opportunities and incentives for behavior, inclusion and exclusion of potential players, and structuring the relative ease or difficulty of

inducing change and the mechanisms through which change may be facilitated or denied. In contrast with rational choice institutionalism where rational actors pursue preferences following a "logic of calculation" or in historical institutionalism in which regularized patterns and routines are the result of agents acting according to "logic of path dependence" or in sociological institutionalism where actions are response to socially constituted and culturally framed actions as outcomes of "logic of appropriateness,", agents in ideational institutionalism are salient and socialized who devise, deliberate, and legitimize their actions according to the "logic of discourse."

5   Ideational Framework of Public Policy

John Campbell (1998, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010) has made important advancements in studying the effects of ideas on policy making outcomes. In his first major publication on the subject, Campbell (1998) sharpens the concept of ideas and their effect on policy making, building upon the work of Peter Hall. He compares existing insights on ideas in historical institutionalism and organizational institutionalism to create a typology of ideas based on structural dimensions of normative and cognitive levels, which he considers to operate both explicitly in the foreground and as underlying assumptions in the background of policy debates (1998, p. 385). Campbell's (1998) typology consists of four distinct types of ideas, namely, programs operating at the foreground compared with paradigms functioning in the background at the cognitive level and frames in the foreground as opposed to public sentiments in the background at the normative level of public making. Campbell (1998, p. 386) defines programmatic ideas, which are at the forefront of policy debates, as concrete solutions "that specify cause-and-effect relationships and prescribe course of policy action." Ideas as paradigms, which also operate at the cognitive level, reside in the background of policy debate and are the "underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about how the world works" (ibid., p. 389). At the normative level of the policy debate, an idea as public sentiment "consists of broad-based attitudes and normative assumptions about what is desirable or not" that work at the background (ibid., p. 392). Ideas as frames are symbols and concepts also normative in their orientation but residing in the foreground of the policy debate through which policy makers "appropriate and manipulate public sentiments for their own purpose" (ibid., p. 394). Through empirical cases from the United States, Campbell (1998) then makes a case that different types of ideas, as identified by their structural features, have different effects on policy making.

   Campbell's (1998) work provides a passionate analysis of what we mean by ideas and how they affect policy making outcomes. It also advances the argument that ideas, as opposed to historical institutionalism, are not just constraints on actors, limiting their possibilities for action, but are also enabling factors that generate solutions for problems (ibid., p. 382). Campbell (ibid., p. 383) also advances historical institutionalism in its approach of treating ideas through normative lenses only and brings insights from organizational institutionalism to add a cognitive

dimension offering a more dynamic theory of action. Importantly, and in contrast to Peter Hall and more generally to new institutionalism's inability to appreciate agency [who said what to whom] over structures [what is said or where and how], Campbell (1998) has given considerable credence to actors, as is the case in ideational institutionalism, and their ability to "self-consciously devise solutions to their problems by deliberately manipulating explicit, culturally given concepts that reside in the cognitive foreground." However, Campbell (2004) sees ideas and interests distinctively and is interested in the interaction of the two rather than seeing one shaping the other. In a subsequent article in 2002, Campbell (pp. 21–38) endorsed another type of idea to the existing typology of ideas, which he calls it world culture. He (Campbell 2002, pp. 21–38) explains it as either a cognitive paradigm or normative framework or a combination thereof with its ability to be diffused around the world and homogenizing national political institutions and policy making apparatuses. Campbell's (1998) typology of ideas and theoretical framework, which brings agent and agency back into institutional scholarship, are important contributions in delineating mechanism through which ideas affect policy making outcomes as well as in terms of bringing overall conceptual clarity. In his more recent article on ideas and their influence on policy making, Campbell (2008) agrees, "Interests are just another type of idea," which are "rooted in people's perceptions of their material situations." This is an important concession and one that constructivists have been emphasizing in their ideational analysis. Hay (2006, p. 64) writes, "[Actors] desires, preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact—a reflection of material or even social circumstances—but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative orientation towards the context in which they will have to be realised." Interests, therefore, whether public or private, are social constructions.

While constructing discursive institutionalism, Vivien Schmidt (2008, p. 303, 321) combines the work of Peter Hall and John Campbell and sees ideas to exist at three levels—policies, programs, and philosophies—and categorizes them, at each level, into two types of ideas, cognitive [constitutive of interests] and normative [which appeal to values]. She does not ascribe to particular titles for the two types of ideas at these three levels; rather, she provides their descriptive understanding. Schmidt (2008, p. 306) talks of cognitive ideas at a policy level to offer solutions to the problem at hand, at the programmatic level to define the problem to be solved and identify the methods by which to solve them, and finally at the philosophical level to mesh solution and definition of problems with deeper core of principles and norms of relevant scientific disciplines or technical practice. Similarly, normative ideas at the policy and program levels meet the aspirations and ideals of the general public and at the philosophical level resonate with a deeper core of principles and norms of public life (ibid., p. 307). Instead of seeing ideas in the background of policy debates or located in the foreground as Campbell distinguishes them in his typology, Schmidt (ibid., p. 314) instead talks of "background ideational abilities" that are internal to agents for creating and maintaining institutions and "foreground discursive abilities" for communicating to either continue or change within those institutions. The synthesis provided by Schmidt (2008) on different types and levels

of ideas combines distinctions that are rarely contested in the study of ideas and their effect on public policy outcomes (see Allmendinger 2011, p. 46; Wentzel 2011, p. 33). More so, Schmidt's (2012, pp. 86–87) typology does not discount the role of interests, as she sees agent's ideas also as response to "material (and not so material) realities, which affect them including material events and pressures." Rather than making a distinction between the two, Schmidt's typology mixes the instrumental and material dimensions of ideas and ascribes cognitive ideas to "provide the recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action and serve to justify policies and programs by speaking to their interest-based logic and necessity" (Schmidt 2008, p. 306). This does little to bring clarity to different types of ideas when cognitive ideas are seen to "provide robust solutions" as well as be "constitutive of interests." This essentially necessitates advancing the agenda beyond its typical distinction between normative and cognitive ideas and clearly distinguishing the instrumental, material, and value dimensions of ideas from one and other.

Referring back to Campbell's (1998) typology while holding this belief that ideas create interests, a material dimension could be added in addition to the two levels of normative and cognitive ideas. Campbell's (1998) first dimension consists of cognitive ideas that specify causal relationships, and the second dimension is of normative ideas, which specifies how things ought to be. The second dimension comprises the locus of the current debate, whether it is at the foreground or in the background of the policy debate. Campbell (ibid., p. 167) concedes that there is slippage between cognitive and normative ideas and between foreground and background ideas and those in the background may shift into the foreground over time. Campbell (ibid., p. 168) further argues, "The two dimensions from which the four types are derived are probably more akin to continua than to rigid dichotomies." Building on these lines, another dimension—the material level—is added to Campbell's typology. The material level at the foreground of the policy debate will be composed of "contested interests" as social and political constructions, which give legitimacy to certain actions over others, and constituted of "private interests" in the background, which are conceptions of self-interest when policies are conceived and decided upon (see Table 1).

6 Policy as Discourse

The fundamental claim of ideational institutionalism and also its point of departure from the three established schools of new institutionalism is that actors' desires, preferences, and motivations are not predetermined through rationalist preferences, historical paths, or cultural norms but are irredeemably ideational reflecting subjective orientation toward the context in which they will have to be realized. This is also the focus of the policy-as-discourse theorists whose starting place for policy analysis is not the "problem" but problematization (Kritzman 1988, p. 257). In Goodwin's words, according to the policy-as-discourse approach, policies are not framed in response to existing conditions and problems "but more as a discourse in which both

Table 1 Ideational framework of public policy: types of ideas and their effect on policy making

	Types of ideas in the foreground of policy formulation	Types of ideas in the background of policy formulation
Cognitive level	Programmatic ideas: Ideas as elite policy prescriptions that help policy makers to chart a clear and specific course of policy action	Paradigmatic ideas: Ideas as elite assumptions that constrain the cognitive range of useful solutions available to policy makers
Normative level	Public notions: Ideas as public notions of ideal public policy solutions that specify policy actions for policy makers or on the basis of which they legitimize proposed policy action	Public sentiments: Ideas as assumptions of public sentiments that constrain the normative range of legitimate solutions available to policy makers
Material level	Contest-interested ideas: Ideas as outcomes of politics of interests between contending interest groups	Self-interested ideas: Ideas as subjective interpretation of self-interest by which policy makers evaluate the relative merits of contending potential course of actions

Reformulation of Campbell's typology of ideas (1998, p. 385)

problems and solutions are created" (Goodwin 1996, p. 67). This is also a key objective of discourse theory to elucidate carefully problematized objects of study by seeking their description, understanding, and interpretation. This implies that the types of ideas, as described in the ideational framework, not only affect the course of the policy process but also are the basis of proposed public policy solutions and their eventual outcomes.

Institutions, in ideational institutionalism, are internal to sentient agents that serve both as structures that constrain action as well as constructs created and changed by those actors. These sentient agents are strategists who favor certain strategies over others while seeking to realize their policy goals. Actors' orientation toward their environment, therefore, is based on their perception of the context in which they seek to realize their policy goals. Change in ideational institutionalism, as argued by Hay and Wincott (1998, p. 955), "is seen as the consequence (whether intended or unintended) of strategic action (whether intuitive or instrumental), filtered through perceptions (however informed or misinformed) of an institutional context that favours certain strategies, actors perceptions over others." These perceptions serve as cognitive filters through which actors conceptualize and assess potential merits and demerits of contending course of policy actions as to what is feasible, legitimize, possible, and desirable (Hay and Wincott 1998, p. 956). Béland argues that such cognitive filters concern "both self-perceptions and the framing processes that actors use to convince others that it is in their interest to mobilise with them in order to reach shared goals and have an impact on outcomes" (Béland 2010, p. 148). This is one of the central contentions of ideational institutionalism that "ideas shape how we understand political problems, give definition to our goals and strategies, and are the currency we use to communicate about politics" (Béland and Cox 2011, p. 3). Both argue that ideas "embrace thoughts, emotions, desires, as well as interests, all in

delicate and fluid balance with one another" (ibid., p. 11). It is contended that it is not just a rational pursuit of actors for maximizing their self-interest; dictation of their actions through symbolic systems, cognitive scripts, or moral templates; or even their dependency on enduring legacies but essentially an interplay of myriad ideas that have cognitive, normative, and material characteristics. This distinction of ideas, their interaction with one another, and the stable system they form together to serve as criteria for evaluation for different courses of policy actions are aptly summed up by Corina Barbaros (2012, p. 114) when she distinguishes between three types of ideas as those that have:

> (. . .) primarily, a cognitive character being descriptions of social political, economic situations and tools for understanding how things work (. . .) a normative nature which consists in ideals, values and norms that define what is good or bad (. . .) [and] a third category of ideas that regards the desires that form people's preferences.

She further asserts that "it is important to distinguish between these three types of ideas, but they are different just in analytical sense, in discursive and perceptual reality they not only interact but form stable systems" (Barbaros 2012, p. 114).

These basic claims about the effect of ideas on the process and outcome of public policy can be ascertained with the help of the methodological approach of policy as discourse. Carol Bacchi (2000, p. 45), one of the frontrunners to have taken up this approach to policy analysis, asserts that with such an understanding, the implication is "that no one stands outside discourse." This particular viewpoint is based on the rejection of neopositivist and realist explanations that correspond to objective realities "out there" in the world (Fischer 2003, p. 21). The roots of the approach policy as discourse are connected with post-empiricism, the theoretical development of which has been outside of policy studies, in particular social constructionism, critical theory, and poststructuralism (ibid., p. 21). Its premise, as Bacchi (2000, p. 48) explains, is based on the understanding that "problems are 'created' or 'given shape' in the very policy proposal that are offered as 'responses'." The policy-as-discourse approach starts with the assumption, writes Goodwin, that "all actions, objects and practices are socially meaningful and that the interpretation of meaning is shaped by the social and political struggle in specific socio-political context" (Goodwin 2012, p. 29). Thus, both the policy process and its outcomes are cultural products and context specific. Theorists who subscribe to the idea of analyzing policy as discourse draw on the work of Michel Foucault on the conceptualization of discourse and apply it to policy. In Foucault's conception, discourse entails "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak; they do not justify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention" (Foucault's 1972, p. 49).

In policy studies, the aim of discourse analysis is to show how actions and objects come to be socially constructed and what they mean for social organization and interaction. A policy-as-discourse approach can then be understood as an attempt to understand the means by which social processes and interactions shape different realities (Shaw 2010, p. 200). It enables researchers, practitioners, and implementers of policy decisions to see how discourses in policy construction legitimize certain

possibilities for thinking and acting while tacitly excluding others. It is argued that conceptualizing policy as discourse offers opportunities for those with a vested interest in policy to reach the parts that other theories and methods can't reach (Daugherty and Ecclestone 2006, p. 153). The analytical focus on policy as discourse can "enable deconstruction of the apparent neutrality and objectivity of the stories that sustain policies and the explicit or implicit rules that validate them (Phoenix 2009, p. 65)." To view policy as discourse is essentially seeing policies as product of ideas. If ideas are understood as the basis for policy decisions, they themselves are the product of discourse, which also serves as the communicative and coordinative vehicle for framing particular set of policy solutions above others. The distinctive aspect of the policy-as-discourse approach is that it can be understood both as a research method and a political activity.

The ideational framework of public policy presented in the previous sections allows for the categorization of different types of ideas as per their influence on the policy process and its outcomes. With the application of the policy-as-discourse approach, the analysis of public policy process and its outcomes would focus on three interrelated facets that constitute institutions and form the basis of ideas. Namely, these three distinct facets are text, agency, and the structural context. Analysis of the text [what is said] will provide an interpretation of ideas as defined by social and intersubjective production of meaning, whereas agency [who said what to whom] will inform us of interactively acquired or constituted identities of different actors involved in the decision-making process. Inquiry into the structural context [where, when, how, and why it was said] will explore processes by which meaning is assigned and disseminated and the ability of the actors in constructing agenda, conceptualizing problems, and rendering the uncertain certain. Structural context will also look into the processes and their dispersion in construction of meaning and identities and configuration of power. In the ideational framework of public policy, analysis of text helps us in determining the value dimension of decision-making, and analysis of relationships between language and power and of language, thought, and knowledge within the structural context enables us to position public policy outcomes on the material and instrumental dimensions, respectively. The analysis of structural context informs us of the degree of politics of interests or contestation, whereas the study of actors' identities helps us to contrast public policy outcomes between different dimensions of the ideational framework.

7   Concluding Thoughts

Policy as discourse, as with other forms of discourse analysis, involves exploring the process of meaning creation. Shaw (2010, p. 202) writes, "A policy-as-discourse analysis incorporates qualitative methods to illuminate the processes whereby reality comes into being." Russell et al. argue the same and assert, "Making visible the role of language, argument and discourse in policy discussions has the potential to play an emancipatory role in giving policy makers new insights into their work, and

increasing awareness of the conditions that shape their actions and choices" (Russell et al. 2008, p. 45). For the authors "policy-making in practice depends crucially on what is said, by whom, and on whether others find their arguments persuasive" and, therefore, "require a framework of ideas that addresses the role of language, argument and discourse" (Russell et al. 2008, p. 41). Their basic thesis calls for analyzing policy problems qualitatively and in their social and political context. The main purpose here is to advance the scholarship on policy studies with an interest in ideas and discourse for overcoming theoretical shortcomings. While much of the scholarship is in its nascent stage, essential features of ideational institutionalism are laid out in this chapter by introducing an ideational framework of public policy, which combines cognitive, normative, and material dimensions behind a policy decision.

In contrast to the dominant influence of economics and its positivist scientific methodologies, the development of the field of policy studies, and its theorization, requires a multidisciplinary methodological perspective. By considering interests as just another type of ideas, the ideational framework of public policy is an effort to specify the relationship between ideas and interests. Positivist methodologies are inadequate in dealing with the complexity and subjectivity of policy making processes. Their quest for a single objective reality is neglectful of politics, which is primarily an interpretive and value-driven exercise. This chapter reiterates the postpositivist agenda for future research to study into the role of ideas in shaping expectations of policy actors and influencing policy process.

For empirical researchers, Peter John writes, "Theory in social sciences is usually based on claims about the nature of human action and power relationship, and seeks to provide a coherent and consistent account of reality" (John 2003, p. 482). At a broader level, perhaps then a theory is essentially "a set of analytical principles designed to structure our observations and explanation of the world" (Cairney 2012, p. 5). However, due to the complexity of the policy process that spans over many disciplines and their subfields, there is an absence of a commonly accepted, clearly articulated, and empirically verified theory of public policy (Sabatier 1991, p. 153). The nature of explanation in the policy and planning sciences, writes Frank Fischer (2003, p. 21), "is scarcely straightforward" to serve as basis for guiding social action as it can take numerous forms where no one form is privileged over another. If there is a way out of this for theorists and researchers to this seemingly endless variety of processes to observe, argues John (2003, p. 487), it is in developing a framework with the ability to conceptualize the relationship between core causal processes. The account provided by the proposed ideational framework rests on discursive means and practices that are originated and constituted by "text," "agency," and the "structural context" and result in the construction of ideas. As Schmidt (2008, p. 305) writes, discourse is not just text but also context and not only refers to structure but also to agency. These ideational constructs, in turn, become the basis for policy decisions, central to how policy makers conceive and evaluate their options and how and what they decide. Institutions, in ideational understanding, are then collection of these interrelated ideational constructs that are themselves affected by its institutional environment for their subsequent design and development. Ideational institutionalism, it is contended, has the capacity to inform an endogenous account of complex

institutional evolution, continuation, adaptation, and innovation. This basic claim is tested later in the book by studying one of the social sector legislations—the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012—enacted in Pakistan.

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Part II
Case Studies

The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia

Juan David Rivera Acevedo, Jorge Sellare, and Lina Martínez

1 Introduction

The history of public policy as an academic discipline is an issue not often debated in the literature. However, as in any other discipline, it is important to trace back its roots to understand how it has evolved throughout the years and how it has been structured as a field of research. The history of public policy is of particular interest because the field has, by definition, direct linkages to the "real world" and thus focuses on how theoretical academic knowledge can be used to promote social change.

Although mankind has been conducting policy analysis and giving policy recommendations in one form or another since ancient times, it was only in the late 1960s that the first schools of public policy started emerging. In the United States, this was clearly a response to the growing demand for highly specialized and meticulously trained analysts who could aid the government in improving its performance. Therefore, although the field uses knowledge from other sciences as an input, such as from economics and political science, the study of public policy distinguishes itself from other disciplines because it is intrinsically problem-oriented, multidisciplinary, and value-oriented (Goodin 2008).

It can be misleading to assume that the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline followed a similar process to the one that occurred in the United States.

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Since the origin of academic thought on public policy seems to be related to political processes and needs, its emergence is likely to be country-specific or, at least, region-specific. For this reason, to find out how the discipline originated, a historical analysis focusing on the most influential political actors is required.

In this chapter, we aim to analyze the rise of public policy as an academic discipline in Colombia and how it is related to multilateral financial and development organizations and to actors from the agricultural sector, traditionally the biggest sector in the Colombian economy. Because of the history of the country and its position in the world economy, we hypothesize that despite the importance of the sector for the national economy, the policies that were implemented were a by-product of outside influence for many decades. It was only when Colombia acquired more autonomy in the international scene, especially in the capital markets, that a need to develop a system for designing and understanding policy was identified, which created the still incipient demand for public policy schools.

To undertake this analysis, we use a historical approach starting from the development of policy-making from the beginning of the twentieth century and continuing to the 2000s when public policy emerged as an academic field. We have reviewed historical documents and analyses in order to reconstruct the decision-making rationale and respond to the following questions: How has policy-making evolved in the country? Who have been the main actors? When did public policy emerge as an academic field?

In the following section, we will present the main ideas advocated by international organizations to promote financial stability and development in the developing world, especially in Latin America. Subsequently, in Sects. 3 and 4, we will examine the history of agriculture in Colombia focusing on how its most important institutions were developed and analyze how agricultural policy needs were thought of in the Development Plans after 1970. Lastly, we will conclude by verifying what role academia played in designing policies for the agricultural sector.

2 International Organizations and Ideas for Development

Under the mercantilist economic structure, Colombia and other colonies traded, almost exclusively, with their mother country, providing food and raw materials. Independence, however, brought a bigger trade network, new governments, and new economic models. During the early postcolonial era, Colombia and other Latin-American countries tried to specialize according to their comparative advantages, but the opening to the international economy did not bring the expected growth (Prados de la Escosura 2005). Additionally, the lack of infrastructure prevented any industrial development during this period, which was the reason why raw materials remained the "mainstay" of Latin-American trade (Albert and Society 1983).

Because World War I significantly reduced the supply of manufactured goods from Europe and the United States, the Latin-American countries were forced to produce some industrial goods to face the limitations of the recession. After the war

ended, these new, unprotected industries could not compete with the global supply and went bankrupt. The 1930s Great Depression brought a second opportunity for industrialization in Latin America, but narrow macroeconomic policies and the open market hampered the success of this goal. Only a handful of industries in the biggest Latin-American countries survived (Heenan and Lamontagne 2002).

It was only after World War II that Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) became a deliberated policy for economic development among Latin-American countries. The theoretical foundation of ISI can be traced to the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch and to the creation of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). ISI was advocated for as a policy that would lead Latin-American countries to greater self-sufficiency and create independent economies capable of handling the fluctuations of international trade (Prebisch 1959). Most of the countries of Latin America, including Colombia, accepted the ECLA analysis and embraced the proposed policy (Baer 1972).

The ISI policies were prejudiced against traditional sectors of the economy; the investment of capital resources targeted mainly infant industries, which reduced the capital available for agricultural innovation. Furthermore, overvalued exchange rates favored the import of inputs for the industry, but severely harmed the agricultural field's competitiveness by increasing the opportunity cost of exports. At the same time, higher industrial prices and price controls of agricultural goods turned the internal trade against domestic agriculture (Baer 1972).

Paradoxically, while the intention of the policies was to strengthen the economies to be independent and capable of handling the fluctuations of international trade, the result was that Colombia and other Latin-American countries were in a new and riskier dependency relationship with industrial countries. As Baer explained:

> In former times, a decline in export receipts acted as a stimulus to ISI. Under the circumstances, a decline in export receipts not counterbalanced by capital inflows can result in forced import curtailments which, in turn, could cause an industrial recession. Such results have been experienced by Argentina and Colombia, and other countries face the same danger. (1972, p. 106)

Latin-American countries remained dependent on the world economy and were unable to escape the influence of foreign markets and finance (Heenan and Lamontagne 2002). Furthermore, the ISI policy created a low labor absorption rate. Cheap credit was channeled into favored industries. At the same time, though, labor legislations were passed in several countries to guarantee high industrial wages, which resulted in incentives to not adopt labor-intense techniques of production. This fact neglected the expansion of certain sectors, such as low-income housing, transportation, agriculture, and other infrastructure facilities, which led to the countries facing severe bottlenecks (Baer 1972; Franko 2007).

While Latin-American countries were trying to implement ISI, the industrialized nations were rebuilding the international monetary system by creating International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), today's World Bank Group. During its early years, the IMF showed less interest in developing countries and focused primarily on developed states.

However, the IMF underwent a structural transformation over time. Babb and Buira identified three phases of transformation and increased conditionality (2004). The initial phase was the establishment of fiscal and monetary conditions toward the balance of payments (see Babb and Buira 2004, p. 7; Mussa and Savastano 1999, p. 82). The second phase introduced the right to pursue policy reforms in debtor nations (Doyle 2012). Finally, the third phase led to the introduction of liberalizing governance, the adoption of the Washington Consensus, and other reforms since the 1980s (Babb and Buira 2004).

The eruption of the Third World Debt Crisis in 1982 eradicated the ideals of material abundance and social welfare in Colombia and other Latin-American countries (Herrera and Acevedo 2004). The IMF played an instrumental role in preventing a greater disaster by keeping the governments from defaulting. At the same time, the Fund required banks to grant loans and restructure their existing debt (Babb and Buira 2004).

From 1982 on, the IMF began to require structural reforms that aimed at the fundamental transformation of the underlying institutions governing national economies (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2011; Doyle 2012).

The structural conditionality of the IMF was based on the premise that the best recipe for growth lies in the market liberalization, privatization, monetary stability, and reduction of the role of the state, regardless of the constitutional, structural, and regulatory framework and capabilities of the countries (Stiglitz 2003).

The IMF and Colombia had a very close relationship from 1999 to 2006. The Colombian government had regular meetings with the IMF staff to verify the progress of the conditions imposed to access the loans. Particularly during the economic crisis of 1999, the conditions included macroeconomic and financial policies, fiscal policy adjustment, monetary and exchange rate policies, financial sector restructuration, external sector policies, structural reforms, and social and anti-drug policies. The nature of this condition can be verified in the Letters of Intention (LOI) from Colombia to the IMF. The conditions changed over the years, but the targets remained the same. Only after October 2006 was Colombia able to gain access to the sovereign bonds market at payable interest rates and reduce the influence of the IMF on internal policies.

3 The Agricultural Sector and Its Relevance in the Colombian Policy-Making Process

3.1 The Rise of Agricultural Organizations and Financial Institutions

At the turn of the twentieth century, Colombian politics were going against the mainstream liberal economic approach that was being followed in Latin America. While other countries in the region were enjoying the benefits of massive foreign

investment and increased exports, Colombia was going through a civil war that culminated in the Conservative Hegemony, the period between 1886 and 1930 in which a conservative and interventionist state was in force (Bergquist 1981; Posada 2002). Its strong opposition to liberal ideas alongside fluctuations in the international price of coffee, destruction of the infrastructure needed for the transportation of commodities, and the utilization of resources from the National Bank to finance the army left the country in an impaired economic situation (Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002).

With the closure of the Congress in the beginning of the 1900s, the liberal opposition grew stronger. In this context, the SAC (Colombian Farmers Association) was created as a guild that would advocate for the interests of the agricultural sector and its supporting industries, promoting public debates and the integration between producers (Bejarano 1985). Throughout its existence, the SAC has been an important actor in the development of the agricultural sector, currently working as a consultative body for the government on agricultural issues through its participation in a number of commissions and technical councils. According to the organization, it represents the interests of 31 of the main guilds of the agroindustry, which together account for 80% of the GDP of the sector (SAC 2013).

The liberals progressively gained more political space throughout the first 30 years of the twentieth century, but when they finally rose back to power in 1930, the world was going through the Great Depression, and, in order to overcome the economic crisis, they had to hold back their reformist drive and conform to some extent to the idea of a centralist and interventionist state. However, if the liberal government had some constraints at the macroeconomic level, it had the possibility to promote significant reforms on internal issues, such as education. The new universal and secular educational system proposed by the liberals gave farmers better conditions to deal with new and more technical methods to grow crops according to their needs (Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002). In addition, Bejarano points out that the promotion of infrastructure development helped link farmers to markets, urbanization created a demand for new agricultural products in the cities, and the protectionism boosted the expansion of some crops (1985).

The growing importance of coffee in the Colombian economy and the coordinated representation of farmers by the SAC and by the Federation of Coffee Growers gave these actors more power to influence politics on the macro level. During the 1930s, these actors successfully opposed the government at least three times. The Federation of Coffee Growers made the government of Enrique Olaya devaluate the peso to make coffee more competitive in the international market, as opposed the Brazilian proposal to regulate the market, which showed that the Colombian coffee growers wanted to establish their commercial policies by themselves and influenced the tax reforms from López Pumarejo's government to benefit the coffee regions (Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002).[1]

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[1]The available literature about the SAC and its effectiveness as a pressure group is scattered and sometimes contradictory. While some scholars challenge the importance of *gremios* in influencing policy-making, others stress the importance of the political elements of these agricultural groups,

Just like other sectors in the economy, agriculture depends heavily on well-established financial institutions to support the investments in the sector and thus its development. Colombia entered the twentieth century with hyperinflation, reaching 398.9% in 1901, which greatly devalued the Colombian peso. This situation was mainly caused by an ineffective National Bank that was indiscriminately issuing money to finance the government's expenses during the Thousand Days War since the government could not access international credit due to its failure to pay its debts (Meisel 1990). In order to help Colombia overcome its financial crisis, the government asked the State Department of the United States for financial advisory help, which was provided in 1923 by the Kemmerer Mission, led by Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer. The recommendations made by the Mission resulted in the creation of the Bank of the Republic, the implementation of new budgetary laws and controls, and the establishment of modern supervision and administration of banks, customs, and duties (Seidel 1972).

The creation of a Central Bank was possible thanks to the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, which ensured that Colombia received 25 million dollars as compensation for the loss of Panama. This compensation required, however, that Colombia create a Central Bank that should collect the old paper currency that had previously been issued and facilitate the country's return to the gold standard, which Colombia had abandoned during the 1880s. At that moment, a new financial system was established with commercial banks that revolved around the Bank of the Republic and provided differentiated discount rates to finance specific sectors of the economy (Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002).

Due to the poor economic situation caused by the 1929 crisis and because of pressure to create public banks to fund the debtors in the agricultural sector, the government created the Colombian Credit Corporation and the Agrarian Fund. Also during this time, the Bank of the Republic was reformed to include two new seats on its Board of Directors that were given to representatives of the agricultural sector: one to the SAC and the other to the Federation of Coffee Growers. This financial structure would last in Colombia until the second half of the twentieth century (Kalmanovitz and Avella 1998; Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002). However, the presence of these actors in the political arena and access to credit did not translate into a competitive advantage for the largest commodity producers.

It was during the second and third decades of the twentieth century that Colombia recovered access to international credit with the opening of branches of foreign banks. At the same time, the government created various financial institutions in an attempt to attract long-term foreign credit, which, given the gold standard, would translate into lower interest rates (Mora Cuartas et al. 2011; Kalmanovitz and Enciso

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especially in the first half of the twentieth century (e.g., Machado 2001). The most prominent study on the history of the SAC is arguably the one conducted by Bejarano (1985) under a request from the SAC itself. Regarding the agrarian reform, the information about the position of the SAC is not completely uniform either. Although most scholars argue that the SAC opposed land reform presents evidence of directors of the SAC arguing in favor of the agrarian reform, which at the very least shows that there were divergent opinions within guilds.

2002). The Colombian Credit Corporation, the Agrarian Fund, and, more recently, FINAGRO are among the public and private institutions that were established to support the development of the agricultural sector.

Alongside the creation of financial institutions, this sector was the recipient of subsidies that were overwhelmingly collected by those who are well-off. In most of the cases, subsidies are planned to be temporary measures to provide producers income support to overcome time-specific circumstances. Nevertheless, subsidies tend to become institutionalized, in particular those beneficiating coffee growers (World Bank 2003).

3.2   Coffee Grower's Contributions to Social Policies

In Colombia, policy formulation for the agricultural sector is a central element in the formulation of long-term government plans. It is highly important not just in response to the protagonist role that key players have taken, but also because the economic dynamic of this sector directly benefits the rural population (Moreno et al.). The Coffee Growers Federation has greatly influenced policy-making in Colombia and has been able to influence policies that directly benefit its sector. However, the full picture would be incomplete if one does not take into account the Federation's important contribution to the social development of the coffee regions, in particular in the design and implementation of educational policies.

For more than 40 years, the Coffee Growers Federation has been investing heavily in improving the educational system for more than 500,000 families in the coffee region. The rationale of this intervention is the increase in human capital and educational levels to ensure that coffee growers are able to adopt technological changes to make them more competitive and improve their quality of life. The scope of this intervention includes partnerships with the government to improve school infrastructure, the development of educational methodologies (*escuela nueva y posprimaria*) to improve the educational outcomes of farmers, and the creation of centers of higher education. All of these strategies, in particular those that have been developed in elementary schools, significantly improved the educational outcomes of coffee growers' families (CRECE 1999).

Among the major contributions of the implementation of this strategy, there have been an increase of educational access, expanding access to more than 12,000 students in rural areas; an increase in more than 5 years of average schooling for the new coffee growers generation (CRECE 1999); and a significant increase in educational quality as measured by scores on standardized tests (UNESCO 1998; Bogoya Maldonado 2001). Evaluations of the educational system implemented in partnership with the Coffee Growers Federation indicate that educational programs using the methodology developed for coffee regions are more cost-effective in terms of access, survival, and learning. This strategy has also been shown to have an impact on productivity and in creating incentives for young coffee growers to stay in the coffee industry instead of migrating to urban settings (Moore et al. 2010).

4 Actors and Ideologies Behind the Colombian Development Plans

4.1 Early Socioeconomic Planning

The Colombian economy continued to grow, boosted by the high price of coffee in the international market that persisted until the 1950s. While the prices for coffee were high, the government was exercising rigid control on international trade by increasing tariffs, a measure that was contrary to the general trend established by the Bretton Woods Agreement. With the fall of coffee prices in 1955, Colombia experienced a severe economic crisis, leading to an increase of the external debt, a decrease in access to credit, and political instability. In order to overcome the economic and political crisis, the liberal and the conservative parties made a coalition called *Frente Nacional* that lasted from 1958 until 1974 and implemented the mechanism of development planning, which included the commitment to institute a land reform process. During this period, the economic policies implemented had a very interventionist character, granting subsidized credit to both the agricultural and industrial sectors and aiming to meet the demands for public services (Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2003).

Kalmanovitz and Enciso (2003) further argue that the debates about the agricultural sector were based on the diagnosis made by a mission from the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) led by Lauchlin Currie. The mission identified a disproportionate relationship between the number of inhabitants in rural areas and their productivity, mainly because of sub-utilization of the most fertile land. One of the main recommendations given by Currie's team was to tax the ownership of the land progressively, in order to push tenants to either intensify their productivity or to sell underutilized lands to reduce the taxes that had to be paid. In addition, Currie proposed incentives to increase migration from the fields to the city, because he believed that agricultural production could be increased and become more competitive without any additional labor by using more modern techniques and achieving economies of scale. However, the government declined Currie's proposal and opted for the *Plan Decenal*, which was based on the ECLA's ideas.

Due to high unemployment, growing tensions in rural areas, and the appearance of guerrilla groups, development was thought in terms of changing rural structures, i.e., to reduce the income differences between rural and urban populations through redistribution of social benefits and promotion of land reform, thus keeping the population in the rural areas.

From 1970 on, each government had to present its own development plan for the country. The first development plan, presented by Pastrana Borrero (DNP 1970), was based on Currie's idea that growth could be achieved by supporting the construction sector and by aiming production at the international market, matching it with a more egalitarian distribution of income. In contrast, the following development plan, from López Michelsen (DNP 1975), had a critical view of the interventionist character that the state had been presenting since the Great Depression and

proposed fighting social inequality by implementing elements of a free market. During his mandate, we can also see a change in the agro-industrial policy, which was more concerned with increasing productivity and exportation than with land tenancy and rural income.

We can identify different views of development planning throughout the 1980s. Turbay's administration focused on the infrastructure sector and on granting more autonomy to the regions. It also benefited from changes in the international financial situation and from the good moment of the coffee to finance its investment (DNP 1979). The *momentum* refers to high prices for coffee at the time, equal to more disposable income for investments. Betancurt sought to boost the economy by emphasizing social housing and specific sectorial policies aimed at improving industry and agriculture. He wanted to have a large supply of agricultural products, which would provide plenty of food at low cost, as well as increase exports and thus increase the demand for industrialized goods (DNP 1983). The last government of this decade pursued a combined social development and economic growth approach, making use of programs created in previous administrations and stimulating private investment by restructuring the system of prices (DNP 1987).

In the early 1990s, Gaviria affirmed that the government would depart from the interventionist model of development from the ECLA and implement a more open model, one that was subject to competitiveness and with more equality and opportunities for citizens (DNP 1990). The promulgation of the new Constitution in 1991 established a process of democratization and social participation that defined new commitments for the government. In 1994, the development plan of the Samper administration tried to honor its social duties by prioritizing social investments, infrastructure, and modernization of the army (DNP 1994). Several national and international thinkers such as Joaquin Bernal, Paul Krugman, and Marcelo Selowsky influenced the direction of the Samper administration's economic growth, social equality, and fiscal policy strategies (ibid). However, the ambitious social programs were truncated by political and institutional scandals, low economic growth, and the rising power of insurgent groups that led to over one million displaced families (see *Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento* (CODHES)).

To fight the high levels of insecurity and to boost the Colombian economy, Andrés Pastrana proposed a plan based on exports, decentralization, and a potential peace treaty with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC in Spanish) (DNP 1998). Nevertheless, during this period, Colombia experienced its first economic recession in more than six decades, which was only exacerbated by the 1999 earthquake at the Colombian Coffee Growers Axis (Hudson 2010). Furthermore, the peace talks did not succeed, in part because US influence transformed the Plan Colombia to focus more on curtailing drug trafficking and strengthening the military, rather than on social development (Livingstone and Pearce 2004).

4.2 Peace, Growth, and Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century

The aforementioned situations help us understand how Alvaro Uribe, a low-profile presidential candidate, positioned himself alongside US interests and won the 2002 election with the clear proposition of fighting the FARC in his so-called democratic security. His development plan also included re-establishing the legitimacy of public institutions, job creation, and promotion of sustainable economic growth (DNP 2002). Uribe's administration restored investor confidence through security and open-market policies. The expansion of the mining and hydrocarbon industries helped the economy grow 4.6% on average from 2002 to 2006 (BanRep 2013). Economic stability and his popularity helped influence Congress to amend the Constitution and allowed Uribe to run for a second consecutive presidential term, which was up until then unconstitutional in Colombia.

Thanks to his successful development plan and a continuation of the "democratic security" policy, Uribe was easily elected for a second term (DNP 2006). Furthermore, the relative stability of the country allowed him to expand his conditional cash transfer program *Familias en Acción* to reduce poverty, pursue free trade agreements (e.g., the United States and South Korea), and establish an ambitious program based on the trickle-down theory for the agricultural recovery program named AIS (*Agro Ingreso Seguro* in Spanish).

After 8 years of growth and political stability, Colombia was facing the future with optimism and hope for continued progress. In this context, Juan Manuel Santos, who was endorsed by Uribe, won the presidential election. In contrast to Uribe's vision, Santos based his development plan on the Third Way ideology, and he also opened the door for peace talks with the FARC. This way of thinking allows the markets to work as far as possible to engender entrepreneurship and wealth creation while involving the state to promote development based on social justice. Santo's plan focused on education, inequality reduction, regional convergence within Colombia, and macroeconomic stability (DNP 2010). During Santos's first term, the economy had performed remarkably (the GDP grew 4.8% between 2010 and 2013) together with a stable macroeconomic basis (BanRep 2013). Furthermore, the peace talks, which officially started in September 2012, gained broad international support. With these successes, Santos was reelected in 2014 for a second presidential term.

The current development plan for Colombia is based on three pillars: peace, social equality, and education. This plan is also heavily influenced by the Third Way ideology by striving for social mobility, governmental compliance, and large investments in infrastructure, innovation, and competitiveness (DNP 2014). The current peace talks with the FARC also include new rural development plans, like the "Comprehensive Agricultural Development Policy" (*Política de desarrollo agrario integral*), which reflects the growing importance of agricultural policies in Colombia. Furthermore, in the last few years, there has been a rise in influential think tanks and institutions in the formulation of bottom-up agricultural policies, such as the

International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) (Jarvis and Carbonari 2014; Parra-Peña et al. 2014).

5 The Introduction of New Public Management in Colombia: New Approach to Policy-Making

The enactment of the new Constitution in 1991 changed the political landscape and the formulation of public policy in many significant ways in the country. The process of democratization and the permanent assistance of Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) allowed profound changes in the government's structure and the adoption of tools and models to improve policy-making (Sagasti 2002). One of the major shifts during this period was the introduction of New Public Management (NPM). This model was aimed at maximizing public value and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the government using a more flexible approach of administrative structures within the government (Echebarria 2006). One of the key components of NPM was the availability of good quality data and information in order to better identify social needs to improve the process of problem identification as well as the formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of public policies. For the first time, data and information were at the center of public policy formulation (CLAD-BID 2007).

One reason for the implementation of NPM in the government was the need to attach interventions to measurable results. During the 1980s there were important investments in social policies; however their impact was negligible and sometimes even negative on social and economic development. To tackle this problem, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Los Andes University started a program for the first time to train civil servants and professionals in monitoring and evaluation, information gathering, and system production, as well as teaching them about promoting effectiveness and efficiency in government spending (DNP 2010). It was only in the 1990s that a culture of evaluation started to permeate public administration as consequence of the requirements made by international organizations to access foreign loans.

One of the conditions imposed by MDB was the incorporation of monitoring and evaluation systems in all projects that were financed by multilateral organizations. The final objective was to build the capacity within the government to be able to attribute changes in social outcomes to program implementation. These requirements also came along with technical assistance provided by multilateral organizations to help governmental offices rigorously design and implement public policy initiatives. This context was the platform for a sense of renewal in the government toward "management for results," which had two main purposes. On the one hand, it was a process to encourage comprehensive management and institutional capacity among civil servants. On the other hand, "management for results" seeks to establish

a new relationship between the state and citizens as mandated in the Constitution through civil participation (DNP 1995).

The 1990s came with important developments in the evaluation of public policies. From the government, the creation of SINERGIA in 1994 as part of the Department of National Planning (DNP in Spanish) was the stepping stone to the creation of an evaluation branch to determine the effectiveness of public investments and public policy implementation (DNP 2010). SINERGIA was created with the main objective of providing data to policy-makers and improving decision-making processes in the country. The data has been used to craft and define objectives attached to quantified indicators of National Development Plans as well as investment projects.

Academia also contributed to this reform. The consolidation of Los Andes University and Javeriana University, in particular the school of economics, provided the technical knowledge needed to undertake the rigorous process of policy evaluation. During this process, the consolidation of COLCIENCIAS and the access to loans provided by the Inter-American Development Bank, aimed at improving the qualification of higher education professors, allowed professionals to access Master and PhD programs at universities outside the country (Salazar 2013). This process was pivotal to the emerging of qualified professionals in academia and government. It was only in 2001 that the first master program of government and public policy was opened at Externado University. Afterward, other similar programs were created, but only in major cities. The consolidation of public policy and economic programs benefitted and strengthened policy formulation in the country, in particular national policies, including early education (Bernal and Fernandez 2013; Bernal and Camacho 2011), social mobility (Gaviria 2007), rural development, and conflict (Ibañez Londoño et al. 2013).

Nevertheless, the nature of the research traditionally undertaken in academia, in particular its theoretical focus and methods, is often irrelevant to real policy problems. Time constraints, political ideologies, lack of resources, and works published in foreign languages are some of the factors that inhibit policy-makers from effectively using research developed in academia internationally. As professors and researchers become more qualified, questions relevant for policy-makers are studied using elaborated methodologies that add little to possible courses of action in the policy-making process (Coleman 1991; Davies 1999). Government, on the other hand, relies too heavily on paradigms and general rules of thumb to make decisions and implement public policies (Van Bergeijk 1997). Much of the policy-making process is based on policy transfer or political ideologies of the government in place. An example of this is the implementation of a major social policy in the country. "*Familias en Acción*," a cash transfer policy that benefits more than 2.5 million families, was based on a conditional cash transfer policy from Mexico (BID-INDES 2011).

To bridge the gap between academics and government, the country has witnessed the emergence of think tanks and research centers during the past few years. In particular, Fedesarrollo has been an important influence in policy formulation on the national level. These institutions have become pivotal in providing relevant information to policy-makers and making research developed by academics accessible to

the public. One fact that has become clear in the policy process is that policy-makers do not face a lack of information. On the contrary, information is abundant and comes from different sources: academia, advisors, civil society, and multilateral organizations, among other groups. What think tanks and research centers do, though, is focus and shed light on the policy side of the information produced (Salazar 2009).

Another source of information that think tanks and academia have used to help the policy-making process and demand transparency and results is public opinion surveys (Manza and Cook 2002). During the last decade, Colombia witnessed the consolidation of public opinion systems in which academia, the private sector, and grass roots organizations have become important actors. For instance, the network of cities *Cómo Vamos* (How are We Doing) is a citizens' initiative that is responsible for assessing and monitoring the changes in the levels of quality of life in cities where it operates. Furthermore, it tracks the district administrations on their compliance with the commitments made in the Development Plans, taking into account both technical indicators and public perception. This initiative started in Bogotá and was later implemented in large metropolitan areas in Colombia.

6 Conclusion

In this contribution, we reviewed the history of public policy in Colombia by looking at some key national and international actors as a means to understand how the academic discipline originated in the country. We started with the hypothesis that specialized policy research was only needed, and thus only originated, after Colombia obtained more political and economic autonomy in the world system. To verify our original proposition, we analyzed the role that international organizations and political-economic national actors—here represented by stakeholders from the agricultural sector—had in the historic development of policy-making and policy research since the beginning of the twentieth century. We have found that these stakeholders influenced the policy-making process in the country, but other forces and actors were far more influential.

Our study has shown that throughout most of its history, Colombia has been influenced by international actors and has frequently adopted foreign ideas and models of development to base its own policies on. In the beginning of the last century, under the Conservative Hegemony and the influence of the SAC, the Coffee Growers Federation and other agricultural actors, the country was indeed going against the mainstream economic ideologies. However, from the 1920s on, Colombia started feeling the influence of international actors more strongly (Thomson-Urrutia Treaty and Kemmerer Mission) and began to import foreign models of development, especially after the 1950s when it consciously adopted the ISI model. In the 1990s, Colombia seemed more committed to complying with the demands of the IMF in order to gain access to loans and access international markets. Because of the country's competitive advantage in agriculture, the *apertura* was actually supported

by most of the guilds represented by the SAC, especially by those who were ready to engage in an export-oriented business model.

After analyzing the history of the Colombian agricultural sector and the Development Plans that reshaped the country's approach to policy-making in the 1970s, we identified several events where either national advocacy groups or international actors exerted influence over the policy choices made. However, we did not find any document pointing to the presence and relevance of academic institutions in influencing or informing the policy-making process.

Although we were correct to affirm that public policy emerged in Colombia as an academic discipline in the context of the gradual independence of the country from international financial institutions, the assumption of causality does not hold. Despite its comfortable economic situation, Colombia today still needs to borrow from Multilateral Development Banks and other international donors to implement its most ambitious sectorial policies and programs. To illustrate this situation, in 2014, the IDB alone approved US$2745.40 million to co-finance various projects from the Colombian government (IDB 2015). However, because these loans require monitoring and evaluation to hold their borrowers accountable and to identify best practices for development programs, the demand for a specific kind of professional was created. In this context, the first academic programs in public policy originated.

The academic field in Colombia is rather underdeveloped, but has potential for growth. The DNP and other regional government actors have been increasingly working together with think tanks and research centers, such as CIAT, FEDESARROLLO, and POLIS, who depend on policy analysts and other practitioners to build their workforce. This increases the demand for professionals trained in implementing and evaluating public policies and in making sense of unstructured data to inform decision-makers. Nevertheless, the relationship between academia and governmental institutions has weak ties. The DNP is not in the hands of technocrats, but rather, it has become politicized, and just like other regional political organizations, it fears the political cost of studies that might show that the monetary investment made in some policies did not result in a real impact for the population.

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Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic Discipline in Brazil: Push or Pull?

Raphael Zimmermann Robiatti

1 Introduction

Brazil is still a relatively young democracy. The current constitution enacted in 1988, frequently referred to as *Constituição Cidadã* (Citizen's Constitution), is a cornerstone of the post-military period and a symbol of the re-democratization. For the first time in the Brazilian republican history, the constitution would, at least legally, recognize the existence of fundamental rights for groups who had their social and political participation systematically hindered, not only during the dictatorship itself, but also in previous so-called democratic governments.

The extension of political and social rights also provided an opportunity for the ample discussion of other matters that were largely secluded from the public, largely due to the strong political control of the public institutions and media during the military dictatorship. Social issues were suddenly brought to the attention of the public and consequently to the academic debate. The awareness of problems afflicting the country increased: extreme poverty, poorly distributed healthcare, unacceptable labor conditions, continuous human rights violations, and many other issues started to emerge as problems to be tackled by the new democratic state. In the wake of re-democratization, the population was called to vote, participate, and endorse the government that should take on the reins and provide an answer to the new emerging demands. Effective solutions, information, and know-how, however, were still lacking.

The end of the dictatorship also led to the necessity of deep state reformation, not only to cope with the newly established democratic status and procedures to ensure transparency and accountability, but also to address the poor economic performance of the country. After years under a developmentalist economic policy with very high levels of state participation and interventionism, Brazil had the challenge of

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"downsizing government" while simultaneously improving its efficiency. How the country would manage to achieve those goals within that very delicate moment of transformation in the political, economic, and social fields was still unclear.

This chapter aims to analyze the process by which public policy emerged as an academic discipline in Brazil. By dividing it into three different cycles, the study seeks to provide a better understanding of the process' timeline, mainly focusing on two driving forces: the undertaken state reformation and the opening for democratic participation. The effect of such factors on the emergence of the public policy field will be assessed based on indicators such as the number and distribution of study programs, availability and access to specific publications, funding structures, and the production of research within the field.

The chapter is divided into six sections. Following this first and introductory part, the second section offers a review of the military period, discussing some of its characteristics in detail that help to understand why the development of public policy studies was hindered and happened so late in comparison to the USA, for example. The third section deals with the re-democratization process and outlines how a convergence of diverse factors influenced and contributed to the inception of public policy in the academic debate. The fourth section narrates the emergence of the three tracks that constitute the area of public policy studies in Brazil, contextualizing the creation of public administration, public policy, and public policy management programs. The fifth section entails the detailed analysis of the current situation of the public policy disciplines in Brazil by outlining and discussing its potential and challenges for the future. Finally, the sixth and last section contains the conclusion of the paper. It summarizes the main problems and arguments of the presented research and provides a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening teaching and studies in the area of public policy in Brazil.

2 The Military Period: 1964–1986

This section discusses some of the most important characteristics of the military dictatorship period in Brazil with regard to its strong state control, the curtailment of individual liberties, and the strict focus on economic development. The objective is to analyze and demonstrate how the conjecture ultimately hindered the development of public policy as an academic discipline.

2.1 The Minimization of the Public Sphere

The military dictatorship that seized power in Brazil during the early 1960s was characterized, as many others of its kind, by the control over the media, limitations of artistic productions, and the suppression of civil and political liberties. Over time, the intensity of this political control varied, oscillating between moments of

permissiveness and moments of very tight control and persecution (Codato 2005). Individuals could not manifest their political views or any criticism without being labeled "revolutionary," "state enemy," and/or "communist," among other designations. They could be arrested, incarcerated, tortured, and even killed in the name of political stability and the establishment. Many people who were not involved in political activism whatsoever were investigated by the intelligence police and many times found guilty without a proper trial and with rights to a legal defense being systematically curtailed. There was a general feeling, which is common to many dictatorial and totalitarian regimes, of constant surveillance. Certain groups were de facto under the military's closest observation, for example, union leaders, journalists, artists, and academics (Gaspari 2014a).

The interest of the military in academia had a particularly strong effect on the academic output during that period. Many professors and students were arrested, censored, and persecuted due to alleged "involvement with subversive activities." The regime also created investigatory units to operate undercover inside the universities in order to feed the secret service information about possible threats to "national security" (Motta 2014). The dynamics described above generated a certain degree of co-optation of the universities by and for the regime, restraining the extent to which research, teaching, and discussion could freely flourish.

Freedom of information was nonexistent, since information was also completely controlled by the state. Media were submitted for official governmental review before publication, and often reporters' original contents were substituted for pro-government news and propaganda. The usage of disinformation via publication of tampered pieces was intended to protect the government from critique from the public. The same rationale was applied to the release of official data: economic, social, and political indicators were also unreliable, making it very hard to have access to real information. The political order obliterated social participation to greatly reduced levels, either by persecution and fear or simply by shrinking the public sphere (Gaspari 2014b).

2.2 The Focus on Economic Development

The military administrations in Brazil were notably engaged in development policies aimed at "catching up" with developed countries. There was a very strong focus on promoting development through state-led investments in infrastructure and industry, which generated an economy-based approach to policy. The evaluation of the implemented public policies was focused on the economic gains that would result from them and also on their potential to project the country as an increasingly important player internationally.

Some sectors regarded as key areas to promote development were highly privileged during the years of military rule. The government gave away concessions to companies from these sectors so that they could operate largely on a monopoly-like basis (Cysne 1993). Civil construction and heavy industry, for example, had

very close ties with the military government, which allowed them to exert particular influence in policy design. They did this either by reporting their "concerns" and providing "recommendations" or by giving in-depth assessments of specific legislation relative to their activities. Many other actors representing other interest groups would attempt to influence the policy design process, something that is widely accepted and part of the political process, including democratic societies. The difference in that case was the disproportionate amount of influence that was granted to such special interests at the expense of participation of the general public, which was, obviously, entirely excluded from the political process. The policy process was not, of course, completely controlled by special interest. Governmental institutions conducted viability studies for the design of policies and also evaluated the implementation and indicators of past efforts. The focus of such studies was, however, very specific and their results were not transparent at all.

The common element in most parts of the state-led intellectual production was the focus on very particular policy areas with specific interest on economic impact. This resulted in a lack of more comprehensive studies that included other important aspects that are also results of policy implementation and go beyond the economy. While the government targeted economic problems such as foreign trade, industrial production, and infrastructure development, the upsurge of social problems such as extreme poverty and the growing gap between rich and poor was overlooked. The military period represented one of the worst times in Brazilian modern history in terms of income concentration and decay of other social development indicators (Hoffman 1986). The steep social disparity contributed even more to the exclusion of a big segment of the population from meaningful political representation.

The end of the military dictatorship period would bring new dynamics for the Brazilian society and not only in terms of increased political participation and the development of new institutions. The focus of policies also shifted from the pursuit of strict economic objectives toward the improvement of social conditions. This opened the country's and policymakers' eyes to the real situation of most part of its population in terms of social development indicators, what partly explains the higher demand for understanding the sources of these problems. The development of public policy as an academic discipline would be instrumental in that matter.

3   The Democratic Re-establishment

A transition process to the liberal-democratic regime characterized the last years of the military dictatorship period. In 1979, both political parties that took turns governing during the military period were extinct. In 1980, workers went on strike for the first time in many years. In 1982, direct elections for state governors were held, opening up space to the first indirect elections for president with an actual opposition party, in 1985. This process culminated in direct elections for president in 1989 (Codato 2005). The final phase of the military period, from the 1979 to 1986, represented a gradual opening-up process in which political persecution and

censorship slowly declined. This process created the necessary conditions to restore the public sphere in Brazil with the reactivation of media's participation and the contribution of multiple civil society groups that started to form.

The "liberation" of the public sphere ended up raising awareness about many issues that have been mostly ignored during the military period. Social policies that were largely "privatized" during the military regime started to be handed back to the state as the political situation started to change (Martine 1989). The restoration of direct elections also shifted the political approach to social problems such as poverty, low education, and the restricted access to basic services. Given the fact that politicians began to compete for popular votes, many populations, especially those that had historically been excluded from the political process, started to receive more attention from politicians. These politicians, and to some extend the government, began to direct their campaigns at these previously marginalized populations. Social problems became a matter that had to be tackled and targeted by the public sector (Nunes 1997). As a consequence, academia developed a great interest in researching and comparing the global approaches to solve such problems and how they could be applied in Brazil.

The political transition also heavily impacted other governmental institutions in Brazil. The democratic awakening demanded changes in the structures of executive agencies, public companies, and bureaucratic services on many different levels. Driven by forces of democratization, transparency, and accountability, the federal government went through an intense transformation in line with the doctrine of the New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991) which became increasingly influential since the beginning of the 1980s. NPM substantially modified the way the public administration was understood and also influenced academic research to a certain degree. Institutionalism and public sector reforms progressively became prevailing topics.

The state reformation and reopening for social participation were the two main driving forces behind the establishment of public policy as an independent academic discipline in Brazil (Arretche 2003). On the one hand, the reform of the Brazilian state demanded not only the necessary know-how but also professionals that could work in the newly envisioned bureaucracy. On the other hand, the increasing social participation revealed many problems that needed to be addressed by the new democratic governments. Most of those issues were reminiscent of the military regime, relating to the poor social and living conditions. From the confluence of those factors emerges the necessity of understanding how the public sector could target and solve these problems.

4 The Development of Public Policy as an Academic Discipline

In Brazil, public policy studies are now generally divided into three different tracks, each of them having a specific undergraduate program focusing on its area of concentration: public administration, public policy, and public policy management.

Those programs were initially very different from one another because they were created in different periods of time and thus with specific objectives. However, over time, they somehow developed toward a common path. The sections below will discuss each of them individually, contextualizing their creation and considering their objectives.

4.1 Demand for Bureaucrats: Public Administration Programs

The first school of public administration in Brazil and in Latin America was created by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) under the name *Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública* (*EBAP*) (Brazilian School of Public Administration), in 1952 (Pinto and Motter Junior 2012). Its main objective was to develop research and disseminate the latest trends in the field of public administration through the exchange of knowledge with schools in the USA, for example, with the University of South California (Nicolini 2003). Eventually, in 1960, the first postgraduate program in public administration started to be offered. The strongest force pushing for the creation of a public administration program was the modernization process of the Brazilian civil service that started in the late 1940s. This process created a demand for specific technocratic managerial knowledge, which was largely unavailable in the country. In those days, public sector employees were mostly economists and lawyers. The situation only started to change in 1962 when the profession "public administrator" and the specific requirements necessary to undertake civil service contracts were finally established by law (de Coelho 2006).

The approval of the law pushed other important universities to start offering public administration programs. This was the case for the University of São Paulo (USP), the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), and the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA). Public administration programs were at that point very technical and emphasized the subjects that were seen as the most important for training a typical public administrator: law, mathematics, statistics, accounting, and management. In short, the public administration programs aimed at meeting the huge demand for civil servants, which was the objective that dominated public policy studies for a considerably long period of time.

The end of the military period brought, as previously mentioned, a new reality for the political and social orders in Brazil. The newly established democratic regime called for public participation and had the challenge of being more inclusive than the military had been. The process of opening for social participation in conjunction with the reformation the state was undergoing created an interesting scenario (Farah 2011). Political scientists increasingly began to research public policy and, in particular, the social aspects of it. Political science programs in Brazil date back to the 1970s (Brazilian Ministry of Education 2014), but it was not until the end of the military dictatorship that the output of research and teaching in the public policy field

started to rapidly increase. There was a notable difference in the new modality of public policy research in comparison to that of the traditional public administration programs that inaugurated the first cycle. By the end of the military period, the interdisciplinary approach put forth by political science was gaining momentum.

4.2   Democracy and the New Order: Public Policy Programs

In 1983, the National Association of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Social Sciences (ANPOCS) established a working group for public policy, opening up a space for the discussion of topics related to the theme. In 1985, the first institution within a university with a main focus on evaluation of public policy was set up in Brazil-the Center for Public Policy Studies (NEPP)[1] of the University of Campinas. Afterward, other academic centers started to promote research and teaching of public policy (Melo 1999). That was the beginning of the second cycle of the development of public policy as a discipline in the country.

The output from this second cycle is very much characterized by the concerns that afflicted the country during the immediate period after the end of the military regime. The research production focused greatly on the effects of public policy on the institutional aspects of the transition to democracy such as direct elections and the reorganization of institutions, for example. What effects would be expected from the decentralization process by which states and municipalities were empowered? How would the emergence of new interest groups affect the policy agenda setting? What approaches had to be used in order to fulfill social objectives and address the "social debt"? Those, among others, were the problems and questions that the new emerging public policy programs were set to dwell upon (Frey 2000). There was still very little coordination between the many studies that were produced, and it cannot be said that there was a deliberate and concise attempt to construct a new field of study. Nonetheless, public policy was certainly institutionalized as an autonomous field within the social sciences (Souza 2003a).

In contrast to the first cycle, when the focus of study was on the application of management tools and strategies to the public sector without necessarily taking into account the nuances of the sociopolitical system, a process-oriented approach, the second cycle shed light on the outcomes of the public administration process. Emphasis was put on the tasks and roles that public institutions have with regard to the conception, implementation, and evaluation of public policies, in other words, a result-oriented approach. Public policy was finally consolidated as a discipline within the field of social sciences. However, despite the growing output of research and teaching, it was still considered as a sub-area of political science.

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[1]http://www.nepp.unicamp.br/ (Access on March 20, 2018).

4.3   Consolidation and Independence: Public Policy Management Programs

The apex of detachment of public policy studies from under the social sciences is rooted in the complex period that Brazil underwent during the 1990s. The international liberalization regime influenced the Brazilian government to abandon the interventionist approach that dominated Latin America since the 1950s. The "big state" was seen, during that period, as harmful for development and economic growth due to its over-bureaucratization, politically motivated interventionism, and overall administrative ineffectiveness (Bresser Pereira 1997). The solution offered by the neoliberal order set forth by the Washington Consensus led to a wave of privatizations, deregulation, and state modernization efforts in order to cope with the demands of a more interdependent and competitive economy. Throughout the years, the country underwent institutional reforms, and government-created managerial proxies to deal with this new reality. The trend of becoming a regulatory state was confirmed, and the area of public policy started to shift focus to managerial aspects of public policy that involved not only politics and institutions but also organizational and performance concerns.

From 2000 onward, full-scale public policy programs were finally developed and implemented. The University of São Paulo (USP) created a public policy management program[2] followed by a number of other universities, inaugurating the third cycle in the development of public policy as an academic discipline. This cycle represents, to a certain extent, the harmonization between the first and the second. Public policy management programs put emphasis on the efficient functioning of the state administration, while simultaneously aiming at the development of effective public policies. Influenced by the so-called International Good Governance regime, the third cycle is an attempt at addressing the lack of transparency and accountability of the governmental institutions in order to prevent corruption and systematic inefficiencies. The embedded concept there was that an efficient state administration would be able to deliver policies with more value to the population and address the social and economic problems that afflict a country by preventing the waste of resources.

5   Future Perspectives and Challenges

The field of public policy experienced a steep growth in the past 15 years that can be measured by using various indicators. This article developed three important ones that reveal not only the upward trend but also some of the challenges in the context of further developments.

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[2]http://www.each.usp.br/gpp/ (Accessed on March 20, 2018).

Fig. 1 Undergraduate study programs in Brazil (2014). Source: Brazilian Ministry of Education (Accessed on February 01, 2015)

There are currently over 100 study programs that are directly related to the public policy field (Brazilian Ministry of Education 2014). According to the electronic database of the Federal Ministry of Education, there are 80 active programs, either in public administration, public policy, or public policy management.

As Fig. 1 indicates, the offer of public administration programs still greatly outnumbers their newer public policy-oriented peers. It could be due to the traditionalism of the first one in comparison to the relative novelty of the second. The first public policy management program was set in 2005; currently, there are 19. This might be a result of the changing perspective of the public and private sectors on the importance of having employees with the ability of analyzing and understanding public policies. Most public policy management programs are not academic in a narrow sense, but rather, they aim to train students to work in the public, private, or third sector. On the other hand, the public administration programs focused on preparing prospective employees to work on a bureaucratic-oriented career, until the early 1980s. After the new constitution in 1988 and the consequent modernization of the Brazilian state and economy, the differences between public administration, public policy, and public policy management programs became less apparent.

The educational system in Brazil is mixed, breaking the monopoly of public universities and allowing private institutions to establish study programs as long as they are in accordance with the rules and regulations after receiving the approval from the Ministry of Education. The constitution of 1988 eased those rules and propitiated a rapid increase in the offer of programs by private universities, due to a suppressed demand that could barely be met by the public sector. In 2013, according to the latest available census, 2000 private universities offered about 21,000 undergraduate programs, while 301 public universities offer a little over than 10,000 undergraduate programs. Although the presence of private universities exceeds public in general, this same tendency does not apply to public policy-related programs. According to the diagram above, public universities still offer the majority of undergraduate programs in public administration (52:9), public policy, and public policy management (16:3), indicating that private universities still have a very limited interest in the area.

Given the structure of the education market in Brazil, access to public universities is still very exclusive. Students take entrance examinations (*vestibular*) that are very competitive due to the limited number of vacancies. Those that had a much better level of education, which is offered, in general, by private schools, end up topping the exam and securing their study offers at public universities, while a bigger share has no other option but to finance their education themselves or not pursue undergraduate studies at all. That is one of the reasons why private universities have had relatively high success in meeting the demand of the large part of the population that simply does not have access to public education at the tertiary level. This can be recognized by looking at the comparison between the number of students enrolled in each of them. Private universities have over 5.3 million students matriculated, while public universities have about 1.9 million (Brazilian Ministry of Education 2014). In order to increase the number of professionals in the area of public policy, it is important that private universities start to offer programs in that field as well, since they are responsible for roughly five in every seven students at the undergraduate level.

The distribution of study programs throughout the country is another point that is worthy of attention. Brazil is divided into 26 states and 1 federal district. They are ordered into five different administrative regions: Midwest, Northeast, North, Southeast, and South. The offer of undergraduate public administration, public policy, and public policy management programs in each of the regions is represented in Fig. 2.

According to the information available in the Federal Ministry of Education's database, in 2014, there were public administration programs available in 24 out of 26 federal states, while public policy and public policy management programs were offered in only 10. Again, public administration outnumbers public policy and public policy management by far in almost all the regions with the Southeast region showing the smallest difference (14:9). The problem here lies in the number of programs in relation to the total population of each region. The most populous region in Brazil is the Southeast (85 million inhabitants), followed by the Northeast (56 million), South (29 million), North (17 million), and Midwest (15 million).

Fig. 2 Number of study programs per region (2014). Source: Brazilian Ministry of Education (Accessed on February 01, 2015)

Public administration programs are relatively well distributed among the population on a quantity basis, with the Northeast having a small advantage in comparison to the Southeast, which can easily be explained by the higher number of states in this region in comparison to the other (9:4). On the other hand, the public policy and public policy management programs are still poorly distributed using the same population-per-region method. Only 10 states offer them, and the Southwest has, by far, the most programs (9), with the Midwest in second place (4), the South in third (3), Northwest in fourth (2), and the North in last (1). Using the standard above, there is still an overall lack of programs in this particular area of the public policy field, but also, the distribution of the existing ones does not satisfy the quantity per population criteria. For those programs, the distribution more likely follows the criteria of economic power and the socioeconomic importance of the regions. One of the major challenges is to distribute the offer of programs fairly across the regions and states in order to ensure access for the population and also to reflect each region's specificities in the creation of its public policies.

Another very important challenge for the growth of the public policy area in Brazil is research production. According to many scholars, despite the growing output of research, there is still a big disconnect between research production and the institutionalization of the field. There are ample sectorial case studies that, in general, do not contribute to the vertical construction of the discipline—there is insufficient focus and interest in contributing to the theoretical embodiment but instead only to horizontal growth (Melo 1999; de Faria 2003). Currently, the discipline lacks a more harmonized methodology that permeates the production of knowledge and enhances the output of the production with more detailed methods and cohesive agendas. However, there are currently many initiatives that seek to overcome the problem of agenda setting in the field that are also paving the way for a more concise elaboration of knowledge. The Internet is helping students all over Brazil to have increased access to national and international forums of public policy discussion (Souza 2003b). Many national and international publications such as the Brazilian Magazine of Public Administration (RAP) and the publications of the National School of Public Administration (ENAP) are accessible via online journal platforms such as SciELO and CAPES. Those platforms also help to facilitate access to highly relevant national and international publications, as well as to other journals that recently opened up space for the debate of public policy-related themes more specifically, such as the National Association of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Social Sciences (ANPOCS) and the National Association of Research and Post-graduation in Administration (ANPAD). Moreover, multiple organizations coordinate symposiums, conferences, and workshops on public policy themes that contribute to the capacity of researchers to network with each other.

Finally, it is also worth noting the situation of graduate and postgraduate programs in Brazil and the role that public finance plays in their creation. Despite the fact that the private sector offers most of the programs and enrolls more students at the undergraduate level, the same does not hold true for the graduate and postgraduate levels. Public universities were responsible for 172,000 students enrolled in 2013, while their private peers had only about 31,000 students, about 15% of the total number of enrolled students in the country. That means that the government is

responsible for most of the financing of research and academic production in Brazil, which can be slightly dangerous. Historically, Brazil has spent relatively few resources on research in proportion to its GDP. Relying mostly on public finances for cutting-edge research can be risky, especially during periods of financial hardship, as was the case in recent years after the financial crisis. Until very recently, many research programs had their funding drastically reduced or completely cut. Government is always under a lot of pressure when it comes to reducing costs, and it is always much easier to cut policies that are less popular, such as academic research.

Of course, relying completely on the private sector also does not solve the problem. Having a mixed approach would be ideal since the risks would be mitigated and the production of research would probably be more plural, reflecting the demands of society more accurately. At least, for sure, more democratic public policy needs to be seen not only as a provider of workforce and tools for government but also as an enabler of better and more sustainable policies that would be beneficial to the society and country in general, thus a strategic area to be funded and fostered. The percentage of the total participation of public investment should not be as substantial as it is today.

6 Conclusion

This chapter traced back the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in Brazil by looking into the historical, social, and political factors that played a role in influencing the studies in this area of knowledge. The period starting with the creation of the first public policy-related program until today was divided arbitrarily in three phases, each of them corresponding to a specific time period: from 1950s until the last years of the military period, from 1986 with the re-democratization until the end of the 1990s, and from 2000 on. Today, public administration, public policy, and public policy management programs have many common goals and overlapping research areas, but the objective of the paper was to point out the differences that necessitated the emergence of each of them, given the sets of characteristics that stimulated their creation during specific periods of time. It is important to see how each of them developed and in order to understand the consequences for the configuration of the field today.

The process of the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in Brazil has always been reactive, meaning that the majority of the curricular changes and creation of new programs were a result of changes in the political, social, and/or economic environment, having little to do with the actual research output or proactive changes by the universities and scholars. One of the important results from this conjecture is the lack of theoretical depth within the field due to the meager accumulation of works focused on theoretical and methodological discussion in Brazil, with a prevalence of case studies and analysis of phenomena related to the changes in the governmental institutions and policies. This situation has been changing in the past 20 years with the creation of platforms through which scholars can better

communicate and exchange ideas and research results. The creation of area-specific journals and online platforms has contributed meaningfully to this matter.

Another important conclusion from this research is that, contrary to what happens with other areas of knowledge, the provision of tertiary education in relation to public policy programs is still very much a prerogative of the public sector. Over 80% of all the available public administration, public policy, and public policy management study programs are offered by public universities, as opposed to only 30% for all the other fields of study. This relationship is criticized by scholars (de Faria 2003) who affirm that conflicts of interest can emerge when most part of the research funding for public policy comes from public institutions which are also potential study objects. Moreover, the provision of funding for postgraduate programs in public policy is almost solely public, which increases the risk of underfinancing in periods of economic hardship or because of changes in the policy agenda, not to mention that it can implicate a certain bias on the research output.

A final important concern that has been raised is the current uneven geographical distribution of programs over the Brazilian territory and the ratio between population and number of programs available. The older and more traditional program "public administration" is relatively well distributed within the regions and has a high number of offers as well. This research did not explore the microlevel in order to affirm if there is an unmet demand across different regions, but the distribution seems to make sense. The situation is not as good, though, for the public policy and public policy management programs. These are very much concentrated in the South and Southeast regions, while offers in the rest of the country are still very low. In this case, the research attributes this situation to the relative novelty of such programs and the fact that they developed mainly in the two richer regions of the country, mainly due to the partnerships with international institutions and stronger links to a number of powerful economic and political groups. These problems must be addressed by offering more programs in the Midwest, North, and Northwest regions in order to supply those markets with highly skilled professionals that have an awareness of the latest developments in the area of policymaking.

From the Brazilian experience in providing public policy-related study programs, it is possible to observe that strong and independent institutions are necessary for the successful implementation of a new academic discipline on the national level (Souza 2006). Once those factors started to be present in the years following the military period, the area began to develop at a very fast pace. This rapid development brought along an underlying lack of cohesion, which has only started to be addressed in recent years. This issue was only and finally corrected by the increasing networking between different research centers and universities, which was made possible, most notably, by the Internet. It is, then, important to keep moving forward in order to keep promoting the studies in this area of knowledge all over Brazil, as well as to coordinate efforts with neighboring countries. This approach might prove useful to allow researchers to learn from each other's successes and mistakes and build a better and brighter future for an important academic field.

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Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic Diversification in Kazakhstan Throughout 2011–2016

Mergen Dyussenov

1   Introduction

Economic diversification often becomes an agenda item across developing nations (Konkakov and Kubayeva 2016; Davis 2012). This issue has also surfaced on political (Strategy 2050.kz 2014) and policy (Toxanova 2008) agendas in Kazakhstan. Regarding its political importance, Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev adopted the Kazakhstan 2050 strategy in 2012, which envisions economic and political reforms, with a focus on the diversification of industries (by creating new cutting-edge industries, e.g., electronics, laser and medical, and expanding existing transportation links), diversifying export capacities away from oil and gas (Weitz 2014), transforming Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based and diversified economy, and shaping budgetary policy to divert financial resources to support long-term projects to boost economic diversification and infrastructure development (Strategy 2050.kz 2014). The economic diversification theme came to agenda setting prominence in the context of the Third Modernization of Kazakhstan (Seisembayeva 2017). "The first one was the creation of an entirely new state based on the principles of a market economy. The second was the implementation of the Strategy 2030 and the creation of our country's capital, Astana," according to President Nazarbayev (as in Seisembayeva 2017). A key priority within the Third Modernization is technological advancement based on digital technologies, as part of a broader goal to join the top 30 developed nations (ibid).

This contribution focuses on agenda setting processes. Defined as the first and most critical stage of the policy process (Howlett et al. 2009) that determines its subsequent stages (Peters 2015), agenda setting contributes to a more nuanced understanding of media's role in society (Carragee et al. 1987, as cited in Rogers

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et al. 1993). Among multiple actors involved in this stage of the policy process, e.g., the public, interest groups, NGOs, and scholarly and think tank communities, media often plays a predominant role in setting policy agendas, as suggested by current debates (e.g., McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Wood and Peake 1998), although the public's role has become stronger since the emergence of the Internet and their increasing use among scholars (see, e.g., Margetts et al. 2016; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2016). Furthermore, as the literature review on agenda setting in Kazakhstan suggests, the president and the government appear to be key actors in defining a variety of policy issues both in the country (e.g., Novikova (2015) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies, Mukhtarova et al. (2013) on anticorruption issues, Koch (2013) on urban modern-ization agenda, etc.) and the Central Asian region (e.g., Tucker (2015) on the role of key political figures, along with media, in shaping public sentiments toward ISIS, Schatz (2009) on political elites' power in framing debates and defining policy agendas, etc.). Thus, to define who actually sets the agenda, it needs to be tested by contrasting and comparing the role of (online) media vis-à-vis the public, think tanks, academia, and the government in agenda setting for economic diversification in Kazakhstan in 2011–2016.

2   Literature Review of Agenda Setting Publications in Kazakh Context

Despite the relatively short period since Kazakhstan gained its independence in late 1991, there is a fair amount of publications worth analyzing related to agenda setting processes in Kazakhstan. The total number of related publications generated by Scopus and Google Scholar [and further filtered for relevance] is 16. Although the time span extends from 2003 to 2016, relevant scholarly attention to the Kazakh context has largely begun to increase recently, i.e., around 2013–2016 (Fig. 1 below). Thus, this research is reflective of the timely scholarly attention given to agenda setting in Kazakhstan, besides the general importance of the agenda setting stage.

The agenda setting publications that are based on the Kazakh context can be grouped not only according to the policy issues analyzed (e.g., CSR as in Novikova (2015), corruption as in Mukhtarova et al. (2013), social conflicts as in Ibrayeva

Fig. 1 Publications related to agenda setting in Kazakhstan, by year. Source: The author's own analytics

(2015), water reform in Central Asia as in Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev (2016) and trans-boundary rivers as in Wegerich (2010), strengthening state capacity as in Cummings and Nørgaard (2004), etc.) or by year of publication (as in Fig. 1) but, more importantly, in terms of the key actors that play a strong role in setting the policy agenda.

Eight of the 16 publications analyzed highlight the importance of the president and his/her leadership in setting agendas in Kazakhstan (Koch 2013; Mukhtarova et al. 2013; Schatz 2008, 2009), political elites and politicians (Tucker 2015; Cummings and Nørgaard 2004), and government (Novikova 2015; Knox and Yessimova 2015). The rest emphasizes the role of the following actors: intergovernmental committees (as in Wegerich 2010) and international organizations (Cleuziou and Direnberger 2016; Asanova 2006), foreign governments (i.e., the government of Russia attempting to set energy policy agenda in the Caspian Basin, as in), media (Akhmet et al. 2015), social media (Ibrayeva 2015), academia (Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev 2016), and networks (i.e., the currently weaker role of human resource (HR) management associations in shaping economic development agenda in Kazakhstan but which should eventually become more pronounced, as in Davis 2012).

Among the sources analyzed in the literature review, the following three papers merit closer scrutiny: Davis (2012), Akhmet et al. (2015), and Ibrayeva (2015). First, Davis (2012) studies the role of HR managerial associations in driving the economic policy agenda in Kazakhstan, specifically as a potential factor in leading nationwide efforts in economic diversification. However, he asserts the potentially strong role that HR associations should play in promoting economic diversification, instead of carefully analyzing their capacity versus other players, e.g., the government (as suggested by the literature review), academia, think tanks, media, and the public.

Second, both Ibrayeva (2015) and Akhmet et al. (2015) use content analysis as applied to social conflicts and diplomatic bilateral relations with Malaysia, respectively. Ibrayeva (2015) employs content analysis to analyze various issues on Facebook—2015 money devaluation, sport achievements, the 2015 mudslide in Almaty, corruption, and court processes—based on netizens' positive, negative, or neutral perceptions. Then she divides publications into Kazakh- versus Russian-language media to trace variations in public perception (ibid.). In a different manner, Akhmet et al. (2015) use the content analysis method to focus on a single issue—the 2012 state visit of Kazakh President Nazarbayev to Malaysia—by looking into the prevalent news frames in covering the topic by Kazakh and Malaysian newspapers. Last but not least, akin to Davis (2012), who simply asserts the potentially strong role of HR network groups in economic policy, Akhmet et al. (2015), referring to McCombs (2004), assert the robust role of media in "forming public opinions and political attitudes" (p. 165) by framing certain issues.

The present contribution attempts to take a similar approach as in Akhmet et al. (2015) by focusing on a single policy issue, economic diversification. It seeks to assess online media by embracing all possible online newspapers and other Internet-based media sources by using LexisNexis (see Sect. IV "Data and Methods").

3 Key Theories and Frameworks Applicable to Agenda Setting

This research draws on a number of actor-centered theories and frameworks related to agenda setting. These emphasize the predominant role of media (e.g., as in McCombs and Shaw 1972), the public (as in Margetts et al. 2016), think tanks as part of epistemic communities (Haas 1992), academia (e.g., Timmermans and Scholten 2006), or the government (e.g., Koch 2013; Mukhtarova et al. 2013; Schatz 2009), as described in the literature review section.

First, some scholars indicate the media's power to set the policy agenda (e.g., McCombs and Shaw 1972; Soroka et al. 2013, etc.). In their groundbreaking work, McCombs and Shaw (1972) observe that media editors can shape public perceptions toward a certain policy issue and the degree of perceived importance by choosing what news to broadcast. Soroka et al. (2013) further emphasize the predominant role of media in policymaking by framing policy issues, acting as a conduit between the public and political groups.

Yet others argue in favor of the stronger role of the public in driving issues onto agenda setting. Margetts et al. (2016) emphasize the ability of citizens, empowered by social media, to drive their collective interest agenda by affectively capturing the attention of politicians by threatening social protests. Further, as Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) note, once an issue reaches the macro-political agenda, two factors—public opinion and party competition—then drive policy change. Wiezien and Soroka (2016) specifically observe the stronger role of active voters in driving the policy agenda. Finally, Stocking (2015) links the emergence of the Internet to the growing role of the public versus media in setting agendas.

A third group of scholars define the predominant role of academia and think tanks. Some scholars generally refer to so-called epistemic communities that combine scholars and think tanks (e.g., Haas 1992). On the contrary, others specifically emphasize either the role of think tanks or academia. For instance, Zimmerman (2016) explores the agenda setting role of think tanks in security policies, while Shaw et al. (2014) analyze the ability of think tanks to set the agenda on healthcare. Regarding academia, Timmermans and Scholten (2006) find that scholars can set the policy agenda for immigration and reproductive technology in the Netherlands. Nisbet and Huge (2006) observed scholars' successful promotion of biotechnology issues into agenda setting in the USA.

Finally, as mentioned earlier in the literature review on the Kazakh context, there are scholars who support the notion of government-dominated agenda setting theory. These include inter alia Novikova (2015), Knox and Yessimova (2015), Koch (2013), Mukhtarova et al. (2013), Schatz (2008), Schatz (2009), Tucker (2015), and Cummings and Nørgaard (2004).

Thus, current agenda setting theories can be broadly divided in theories and frameworks defined by media, the public, think tanks, academia, and the government. Not all of these theories were initially developed for agenda setting, e.g., Haas (1992) applied the notion of epistemic communities to policy coordination, enabling

policymakers to articulate cause-and-effect relationships, identify state-level inter-ests, frame issues for debates, develop policies, etc., thus partially relating to agenda setting (i.e., framing the issues). Thus, this research attempts to clearly define key actor categories based on both explicit and implicit agenda setting theories.

4   Data and Methods

The major research question that the paper seeks to explore is the following: (1) Who sets the agenda for economic diversification issues in Kazakhstan over the time span of 2011–2016? This needs to be established by contrasting the agenda setting power of the public and media (collectively referred to as "non-experts"), academia and think tanks (collectively "experts"), and the government. This research takes advan-tage of the inductive nature of the content analysis method (using NVivo), analyzing the specific nodes that emerge in the analysis process, e.g., common and divergent patterns.

The 6-year time span is defined by evolving Internet penetration rates in Kazakhstan. As demonstrated in Sect. 5, the share of the Kazakh population with access to the Internet jumped from a critically low 32% in 2010 to 50.6% by 2011and then around 56% by 2016. For comparison, Özdemir (2012) applies social media to online campaigns in Turkey, with the Internet penetration level being 45% in 2012 and 43% in 2011 (Internetlivestats.com 2016). Kazakhstan's fixed Internet penetration rate of 56% in 2016 is comparable to the rate of Turkey, at 58% (Internetlivestats.com 2016), which now witnesses further proliferation of online research applications (e.g., Chadwick and Sengül (2015) on unemployment, Ozan-Rafferty et al. (2014) on medical tourism, Demirdogen et al. (2010) on Turkish online banking). Moreover, reflective of evolving online research in Kazakhstan (e.g., Sultanov et al. 2016; Tyson et al. 2015; Dyussenov 2016), the country is highly positioned in UN e-government rankings, 28th in 2014 globally (Egov.kz 2014), and 33rd in 2016, while ranked 7th in Asia (Inform.kz 2016). Finally, in terms of the ICT development index, Kazakhstan was ranked 58th in 2015 (up from 62nd in 2010), compared to 61st for Brazil, 64th for Malaysia, and 69th for Turkey (ITU 2015). Thus, when compared to other emerging nations, Kazakhstan appears quite well suited for conducting online research.

The data analyzed will be collected using the following sources:

1. *Google Search filtered for blogs*, as well as www.blogsearch.com, between January 1, 2011, and December 31, 2016. The goal of using this tool is to generate data to trace attention dynamics of the public with the use of content from e-blogs and readers' comments posted on media. Furthermore, readers' comments will also be generated by using *Google Search filtered for news* (see below). The total number of mentions serves as the proxy for public attention. To collect mentions, the following Google commands are used: Commands "*экон* әртараптандыру* (economic diversification) AND *Қазақстан*"(Kazakhstan) in Kazakh,"*экон* диверсиф** AND *Казахстан*" in Russian, and "econ* diversif*

Fig. 2 Scopus interface. Source: Scopus (2017)

AND Kazakhstan" in English will be used to capture mentions on economic diversification in Kazakhstan among Kazakh and Russian speaking parts.

2. *Google Search filtered for news* is employed to trace relevant media articles. The data collected, i.e., publications by both local and international media, serve as the proxy for media attention. Similar Google Search commands, as outlined above for Google Search filtered for blogs, will be employed. Those media publications that include readers' comments will be employed to trace public attention.

3. *Scopus database* and *Google Scholar* are employed to generate academic publications. Furthermore, some publications may be generated by using *Google Search filtered for news*. This data would serve as a proxy for scholarly attention to the issue. To search for "economic diversification" in Kazakhstan, the following command is employed, "*econ* diversif* AND Kazakhstan*" (Fig. 2), which then produces eight academic publications by Scopus and nine by Google Scholar. Furthermore, the search of think tank articles on KIMEP University's website resulted in two academic publications.

4. To collect data on think tanks, their respective websites are analyzed. Google Search led to the selection of the following key Kazakhstan-based think tanks for analysis: the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research (www.kisi.kz), Kazakhstan Center of Humanitarian and Political Trends (sarap.), KIMEP University (kimep. kz), Nazarbayev University (nu.edu.kz), the Eurasian Research Institute of A. Yassawi University, the Institute of World Economic and Politics (iwep.kz), and the Economic Research Institute (http://economy.kz/). Additional publications may emerge by using *Google Search filtered for news*. Relevant documented mentions are collected and analyzed. It is worth noting that almost all the above-listed think tanks produced relevant publications, except KIMEP University, which only produced two academic publications dated 2013 and no articles from think tanks.

5. Adilet.kz parliamentary legal database (Adilet 2017), from January 1, 2011, through December 31, 2016, is used to generate data on the number of laws related to economic diversification adopted over the period. It captures all legal and normative acts as well as presidential decrees. Furthermore, major government programs and documents are captured by tracing media, think tank, and academic publications in reference to economic diversification initiatives. The

data collected serve as a *proxy for government's attention* to the issue, which is aggregated to observe its relationship between the trends of public and media attention and trends in academia and think tank attention.

This research proposes the following units of analysis: an *online article*, or a piece of *e-document* (for media and the government) identified by using Google search; *a blog post*, or *comment* (the public); and an academic and think tank *publication* (or *abstract/summary*) related to economic diversification.

It should be noted that the use of these units of analysis is not novel. For instance, Murray (1991) analyzed *e-documents* used for person-to-person (online network) interactions and developed cognitive and context-specific strategies to write personal computer documents in a study that involved an IBM manager and his staff (as cited in December 1996). Lörcher and Neverla (2015) analyze climate change attention dynamics of online German news media by using *news samples* derived from "Spiegel.de" and "Welt.de," as well as *readers' comments* (both on news websites and e-blogs) as units of analysis.

5 Analyses

This section presents analyses of documented publications and mentions on economic diversification from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2016. Divided into two parts—quantitative analysis and qualitative (content) analysis—it seeks to analyze and contrast these publications and mentions by each of the key actors.

5.1 *Quantitative Analysis*

1. **Experts**. The search for academic and think tank publications reveals the following. First, academia produced totally 20 publications over the period, including 3 in 2016, 2015, and 2014, followed by 7 in 2013 and 4 in 2012 (see Table 1). Second, the think tank community generated 53 relevant publications with the following breakdown by year: 16 in 2016, 14 in 2015, 6 in 2014, 5 in 2013, 8 in 2012, and 4 in 2011. Thus, the total number of expert publications was 73.
2. **Non-experts**. The use of search engines as described above leads to 83 media articles selected for analysis. These include 35 articles in 2016, 24 in 2015, 9 in 2014, 8 in 2013, 3 in 2012, and 4 in 2011. The search for public sentiments did not result in any e-blog content but included readers' comments on media articles (12) and think tank publications (2). Thus, the total number of non-expert publications over the period was 85. The total number of publications and articles with public comments is 14, including 12 "public/media" articles and 2 "public/ think tank" publications. The total number can be divided by year, i.e., five in 2016, four in 2015, two in 2014, and one for 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively.

Table 1 Total number of publications/articles and mentions on economic diversification in Kazakhstan among key actors in 2011–2016

		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Experts	Think tanks	4	8	5	6	14	17	53
	Academia	–	4	7	3	3	3	20
	Total	4	12	12	9	17	20	73
Non-experts	Media	4	3	8	9	24	35	83
	The public	1	1	1	2	4	5	14[a]
	Total	4	3	8	10[b]	24	36[b]	85[b]
	Government	5	6	8	12	6	6	43

Source: The author's own analytics
[a]This includes 12 publications generated by media and 2 by think tanks
[b]These numbers include two publications generated by think tanks, one in 2014 and one in 2016

3. **Kazakh Government**. The analysis of the *adliet.kz* database reveals a total of 103 legislative documents (such as decrees, drafts, directives, etc.). Further filtered for substance and relevance, the number can be trimmed down to 38. Furthermore, another five government program documents are added based on references by media, academic, and think tank publications and articles. Thus, the total number of government documents selected for analyses is 43. This includes 6 in 2016, 6 in 2015, 12 in 2014, 8 in 2013, 6 in 2012, and 5 in 2011. In terms of the key bodies, these documents are adopted either by the Kazakh government (under prime minister) or by the president. Table 1 summarizes the number of publications and mentions by each of the key actors by year.

Table 1 demonstrates interesting observations. Indeed, over the 6-year period, it is largely the *experts*, i.e., both think tanks and academia, that actually precede the attention of *non-experts*, i.e., media and the public, and the *government*: the *experts* first paid increasing attention in 2012–2013, with the *think tank* community producing eight publications in 2012 (a twofold increase vis-à-vis 2011) and then *academia* producing seven publications in 2013 (up from four in 2012). On the other hand, in terms of the total number of publications, *non-experts* produced a larger number (85), versus *experts* (73), and the *government* (43) in 2011–2016. In other words, though the *experts* seem to set the agenda on economic diversification, *non-experts* demonstrate a higher degree of overall activity related to the issue. The government occupies the middle ground with 12 legal documents adopted in 2014, following the *experts* but preceding *non-experts*. To better visualize the patterns in attention to the issue, Fig. 3 is helpful.

As Fig. 3 reveals, not only do *experts* set the agenda for the issue but also two other players—*non-experts* and *government*—though exhibiting different trajectories. The *government*, while showing a spike in the number of adopted legislative documents in 2014, slowed its activity again by 2015–2016, as was the case in 2011–2012. *Non-experts*, on the other hand, while dormant in 2011–2014, disproportionately react with their attention spikes of 24 and 36 pieces in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Finally, as the *experts* continue to show growing attention trends in

Fig. 3 Attention dynamics of experts, non-experts, and government, 2011–2016. Source: The author's own analytics

Fig. 4 Attention dynamics among all actors, 2011–2016. Source: The author's own analytics

2015–2016, provided that their agenda setting power remains valid in the years to come, then *non-experts* are expected to continue demonstrating high attention trends comparable with, if not higher than, their 2015–2016 levels, and the *government* should resume its legislative activity related to economic diversification. To better observe specific variations in attention trends among all actors, Fig. 4 is presented below.

Overall, as Fig. 4 above shows, while *experts*, *non-experts*, and the *government* exhibit some degree of change in attention, the public largely remains dormant over the period, with a slight increase around 2015–2016. One possible explanation is that economic diversification had not captured the interest of the public. For instance, the search for public sentiments did not return any results on relevant e-blogs but only readers' comments posted on media and think tank publications. Another is the use of online research methods, which are likely to exclude some part of Kazakh population out of analyses due to still expanding Internet penetration. This tentative finding is similar to the corruption agenda setting context in Thailand (Dyussenov 2017), where the public is also found to be rather dormant. Two things are worth noting—first, the public includes both local and international netizens since it can be

challenging to clearly differentiate between these subgroups using online research methods and second, as Internet penetration rates in Thailand over the period was lower than in Kazakhstan varying from 24% in 2011 to 43% in 2016 (Internetlivestats.com (2016), as in Dyussenov (2017)) versus 51% in 2011 and 56% in 2016 in Kazakhstan, the inability of online research methods to capture parts of local population becomes less plausible (although not entirely improbable).

Another observation as Fig. 4 suggests is that among the *experts* it is *think tanks* that seem to precede *academia*. Yet, possible time lags due to academic publications' reviews should be taken into account. For example, as Björk and Solomon (2013) suggest, the period between the date received by a publisher and the date of publication is 14.1 months for social science papers. Thus, both think tanks and academia may roughly coincide around 2012 (again, accounting for 1 to 1.5 year publication lags for academia). However, at a later stage (2015–2016), think tanks demonstrate a higher degree of attention to the issue than academia. However, to observe whether think tank discourse on economic diversification actually influences discourse in the spheres of academia, media, the public, and government over time, or to observe some of the other actor's influence on one another, it is necessary to conduct qualitative content analysis of publications. To do this, we must analyze specific codes used by the sectors and industries where diversification is defined as necessary to pursue types of economic diversification and other codes.

5.2   *Qualitative Content Analysis*

Content analysis (using NVivo) of publications for each of the key actors leads to the selection of the following nodes: *causes and effects*, *types of diversification*, *key industries defined*, and *key actors* (Appendix 1). A cause should be understood, in broad terms, as a factor that is believed to influence the development of economic diversification, versus a more specific definition of establishing causality through statistical regressions, while an effect is what economic diversification should lead to. The *types of diversification* node as defined by actors is divided into product, market, industry diversification, diversification of the energy sector, and single-industry towns. The notion of key industries includes those industries where each of the actors believes economic diversification is important. Finally, the *key actor's* node embraces a set of actors (not necessarily included for analysis, e.g., international organizations) that each of the actors believes should drive the economic diversification policy in Kazakhstan.

First, as Appendix 2 demonstrates, with regard to *causes and effects*, think tanks (13 causes, 12 effects), media (13, 3), and academia (8, 8) produced more substantive outputs than the public (4 causes) and the government (5 causes). Thus, it is the think tank community that outperforms the other actors both in terms of causes and effects of economic diversification. Table 2 summarizes these observations.

Second, with regard to the *types of diversification* node, the key actors produced the following major types of economic diversification: *product diversification*, i.e.,

Table 2 The aggregate number of causes and effects of economic diversification

	Academia	Think tanks	Media	The public	Government
The number of causes	8	13	13	4	5
The number of effects	8	12	3	–	–

Note: Italicized and emboldened numbers denote the largest number of references
Source: The author's own analytics

Table 3 Types of diversification as defined by actors

	The number of references by each of the key actors				
Types of Diversification	Academia	Think tanks	Media	The public	Government
Product	13	8	11	–	12
Market	11	19	30	4	15
Industrial	8	6	17	3	15
Energy (green; within the energy sector)	10 (5; 5)	10 (7; 3)	17 (10; 7)	–	20 (9; 11)
Single-industry towns	1	2	1	–	2

Note: Italicized and emboldened numbers denote the larger numbers of references
Source: The author's own analytics

pursuing economic diversification based on expansion of manufactured products either within a single industry or across sectors; *market diversification*, i.e., the need to expand the export geography for a single product or a set of products; *industry diversification*, i.e., developing new industries especially in oil- and gas-rich nations; and *diversification of single-industry towns* (also known as mono-towns) either by expanding the range of products within a given industry or developing new industries in a town. Furthermore, due to dependence of the Kazakh economy on energy resources to sustain growth, the *energy diversification* node is also included in the analysis. This node is further divided into two sub-nodes—*diversification within the energy sector* and *transition to green energy* including renewable energy.

As Table 3 suggests, regarding the *product diversification* node, academia produces the largest magnitude (13), closely followed by the Kazakh government (12) and media (11). On the contrary, the public appears dormant in this regard, while think tanks produce moderate impact. The *market diversification* node, unlike the previous node, exhibits a less ambiguous picture—i.e., media outperforms the rest with 30 references. Regarding *industrial diversification*, media again produces the largest magnitude (17), closely followed by the government (15). As for the *energy diversification* node, the government outperforms the rest, with 20 references and a further 11 references to the *within the energy sector* sub-node. Although media (10) slightly outperforms the government (9) in terms of the number of references to the *transition to green energy* sub-node, the difference is negligible. Finally, regarding the *single-industry towns* node, neither actor seems to outperform the rest, with the government and think tanks producing a marginally larger degree of impact.

To summarize this section, media largely remains the most dominant actor exhibiting a larger magnitude with regard to market and industrial types and the *transition to green energy* sub-node. This is followed by the government exhibiting the largest magnitude related to the *energy diversification*, including the *within the energy sector* sub-node. Finally, academia outperforms the rest with regard to the *product diversification* category. None of the key actors seems to emphasize the importance of promoting diversification policies related to single-industry towns. This is not to suggest diminished importance of developing single-industry towns based on diversification policy, but rather compared to the other types of economic diversification, single-industry town diversification is a relatively lower item on the agenda among the key actors analyzed.

Third, regarding *key industries* as defined by each of the actors, Table 4 (below) is helpful. Although the range of industries is quite wide (see Appendix 1), the analysis here focuses on more substantive industries, i.e., those generating at least five references by each actor. Furthermore, the industries selected for analysis must not be unique, i.e., defined by a single actor only (e.g., services as defined by the government, Appendix 1e), to ensure adequate comparability.

As Table 4 suggests, the government produced the largest magnitude in terms of the number of references for the selected industries (seven industries), followed by media (three industries). The public, on the contrary, did not produce any meaningful impact in defining key industries. Both think tanks and academia, though exhibiting certain influence, fall short of producing a magnitude sufficient to qualify these two actors as agenda setters. It is thus the Kazakh government that seems to lead the pack in this regard.

Lastly, with regard to *key actors*, i.e., those deemed to play a role in shaping the agenda on economic diversification as identified by each of the actors (Appendix 1), the public seems to emphasize the role of media (2 references), while media tends to refer to the Kazakh government (20) and to a lesser degree international organizations (9), followed by academia (5 media references). Academia emphasizes the

Table 4 Key industries as defined by actors

Industry	The number of references by each of the key actors			
	Academia	Think tanks	Media	Government
Agriculture	7	10	15	24
Chemical	–	–	8	9
Construction	6	–	8	7
Food	5	–	–	8
ICT and digital technologies	–	–	7	9
Engineering and machinery	5	–	13	9
Mining	11	9	13	15
Processing	6	6	10	18
Tourism	7	–	–	11
Transport	9	15	26	15

Note: (a) Italicized and emboldened numbers denote the largest number of references. (b) The public produced negligible numbers of references, i.e., fewer than five, and thus is omitted
Source: The author's own analytics

predominant role of the Kazakh government (16), followed by their fellows, i.e., academia (9 references). The think tank community largely refers to the Kazakh government (10 references), followed by international organizations (4) and foreign think tanks (3). Finally, the government emphasizes the importance of supporting small and medium business, i.e., the private sector (with eight documented references), in setting the agenda for economic diversification policy, followed by international organizations (four). It is thus the Kazakh government that outperforms the other actors with regard to the *key actors* node.

5.3 An Analysis of the Public's Comments

This sub-section analyzes the public sentiments in relation to think tanks, media, and international organizations, as reflected in readers' comments to some of the documented publications. First, while *think tanks* generally refer to the following negative causes that stifle economic diversification, a lack of political rivalry and openness, independent media, and strong civil society, the *public* further emphasizes the following key factors: pervasive corruption and lack of strong civil society, i.e., "people are silent" (Stronski 2016). Thus while think tanks identified three distinct negative factors, the public did so with regard to two factors, including one in common, i.e., a lack of strong civil society and public activism. With regard to *transition to a green economy*, think tanks note Kazakhstan's leadership position among Central Asian states in promoting the *transition to a green economy* into the political agenda through the adoption of the Green Economy Concept in 2013 with a focus on diversification based on renewable energy sources and reforming agriculture and industrial sectors to spur research activity and the use of advanced technologies (Ospanova 2014). The public suggests taking a step further by amending legislation, e.g., the Ecological Code, to formally institutionalize emission trading and introduce a price on carbon emissions (ibid). In other words, while think tanks believe Kazakhstan has made certain progress in *transitioning to green energy*, the public deems this is not enough and that further steps are needed to bolster confidence in government measures as perceived by business and the wider public.

Second, in relation to media, the public expresses two opposing views. On one hand, the public appears to agree with some of media's arguments: in Tokabekova (2016), Kazakh national news portal Bnews.kz, referring to the success of key government policies such as the National Program on Investment Attractiveness (stage 1 for 2010–2014, stage 2 for 2015–2019), describes Kazakhstan as the most favorable and sustainable nation in Central Asia in terms of foreign investment attractiveness, while the public comments seem to be in line with this assessment. Furthermore, with regard to the opening of a new armored vehicle manufacturing factory in Kazakhstan in 2015, the media cites Chairman of Paramount Group Ivor Ichikowitz, who positively assesses this move reflecting on Kazakh government's vision of diversified high-tech economy, and the public appears to agree based on readers' comments (DefenceWeb 2015). On the other hand, the public may be found

to be in disagreement with media's portrayal of certain issues. A Forbes.com media article cites a Lithuania-born adviser at Samruk-Kazyna, the Kazakh national wealth fund, who referred to the Kazakhstan 2050 strategy as the one that reforms state enterprises, diversifying the economy away from mining and building transportation infrastructure, and praised the 2014 "Nurly Zhol" government program to develop transportation infrastructure (Shepard 2016). The public's reaction was rather negative, referring to the adviser's narrative as the "Potemkin village for foreigners" (ibid), pinpointing his apparent lack of wealth fund management experience, especially in Kazakhstan.

Third, regarding international organizations, the public expresses negative sentiments. In response to a media publication, which stated that according to Moody's analyses Kazakh economy still failed to diversify (as in Nur.kz 2015), readers reacted negatively by invoking the memory of Moody's failure to predict the financial crises in the USA to begin with, not to mention its attempt to assess the vibrancy of the Kazakh economy (ibid). Another media piece (Blua 2011) cites a new OECD report that urged Central Asian states to diversify their economies to attract foreign investments, while one of the readers reacted by pointing to OECD's limited knowledge of the region: "As usual with OECD, the report is relevant mainly for energy-exporting states of Central Asia" (ibid.). The negative assessment of international organizations is also developed by academia. For instance, Pomfret (2014) in his assessment of Kazakhstan 2030 strategy notes that major policy documents "have the personal imprint of the President Nazarbayev" (p. 10), while the role of international organizations remains mixed. In particular, both "the World Bank and IMF have become more cautious about being identified as apostles of neo-liberalism, and the United Nations, Asian Development Bank and OECD all have different agencies... offering conflicting advice" (ibid.).

To conclude, the public seems generally supportive of the narrative developed by the think tank community, jointly building a constructive dialogue with regard to possible factors that drive the development of economic diversification policies in Kazakhstan. On the contrary, international organizations are generally perceived rather in negative terms by the public, i.e., lack of competence (Nur.kz 2015) and limited knowledge of the region (Blua 2011), with regard to economic diversification policy. Media seems to occupy the middle ground, with the public being in line with some media narratives (e.g., Tokabekova 2016; DefenceWeb 2015), while being opposed to other media articles (Shepard 2016; Gorst 2012).

6   Key Findings and Discussion

This research reveals a number of interesting findings. First, quantitative analysis suggests the presence of overall agenda setting power driven by experts, i.e., think tank and academic communities. Indeed, their attention to the issue precedes the attention of both non-experts—i.e., media and the public—and the government. Furthermore, as the experts continue to exhibit growing attention dynamics to

economic diversification in 2015–2016 and assuming that their agenda setting power remains valid in another few years, non-experts should be expected to further increase their attention trends vis-à-vis their 2015–2016 levels. The government is also expected to resume its activity by introducing more legislation and programs on economic diversification and intensifying discussions on parliamentary sessions within the next few years (as Fig. 3 suggests, there should be a 2-year gap between a spike in experts' attention and a correlated spike in government's attention, though this is a tentative finding). Among experts, think tanks are found to precede academia in terms of attention to the issue.

Interestingly, the role of the (online) public is found to be dormant. Having assessed two initially plausible explanations—lack of netizens' interest to the issue versus the inability of online research methods to capture parts of public sentiments—the former appears more plausible than the latter. If this tentative finding is confirmed by further studies, it should have important methodological implications in support of the overall validity of online research methods even with lower Internet penetration rates, i.e., around 25–40% (as in Dyussenov 2017). In other words, as long as an issue is interesting to the online public enough to spur debates, public sentiments might intensify even with *lower* Internet penetration.

Next, (NVivo-based) content analysis points to further findings. With regard to *causes and effects*, think tanks appear to outperform the other actors by producing the largest magnitude in terms of the number of identified causes and effects related to economic diversification. On the other hand, media is found to lead the pack related to the *types of diversification* node by showing the largest relative magnitude. Regarding *key industries*, the Kazakh government produces the largest impact by defining seven industries (out of 10 substantive industrial sectors) where diversification policy should be pursued. Finally, with regard to the *key actors* node, each of the analyzed actors emphasizes the predominant significance, i.e., agenda setting magnitude, of the government.

To conclude, quantitative analyses suggest the dominant agenda setting role of think tanks in driving economic diversification policy as contrasted with other actors. Qualitative (content) analyses exhibit a more complex picture. Think tanks again lead in relation to *causes and effects*, while the government is found to be the key actor with regard to *key industries* and *key actors* nodes. Finally, media demonstrates the largest magnitude with regard to *types of diversification*.

7 An Overview of Key Think Tanks

As the findings of this research suggest the dominance of think tanks in setting the agenda for economic diversification in the Kazakh context, it is important to provide a brief overview of key think tanks that produced the largest impact in terms of the number of mentions related to the issue over the period.

To begin with, out of a total of 53 documented mentions produced by the think tank community (including both Kazakh-based and international institutions) in

2011–2016, the following think tanks appear more prominent: Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research (with 20 mentions produced), Nazarbayev University-based research units (9), and the Eurasian Research Institute of A.Yassawi University (8). The remaining think tanks—the Kazakhstan Center of Humanitarian and Political Trends (4), the Institute of World Economic and Politics (4), and the Economic Research Institute (3), followed by international institutions (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2), Russian Council on International Affairs (1), Duke Social Science Research Institute (1), and the International Institute for Environment and Development (1))—produced far more modest contributions.

According to its website, the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research was established in 1993 with the mission to offer analytical support to the Kazakh president and government (KAZISS 2017). It positions itself as the most reputed think tank in the country due to the high professionalism of its staff and is ranked 57th among government-affiliated think tanks worldwide based on University of Pennsylvania's 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index (ibid). Apart from its own self-assessment, it is worth noting that this think tank appears to be the largest contributor to this research in terms of the number of documented mentions.

Next, Nazarbayev University established in 2010 (NU 2017) is a fairly new academic and research institution. Its stated aim is to educate leaders in Kazakh public administration and science, while its core features include academic freedom and institutional autonomy (ibid). Furthermore, among its major goals is pursuing research excellence by developing programs of world-class research based on partnerships with the best research institutions across the globe (ibid).

Finally, the Eurasian Research Institute, based in the city of Almaty, is affiliated with A.Yassawi Kazakh-Turkish University based in the city of Turkistan in the South Kazakhstan region (ERI 2017). The Institute's mission is to conduct academic research and project planning across various areas including economics and finance, new technologies, sociology, politics, etc. in Eurasia (ibid).

Thus, the three dominant Kazakh-based think tanks include a well-reputed government-affiliated institution (KISR) and two university-based think tanks (NU and ERI). On the contrary, among the remaining Kazakh-based think tanks, the Institute of World Economics and Politics describes itself as a government-affiliated institution established in 2003 under the Foundation of the First President of Kazakhstan (IWEP 2017), and the Kazakhstan Center for Humanitarian and Political Trends is viewed as a nonprofit organization (KCHPT 2017), thus representing civil society, while the Economic Research Institute is affiliated with the Kazakh Ministry of National Economy (ERI 2017), thus representing civil service.

Based on the above information, it appears that with regard to organizational forms of think tanks, it is the government-affiliated and university-based institutions that play a predominant role. However, there are two caveats. First, while KISR produced the largest impact with 20 mentions, its other counterpart—IWEP—produced a more negligible contribution (with 4 mentions). Second, while both Nazarbayev University research units and the Eurasian Research Institute (representing academia-based institutions), their other counterpart—KIMEP University—failed to produce any documented mentions, instead producing two relevant academic publications over the period.

8 Conclusion and Further Research

Apart from contributing to the emerging agenda setting scholarly literature in the context of Kazakhstan, the paper concludes that (a) think tanks set government agenda for economic diversification policy, which provides support to the validity of think tank-dominated agenda setting theory, and (b) the government, while producing the largest agenda setting magnitude vis-à-vis the other actors, shapes the subsequent debates as measured by the number of relevant references in media, think tank, and academic publications. On the contrary, media only partially shapes the agenda with regard to the types of economic diversification as identified by the actors.

This research raises important policy and research implications. With regard to key policy experts and government decision-makers, the findings suggest the importance of taking into account the messages developed by local think tank communities in the context of economic diversification in Kazakhstan. By doing this, the government should be better equipped to make more efficient policy decisions. On the contrary, the role of international organizations and advisors is often weaker, as demonstrated in Sects. 5.1 and 5.2. Regarding research implications, these findings prima facie support the validity of think tank-dominant agenda setting theory (e.g., Zimmerman 2016; Shaw et al. 2014), while disproving the validity of media-dominated agenda setting theory (McCombs and Shaw 1972), at least as applied to economic diversification policies in Kazakhstan. This research also partially refutes the existing literature, which suggests the predominant role of the government and the president's office in setting the agenda for various policy issues in Kazakhstan, by differentiating between actual agenda setting in terms of temporal sequence of attention (with think tanks being the leading actor) and agenda-shaping magnitude (with the government being the more predominant actor and think tanks and media being other, possibly less important, players).

There are certain areas for further research. First, scholars should further establish whether the "think tank-government" agenda setting tandem plays out across other jurisdictions, primarily across former Soviet, as well as Eurasian and East European nations across different policy issues. Alternatively, if other actors, e.g., media, academia, or international organizations, should be found to set the agenda, it is important to identify specific clusters of policy issues in the domain of a specific actor. Another area for further research is methodological. In contrast with previous research as applied to the corruption policy agenda setting context in Thailand (Dyussenov 2017), this research tentatively finds the possible validity of using online research methods even with lower Internet penetration levels (p. 26). Thus, future studies should either support or disprove it. Finally, regarding the organizational forms and affiliations of think tanks, further research should analyze whether university-based and/or government-affiliated think tanks produce a larger impact on setting policy agendas across other jurisdictions vis-à-vis their civil service-affiliated and civil society-based institutional counterparts.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Nodes as Defined by NVivo Content Analysis

(a) The Public

Causes and effects	0	0
Effects	0	0
Causes	0	0
Positive	0	0
Eurasian cooperation	1	1
Cross-border investment	1	1
Negative	0	0
Mismanagement	1	1
Corruption	1	1
Types of diversification	0	0
Market (export & trade) diversification	1	4
Industrial diversification	1	3
Key industries defined	0	0
Transportation & cargos	1	1
Processing	1	1
Mining (e.g. oil & gas)	1	2
Defence	1	1
Car manufacturing	1	1
Agriculture	1	2
Key actors	0	0
Media	1	2

(b) Media

Causes and effects	0	0
Effects (what diversification leads to)	1	2
Causes (what impacts diversification)	1	12
Types of diversification	0	0
Product diversification	1	11
Market (exports, trade) diversification	1	30
Industry diversification	1	17
Energy diversification	0	0
Transition to green energy	1	10
Diversification within the energy (oil & gas, mining)	1	7
Diversifying single-industry towns	1	1
Key industries defined	0	0
Transportation & logistics	1	26
Tourism	1	4
Processing	1	10
Mining & extraction	1	13
Medical products	1	2
Machines and engineering	1	13
IT & telecommunications	1	7
Food production	1	2
Finance	1	5
Construction	1	7
Hotels, real estate	1	1
Chemical	1	8
Agriculture	1	15
Key actors found to shape the agenda	0	0
Think tanks	0	0
Local	1	1
Foreign	1	4
Private sector (local)	1	2
Private sector (foreign)	1	3
Media	0	0
International organizations	1	9
Government	0	0
Local	1	20
Foreign	1	2
Academia	1	5

(c) Academia

Causes and effects	0	0
Effects	5	7
Causes	7	12
Types of diversification	0	0
Product	8	13
Market (trade, export)	9	11
Industrial	6	8
Energy	0	0
Transition to green energy	5	5
Diversification within the energy sector	5	5
Diversifying single-industry towns	1	1
Key industries	0	0
Transportation (railways, pipelines etc.)	6	9
Tourism & hotels	6	7
Textile	3	3
Services	2	2
Processing	5	6
Mining	8	11
Manufacturing	2	2
Food	4	5
Engineering and machine-building	5	5
Construction	5	6
Agriculture	5	7
Key actors	0	0
Think tanks	1	1
Small and medium business	1	1
Media	0	0
International organizations	2	2
Government	0	0
Local	9	16
Academia	5	9

(d) Think Tanks

Causes and effects		0		0
Effects		0		0
Positive		1		10
Negative		1		2
Causes		0		0
Positive		1		11
Negative (constraints)		1		2

Key actors found to shape the agenda

Name	Sources	References
Think tanks	0	0
Local	0	0
Foreign	1	3
Media	1	2
International organizations	1	4
Government	0	0
Local	1	10
Foreign	0	0
Academia	1	1

Types of diversification

Name	Sources	References
Product diversification	1	8
Market (trade & export) diversification	1	19
Industry diversification	1	6
Energy diversification	0	0
Transition to green energy	1	7
Diversification within the energy (e.g. oil & gas) sector	1	3
Diversifying single-industry towns	1	2

Key industries defined

Name	Sources	References
Transportation & logistics	1	14
Railways, locomotives, railcars	0	0
Aviation	1	1
Tourism	1	4
Processing	1	6
Mining & extraction	1	9
Machines & engineering	1	2
Food production	1	2
Finance	1	2
Construction	1	2
Chemical	1	1
Agriculture	1	10

(e) Government

Causes and effects	0	0
Causes (what impacts diversification)	2	3
Effects (what diversification leads to)	0	0
Industries defined	0	0
Agriculture	2	24
Processing	2	18
Mining & extraction (e.g. oil & gas, metallurgy)	2	15
Transportation & logistics	2	15
Tourism	2	11
Services	2	10
Machines & engineering	2	9
Chemical	2	9
ICT & digital technologies	2	9
Food production	2	8
Construction	2	7
Textile	1	4
Finance	1	3
Defence	1	2
Types of diversification	0	0
Industry diversification	2	15
Market (exports & trade) diversification	2	15
Product diversification	2	12
Diversifying single-industry towns	2	2
Energy diversification	0	0
Diversification within the energy sector (e.g. oil & gas, uranium, power etc.)	2	11
Green energy (renewables, wind, solar)	2	9
Key actors	0	0
The private sector (small and medium business)	1	8
International organizations	1	4
Think tanks	1	1

Appendix 2 Causes and Effects as Defined by Key Actors

(a) The Public

Note: The public defined causes only. Dark green denotes negatively correlated causes, i.e., mismanagement should lead to weaker economic diversification.

(b) Media

Note: Media defined 13 distinct causes (including 6 negatively correlated, as denoted by dark green) and 3 effects of economic diversification (all positive).

(c) Academia

Note: (a) Academia defined the total of eight distinct causes (two negative and six positive) and eight distinct effects (three negative and five positive) of economic diversification in the context of Kazakhstan. (b) Red denotes a hypothesized cause (i.e., foreign direct investments) that was tested in a research publication and found not to be an important factor explaining the development of economic diversification.

(d) Think Tanks

Lacking innovations and technologies

Problem loans

Lower political risks

Negative migration in a region

Transport logistics and tourism as key competetive advantages

Innovative development

Tourism development

Economic growth

Trade balance

Cluster-based tourism development

Developing the One Belt One Road project

Sustainable development

Energy & environmental security

Infrastructure project development

Transport & logistics infrastructure, Internet & lower energy

Create jobs

Communication projects (railways, roads)

Economic diversification

Boost attractiveness of a region to investors

Kashagan oilfield development

Increase transit flows

Construction of pipelines

EXPO 2017

Boost agricultural prodictivity and competitiveness

Investment volumes

National competitiveness

Notes: (a) The think tank community produced 13 distinct causes of economic diversification. These include 11 positively correlated causes (light green) and 2 negatively correlated (dark green) causes. (b) Think tanks defined 12 distinct effects of economic diversification, including 10 positive (blue) and 2 negative (navy blue) effects.

(e) Government

Note: Similar to the public (Appendix 3a), the government of Kazakhstan defined causes only. Dark green denotes a negatively correlated cause of economic diversification, i.e., incomplete infrastructure.

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The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory Governance in Ghana

Kow Kwegya Amissah Abraham

1   Introduction

The growing trend of information sharing and human capacity development that is due, in part, to globalization reflects an upshot in the changing trend in how governments, especially, engage in the decision-making processes. Since 1957, when Ghana gained independence, there have been changing trends in the administration and governance systems that have and still continue to engage the masses in political affairs and governance. Thus, since Ghana began to self-govern, there have been numerous reforms at various governmental levels. To this end, there has been increased citizen participation in governance and easy access to information from government. As the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence, Ghana became a political role model in the manner that she approached issues of governance. Thus, in sub-Saharan Africa, the changes in governance, in terms of citizen participation, became very evident especially when dictatorial rule and military regimes ceased to dominate political discourse in the early 1970s and 1980s. The general picture now is steady progress toward open governance and increased democratization through which citizens are seen to have a say in government policies.

One major changing force is also the activities of think tanks. In this work, I will use think tanks, policy institutes, and policy centers interchangeably. Policy institutes, which are also known as think tanks, have played a sufficient role in the changing trends of governance in sub-Saharan Africa. They are public policy research and analysis institutions that advise policy makers and the public on how to make informed decisions about public policy through their activities (Global Go To Think Tank 2013). According to Ayee (2000), they act as linchpins in the policy making process since they subject public policy to strict analysis and assessment. We note that these institutes have become a beacon of knowledge and information

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providers to the extent that they have emerged as strong policy actors especially in Ghana (Kpessah 2011).

Since the early 1990s, there has been a tremendous shift from elite-centered policy making to a participatory approach in government decision-making in Ghana (Ohemeng 2005). The change is partly attributed to the emergence of strong civil society groups that have turned themselves into think tanks. Even though the process of participation in Africa is slow, the change has been steady, and it is estimated to improve even further. Sub-Saharan Africa has, as at the year 2012, a total of 610 think tanks out of a global number of 6826, thus representing 8.97% of global distribution of policy think tanks (Global Go To Think Tanks 2013). This number seems encouraging considering the fact that almost all the 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have a political history characterized by a lack of participation in government on the part of the citizenry. Again, there have been historical antecedents when political participation by the citizens had been reserved for a select few in the society, especially the educated elite. This has been attributed to the legacies of colonialism and the military dictatorships that took control of affairs after independence (Miller et al. 2009).

Thus, proceeding from the legacy of a politically stifled citizenry, where participation in governance was low, it is encouraging to see the growth of organizations such as policy think tanks that are influencing government decisions and educating the public on the impact of certain governmental decisions on society. In July 2001, the space for civil society activism had expanded further through the repeal of the criminal libel and sedition laws, which in the past had been used to intimidate the media (Crawford 2004; Jonah 2007).

It is, however, important to note that most of these policy institutes focus more on domestic issues and internal affairs of the various countries of origin rather than regional or even international issues. The new trend has been the development of institutes with a regional and global focus. Generally, Johnson and Prakesh (2007) trace the economic history of civil society organizations, of which policy think tanks make up a major part. They observe that the state has been seen as the main actor dealing with negative governance externalities and other issues such as market failures. However, due to political and administrative constraints, states are often not able to cover the full range of needs of the citizens. This is what accounts for the creation of civil societies to fill in the gaps left by the state as a result of political and administrative constraints. In performing their supporting functions, policy think tanks perform various activities that influence the people to contribute to shaping policy as a part of civil society.

It is important to note that the role of civil society in governance has been a vital aspect of democratization. There is no doubt that civil society promotes grassroots participation. In this vein, it is recommended that governments, especially in developing countries, work more closely with civil society to leverage additional knowledge and capacity (Heimans 2002). This is because it is only through forming closer relationships with civil society that governments can realize concrete benefits of participative governance. Given the major role that these institutes play as an aspect of civil society in promoting citizen participation in governance, it is imperative that

they are given the free environment to operate. In fact, "they must be treated well, conceptually, and, above all, relationally" (Mitlin et al. 2007). We observe therefore that policy think tanks are considered as part of the civil society. Civil society is seen as an arena of organized citizens and a collection of organizations that acts to balance the state and the market, as a place where civic democratic values can be upheld (Lewis and Kanji 2009).

In this study, I look at the development of policy institutes in Ghana and how their activities have influenced the role of citizens in policy making. We note that these institutes have contributed to a shift from elite or bureaucratic systems of governance to a more participatory style through their activities. Again, these activities have further strengthened the civil society of the country. To better understand the potential roles of these institutes in Ghana, it is imperative to look at the political situation in the county.

The study thus focuses on participatory governance at the grassroots level and how the activities of think tanks promote it. Here, participatory governance involves the collaboration of the government, civil society, and the general citizenry. We conceive in this study that the aspect of policy institutes performs various activities that influence the citizens to participate in governance through sharing of opinions, advocacy, etc. Songco (2001), however, notes that there is a risk of conflict among different sectors of civil society, especially those concerned with poverty reduction, when participatory programs are introduced at the formulation stage. Additionally, participatory governance is a tool for preventing corruption and other shortcomings in government. For instance, Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2014) assert that improving government effectiveness should be accompanied by strategies aimed at combating corruption.

2 Ghana's Political Landscape

Ghana became an independent country on March 6, 1957, after decades of British rule, making Ghana the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence. As a British colony, the country was governed through a system of indirect rule which stipulated that power was to be given to local chiefs who were handpicked by the British according to their loyalty to the colonial powers (Lugard 1992). These rulers had limited powers to control political affairs although they were in charge of routine governmental activities. The system was thus meant to avoid any confrontation between the masses and the colonial masters; as a result, the system of control was passed through the traditional rulers. Thus, one of the primary roles of the rulers was to enforce orders given by the colonial officer.

We reckon that although this system seemed to have given traditional leaders a say in the governing of the state, it was not necessarily so. This is because the British handed down policies and the traditional leaders were obligated to simply implement them. Those who were seen as dissident rulers were sent into exile; for instance, Prempeh I was exiled in Seychelles for disobeying the colonial master.

The rule under colonialism greatly affected the organic development of the political landscape, which could have allowed the people to participate and have a say on who governs, how they are governed, and what policies they felt best served their needs. It can thus be seen that the political timidity of the masses and the ensuing apathy that developed was as a result of events that took place during the colonial rule. The important thing is that, with such a situation, protests and demonstrations that are seen as civil rights were banned, so political participation at the grassroots level was indeed nonexistent.

Since independence, various events have taken place in Ghana's political arena. For instance, there was the establishment of a one-party state in 1964 by the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah. This situation further stifled political participation because all political parties as well as all political activities were banned. The effect was that citizens were alienated from the political process and policy making became the primary responsibility of the elites and those holding positions of political power. With little or no political competition, the new nation descended into military rule during that period.

There were intermittent coup d'états that aimed to remove legitimate governments up until the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1992. Between 1966 and 1992, there were a total of four coup d'états—1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981 (Abdulai 2009). However, there have been three democratically elected governments which also represent the various republican eras: the First Republic from 1960 to 1966, the Second Republic from 1969 to 1972, and the Third Republic from 1979 to 1981. These situations led to a hostile political environment which instilled political fear in the citizens since governance was in the hands of the strong. Again, military regimes and political instability as a result of incessant coup d'états led to weak institutions since most of these regimes did not include institutions in the political process.

However, since the Fourth Republic in 1992, which transferred governmental rule from the military and authoritarianism to constitutional democracy, there has been tremendous growth in civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, and policy institutes (Abdulai 2009). Their emergence, in fact, contributed to the political liberalization of the country. Their activities have also awakened citizen consciousness which for some time had been dormant due to the pre-existing political system. Thus think tanks continue to play a pivotal role in determining how the state operates in the modern governance system (Ohemeng 2005; Kpessah 2011). The experience of four uninterrupted elected regimes since 1992 has helped in re-engaging the masses, a political system that seeks to ensure participation. The 1992 Constitution, under which the state is run, sets out a clear framework (Gyimah-Boadi 2008) for the governance processes.

With the stabilization of the political system, and the establishment of multiparty democracy, citizen consciousness has been heightened. However, with the high illiteracy rate, unemployment, and economic hardships, many people did not seem to be interested in political issues, which most people considered "petty," because they were more concerned with how to put food on the table. Thus, many people were much more engaged in their everyday lives than in designing and participating in policy processes and activities. The role of policy institutes has been to research

and analyze government's policies, put it in the public domain, and, through citizen response, influence the policy process and policy making.

3   Policy Institutes in Ghana: Developments and Activities

Policy institutes or think tanks in this case are seen as part of the wider civil society, but their activities are recognized as a significant tool in the creation of ideas for emerging democracies, especially developing countries (Weaver and McGann 2000). In other words, their activities have become an alternative knowledge hub through which governments, citizens, and other civil society organizations look to for innovative ideas for the progress of good governance. Increased participation in Ghana's civil societies and consequently the growth and development of policy institutes were quite evident after 1992. The stabilization of the political landscape, the liberalization of the airwaves, the toleration of dissenting views, and the implementation of good governance indicators have led to such steady growth.

We note, at this point, that policy institutes have been important to the political process in Ghana. This is because governments are mostly preoccupied with administrative duties that they consider more pertinent than analyzing and evaluating policies. Thus, the mountain of problems they then face makes it necessary for some sectors, especially the private sector where most policy institutes are, to take on these roles to supplement the government's efforts. Again, most countries in the developing world lack the capacity, especially the human resources expertise, to make critical analyses, data assessments, and in-depth research before policy decisions are made or existing policies are evaluated. This makes the activities of think tanks a necessary supplement for governments. Policy makers and implementers in the developing world are most notably handicapped when it comes to knowledge and expertise as most use guess work (Turner and Hulme 1997). This is even worse when it comes to most African states where there is little information on policy design, means of implementation, and data availability. This is why the presence of policy centers is seen as an important phenomenon for the strengthening of good governance.

According to the Global Go To Think Tank (2013) index report, Ghana, as at 2013, had a total of 38 think tanks. Hence, it is ranked as having the 4th highest number of think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa, the first being South Africa (88), followed by Kenya (57), and Nigeria (51). These think tanks in Ghana range from privately owned, nonprofit non-governmental policy centers, profit-oriented private institutes, and public academic centers. Table 1 indicates a list of selected think tanks in Ghana in no particular order. We note that the selection of these think tanks is informed by their keen involvement in activities that promote and influence citizen participation in governance even at the grassroots. This does not necessarily mean that the unlisted think tanks are not active, but rather that most of their activities have been advisory, other than grassroots participation.

Table 1 List of randomly selected think tanks in Ghana

Policy think tank	Status	Website
Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA)	Non-governmental	www.ieagh.org
Center for Democratic Development (CDD)	Non-governmental	www.cddgh.org
Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA)	Non-governmental	www.cepa.org.gh
IMANI Center for Policy and Education	Non-governmental	www.imaniafrica.org
Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)	Non-governmental	www.ideg.org
Institute for Health Policy Research	Non-governmental	www.healthresearchweb.org
The Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC)	Non-governmental	www.isodeg.org.gh
Centre for Policy Research and Training	Non-governmental	www.cepratgh.org
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC)	Non-governmental	www.kaiptc.org
Danquah Institute	Non-governmental	www.danquahinstitute.org
Africa Center for Energy Policy (ACEP)	Non-governmental	www.acepghana.com
African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET)	Non-governmental	www.acetforafrica.org
Institute for Policy Alternatives (IPA)	Non-governmental	www.ipaghana.com
International Food Policy Research Institute	Non-governmental	www.ifpri.org
Center for Freedom and Accuracy	Non-governmental	------------
Africa Youth Peace Call		www.aypcghana.org
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding	Non-governmental	www.wanep.org
African Security Dialogue and Research	Non-governmental	www.myafrica.allafrica.com
Third World Network	Non-governmental	www.twnafrica.org
Mutatio Institute	Non-governmental	http://mutatio-institute.alumniportal.com/
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER)	Governmental	www.isser.edu.gh
Center for Social Policy Studies	Governmental	http://csps.ug.edu.gh

Source: Author (2015), all websites accessed in March 2015

These think tanks have various motivations and objectives for their establishment. However, their activities are driven by one common motive, offering policy alternatives to government and giving citizens the opportunity to be part of the decision-making process as far as influencing policy making is concerned.

4 Establishments and General Characteristics

The various think tanks in Ghana were established under different mandates, purposes, and objectives. A Ghanaian economist, Dr. Charles Mensa, who returned to Ghana in the late 1980s, established the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana's first public policy think tank. The founder started the think tank with the goal of establishing an institution to strengthen democracy and promote economic analysis and growth through policy recommendations while also promoting democratic views among citizens. In the same vein, the Centre for Policy Research and Training (CEPRAT) and Mutatio Institute were established by young individuals who returned from Germany after being trained in public policy and governance under the German Education Exchange Services' (DAAD) Public Policy and Good Governance Programme. These institutes have become a platform for young people with policy analysis expertise to promote citizen participation in governance through their activities.

It is important to note that the policy institutes in Ghana mimic the American system of policy centers. The reason for this is because most of the founders are individuals and groups of individuals who have studied and acquired knowledge of democratic governance, policy assessment, and the roles organizations can play in the policy making process. We observe that public policy as an academic discipline and vibrant practice of public policy in the United States and the United Kingdom has had a rippling effect on some of these individuals and their views on the importance of policy institutes.

There are few centers that can be seen as public or government owned. These centers are also mostly attached to public universities, so their employees are remunerated by the government. For instance, the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), the Center for Social Policy Studies, and the Center for Development Studies are all attached to public institutions like the University of Ghana. Their activities are not greatly different from the privately owned institutes; however, they seek to concentrate on training in policy, economics, and/or development fields. These centers also liaise with foreign institutes to train their staff. For instance, ISSER has a collaborative agreement with the Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn (http://www.zef.de/). Through this program, Ghanaians are trained in fields of development up to the PhD level.

The privately owned think tanks, which form more than 90% of the total 38 think tanks in Ghana as at 2013, have a more praxis-oriented approach to policy analysis and policy alternatives and sometimes critically assess and challenge governmental decisions. Some of the most vibrant in this area are Imani, CDD, the IEA, ACEP, and

the CEPRAT, among others. Their establishment was also influenced by the Western education that the founders acquired and policy systems they studied. This is evident in the founding information on their websites and the educational background of their founders. Thus, the Western public policy influence took another dimension in sub-Saharan Africa in general and Ghana in particular. Here we posit that the influence translated into the establishment of think tanks rather than a continuation of the academic stream where other countries have been influenced to establish policy schools and colleges to actually train minds and continue the academic debate.

The reason for this is that most sub-Saharan African states, Ghana included, are bedeviled with a plethora of problems whereby governments seem to be overwhelmed by the task of coming up with practical and sustainable solutions to deal with most of these problems. As a result, we assert that individuals with Western training, not necessarily in public policy but also in economics, public administration, and other fields, found it imperative to establish institutes that make governments accountable in terms of information sharing, policy design and implementation, as well as participatory decision-making in governance. We further surmise again that the institutes also assess the impact of governmental policies as well as bring the actual implications of governmental actions to the doorstep of the people, thereby making them part of the decision-making process.

5   Policy Institutes as a Platform for Participatory Governance

Participatory governance involves harnessing the population's human resource capacity in the decision-making process when it comes to policy making. In other words, this is when the citizens are involved in the decision-making processes before final decisions are made; participation is not just restricted to general elections but rather policy makers seek the people's views and policies are laid before the public sphere for deliberations. The importance of making policy decisions participatory is to engage citizens in the policy process either through consultations or direct involvement (Peters and Pierre 2000). This becomes more of a co-governance whereby the decision-making gap between government and the citizens is not considered to be wide. This, according to Ackerman and Fishkin (2005), is when social actors, in this case think tanks, are invited to participate in the core activities of the state.

We note here that decisions by governments inadvertently have consequences for the people either in the positive or negative sense. To this end, when governments directly involve the people in decision-making, the final policy thereof and the effect of the policy are seen as a collective decision of both the people and the government. This incorporation not only builds the confidence of the people in such a democratic system but also legitimizes the final policy outcomes (Cohen and Sabel 1997). This

makes the policy making approach bottom-up and also centers policy making strategies on deliberation and compromise. Here, there is the commitment to varying opinions, constructive criticisms, and maximum support for policy ideas.

Kpessah (2011) distinguishes between the conventional form of decision-making, which is based on representative governance, a participatory form of decision-making, and a participatory approach. The conventional form in this sense conceives of the citizen as a voter, client, subject, or even customers, while the participatory approach sees the citizen as an activist, co-producer of policy, negotiator, and a social cooperation partner. In this view, participatory policy making is the result of a paradigm shift from the traditional form which is mostly seen as elitist because the ruling class makes decisions based on either guess work or how they believe things should be. This posture according to Esau (2008) is more paternalistic in its orientation.

Policy think tanks in Ghana are considered to have been part of the paradigmatic shift from traditional representative decision-making to participatory governance. Though the successes are not at peak height, they are visible and the progress is evident. For instance, their activities have led to being empaneled in policy deliberations such as the Economic Forum as Senchi in 2015, Social Security and National Insurance Trust, tier-two pension investigations, etc.

The dynamism in administration especially after Ghana gained her independence has aided the penetration of the policy centers into decision-making processes. Through these advisory committees, focus groups, consensus conferences, and further bodies have been established (Montpetit 2003) to deliberate on national issues and policy drafts. These groups are made up of experts and policy analysts, some of whom are founders of and researchers for policy think tanks. For instance, in 2013, the Government of Ghana, through the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, set up a focus group to discuss the ways of dealing with the newly implemented pay structure called Single Spine Salary Structure which was estimated to be taking about 60% of government annual revenue. Among the participants of the focus group were different heads of think tanks and technocrats who were involved in policy analysis at the various policy institutes.

Policy institutes employ various approaches at raising citizens' interest in participatory decision-making. Thematically, the major approaches that these think tanks employ are advocacy; policy analysis; public debates, conferences, workshops, and colloquiums; and capacity building and training.

5.1 Advocacy

There are many different types of advocacy. It definitively involves action being taken in the form of writing, acting, etc. by an individual or a group to promote, protect, or defend the interest of a group or to affect decision-making through education (Casey 2011). Many advocacy programs are employed by think tanks,

and this accounts for citizen awareness in governance. For instance, ISODEC conducts its activities through rights-based advocacy programs whereby they seek to ensure transparency and accountability in governance, responsiveness and equity in the management of natural resource revenues, and access of the poor to essential services, etc. (www.isodec.org.gh, accessed in March, 2015). ACEP and CEPRAT, on the other hand, employ training and advocacy as the core activities with specific reference to Ghana's energy resources and general policies on governance. The CDD is predominantly seen as a research and advocacy institute. This is not limited to one think tank. It is commonly accepted that almost all of these organizations have advocacy strategies since this is the easiest means of getting information across to either the policy makers or the citizens. For instance, the ACEP engages citizens on regional bases in a symposium to explain the state of Ghana's oil exploration and how the government has managed the oil revenue so far. This advocacy activity has sensitized many people to gain first-hand information on the extent to which the oil revenue is either mismanaged or well-managed by government.

Again, the CEPRAT has established policy clubs in tertiary institutions where they discuss, hold seminars, and assess pertinent issues concerning the country such as corruption, peaceful elections, national health insurance, etc. Another example is the Danquah Institute's which major activity is advocacy. For instance, the Institute has been a strong advocate for the use of biometric registration and verification for elections in Ghana. This has been adopted and is being used to conduct elections. Advocacy is the major activity of ISODEC as well. Through this, the ISODEC defends and promotes the provision of public goods, accountability of public resources, and community engagements. It is also dedicated to what it calls "people-centered advocacy." This creates awareness at the grassroots level on governance and public resources issues. This initiative gives remote areas the opportunity to participate in governance through the sharing of ideas to shape public policy. The WANEP focuses on using dialogue as an approach to building peace. The organization also uses training of community leaders and opinion leaders to help in peace-building. Their activities, therefore, engage the grassroots level and expose them to the various benefits in conflict prevention and peace-building. Furthermore, the IEA makes its research known to stakeholders and the general public through advocacy and advising. Here, they engage directly with stakeholders through various programs to present their research and offer advice. In the same vein, the Third World Africa Network engages in advocacy on policy issues such as political economy, gender, environment, etc.

5.2   Policy Analysis

Citizen participation in governance includes creating the socioeconomic understanding of government's policies from a nonpartisan perspective. One of the duties of governments is the redistribution of income to help bridge the inequality gap between the rich and poor. In performing this duty, government engages in policy

design and implementation. It is imperative that citizens understand and appreciate the various policies such as health insurance, social security, unemployment support, etc. and know the extent of its effects. In this vein, think tanks engage in policy analysis for the purposes of evaluating and creating citizen awareness of government's policies. Here, there are many analyses on fiscal policy and development policy, as well as the general economic health of a country.

Within the policy analysis framework, there are various thematic areas for analysis. Policy institutes produce analytical reports and put them in the public domain to help the masses better understand the effects and impact of the policy proposed by the government. For instance, there are analyses concerning the ecological and agricultural sectors of the economy.

Again, there are analyses of foreign direct investments inflows, skills development, education, policies on export promotion, etc. The Center for Social Policy Studies, which is affiliated with the University of Ghana, aims at designing, developing, and improving the social welfare system through the development of a comprehensive social welfare policy. Even broader is the approach of the ISSER, which is also affiliated with the University of Ghana. They engage in research in the areas of statistics and social and economic research to help policy makers decide on the best policy for national development. Also, the ISODEC and IDEG engage in assessing policies that are mostly community-based like rural electrification, education, and health.

Additionally, CEPA engages in economic policy research and analysis. Here, the Center takes a nonpartisan approach to analyzing fiscal policy issues, inflation, exchange rate development, and the economic outlook in Ghana and the African subregion. The CDD also undertakes policy research on various governance themes which allows for citizen participation and various views on governmental issues through its annual programs such as the *Afro-Barometer*, *Transparency* and *Accountability Project*, the *African Power*, and *Politics Program* among other things. Even more, ACET is focused on economic policy analysis for transformational growth, especially in Africa. Through this, the ACET also engages in policy advising and advocacy. Here, they engage with stakeholders for the purposes of achieving transformational and sustainable growth. This gives the opportunity to citizens and individuals across the continent to know and understand the economic development patterns in Africa. The IFPRI is dedicated to proposing policy solutions for poverty reduction and hunger. These are mostly done through research and advocacy.

In the same vein, IPA mostly engages in policy research and advice. Through this they use participatory tools such as citizen reports to inform citizens on important policies, as well as solicit for views on design and implementation mechanisms. Likewise, the IEA engages in rigorous policy analysis. Here, government policies on employment, economic growth, governance, financial management, etc. are subjected to scrutiny. We note that people who have strong academic backgrounds also run most of these think tanks and this provides the opportunity to apply their research experience in the academic field to their policy analyses. For instance, the heads of IDEG, CDD, CEPRAT, IEA, and CEPA are all individuals who have strong academic training in research and field advocacy. The import is that they

create an avenue where their activities do not alloy supplement governance but also contribute to the academic discourses on the various areas of research.

5.3 Public Debates, Conferences, Workshops, and Colloquia

In public debates, there are various conferences, seminars, and colloquiums organized to release information into the public domain. Here, policy institutes have various policy review magazines, journals, and blogs where they publish their findings, as well as written papers and memorandums. This provides the opportunity for the wider population to have access to the information and activities of these think tanks. Also, think tanks like the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) organize presidential debates for representatives of political parties during general elections. This is a new phenomenon in our body politic where questions are requested from the general public and sorted out for the candidates to answer. Additionally, there are panel discussions on radios and television programs to discuss the government's policies, the general state of the nation, the annual budget, and other issues of public interest.

The IEA, on the other hand, publishes the legislative alert, governance, economic review (midyear), quarterly highlights, and more. The CDD and CEPA produce publications that are all meant to disseminate information on policy issues to the public. Specifically, the CDD organizes workshops and roundtable discussions with the involvement of leading actors on pertinent issues such as electoral violence, extractive sector governance, transparency, and others. Research is presented and discussed in workshops and roundtable discussions: media, politicians, and policy makers are invited on a regular basis, potentially influencing policy processes and policy making.

For instance, the Danquah Institute engages in conferences and seminars to publicize their views on government policies. Being a politically oriented (partisan) think tank, it uses these conferences to push for a property-owning approach to capitalism and a free market economy. Also, CEPA organizes seminars that are mostly to unveil research findings and results to the general public. Thus, their research activities are directly linked with their workshops and seminars. The IEA and ACET are also noted for organizing conferences and seminars that are mostly attended by presidents and other experts in Africa.

5.4 Capacity Building and Training

Capacity building also involves capacity development which is a vital role played by policy institutes. Capacity development has gradually become the center of attention in the development discourse over the past few years, and it constitutes an increasingly important strategy in development today (Ulleberg 2009). Furthermore,

capacity building is sometimes conceptualized as capacity development, expecially when describing their activities or mandate or using the equivalent notions of "capacity building," "providing an enabling environment," or "developing abilities" (Eade 1997).

Capacity building and training involves the improvement of the human resource capacity of individuals and groups who are interested in policy analysis. Through this, policy institutes organize trainings for people, including politicians, and also offer internships and volunteer opportunities for citizens who are interested in policy analysis. Internships give opportunities to people who may not necessarily have any policy background to get at least 3-month training and work experience with these institutes. Some institutes also offer to host graduates who are doing their national service. In regard to institutional capacity building, the IEA is dedicated to strengthening the institutional capacity of both the public and private sectors to enable them to perform more efficiently.

Thus, governmental institutions such as parliament, district assemblies, etc. gain from the institute. Again, the institute helps political parties during elections through training programs and other logistical support. Volunteers are also sought mainly to help in large research projects. These people are given in-service training that adds to their knowledge base and can enable them to transfer and improve upon their previous knowledge. Again, there are school and college programs such as those run at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast, and the University of Ghana Business School to name a few, aimed at targeting students to better understand governmental policies and to appraise the impact assessment of implemented policies.

Other centers such as the IEA, CEPA, CDD, ACET, KAIPTC, etc. are dedicated to training politicians and stakeholders on policy design and analysis. These trainings are done in the form of roundtable discussions, seminars, and other formats. This approach is taken by almost all the major policy think tanks to help make them reach their target groups. For instance, CDD has a range of programs for building the human capacity of state agencies, constitutional bodies, and other interested agencies. Programs such as the media literacy and anti-stigmatization programs are prominent. Also, the CEPA engages in programs that aim at building the capacity of state institutions such as parliament and the civil society. There are also school and college programs that are organized periodically to enlighten the youth on governmental policy trends. Again, through the African Trade Network (ATN), TWN Africa provides training and information on trade to many civil society organizations. This has an indirect link with educating the grassroots level on issues that are mostly community-based.

Table 2 Activities of randomly selected think tanks in Ghana (Author, 2015)

Policy think tanks	Advocacy	Policy analysis	Public debates, conferences, workshops	Capacity building
Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA)	x	x	x	x
Center for Democratic Development (CDD)	x	x	x	x
Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA)	–	x	x	x
IMANI Center for Policy and Education	x	x	–	–
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER)	x	x	x	–
Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)	x	x	x	–
Institute for Health Policy Research	x	x	–	–
The Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC)	x	x	x	–
Africa Center for Development and Integrity	x	x	–	–
Danquah Institute	x	x	x	–
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC)	x	x	–	x
Africa Center for Energy Policy (ACEP)	x	x	–	–
African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET)	x	x	x	–
Center for Social Policy Studies	–	x	–	x
Institute for Policy Alternatives (IPA)	x	x	–	–
International Food Policy Research Institute	x	x	–	x
Center for Freedom and Accuracy	x	x	–	–
Africa Youth Peace Call	x	x	–	–
Center for Development Studies	–	x	–	x
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding	x	x	x	x
African Security Dialogue and Research	x	x	x	–
Centre for Policy Research and Training	x	x	–	x

Source: Author (2015), all websites accessed in March 2015

5.5 Synthesis

The policy think tanks listed in Table 2 follow no preferential order. However, their selection, which is based on the criteria of their activism in the various activities listed over and above other think tanks that were not selected, satisfies a pattern that

effectively influences citizen participation in participatory governance. These think tanks operate with systematically updated websites and/or communication methods in order to get information about their activities with the people. The table below indicates where their focus lies when it comes to specific activities. The main activities that are aimed at improving citizen participation in governance are advocacy, policy analysis, public debates, conferences, workshops, and capacity building.

For my assessment, I gathered information from the websites of the various think tanks from the period between 2013 and 2015, as well as the media reportage of their activities. My assessment shows that more than 90% of the think tanks engage in advocacy and policy analysis. This has been the broad base activity through which grassroots change is influenced. This is mainly because such activities require fewer resources as compared to other activities. They educate the people sometimes through the media and also engage in in-depth analyses on policy implementation by the government and then publish it for interested readers.

My assessment in Table 2 also indicates that about 60% of the think tanks engage in public debates, conferences, workshops, and seminars on a regular basis. The table shows the strength of the think tanks when it comes to these activities. It is important to note, however, that almost all of the think tanks offer seminars or conferences at some point. The table looks at how deeply these think tanks engage in these activities to promote citizen participation in governance. Few think tanks prioritize a strategy to mobilize the people to understand and take part in public decision-making. In terms of capacity building, there lacks a sense of variety and vibrancy in the activities of the think tank. Think tanks that concentrate on purely academic research are the most active ones. These think tanks train people in master's degrees and other professional courses. Table 2 gives an overview of the think tank activities in Ghana related to the selected institutes.

6 Assessment of Activities on Citizen Participation

From the time that Ghana gained independence in 1957 until the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1992, bureaucrats and politicians were solely in charge of policy making. According to Carroll et al. (2003), policy making has become the job description of management teams, core civil servants, and politicians. Here, decision-making enabled the ruling elite to develop their leadership style, which was mainly authoritarian, through the policies they made for those actually affected by those policies.

The grassroots involvement of citizens through the activities of policy think tanks has led to the incorporation of the nonprofit sector into the policy making process. This is an improvement in the political system that existed from the precolonial, colonial, and early part of the postcolonial period. Apart from the colonial regime, the various authoritarian regimes from 1957 on governed with the practice of reducing and excluding the private sector, civil society, trade unions, etc. from the policy making process (Tsikata 2001).

Through their activities, citizens are now largely aware of governmental decisions. There is a movement from passive citizenry to participative citizenry. For instance, the citizen approach to issues such as electoral reforms before the 2012 general elections in Ghana and the legal struggles after the elections evidently shows the widespread interest in governance. Additionally, through the activities of policy think tanks, public discussions on major issues such as erratic energy supply, water, sanitation, and other themes have taken on a different dimension that has overwhelmed governments. Suddenly, everyone seems ready and eager to contribute to national debates on radio and television stations during phone-in programs.

According to Ohemeng (2005), these think tanks have become a catalyst for complementing government's policies by educating the populace on public policies that are vital for the development and *marketization* of Ghana. Thus, through this, the various policy institutes are dedicated to the promotion of rights, governance based on the rule of law, strengthening the market economy, and promoting libertarian society among other concerns. Some have also become what Ohemeng (2005) refers to as policy mediators, whereby their assistance is sought to help in conflict resolution.

Again, past and successive governments have been taught the importance of involving these institutes in policy making. This has happened in situations whereby these think tanks have formed coalitions with non-governmental organizations. For instance, a coalition between the TWN, ISODEC, and NGOs led to the adoption of a tripartite committee to review the Structural Adjustment Programme when that policy started facing problems of implementation (Britwum et al. 2001).

It is important to note that apart from the Danquah Institute, which is affiliated with a political party, these think tanks are purely nonpartisan. Since their basic aim is to influence governmental policies through objective research and analysis, it is imperative that they remain objective in performing their duties and this is considered to be an important feature of most think tanks. Because of this important feature, they are able to better inform the people who are, for the most part, deeply divided by political affiliation between two main political parties: the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that occasionally politicians associate some of these think tanks with some parties depending on how critical the institute is to the party in power.

The activities that the think tanks employ have had an enormous impact on citizen participation in governance. Through advocacy, these institutes, rather than the government, have made policy information that was previously shrouded in secrecy available to the people. This effect is enhanced through the various advocacy strategies that they employ. Some accomplish this through panel discussions in the media. And since these policies are discussed in the local language by representatives of the think tanks during panel discussions and phone-in periods, the populace is able to listen to and understand even complex policy issues. Ultimately, they are able to share their views which can possibly lead to mass demonstrations when a policy is not received well by the people. We note here that some advocacy means are very subtle, while others are very rigorous, such as lobbying. Rigorous advocacy is not largely seen to be employed by these think tanks. This is because the aim has

not been to push a certain agenda, but rather to give the government policy alternatives and educate them on the implications of the proposed policies. Thus, through advocacy, there is a general understanding among the people of what government needs to do and not to do. This is a very promising sign for a growing democracy.

Like advocacy, all the think tanks are involved in policy analysis. Through this, they become critical of the government and conduct impact assessments of governmental policies. For instance, think tanks have for some time now placed the current salary structure in Ghana under scrutiny, with some institutes putting forward the view that public servants are overpaid, while others are of the view that it was rather the implementation strategy of the salary structure that was problematic.

Again, the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana has for some time now been under the policy analysis microscope (Agyepong and Adjei 2008). This has been necessary because the current state of the scheme is seen as collapsing. Through their analysis, policy alternatives have been proposed on how to revamp the scheme. Policy analysis on Ghana's oil revenue and use was and continues to be even more pertinent, especially after the then government decided to collateralize the oil revenue for 15 years to acquire a $3 billion Chinese loan in 2014. Under normal circumstances this would only be a parliamentary and elitist discussion, but the role that think tanks played in getting the information into the public domain empowered every Ghanaian to have an opinion and to share it. The effect is that people are now issue-centered and are open to decisions that governments propose and make. This has also been reflected in the body politic when it comes to political campaigning.

Public debates such as the presidential debates have been a new phenomenon in Ghanaian politics; in addition to these, conferences, roundtable discussions, focus groups, workshops, and colloquiums have been an effective tool for mass enlightenment and citizen participation. Since the aim has been to influence policy making, involving the public through these activities leads to a larger influence in governmental policy making since the activities bring the grassroots base to the policy domain. Through this, capacity building, education, and training have also developed young minds who are now very interested in policy and public administration. The Center for Social Policy is now known to run a postgraduate program in social policy. This has put an academic touch on policy knowledge. The program boasts of a student body characterized by a broad range of backgrounds and fields from the private to the public sector including politicians. This is a vital approach to bringing policy making as an academic activity into the broader academic setting. Many student alumni, trained individuals, interns, service personnel, and volunteers acquire knowledge that is very important for grassroots participation and activism in understanding governmental policies.

The activities of the policy think tanks have in no uncertain terms contributed to the shift from the traditional bureaucratic and elitist decision-making to a more participatory and deliberative form of policy making. This progress is not all perfect, however, since there are still many aspects of governance systems that ought to be put into the public sphere for more objective discussion. For instance, the politicization of the educational system in Ghana is an important theme, as the duration of

secondary education keeps switching between 3 and 4 years depending on which party is in government.

Again, there are periods when the government fails to see recommendations by these think tanks as relevant and this case is an example of such a situation. This is because there seems to be unanimous agreement by policy experts and civil society on the need to make secondary education a 4-year program, but the government has ignored such recommendations presumably because it was a policy implemented by the opposition when they were in power. Instances like this sometimes make the work of these institutes just a formality and without any meaningful impact on governance. However, when concerned citizens become engaged, they can have a meaningful impact on public policy. This indirectly puts pressure on the government since it then becomes a public issue rather than a recommendation from a policy institute. In the end, citizens are empowered, enlightened, and informed about government policies which help them to be part of policy making through participatory democracy.

7 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the impact of policy institutes on citizen involvement in governance and policy making. This feat has been achieved through the grassroots-oriented activities that the think tanks employ to influence public policy. The various strategies inherent in the major activities of the policy think tanks have all contributed to increased citizen participation in governance. The progress of citizen participation is very much seen as an improvement in the state of governance when we assess the political history of Ghana. Having gone through the colonial stage to a one-party system, and then to the various military and authoritarian regimes, it seemed natural for citizens to be less politically concerned when it comes to governance. Additionally, the state of the economic health and living conditions also made political issues and policy making less of a priority for citizens to be concerned with since their major focus was on how to earn a sustainable income necessary for survival. This accounts for why policy making and decision-making at the government level were more elitist than participatory in the period between 1957 and 1992. However, with the liberalization and democratization of the state, citizens have been included in the decision-making process and policy implications less by government and more by civil society, of which think tanks are a part. Their activities have undoubtedly given many average Ghanaians the opportunity to understand and assess the implications of some governmental policies for themselves.

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The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing Countries: The Case of a Donor-Funded Community-Driven Development Program in The Gambia

Lamin O. Ceesay

1 Introduction

The following contribution begins with an introduction of the case, The Gambia, and a discussion of its background and the set of events that culminated into a local governance and decentralization reform in the country. This is followed by a description of the contexts in which public policy making is pursued in developing countries and the various policy transfer/lesson-drawing approaches that are being used. This helps to lay a fitting foundation and thus puts the case discussion within an analytical framework. The rest of the discussions focuses on drawing evidence from secondary sources to demonstrate where The Gambia's local government and decentralization policy came from, who formulated/transferred these policies and why supranational organizations engage in policy transfer, and what policy objects are transferred.

2 Country Overview and Context of Decentralization in The Gambia

After political independence, countries in sub-Saharan Africa went through waves of decentralization reform processes. In the past decades, the desire to shift power to sub-national governments in sub-Saharan Africa was motivated by the different countries' desire to ensure democratic governance, better managed intrastate conflicts that characterized postindependent Africa, rapid urbanization, and to accelerate development. Although the reform processes continue to be inhibited by inadequacies regarding the availability of resources and ineffective collaboration

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between various stakeholders, decentralization policy formulation and implementation began in The Gambia in the late 1980s (Alam 2009, p. 28; Sowe 2017, p. 111).

The Gambia is a small subtropical country in West Africa occupying an area of about 10,689 sq. km. She shares borders to the north, east, and south with Senegal, with an 80 km coast on the Atlantic Ocean in the west. She has an island capital city, Banjul. The River Gambia divides the country into north and south banks. The country has a total area of approximately 11,300 km^2 (4388 sq. miles) out of which 1300 km^2 is comprised of bodies of water (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2018, p. 1). English is the official language of communication in The Gambia and other spoken local languages. As of 2018, The Gambia has seven administrative regions: Banjul City Council, Kanifing Municipal Council, West Coast Region (Brikama), Lower River Region (Mansa Konko), North Bank Region (Kerewan), Central River Region (Janjanbureh), and Upper River Region (Basse). It also has eight local government authorities—one city council, one municipality, and six area councils. These councils are Banjul City Council, Kanifing Municipal Council, Brikama Area Council, Mansa Konko Area Council, Kerewan Area Council, Janjanbureh Area Council, Kuntaur Area Council, and Basse Area Council.

Since The Gambia was under the colonial administration and its indirect rule system of government, local government administrations have been a critical component of her overall governance and development structures. They are key players not only in the areas of economic development but equally in the areas of maintenance of law and order, environmental protection, growth, and employment. The central government is able to inject valuable insight into its development policy design and governance processes only through its frequent interactions with local government authorities. The Government of The Gambia, as far back as the early 1980s, began rethinking its approaches to development and governance and how it could ensure greater participation of its citizens in the activities of national socio-economic and political development (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2011, p. 95).

To achieve its decentralized objectives, the Government of The Gambia pursued some of the following actions: (1) assist local government authorities, technical line departments, and community institutions to coordinate, inspect, implement, manage, monitor, and evaluate decentralized development programs in a democratic and transparent manner and (2) promote civil society (NGOs and CBOs) and people's participation in determining the country's destiny through a participatory development process (ibid., p. 96).

Decentralized administrative reforms in The Gambia, as of late, have been accelerated through the enactment of the country's 1997 Constitution and its relevant provisions like sections 193–194 and 214 (3), all of which provided for decentralization through the devolution of some central government functions to the local governments. And in line with the decentralization strategy, several enabling policy and legal frameworks have been formulated on local government reform. Notable among these policy and legal frameworks are the Local Government Act of 2002, Local Government Amendment Acts (2004, 2006, and 2007), Finance and Audit Act 2004, and the establishment of Local Government Service Commission. A National

Steering Committee was established to implement the reforms, whereas the response from the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Religious Affairs was the establishment of the Directorate of Local Governance for smooth formulation and coordination of decentralization reforms (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009; Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2011, 2018).

The Local Government Act 2002; the subsequent amendments of 2004, 2006, and 2007; and the Finance and Audit Act of 2004 outlined the framework for large-scale fiscal and functional decentralization of the public sector. The legislations restructured the public sector beginning with the demarcation of local government areas, the new institutional arrangements or structures, and staffing. Equally prescribed by the legal instruments are the obligations of the central government toward the councils, what authorities and services the center must devolve to the councils both functional and fiscal, and the terms and conditions for the provision of grants to the local councils. Such basic services like education, health, agriculture, road maintenance, sanitation, and animal husbandry are identified as the domains of the councils; however, the devolution is incomplete without the concomitant transfer of the needed resources from the central to the local government administrations to run and maintain these services.

Decentralization serves as the foundation for The Gambia Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP), its Strategy for Poverty Alleviation (1994 and 2003) and Vision 2020 (1996), Program for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE 2012–2015), and the National Development Plan (NDP 2018–2021). The cornerstone of all of these is a participatory approach to sustainable development and poverty alleviation (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 8).

However, the Government of The Gambia's actions to deepen decentralization have been frustrated by certain challenges. Among which are inadequate Government budget allocations to facilitate decentralized governance, participatory community planning, and development interventions and weak capacity of local decentralized structures to plan and implement their own development initiatives (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2011, p. 96). Similar sentiments are shared in The Gambia National Development Plan (NDP 2018–2021) (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2018, p. 23) and the report on the *Decentralisation in The Gambia* (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 9).

As of 2018, in the areas of human and institutional capacity strengthening at all levels of the decentralized structures, there is no comprehensive capacity building plan to facilitate capacity building at all levels. Out of the eight local government councils in The Gambia with regard to the evidence-based planning, monitoring, and evaluation front, "only 37 percent (3) of councils have strategic plans" (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2018, pp. 24–25). In the area of standardized financial management and accounting systems, presently, only one out of eight councils has a resource mobilization plan in place, while "only 37 per cent of councils have computerized financial management packages" (ibid., p. 25). Table 1 summarizes the decentralized structures of The Gambia.

Table 1 Summarized decentralized structure of The Gambia

Level	Structures	Development mandate in LG Act 2002
Local Government Areas (LGAs)	*Local Government Authority (Local Area Council)* – Elected councilor from each ward – Finance, establishment, development committee	– Coordinates development plans and programs – Promotes economic, social, spatial, and human settlement policy
	Local Government Services – Departments of finance, services, planning and development, and administration	– Plan and implement any program or project for developing the infrastructure, improve social services, developing human and financial resources
	Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) – Central government's technical department that have extension workers at ward and village levels (MDFTs) – Representatives of locally involved NGOs	– Provides technical advice to area council, WDCs, and VDCs to ensure local projects conform to the national standards, policies, and priorities
Ward	*Ward Development Committees* – Ward councilor (chair) – Male and female elected representatives from each VDC – Representatives of organizations involved in ward level development activities – Other co-opted members – May establish subcommittees	– Coordinate and prioritize all development planning at the ward level – Prepare ward development plans – Coordinate development assistance at ward level – Review village plans to identify shared prioritizes and concerns – May operate bank accounts
Village	*Village Development Committees* – Male and female representatives from each *Kabilo* (clan) – Male and female representative of each community-based organization (CBO) – Youth representative – Other co-opted members – May establish subcommittees	– Identifying and prioritizing local development needs, in consultation with the local community – Developing plans; raising, coordinating and managing financial resources at village level – Implementing and managing development plans and projects at village level – Carrying out other functions as assigned by the area council or WDC – May operate bank account

Adapted from Project Appraisal Document on a proposed grant by the Government of The Gambia for a community-driven development project, May 24, 2006

3 Public Policy-Making Process in Developing Countries

Many policy scientists have argued that public policy making involves a complex interactive process, rather than a mere one-off technical function of governments. The fact that the process is interactive has been influenced by a variety of sociopolitical, economic, and environmental factors. The environmental factors that

characterize the policy context are responsible for the policy variations not only in the kinds of inputs that are supplied, or the demands made to the system, but also in the results realized in the differences in public policy processes in dissimilar contexts, thus influencing both the policy output and impact. As a result of the differences in their policy contexts, significant variations are realized between public policies processes of the developed countries and those of the developing countries (Abdul Mu'eez et al. 2018; Aiafi 2017; Dery 2000; Osman 2002).

Public policies in developing countries are immensely influenced by volatile sociopolitical environments and other challenges such as ill health, malnutrition, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, low living standards, and others. As a result, Osman (2002) referred to public policies in developing countries as having special peculiarities that are unlike those of the developed nations. According to him, policy refers "to a broad statement that reflects future goals and aspirations and provides guidelines for carrying out those goals." He provided another definition where policy means "the product of political influence, determining and setting limits to what the state does" (p. 38).

Potoae Roberts Aiafi (2017) argued that public policy has been defined differently by different scholars and according to her, the term refers to any of the following:

> (. . .) 'what governments do, why they do it and what difference it makes', (. . .) or 'the sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through agents as it has influence on the lives of citizens' (. . .) or 'an emergent, self- organizational, and dynamic complex system (p. 452).

In short, policy is any course of action or decision taken by government to provide a solution to a social issue and one, which has to have a deliberate strategy for planning and implementation.

A consensus has been reached among policy scientists such as Osman (2002), Aiafi (2017), and Abdul Mu'eez et al. (2018) that the best way to conceptualize public policy is in terms of a process. The reason being that policy decision-making is neither static nor confined to any one level of government and that the process is best conveyed using the process analogy and not a one-off or a single act of a government or any of its agencies (Dery 2000; Osman 2002, p. 38). Policy processes involve a network of political activities and interactions such as bargaining, negotiation, lobbying, and accommodation of a variety of interests within which not only decisions flow but where programs are formulated and implemented. Thus, organizations become dependent on each other within this network of political interaction through frequent interactions and program implementation. Due to activities and interactions involved in public policy processes, Osman referred to policy making as both complex and dynamic with a "series of actions and inactions of varieties of groups with varieties of interests at different stages," rather than a simple process (2002, p. 38).

Actors in the policy process that play active roles include officials of public institutions, private sector organizations, civil society groups, and individuals. The series of interactions between the officials of public and private sector organizations

in the policy-making process is what "constitutes the structure of the political system within which policy actors influence the policy process," and it is again due to these differences existing between the structures of political systems of the developed and developing countries that differentiate their policy-making processes (ibid., p. 39). In the words of Osman (2002), "This makes the existing theories or models of public policy-making derived from the developed countries inadequate to explain the policy making process of developing countries" (p. 38).

According to him, an important distinction is that

> Compared to the developed countries, policies of developing countries are less responsive to the demands of the environment. On the other hand, support from the society as input for decision-making is also less significant in the developing country context (p. 39).

Research findings of Aiafi (2017) and Osman (2002) show that developing countries have certain common sociopolitical and economic characteristics that result in them having some distinct policy contexts compared to developed countries.

Ferdous Arfina Osman's (2002) article entitled *Public policy making: theories and their implications in developing countries*, where she examined the health policy-making process of Bangladesh as a developing country, has identified some common features among developing countries' policy-making environment. Firstly, she observed that in developing countries in particular, those that have experienced colonialization, the "state elites frequently find themselves facing weak and disorganized societies. Their own autonomous preferences can thus play a large role-at least initially" (p. 46).

In developing countries, interest groups are "less organized. . .thus cannot become dominant over the state machinery and in the same way, professionals in developing countries are less dominant than their counterparts in the developed countries." Secondly, the fact that in the developing countries, decision-making is "highly centralised. . . the state assumes the key role in policy making." With regard to agenda setting, for instance, in developing nations, noted (Osman 2002, p. 46), state actors are "frequently the most important actors in placing issues on an agenda for government action, assessing alternatives and superintending implementation."

Thirdly and the most important argument regarding the subject matter of this chapter is that the "scarcity of financial resources in developing countries has made donor agencies another dominant policy actor which is non-existent in developed countries." Thus, the heavy dependency on foreign aid for durable and effective functioning by most political systems in developing countries such as health care, agriculture, education, and so on causes donor agencies to influence "policy priority, allocation of resources and creates scope to the donor agencies to emerge as important policy actors." Alongside the issues of unavailability and limited access to vital public goods and poor, ineffective, and inefficient service delivery by the governments functionaries in developing countries, the doors are opened for NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) or "voluntary agencies emerge as another policy actor in developing countries" (ibid., p. 47).

Similarly, in terms of policy initiation/adoption in three Pacific Island nations (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa) and key regional intergovernmental organizations, the results of Potoae Roberts Aiafi's (2017) study on *The Nature of Public Policy Processes in the Pacific Islands: Public Policy in the Pacific Islands* show that

(. . .) issues that enter the government agenda and then become public policies came largely from the top (political actors. . .) and external (foreign actors. . .). This means that policy adoption is highly political, influenced mainly by local politicians and donor countries. [Secondly] (. . .) issues originating from society (. . .) were limited. This means that the society on which public policy is meant to impact, and in which the state is a part, has been the missing element in policy processes examined. Third, external influences came as policy transfers mostly through the roles performed by donors (or international development agencies) and consultants (p. 455).

With regard to policy formulation, Potoae Roberts Aiafi's (2017) research findings also indicate four commonalities and one key difference:

First, the formulation process is predominantly top-down. Second, most policies are constructed without proper consultation or stakeholder participation. Although consultative discourses have improved, civil society's meaningful participation remains minimal. Third, rational and evidence-based policy is limited (although much stronger at regional than national level). Fourth, the 'policies' are largely policy transfers (lacking recognition of local institutions), but the 'practices' are ad hoc driven mostly by ideological factors. Fifth, stakeholders understanding of policies (and notions of public policy in terms of state–society relationships) are limited. Lastly, the key difference across the four case studies is direct involvement of the political level in policy formulation in the Solomon Islands (p. 459).

4   Policy Transfer or Lesson-Drawing

One key attribute of public policy is that it is enacted in response to some kind of issue (s) that calls for attention (Birkland 2015). The waves of decentralization reforms or the attempts that African countries have made to shift powers to sub-national government after independence are certainly "in response to some sort of problem that requires attention" (Birkland 2015, p. 8). The aftermath of political independence on the continent was characterized by authoritarian or dictatorial governments or simply the absence of democratic governance; the problem of legitimacy especially at sub-national level; and the plague of intrastate conflicts and excruciating underdevelopment to name but a few. Although public policy making is the ultimate responsibility of national governments, however, the ideas may emanate externally, i.e., "from outside government or through the interaction of government and nongovernment actors" (Birkland 2015, p. 8).

According to Rose (1991), it is not only normal to transfer policy or draw policy lessons from one country, but it is common to do so.

Every country has problems, and each think that its problems are unique to its place and time (. . .) However, problems that are unique to one country (. . .) are abnormal. The concerns for which ordinary people turn to government–education, social security, health care, safety on the streets, a clean environment, and a buoyant economy–are common on many continents. Within a given policy area there is much in common across state and national boundaries

(. . .) Confronted with a common problem policy makers in cities, regional governments and nations can learn from how their counterparts elsewhere responded (pp. 3–4).

In the opening statement of their review of policy transfer literature, David Dolowitz and David Mars (1996) argued that policy transfer

has always existed [and] (. . .) that the rapid growth in communications of all types (. . .) has accelerated the process. Not surprisingly, the increase in policy transfer has led to the development of interest in the topic among students of comparative politics and public policy (p. 343).

They went further to argue that whether it is called policy transfer, policy emulation, or lesson-drawing, they all mean

(. . .) a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, p. 344).

Policy transfer, as it is argued by Rose (1991), can be either voluntary or coercive. Many authors concur that the key reason for voluntary policy transfer is "some form of dissatisfaction or problem with the status quo." This argument points to the fact that it is necessary for governments to search for policy lessons from elsewhere voluntarily "Only when routines stop providing 'solutions'(. . .)" (Dolowitz an Marsh 1996, p. 346). The usual cause of dissatisfaction most authors argued results from "a perception, either by the government or the public, of policy failure" (ibid, p. 347).

Although "direct imposition of policy transfer on one country by another is rare" (ibid., p. 348), however, the direct coercive policy transfer occurs when one government, in most cases a powerful one, forces another government, usually a less powerful one, to adopt a policy. The notable and sometime notorious key players in coercive policy transfers are the supranational institutions. For instance, supranational institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank (WB), through their stipulating of certain economic policies for implementation as conditions for granting loans to the developing countries, have performed a crucial part "in the spread of Western monetary policies" to the developing countries over the years (ibid., p. 348).

Other examples include the European Union (EU) and the European Court of Justice which force policy transfer upon its member states and beyond. With their power to bully developing country governments to conform to certain business regulations or threaten to move their businesses to other countries, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are other supranational institutions that can engage in direct coercive policy transfers. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) argued that alongside direct coercive policy transfer is that of indirect coercive policy transfer which happens through the potential role played by "externalities, or functional interdependence." They maintained that "There is little doubt that externalities, which result from interdependence, push government to work together to solve common problems" (ibid., p. 348). They cited the development of common environmental policies in the Mediterranean and European chemical regulations as examples.

Due to the speed with which technology forces change, it is mentioned as another indirect coercive transfer, for it pushes governments into policy transfer. Other factors that indirectly push governments toward policy transfer include world economy constrains (e.g., financial crisis), global economic integration, perception among political actors that their country is falling behind its neighbors or competitors, and the emergence of an international consensus on a solution to a particular problem could also pressure countries "to join the international 'community' by implementing similar programmes or policies" (ibid., p. 349).

With regard to what is transferred or the objects of policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) argued that it is not only "policy goals, content and instrument" that are transferred as identified by Bennett, but rather all of the following seven objects they have identified are transferred: "policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons" (ibid., pp. 349–350). As they engage in policy transfer processes, actors do have access to a range of options with regard to how they could incorporate lessons from elsewhere into their political systems. Regarding these, Rose (1993) identified five options which include copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis, and inspiration (pp. 132–134). However, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) combined hybridization and synthesis as one, due to their perception that the two categories are related (p. 351).

Rose (1991) argued that lesson-drawing is "about whether programmes can transfer from one place to another; it is not about what politicians think ought to be done" (p. 5). Lesson-drawing noted Rose (1991) comprises the entire policy or institutions transfer process, whereas, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) understood the term lesson-drawing to imply that "political actors or decision makers in one country draw lessons from one or more other countries, which they then apply to their own political system"(p. 344).

Although it is likely that more than one category of actors is involved in a number of specific policy cases, however, in providing an answer to the question on who does the policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identifies six key categories of actors that are involve in this process. Actors involved in the policy transfer process include elected official, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs/experts, and supranational institutions (p. 345). Rose (1991) argued that "Organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank regularly deal with the concerns of 150 nations around the globe, and this experience is often cited as a justification for advice" (p. 5).

A similar view is shared in a book *Something Borrowed, Something Blue? Part One: A Study of the Thatcher Government's Appropriation of American Education and Training Policy* by Finegold et al. (1993). In the introductory section, it has been explained how the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) did learn some policy lessons from each other. Rose (1991) also argued that "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is concerned with moving ideas across national boundaries" (p. 18).

Intergovernmental and international organizations encourage exchanges of ideas between countries (. . .) The European Community and OECD encourage exchanges among advanced industrial nations (. . .) and the World Bank and the United Nations agencies focus on programs of concern to developing countries (ibid., p. 105).

Similarly, Jacqueline Wilson, Director of the Governance and Institutional Development Division of Commonwealth Secretariat in the preface to the book *Decentralisation in The Gambia: Report of a High-level Workshop on 'Managing Change in Local Governance' held in Banjul, The Gambia, 7–9 April 2008*, has stated that "Donors and international agencies such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank are placing a higher priority on how they can assist local governments in the medium and long term" (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. V). While the Commonwealth Secretariat, according to her,

(. . .) a sizeable proportion of Commonwealth resources are allocated to the Africa region and to small states. The Secretariat, in furtherance of millennium development goal 8 on developing a global partnership for development, continues to extend assistance in the important area of local government and service delivery (ibid).

5 Local Governance and Decentralization Policy-Making Process in The Gambia: Donor Agencies as Another Dominant Policy Actor

5.1 Agenda Setting

As the initial stages of the policy-making processes, problem identification and agenda setting are processes where certain policy problems or issues are identified and brought to the attention of legislators. This process can be set in motion or initiated by either the government, politician, individual citizens, interest groups, pressure groups, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)/supra-institutions. To bring policy issues to the attention of policy makers, issues are discussed and debated through multiple processes such as negotiation, lobbying, and advocacy.

Power manifests in different forms during the policy-making process with the "government, technical aspect such as expertise, evidence and technologies and also funding resources" as the three main sources of power. Power is defined as "the ability to influence, and in particular to control resources. Power is also described as those who make and implement the policy" (Abdul Mu'eez et al. 2018, p. 4). As the stage where power comes to play so as to influence the decision of an agenda, agenda setting is an extremely important component of policy-making process.

In the late 1980s, when decentralization reform was being conceptualized in The Gambia, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), European Development Fund (EDF), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the World Bank are the international agencies that were the initial partners that supported the process. As a result of domestic problems, however, the initial momentum gathered by the reform process "waxed and waned" until 1986 when

the government together with UNECA organized a high-level workshop on the matter (Alam 2009, p. 28).

Following this, in the early 1990s, a study was commissioned by the UNDP to solicit recommendations on decentralization in The Gambia. With the submission of the study report in 1993, a joint cabinet paper was prepared by the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Religious Affairs together with other relevant ministries in 1994, which got approved in April the same year by the cabinet (Alam 2009; Sowe 2017). After the July 1994 military coup, the new administration took up the decentralization reform agenda. With the explicit provisions for decentralization and devolution of government functions to local governments enshrined in the 1997 Constitution, decentralization regained momentum, thus laying the foundation for the enactment of the Local Government Act of 2002, its subsequent amendments, and the local Government Finance and Audit Act of 2004 (Alam 2009; Fye 2016, 2017; Sowe 2017).

The initial phase of the local government and decentralization reform in The Gambia is similar to that of many other countries in the developing world. The agenda setting for the reform processes was influenced by international development organizations. For instance, as early as 1996 to early 2000 during The Gambia's political transition from military to civilian, the UNDP and the EU, as part of their technical assistance, provided support to The Gambia's decentralization program. The goal of the UNDP and the EU's technical assistance was to work with the Government of The Gambia to strengthen its local democracy with a local government reform agenda as the focus. Due to the unwillingness to open up the political space for local government reform by Yaya Jammeh's totalitarian and neo-patrimonial regime, this initial attempt was very unsuccessful (Sanneh 2018).

According to the Commonwealth Secretariat, "The implementation of decentralization started well, with an initial surge of donor support and government attention" (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 9). The Commonwealth Secretariat also acknowledged the support of international donor agencies in The Gambia's decentralization and local governance policy reform processes when they argued that

> Donors and international agencies such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank are placing a higher priority on how they can assist local governments in the medium and long term (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. V).

Donors have financed efforts on both the demand and supply sides of The Gambia's decentralization reform processes to bolster both village and municipal governments. On the demand side, the support of international partners included the strengthening of citizen participation in local government. In particular, they have supported regular local government elections, improved access to information, and fostered deliberative decision-making mechanisms. However, on the supply front, international development stakeholders through their support to the capacity enhancement of local governments in the areas of coordination, development planning, and service provision have left an indelible make on The Gambia's decentralization policy. They have financially supported the capacity strengthening of local officials and helped both the central and local governments to reorganize and rationalize their administrative functions.

5.2   Policy Formulation

Policy formulation in the field of public policy

> is part of the pre-decision phase of policy making including to craft the goals and priorities
> and options, costs and benefits of each options, externalities of each option. It involves
> identifying a set of policy alternatives and public policy tools to address a problem (Hai
> 2013, p. 1).

As a pre-decision phase of the policy-making process, the policy formulation phase includes tasks such as identifying policy alternatives that would address the socioeconomic, political, or environmental issues and narrowing the set of solutions to prepare for final policy solutions and setting the stage for the next phase. Hai (2013) defined policy formulation as a stage in the policy process/cycle that deals with "the problem, goals and priorities, solution options for the achievement of policy objectives, cost benefit analysis, negative and positive externalities are associated with each alternative." Policy formulation Hai (2013) argued, "is a function rather than a stage where dominant actors and set ideas shaping significantly during their course of actions"(p. 3). The stage could be referred to as a social and political process through which policies are conceptualized, created, or changed, while adoption refers to the policy enactment stage, or when the policy comes into force through legislation, cabinet, or an individual minister's decision.

International development agencies supported numerous other major milestone programs in the context of The Gambia's national development that incorporated decentralization and local governance as a socioeconomic development priority. For instance, although the 1985 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and the 1990 Programme for Sustainable Development (PSD), which got interrupted between 1994 and 1997 due to the military coup, did not make any specific reference with regard decentralization, they "were supported by donors" (Alam 2009, p. 28). Alam, however, stated that "starting with the 1994 Strategy for Poverty Alleviation, there were references to decentralization" (Alam 2009, p. 29). All the major priority national development blueprints that are necessary for the operationalization of local government reform agenda, such as the 1998 Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the 2003–2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper I/SPAII, 2007 PRSP II, the 2007–2011, 2012–2016, and 2017–2021 Medium-term plans, have made reference to decentralization (Alam 2009, p. 28).

For instance, NPAP/Strategy for Poverty Alleviation I, which was in response to the key poverty issues diagnosed under the 1989 ILO study on poverty in The Gambia, has capacity building at the local level and access to resources as one of its four priority areas or pillars (Alam 2009; Republic of The Gambia 2000). SPA I was presented at a round table conference in April 1994 organized by the donor community in Geneva. The findings of the 1998 participatory assessment of the NPAP/SPA I recognized decentralization as a key area for poverty alleviation and the empowerment of the poor.

As a follow-up to SPA I, capacity building at the local level was among the pillars of Strategy for Poverty Alleviation II (Alam 2009; Republic of The Gambia 2000). The fact that PRSP II (2007–2011) "stressed the importance of continuity of assistance from development partners" pointed to the fact that all these national development blueprints got donor support throughout the policy cycle (Alam 2009, p. 31; Republic of The Gambia 2008). Again, the fact that the "PRSP was oriented towards the Paris Declaration" and the MDGs also points to how international development institutions influence the public policy processes in developing countries such as The Gambia (Alam 2009, p. 31; Republic of The Gambia 2008).

In 2006, The Gambia adopted her national development blueprint called the Vision 2020, and this also has enhanced local governance and decentralization as an important pillar. As a signatory to the Brussels Programme of Action agreed at the third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries convened in Brussels in May 2001, and as part of her commitment to this Action, the Government of The Gambia committed itself to local government reform and decentralization (Alam 2009; Republic of The Gambia 2006).

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) agreement, signed in 2006 between the Government of The Gambia and the UNDP, incorporated the recommendations of the Common Country Assessment and furthered the decentralization and deconcentration of central government functions. As part of the UNDAF agreement, the Government of The Gambia has identified certain local councils where she piloted reforms. These programs were to be scaled up later, so as to meet the human resource and financial capacity requirements at both the central and local government levels (Alam 2009; United System in The Gambia and The Republic of The Gambia 2006).

The consultative processes of the legal instruments like the Local Government Act of 2002; the subsequent amendments of 2004, 2006, and 2007; and the Finance and Audit Act of 2004 were supported by international donors. These legal instruments set out the restructuring agenda of the public sector and ignited the country's fiscal and functional decentralization in motion. Decentralization in The Gambia was formulated in close partnership with support from international organizations like the Economic Development Fund (EDF) of the European Commission, the World Bank, and the UNDP. These institutions were not only part of the broad stakeholder consultative processes that preceded the decentralization reform agenda but also the commissioning of a number of consultancy studies in collaboration with the Directorate of Local Governance that assessed the in-country capacity of both the central government institutions and local councils for the smooth implementation of the decentralization reform agenda (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009).

The support of the international development stakeholder in the development of The Gambia's national development blueprints, which are fundamental for the successful political and institutional decentralization, is also marked. For instance, the following national development blueprints, of which decentralization is a cornerstone, were formulated in close partnership with international donors: The Gambia Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP), its *Strategy for Poverty Alleviation* (1994 and 2003) and *Vision 2020* (1996), the *Program for*

Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE 2012–2015), and the *National Development Plan* (NDP 2018–2021). The cornerstone of all of these is a participatory approach to sustainable development and poverty alleviation (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 8).

Under the auspices of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation (CFTC), the commonwealth secretariat, as part of its assistance in the area of local government and service delivery, through its Governance and Institutional Development Division (GIDD), organized a high-level workshop on decentralization and local government reforms for the Department of State for Local Government, Government of The Gambia in Banjul from 7–9 April 2008 on "Managing Change in Local Governance." The aim of this consultative workshop was

> to facilitate the sharing of ideas and international good practice on the implementation of effective decentralisation. It was intended to be a forum for discussion of current pertinent issues relating to good local governance and development, and to project common concerns that need to be resolved at all levels. Specifically, the programme provided an opportunity for informing participants about the strengths and weaknesses of The Gambia in its application of the principles, process and methodology of decentralisation (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 9).

5.3   Policy Implementation

Policy implementation is the stage in the policy-making process where actions and mechanisms that ensure policies are brought to practice are set to motion. In other words, it is the practice of turning what is written in the law books, legislations, or policy documents into reality. Policy implementation, Makinde (2005) argued, could refer to any of the following:

> the activities that are carried out in the light of established policies (. . .) the process of converting financial, material, technical and human inputs into outputs-goods and services (. . .) a stage of policy making between the establishment of a policy (such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule) and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects (p. 63).

Policy implementation is characterized by a number of actions, some of which are fund disbursement, making loans, issuing and enforcing policy directives, assigning and hiring personnel, sanctioning defaulters, and so forth.

The most cited advantage of decentralization is that it moves the government closer to its citizens and gives them the chance to participate in development governance decision-making processes. Mansuri and Rao (2013) described decentralization as

> efforts to strengthen village and municipal governments on both the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, it strengthens citizens' participation in local government-by, for example, instituting regular elections, improving access to information, and fostering mechanisms for deliberative decision making. On the supply side, it enhances the ability of local governments to provide services by increasing their financial resources, strengthening the capacity of local officials, and streamlining and rationalizing administrative functions (p. 16)

In many countries, "A great deal of empirical evidence reveals that decentralization will not always achieve the goal of making local governments more responsive and accountable" (Wong and Guggenheim 2005, p. 253). The cited reasons included the fact that often decentralization and its benefits are "susceptible to elite capture" (ibid., p. 253). In most decentralized situations often society's well-to-do, well-off, and well-connected groups disproportionately influence public decision-making or hijack it.

In a number of developing countries, opportunities offered by decentralization are often exploited by officials through the promotion of their own commercial activities over the provision of public goods and services. Existing social problems can also be made worse by decentralization when it results in the polarization of the different social groups in communities. It does this through the exclusion of certain community groups from government. When local governments fail to equitably redistribute resources or to prioritize social programs that matter the most to the poor and vulnerable groups, marginalized groups can be made worse off under decentralization (ibid.).

To introduce mechanisms such as consultation, transparency, participation, and, above all, accountability in local governance system for it to serve as a linkage between its immediate communities and the public administrators and ultimately ensure greater voice to the poor would need a greater deal of work (ibid.). In the words of Wong and Guggenheim (2005), achieving this goal, however, hinges on a variety of conditions such as "establishing mechanisms to promote broad civic participation and more responsive and accountable local governments" (p. 253). What this means is the operationalization of the policies as written in documents.

Community-driven development (CDD), as Wong and Guggenheim argued, is one such mechanism that is designed to ensure community development planning and management, as legislated, is not only more responsive but accountable (Dongier et al. 2003; Mansuri and Rao 2013). There is no doubt that both decentralization and CDD are inherently political reform processes; however, international development interventions like the CDD programs make significant amount of resources available to governance structures. The structural and administrative choices of donors undoubtedly influence decentralization reform processes in the developing world. To a larger extent, donor-funded programs stimulate healthier relationships between governments and their citizens at the community level (Wong and Guggenheim 2005).

As referenced above, the implementation of decentralization in The Gambia began with an upsurge of support from the donor community; however, at some point, the interests of the donors appeared to have diminished (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009). As a fragile state, where both the central and local governments have poor track records of service delivery, one of the challenges The Gambia Government faced prior to the CDD program intervention was a mechanism to operationalize/implement its decentralization reform processes and inject energy that would promote more responsive and accountable local government. The country's decentralization reform processes continued to be very weak both on the demand and supply sides.

Coupled with the lack of the much-anticipated support of decentralization and local governance from the government resulted in the absence of adequate local and national government capacities. This derailed the adequate articulation and dissemination of the decentralization agenda not only for the creation of greater understanding but also for the deeper engagement of the public on the subject matter. Added to a weak capacity for both local planning and development, local communities continue to wallow in ineffective public goods provisions and poor service delivery. The central government failed to make available the required grants to the local government as required by the Local Government Act of 2002 and its amendments and the Financial and Audit Act of 2004 and to effectively devolve or transfer vital functions to the councils.

Thus, between 2008 and 2010, a CDD program funded through the World Bank and the Governments of Japan and The Gambia was implemented. The program did not only simulate functional local governance systems but countered some of the major challenges facing the decentralization efforts through programs that improved local governance and promoted community participation in development (Fanneh and Jallow 2013). The objective of the program was to "support the [Gambia's] rural communities in planning, implementation and maintaining their priority social and economic investments in partnership with Local Government Authorities" (IDA 2007, p. 4). The CDD program designs in general often share at least two key sets of goals: (1) improved service delivery/provision and socioeconomic well-being of communities and (2) improved governance institutions and social cohesion at the level of the community, of which the CDD program of The Gambia is not an exception (Casey et al. 2011a, b; Fearon et al. 2009, 2011, 2013; King and Samii 2014; Wong 2012).

In recent decades, Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) stated that CDD programs have become the conduit through which experiments in decentralization structures and participatory development institutions can take place. To make development planning and management more accountable, there is no mechanism more appealing to both developing country governments and the international donor community than that of a CDD program today. The design is pleasing to governments because it places less stress on their line agencies while at the same time reaching a large number of the poor, vulnerable groups, and community actors. While for the international community, due to its numerous advantages, a CDD constitutes an important approach in their collection of development interventions in developing nations, be they fragile, post-conflict, disaster stricken nations, or countries with poor records of public service delivery (Adusei-Asante and Hancock 2012; Wong 2012; Wong and Guggenheim 2005).

CDD is a bottom-up development approach that not only values but prioritizes the contributions from its beneficiary communities. It is an approach to community development in which community groups have the control over development decisions and its resources. The approach fosters local participation and collective action for development. According to Dongier et al. (2003), CDD is an approach to development that "gives control of decisions and resources to community groups" (p. 303). Often these community groups work in partnership with both the service providers and

demand-responsive support organizations such as the elected local councils, central government agencies, the private sector, and NGOs (Dongier et al. 2003).

To Wong (2012), CDD is an approach to development that "emphasizes community control over planning decisions and investment resources" (p. iv). While for Wong and Guggenheim (2005), it is "an approach that gives communities or locally elected bodies control over the decision making, management, and use of development funds" (p. 254). Community development project, argued Mansuri and Rao (2013),

> supports efforts to bring villages, urban neighbourhoods, and other household groupings into the process of managing development resources, without relying on formally constituted local governments (p. 16).

The significant difference between CDD and the earlier approaches of community-based rural development programs is found in its emphasis on the active, rather than a passive role performed by communities in leading development processes.

Although they vary in their designs, community-driven development approaches share the goal of poverty reduction through improved local governance and empowered local people. Despite variations in terms of the exact role of each of the players, Dongier et al. identified the following three broad sets of alternative institutional arrangements: "partnerships between CBOs and elected local or municipal governments; partnerships between CBOs and private support organizations (NGOs or private firms); and direct partnerships between CBOs and central government or a central fund, including other, higher-level governments and funds, for example, states or provinces in federal systems" (Dongier et al. 2003, p. 308).

The key components of a CDD program include planning, institutional building, and the execution of projects. Its key inputs are to facilitate, recognize, promote, or establish inclusive community institutions such as the ward development committees (WDCs) and village development committees (VDCs) that would continue to decide their respective community's development priorities and how to administer the block grants that are used to finance identified community development projects.

The CDD program of The Gambia consisted of three core segments: community development facility (including Good Governance grant), strengthening the capacity for community development, and project coordination and monitoring. The overall coordination was done at the Ministry of Local Governments and Lands and its Department of Community Development. Its institutional and implementation arrangement included the Program Steering Committee, Program Coordination Team, Community Development Officers and Assistants (CDOs and CDAs), and Multi-Disciplinary Facilitation Teams (MDFTs). MDFTs refer to the extension staff of the different government departments in a particular region with the regional governor as the coordinator (Arcand et al. 2010; Diop et al. 2013; Fanneh and Jallow 2013; IDA 2007; MASDAR UK Ltd. 2010).

6 The Case of Brikama Area Council and the Influence of the Donor-Funded CDD Program

A typical case of a CDD program influence on the developmental approach, functional, and institutional arrangement choices of local government administration in The Gambia is the Brikama Area Council. Brikama Local Government is located in the West Coast Region of The Gambia and is the second most populated region of The Gambia comprising of nine administrative districts, each headed by a district chief (a traditional ruler). The administrative districts are Foni Bintang-Karenai, Foni Bondali, Foni Brefet, Foni Jarrol, Foni Kansala, Kombo Central, Kombo East, Kombo North, and Kombo South. The region is an important link between The Gambia and the Southern Senegalese Region of Casamance. Brikama, the regional capital, is the largest provincial capital in The Gambia.

6.1 Development Approach

To tackle the several determinants of abject poverty in the West Coast Region, the Brikama Local Government Council developed a Development Fund Implementation Manual (DeFIM). The inspiration and rationale for this manual according to the council is the CDD program approach. The manual "intends to support the creation of Development Fund based on the community-driven development approach" to enhance transfer of skills and resources to decentralized administrative structures (Brikama Area Council 2015, p. 3).

With regard to the council's chosen development approach, it has been made explicitly clear that the "Council's approach will be anchored on promoting participatory development methods with emphasis on people taking the lead in their own development activities," which is a typical CDD approach. It is also stated that to design, implement, monitor, and evaluate community development programs in the different sectors, the council would "focus on downstream, decentralized structures" as the case was during donor-funded CDD program (Brikama Area Council 2015, p. 4).

6.2 Methods of Program Implementation Arrangements

6.2.1 Community Focus

The four major principles identified in the manual also adhere to the CDD program design philosophy as well. The initial principle which is community focus ensures about 60% of the council's generated funds dedicated directly to community development, the usage of which would be decided exclusively by members of the communities as was the case of the block grant in the World Bank-funded CDD program that the council implemented some years back.

6.2.2 Community Participation

Active community participation is ranked the second key priority of the council for a purposed similar to that of the CDD program philosophy. The objective is the promotion of community empowerment and a sense of project ownership for enhanced sustainability of the Council's physical investment.

6.2.3 Existing Local Capacity and Knowledge

The use of existing local capacity and/or knowledge is third in the rank of Manual's principles. Just as it was the case in the CDD program approach, the council intends to build on existing VDC and WDC capacities and structures and to reinforce them through periodic capacity enhancement activities. The services of Multi-Disciplinary Facilitation Teams (MDFTs), Community Development Officer (CDO), the Planning and Development Directorate (Director of Planning and Development), and Community Development Assistants (CDA) are being utilized for effective facilitation just as was the case during the CDD program. The Manual equally reiterated the Council's resolve to not create any "new parallel structures" either at the ward or village levels (Brikama Area Council 2015, p. 4).

6.2.4 Functional Fund Management Team (FMT)

The fourth development principle identified in the manual, i.e., the FMT also typifies the pivotal role that the local government authorities performed during the CDD program. This team is established and tasked with fund management, resource allocation, monitoring, and evaluation of community projects.

6.3 Program Coordination and Institutional Arrangements and Functions

The overall coordinating body of community development programs of the Brikama Area Council is the Directorate of Planning and Development. This arrangement is similar to the Program Steering Committee (PSC) of the CDD program arrangement. In collaboration with various relevant community stakeholders, the Regional Community Development Office for the West Coast Region provides technical support and supervision to field activities just as it was the case in the CDD program implementation.

6.4   Development Fund Implementation and Management Structures of Brikama Area Council

6.4.1   Fund Steering Committee

The responsibility of setting up the policy directive and the review of project implementation in the various villages and wards is the task of the Fund Steering Committee (FSC), functions that replicate the roles of the PSC during the CDD program. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Council or his/her representative is the chair of this committee, and the Director of Planning and Development acts as its secretary or any other senior staff designated by the CEO of the Council.

The representation of the committee, similarly to that of the CDD's PSC, is drawn from the following regional government institutions: the governor or his/her representative, the Chairperson of the Council, the two Directors of the Council (Finance and Planning and Development), Department of Community Development, CEO of the Council, Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Education, National Environment Agency, a representative of an NGO institution, and the Chairpersons of the Development and Finance Subcommittees of the Council Subcommittee.

6.4.2   Council

The overall oversight function of the development fund is provided by the Council equivalent of the Program Coordination Team in the CDD program, a body which also determines the total budgetary allocation for the fund.

6.4.3   Directorate of Finance (DF)

The Directorate of Finance (DF) ensures technical assistance is provided to the villages, wards, and the council itself. This body is the equivalent of the appointed financial controller in the CDD program who worked with the council CEOs in managing finances at the council level. It ensures financial management compliance as per the provisions in the Local Government Financial and Audit Act of 2004. The head of the directorate is the Director of Finance who also answers to the CEO of the council and to whom, in addition to other specific functions, he/she periodically reports directly.

6.4.4   Technical Advisory Committees (TAC)

As an established body in the Local Government Act of 2002, the TAC performs exactly the roles it has always played in the CDD program. It is responsible for

endorsing the Strategic Development Plans (SDP) of the villages and the wards during which it ensures the conformity of the plans to standards, policies, and priorities set by the government. A committee comprising some TAC members and the Brikama Area Council subcommittee for development called a Plan Endorsement Committee (PEC) is constituted to work together as well as review, advise, and endorse technical components of community projects.

Composition of the TAC as per the provisions of Local Government Act of 2002 includes the Divisional Governor as Chairperson, the CEO as the Vice Chairperson, the regional Heads of Government Departments, the Heads of Local Government technical services, representatives of the NGOs operating in the Division, and other persons such as the Chairperson in consultation with the Vice Chairperson shall determine.

6.4.5 Multidisciplinary Facilitation Teams (MDFTs)

MDFTs are tasked to ensure guidance, and support is provided to the villages and wards throughout the project cycles just as they did during the CDD program implementation cycle. MDFTs are composed of extension workers from different government line ministries or institutions or NGOs operating in the area and the CDAs from the Department for community development. As far as community development project activity implementations are concerned, the reporting line of a MDFT task leader is to the Director of Planning and Development (DPD) and CDOs.

6.4.6 Fund Management Team (FMT)

This team is found in the Council and has the overall task of managing the development fund of the council. FMT's other mandates are related to issues of community development and decentralization reforms. This function of this team is similar to those of financial controllers and CEOs of the councils from the period of the CDD program. The team is comprised of the CEO of the Council, the Community Development Officer, the Director of Planning and Development, Director of Finance, the Procurement Specialist, the Chairpersons of the Development and Finance subcommittees, and three other directors.

6.4.7 Ward Development Committees (WDCs)

WDCs are the second to last structure of local governance in The Gambia. As enshrined in the Local Government Act 2002, the WDCs, in addition to other functions with support from the MDFTs and the FMT, are mandated to take the lead in the preparation of the ward SDPs.

6.4.8 Village Development Committees (VDCs)

With the support of the MDFTs, the mandate of the VDCs, among other functions, is to take the lead in the identification and preparation of the village SDPs. While developing their village plans, VDCs ensure active community participation and regular endorsement of their decisions.

7 Conclusion

As demonstrated in this chapter, most developing countries over the years have experienced various interventions in their policy-making processes from the international development organizations. From 1996 to date, donors have financed efforts on both the demand and supply sides of The Gambia's decentralization reform processes with the aim of bolstering both village and municipal governments. One notable intervention in this area is the community-driven development (CDD) program, an intervention which could be defined as a bottom-up approach to development that offers communities and their locally elected representatives the control over the decision-making, use, and management of resources for development.

Through the use of secondary sources, this chapter was able to illustrate how international aid donors and their development programs influence policy-making processes in a developing nation. This is demonstrated by a number of research findings from the health system policy-making processes in Bangladesh and the case of policy making in Pacific Island nations and to The Gambia's decentralization policy processes. As demonstrated, the structural and administrative choices of donor agencies or supra-institutions such as WB, IMF, UN, EU, etc. and/or their local partner NGOs have exerted enormous influence on the policy processes in The Gambia through various programs.

Of particular significance to this chapter is the long-lasting influence that the donor-funded, CDD intervention continues to have on the implementation of local governance and decentralization reform processes in The Gambia. The success of international development interventions like the CDD program in The Gambia is, to a large extent, due to the fact that the intervention made a significant amount of resources and institutional strengthening programs available to government and the decentralized structures. The other success factors are the support it had rendered for the functioning of local governance structures, the numerous capacity building exercises it has for the communities and their elected representatives, and the benefits they have accrued from the priority community projects it funded. The findings of this research have demonstrated that The Gambia's experience of donor-funded CDD program has influenced her local government system in terms of development approach, council structure, functions, and funding model.

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Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither "Asian Values" in the Emigration Policies of the Philippines?

Exequiel Cabanda and Meng-Hsuan Chou

1 Introduction

The production of labor for export is an emergent development policy for developing countries that have an abundant supply of labor (see Skeldon 2009). These countries serve as the suppliers of labor to developed economies experiencing chronic shortages of labor due to, inter alia, structural changes in the labor market such as aging demographics. While developing countries actively promote labor migration because remittances generally boost economic growth, the question remains: How do governments of the Global South address the need for economic growth and the wider effects of emigration on the families left behind when designing labor migration policies?

"Asian values" (without quotation hereafter), following their cultural roots in Confucianism, conceive and promote the notion that society is hierarchal and paternalistic, with family as the basic unit or model of governance (Barr 2000; Yung 2012). Although the remnants of Western ideas from the long history of colonization continue to influence the decision-making of some Southeast Asian countries (e.g., the Philippines) (see Jetschke 1999), a closer examination of the governance structure in the region illustrates how these countries interpret, integrate, or discount Asian values in its most significant policy areas such as economic development and labor migration. Although some scholars and policy-makers have argued that there may not be any tension between the Western-led neoliberal framework and Asian values (see Robison 1996), the way some emerging economies in Asia attempt to challenge this synchrony when examining the core value of family and state-led labor export remains less investigated.

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Over the past few decades, Southeast Asia has dramatically witnessed an increasing level of labor mobility within and outside of the region as countries function as either producers or consumers of labor. In this chapter, we demonstrate how certain existing governance structures and political institutions in Southeast Asia are more likely to discount the tension embedded in Asian values, particularly the role of women in the family, when seeking to implement neoliberal practices in the area of labor migration. While some countries in the region have embraced neoliberal migration policies that promote labor export as the primary lever for pumping economic growth through remittances, we specifically ask: How does the policy design of labor export policies address Asian values when female migrants aspire to upward economic and social mobility for themselves and their family members?

Taking the case of the Philippines as the top producer of nurses (a female-dominated labor profession) in the world, this chapter examines how the policy-makers portray the Filipino nurses in the design of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 (from here onward, the Nursing Act), which was signed into law on October 21, 2002. In contrast to Singapore and Malaysia, which are strong advocates of Asian values, the Philippines is not a major case study for Asian values considering the country's dominant Western-influenced governance. However, in debates between human rights and economic development within the Asian values, the country serves as a good case because of its portrayal of "Asian familism" or values reflecting "family, rather than the individual, defines notion of public good" (Diokno 2003, p. 77).

Our starting point is Cabanda's (2017) empirical study of the Nursing Act, which underlines the government's policy position to promote the emigration of nurses through higher education policies and practices that prepare them for foreign employment. While Cabanda (2017) focuses on the process of designing this law by analyzing the different stages of the enactment process, this chapter examines the different policy narratives the policy-makers advanced about Filipino nurses in the legislative process. In doing so, our findings show how and why legislators were far more interested in exporting nurses than retaining them in the country to address domestic labor shortages. Specifically, these legislators were steered by the positive contribution of remittances to economic growth and the international recognition of producing "world class" nurses, a source of national pride for a country with strong implications to its supposed heritage of Asian values.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we present Asian values to illustrate the "Asian way" of politics and governance which situate the policy narratives that evolved in designing the Nursing Act. Next, we present the case of the Philippines and highlight the strong neoliberal position of the country in producing labor for foreign employment in exchange for monetary remittances that are assumed to boost economic growth. Drawing from Asian values, we delineate the dominating policy narratives portraying Filipino nurses as economic migrants with the policy-makers evading the gender perspective during the enactment process. We find that the discursive stronghold of the core Asian values of family in governance structure is weakened when confronted with the neoliberal economic agenda in the Philippines. This chapter concludes that, while the country belongs to the cultural

heritage of Asia that upholds strong family ties and the important role of women in bringing up their children, the governance structure and regulatory practices have reconfigured Asian values to prioritize economic growth over the core values of the family. In so doing, we further engage in debates between economic and normative considerations in a highly contested policy area of migration.

2 Asian Values

The Asian values debate emerged in the early 1990s when countries in Southeast and East Asia gained economic and regional power in the Western-dominated global economy. The Asian values are a "challenge to Western hegemonic thoughts and civilizations," deeply implanted in many Asian nations that "harbor deep resentment against the West for its past colonialism and who have an inferiority complex in regards to Western civilization" (Hoon 2004, p. 151). Specifically, it challenges Western ideas on the universality of human rights (Barr 2000) and "Western style" civil and political freedoms (Hoon 2004, p. 155). The Asian values approach promotes three core ideas: (1) the non-universality of human rights, (2) family-centered structures where interests of the family take precedence over individual interests, and (3) emphasis on collective social and economic rights over individual political rights (Hoon 2004, p. 155). Through these core principles, Asian countries make policy decisions by seeing the state as the "guardian of the general interests of the society, above and against the contest of vested interest" (Robison 1996, p. 311).

The high stake of family life, especially the role of women, is a significant element of Asian values that governments in Southeast Asia like to invoke (Eng and Blake 1998, p. 188). The responsibility evolves around caring for children, sick, and the elderly and the decision to hire domestic helpers (Willis and Yeoh 2000, p. 255) while their "qualification and employment" weakens the cohesion of the family (Langguth 2003, pp. 32–33). To a greater extent, women have a more significant role in the family amid the increasing openness of global markets. Yeoh and Willis (1999, p. 359) write: "While men are associated with mobility and agility to grapple with newly fluid and somewhat erratic forms of transnational capital, women are often positioned in official state discourse as stabilizing forces of the 'home'—the cultural carriers of 'Asian values' [. . .]."

Although these scholars convey the state narratives about the role of women in the family, how policy-makers incorporate these narratives in the design of policies that support, undermine, or reconfigure Asian values in light of growing global demand for labor is generally less examined in labor-producing countries of Asia. Migration remains a key phenomenon in the contemporary period, especially for economic purposes. It is therefore important to examine more closely how policy-makers approach the unit of family, as generally understood within the Asian values framework, when designing public policies to promote, limit, or altogether restrict emigration.

3   The Policy Design Approach in Examining
the Nursing Act

Designing public policies requires specific goals that effectively address the policy problem. The better the policy is crafted, the greater the possibility of success of achieving the goals as originally set out (Turnbull 2017, p. 2). According to Colebatch (2017, p. 2), policy design is part of the broad concept of "authoritative instrumentalism" which explains that the state, composed of government actors or leaders, exercise their authority with various agendas and preferences to achieve their objectives. Simply put, the state is the fundamental actor in policy design. With the growing interconnectedness of the world system, policy design develops into a complex process that involves the network of government and nongovernment actors as policy actors in the policy-making process as a result of the "decentering of policy studies away from the centrality and authority of the state centeredness" (Howlett and Lejano 2013, pp. 360–361). In this chapter, we define policy design as a:

> [. . .] dynamic and deliberative process between policy actors, during which they exchange policy ideas (problems are coupled with solutions), provide and articulate justifications for their positions, and agree on and experiment with the steps forward based on existing knowledge (Chou and Ravinet 2019, p. 437).

Conversely, Howlett and Lejano (2013, p. 360) explain that policy design contains two important components—substantive and procedural. The substantive component is a set of different alternatives to address policy problems, while the procedural component contains different activities (such as formulating and decision-making) to achieve agreement among policy actors on policy alternatives. Essentially, these two components are significant in any analysis of the design process of public policies.

In designing policies, policy actors predominantly have differing views of the policy problems and competing proposals to provide solutions to the problems (Hoppe 2017, p. 6). The interactions of the policy actors in the design process produce different policy narratives that reflect their position in shaping a particular policy. Roe (1994, p. 3) broadly defines policy narratives as:

> [. . .] stories—scenarios and arguments—that are taken by one or more parties in the controversy as underwriting and stabilizing the assumptions for policymaking in the face of the issue's uncertainty, complexity or polarization.

For example, definitions of policy problems contain "narrative structure" where there are "stories [. . .of] heroes or villain [. . .] and they pit forces of evil against forces of good" (Stone 2001, p. 138). These policy narratives reflect different frames which drive policy debates from problem identification to the details of implementation (see Hoppe 2017). Consistently, the policy narratives lead to a more interpretative policy analysis by contextualizing these stories (Jones and McBeth 2010, pp. 333–334). In this chapter, the policy design approach helps unveil how the policy-makers in the

Philippines prioritize economic value over maintaining the coherence of family when designing the Nursing Act.

4   The Case of the Philippines: Context, Legal Development, and Policy

Nursing is considered a predominantly female profession. Basford and Slevin (2003, p. 392) explain that nurses are "perceived socially and culturally to be a feminine one [. . .] [. . .] linked to the notion of human (feminine) caring values, and the domestic and nurturing role of women." By contrast, some scholars claim that as early as the fourth and fifth century, there were male nurses out of well-established monastic orders who cared for the injured and wounded military knights; indeed, it was only when Florence Nightingale, the founder of modern-day nursing in 1863, declared nursing as a female occupation that it became associated with women (Evans 2004). In the contemporary world, wealthy and developed countries such as the USA, Canada, and the UK and some major nurse-producing countries such as the Philippines have welcomed male nurses into their nursing registry due to the growing demand for care. For example, according to the results of the 2011 American Community Survey (ACS) on the participation of men in nursing, from a roughly 3% share of male nurses to the total nursing workforce in the USA in 1970, the share increased to 9% in 2011 (US Census Bureau 2013).

The Philippines is known for its neoliberal policies in the production and export of labor (Rodriguez 2010). For instance, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act governs migrant workers and various laws on the production of Filipino seafarers, among others. Neoliberal policies assume that higher economic growth can be best achieved when the market is not restrained by state protection (Misra et al. 2006, p. 318) and could likewise necessitate an increase in state intervention "to roll forward new forms of governance [. . .] that are purportedly more suited to a market-driven [. . .] globalizing economy" (Jessop 2002, p. 454). Consistently, the country is considered to be the top producer of foreign-trained nurses in the world.

Since the 1970s, the Philippines has been actively sending nurses abroad, with the USA as one of the major destinations for Filipino nurses (Choy 2003). To strengthen their position within this global market, over the decades, the country ensured that existing policies were well implemented, updated, and reflective of the most recent development in the international practice of professional nursing. Put simply, the country has contributed to establishing Philippine nurses as an international brand by ensuring that this important export "commodity" is seen as having achieved world standards.

Education, training, and licensing of Filipino nurses are key areas in producing "globally" competitive nurses who are responsive to the needs of health systems at home and around the world. To ensure oversight of these key areas, the Philippines

Table 1 Key legislations for nursing education and practice in the Philippines

Legislation numbers	Description
Public Act 2808 of 1919	Creation of Board of Examiners for Nurses
Republic Act No. 877 of 1953	Philippine Nursing Law
Republic Act No. 4704 of 1966	Amendment to Republic Act No. 877-Creation of Board of Nursing
Republic Act No. 7164 of 1991	Philippine Nursing Act of 1991
Republic Act No. 9173	Philippine Nursing Act of 2001

Source: Various policy documents

has adopted and implemented several important laws that govern nursing education and practice in the country. Although since 1919 there have been different laws explicitly guiding the nursing practice (Table 1), Republic Act No. 877 of 1953, also known as the Philippine Nursing Law, served as the legal basis for all succeeding nursing legislation. This law specified the provisions on the composition of the nursing board that oversees education, licensing, and nursing practice and the establishment of nursing schools, curriculum, and compensation for nurses. Legislators amended this law in 1966 through Republic Act No. 4704 until further amendments in 1991 through Republic Act No. 7164 or the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991. The Nursing Act of 1991 paved the way for modernizing the nursing practice following the rapid changes in the global development of the nursing profession.

As a result of a decade of changes in nursing curriculum and new nursing practices in countries such as the USA and Canada, the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991 was repealed and replaced by the Republic Act No. 9173 or the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002. The Nursing Act serves as the principal policy regulating Philippine nursing education and practice. According to Cabanda (2017), although the Nursing Act governs the country's higher education and nursing practice, examining the process of designing the law revealed a strong emigration context. He explained that, in the making of this law, the legislators intended to educate nurses for export relying on nurses' remittances as a key factor in boosting economic growth.

Taking Cabanda's (2017) findings as our starting point, we ask: how then does the Philippine government address the Asian values it purportedly promotes? Indeed, the gender idioms with reference to men as *haligi ng tahanan* (pillar of the home) and women as *ilaw ng tahanan* (light of the home) are significant concepts at the core of the Philippine society and family (Parreñas 2008, p. 1062). What happens to the home when the light is removed? These gendered roles raise crucial questions about the role of public policy in achieving important economic objectives while upholding norms and practices that have long been at the core of the society. We are primarily concerned with how the policy narratives presented during the design of the Nursing Act interpret Asian values and align them with the economic agenda that diminishes the potent role of women in the family.

5   Data and Method

To address the question we raised in the previous sections, we used the legislative documents from the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines related to the enactment of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002. Specifically, we used the minutes of public deliberations from the committee to plenary levels, proposed bills, and committee reports; these documents are publicly accessible at the archives of these two legislative bodies.

Methodologically, we traced the policy narratives of the policy-makers during the enactment process of the Nursing Act, the prevailing policy governing higher education, and the practice of nursing in the Philippines. The analysis of policy narratives entails the use of "existing papers" such as "policy papers, bureaucratic forms, speeches" (van Eeten 2006, p. 253), which are consistent with our existing data.

We manually coded the legislative documents and identified various narratives portraying Filipino nurses as economic migrants (see Annex for the codebook). Our findings also point to the general silence about the gendering effects of promoting Filipino nurses for export. This has strong implications in the broad spectrum of state-led women migration and its centrality in the family which is deeply rooted in Asian values—a theme to which we return in the concluding section. In the next section, we will present our findings.

6   Exploring the Narratives in the Design Process of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002: Economic Gain Versus Normative Concerns

The Nursing Act of 2002 serves as a guiding policy in nursing education and profession in the Philippines. This agenda is set out in Article 1, Section 2, which describes the overall responsibility of the state to protect and improve the nursing profession to guarantee the delivery of quality basic health services and ensure that there are adequate nursing personnel in the country. The Act also highlights the improvements in nursing education, good working conditions, career prospects, and dignified existence of nurses as principal elements of the Nursing Act. Despite the Act's domestic context, the policy discussions behind the enactment of this law converged around the debate on the international mobility of Filipino nurses. These discussions portray Filipino nurses as economic migrants while remaining silent about the effects of nurse emigration within the confines of the family and the role of women within the context of Asian values.

This section traces the policy narratives and the factors that have led to the general silence about the societal effects of emigration. This process tracing starts with the discussions of the proposed bills at the committee level, and moves on to the plenary level, which saw the adoption and the passage of the law.

6.1 Filipino Nurses as Economic Migrants

While there is a long history of nursing policy in the Philippines dating back as early as 1919, the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 is the current policy that governs the country's nursing education and profession. The Nursing Act of 2002 repealed and replaced the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991 due to the fast-changing health-care environment, medical technology, and licensing practices, among others, especially in the USA and Canada. It also addresses domestic health-care needs and employment concerns in the Philippines in view of the international mobility of nurses.

In October 2001, during the 11th Congress, Congressman Carlos Padilla and Rufus Rodriguez, Jr., filed two separate bills in the House of Representatives—House Bills No. 1084 and 676—which sought to repeal and replace the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991. The repeal of the 1991 Nursing Act aims to make the nursing profession more responsive to the rapidly changing context of health care in the country and the world amid demographic changes and the discovery of new technologies. The explanatory notes of these proposed bills provide us with the initial idea the sponsors had envisioned for the law through their portrayal of Filipino nurses.

In these house bills, the two legislators portrayed the image of Filipino nurses as economic migrants by emphasizing the vulnerable employment status of nurses in the country. Congressman Padilla and Rodriguez, Jr., cited two economic-related factors—high employment rates and low remuneration of nurses in the Philippines—as motivations for nurses to seek employment in wealthier countries. For example, in the explanatory note of House Bill No. 1084, Congressman Carlos Padilla stressed the significant issue of employment in the nursing sector of the Philippines and the huge demand for foreign nurses in the USA and Europe:

> The nursing profession in the country has faced many problems, foremost of which is the very high unemployment and underemployment of nurses [...] the shortage of nurses back in the United States of America and Europe has caused the intensive recruitment of Filipino nurses for employment abroad. (Par. 2, House Bill No. 1084)

By articulating demand and supply in comparative terms, Congressman Padilla presents the image of Filipino nurses as skilled economic migrants who are deskilled in their home countries as a result of the high unemployment and underemployment of nurses during the period when the Nursing Act was deliberated. Moreover, he points to voracious international demands for Filipino nurses, which frames this phenomenon as an area for potential government intervention. Indeed, these bills also proposed to safeguard the local hospitals and health institutions as a safety mechanism in case of a possible shortage of nurses that may occur in the future if legislators do not properly give these issues the necessary policy attention. The provisions of the house bills also aimed to strengthen regulation in education, licensing, and professional practice of Filipino nurses. Although these bills sought to address future domestic shortages and the growing market for Filipino nurses abroad, this regulatory oversight presents the overall image of nurses as strategic economic actors who are willing to emigrate and explore more rewarding

opportunities in other countries as a result of the then shrinking domestic demand for their skills.

In the Senate of the Philippines, there are three prominent sponsors of the new Nursing Act: Senators Juan Flavier, Loren Legarda-Leviste, and Manuel Villar. Their sponsorship speeches promote their unwavering stance of Filipino nurses as modern-day heroes. They articulate the narrative of Filipino nurses as economic migrants through the framework of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), which remains a key pillar to the Philippines' economic growth (Rodriguez 2002, 2010). Senator Loren Legarda presented this policy position in her sponsorship speech during the opening of the plenary deliberation on August 14, 2002:

> [. . .] our nurses deserve to be as equally competitive in a field that has gained for themselves recognition and acceptance, especially in hospitals and health-care facilities in the United States and Europe [. . .] They are among our overseas Filipino workers who have evolved into our modern-day heroes for the Filipino nation (Senate 2002, p. 012).

Manuel Villar, in his sponsorship speech on August 14, 2002, concurred with this recognition of Filipino nurses as migrant workers who contribute to the Philippine economy through their remittances. He stressed that:

> One of the reasons that the Philippine economy continues to thrive amidst to global recession is the valuable contribution of our OFWs. Part of this sector, hailed as the country's modern heroes, are our nurses. However, despite being the lifeblood of our hospitals, nurses remain as part of the most neglected workers [. . .] This unfortunate occurrence has a large number of them to seek better opportunities overseas. Thus, we need policies to enhance their competitiveness and professionalism of Filipino nurses [. . .]. (Senate 2002, p. 386)

These statements portrayed the mobility of nurses as one of the most significant sources of remittances these lawmakers believe could contribute to the country's economic growth. These narratives also reinforced the bills introduced by Congressman Padilla and Rodriguez, Jr., in the House of Representatives, which acknowledged the mobility of Filipino nurses as a favorable policy approach. Further, Senator Edgardo Angara, Jr., one of the pioneers of all health bills in the Philippines and the author of the previous Nursing Act of 1991, generally conveyed in all his committee and plenary appearances that there was no domestic shortage of nurses during the enactment of the law. For him, the concern was that a shortage may occur in the future if policies on proper health resource manpower planning are not introduced in the Nursing Act:

> On a per capita basis, it is said that the Philippines has one of the more favorable nurse-to-population ratio [. . .] Making us the number one exporter of nurses in the world [. . .] And so, when we have a supply of over 300,000 and a demand of 178,000, naturally we have a surplus of some 128,000 nurses [. . .] we ought not to be content with having surplus nurses [. . .] because this soon can vanish without realizing it. (Senate 2002, p. 327)

These legislators further sharpened the image of Filipino nurses as economic actors who are willing to migrate when they debated on how to improve domestic education, training, and practice of the nursing profession to be more attractive to foreign employers. Expanding on this aspect, some legislators suggested a form of

bilateral dialogues with key receiving countries such as the USA to eliminate the identified structural barriers to the entry of Filipino nurses. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., articulated this point as follows:

> Why is it that nurses being employed in the United States are made to undergo additional examinations? [...] our government should exert effort to remove this apparent unnecessary examination as far as our nurses are concerned [...] I think we should aggressively ask our CHED [Commission on Higher Education] [...] the Department of Foreign Affairs [...] I cannot understand really why the United States should lump us together with other countries as if there is no such special relationship between the United States and the Philippines. (Senate 2002, p. 340)

On this specific matter, Senator Pimentel, Jr., explained his point about receiving countries imposing qualification standards on sending countries like the Philippines and implied that a dialogue on a possible cooperation agreement between them would contribute to eliminating these structural barriers. Our results support Cabanda's (2017) findings about the overriding viewpoint of policy-makers during the deliberation process of the Nursing Act, specifically how they utilize higher education reforms in nursing as an export-promotion strategy to prepare Filipino nurses for foreign employment.

This dominant narrative of portraying Filipino nurses as economic migrants is an established story line in the migration literature. Historically, Filipino nurses have always been considered to be one of the earliest economic migrants from the country. Certainly, dating back to the US occupation of the Philippines (1898–1946), the immigration of Filipino nurses to the USA was part of the broader spectrum of the American colonial legacy that includes the introduction of the nursing profession and the opening of education and travel opportunities to the USA for Filipinos (Choy 2003). Consistently, scholars of health professional migration have viewed nurses as one of the most mobile professions (Dovlo 2007; Kingma 2007). These scholars have argued and demonstrated that the changing demographics and the unpopularity of the nursing profession in wealthy economies such as the USA, Canada, and the UK have acted as key pull factors leading toward the out-migration of nurses from less wealthy countries such as the Philippines (Ball 2004; Kline 2003).

What are generally missing from these narratives are the roles that governments of sending countries play in facilitating out-migration, specifically, in the case of the Philippines, a careful consideration of the negative trade-offs of nurse emigration and the importance of Filipino families as a core reflection of certain aspects of Asian values. In the congressional deliberations, policy-makers did not contextualize the effects of nurse emigration on the possible disintegration of families, particularly on the role of women in the upbringing of children. The next section reveals this general absence by exploring the extant gender narratives presented in the policy-making process and, in so doing, illustrates the overall inattentiveness of the policy-makers to this very important societal concern.

6.2 The Gendered Versus Gender-Neutral Nature of Filipino Nurses

In the previous section, we described the most dominant narrative behind the enactment of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002: Filipino nurses are key economic migrants. While policy-makers viewed them as modern-day heroes through their remittance contributions to the economy, they were generally nonvocal about the significant issues concerning the gender aspect of the nursing profession and the role of women in the family, with particular attention to the effects on the family members left behind.

Although there is a growing interest on nursing among men in the Philippines, women constitute the majority of entrants into the nursing sector; women represent an estimated 95% of the total registered Filipino nurses (see Institute of Health Policy and Development Studies 2005). By promoting their role as economic migrants through policy, these very policy-makers appear to pitch economic objectives against core societal and familial values. Women in the nursing profession must reconcile this tension between the fulfillment of economic goals through emigration and the fulfillment of family expectations (as daughter, sister, wife, or mother). Although there are certainly overlaps between these two sets of demands, in this section we highlight the neglected dimension often linked to Asian values by revealing the policy-makers' implicit non-feminized depiction of Filipino nurses, which ultimately conveyed a tension between the gendered and gender-neutral dimensions of this profession during the policy discussions.

In the enactment of the Nursing Act, the gender dimension of Filipino nurses is almost nonexistent in the policy discussions. When there were references to the gender dimension of Filipino nurses, the lawmakers did not make this aspect a centerfold of their policy narratives. Most of the narratives that did convey any gender dimension were based on the policy-makers' personal experiences rather than more general concerns about the gendering nature of the profession, but these references did not receive any policy attention when it came to designing emigration policies.

For instance, the most important reference to nurses as a non-feminized profession came from Senator Edgardo Angara, Jr., the author of the previous Philippine Nursing Act of 1991. In his committee hearing appearance on August 02, 2002, Senator Angara introduced himself as someone who was born in a family of nurses with personal reference to his parents as professional nurses. He utilized this personal statement to justify his support for the passage of the law and to promote the competitive edge of migrant Filipino nurses in terms of nursing care:

> Ako po'y talagang galing sa mga nurses sapagkat ang tatay at nanay ko ay nurse [I came from the family of nurses since my father and mother are nurses] (Senate 2002, p. 004).
>
> Now, the trend as I understand globally, is more of these western countries but including Japan, to look to us for nursing care. Because fortunately, our nurses are so well-known for their TLC—tender loving care and this is a world reputation [. . .] of course, we cannot prevent our bright young men and women from migrating [. . .]. (Senate 2002, p. 004)

In contrast, by analyzing further the broader context of his speech, particularly his reference to Filipino nurses who extend the famous "TLC—tender loving care" as a form of caring, we find a more feminized representation of the nursing profession. The adjectives "tender" and "loving" prefacing "care" are defining characteristics of nurses that are often associated with motherly care (Allan 2001; Baylis et al. 2011). While conjuring up this motherly image, Senator Angara and other members of the legislation did not elaborate on this gender dimension and certainly not on the implications of nurse emigration on family members who are left behind.

Subsequently, during the policy discussions, the policy-makers referenced "mothers" or "motherly care" to describe nurses as a woman's occupation. For example, in her proposal to strengthen the registry of Filipino nurses to know if they are actively serving in the Philippines or abroad, Ms. Vilma V. Paner, a resource person from the Department of Health (DOH), referred to nurses as housewives or women engaged in entrepreneurial activities instead of practicing the nursing profession:

> [. . .] we would like other information in terms of tracking down the nurses where they are now, if they are in active practice [. . .] Because others may have delegated themselves to become full housewife or indulge in business. (Senate 2002, p. 23)

Like Senator Angara, Ms. Paner did not move forward to discuss the effects of nurse emigration in the absence of "mothers" who decide to move abroad and work; instead she concentrated on how the DOH can establish a good registry system on the mobility of Filipino nurses. Consistently, Senator Loren Legarda also conveyed her personal support to the Nursing Act with reference to nurses as a female profession based on her experience with her aunt who personally cared for her when she was growing up:

> [. . .] nurses have played a special part or role in my life because my aunt whom I lived with in the compound where I grew up, took special care of me since birth [. . .] She was in fact a head nurse of Makati Medical [...] she is considered as one of the pillars of nursing profession in the country [. . .]. (Senate 2002, p. 011)

The personal story of Senator Legarda underscores the importance of nurses as mothers in the family, even in the structure of extended family, while balancing career growth and responsibility to family members. That is, if further examined, this motherly role has a greater implication to the broader context of nurse emigration especially in the rearing of children. This reference to nurses as mothers could be seen as an opportunity to open up discussions on the societal issues relating to the emigration of nurses, but it was not taken. In broadly linking the family (as one of the core Asian values) with migration, Asis (2000, pp. 262–263) identifies "breakup or estrangement of families, the adverse consequences of children growing up in the absence of fathers, mothers, or both" as the primary concerns of migration. But she added that the changes in the family as an institution is crucial with female migration because "women's role are much more closely woven to family life" (Asis 2000, p. 263).

While the weight of the policy discussions centered on economic gain, the importance of family coherence and the role of women in the family pose serious implications on the family left behind when nurses (mothers) work abroad.

7 Conclusion: Implications of the Policy Design of the Nursing Act to Understanding Asian Values

In this chapter, we set out to address whether policy-makers in Asia took into consideration the importance of Asian values in policy deliberation and practices in designing policy interventions. Specifically, we focused on the notion of family as the central pillar that distinguishes Asian values from the "West." In the key aspect of family life, especially the role of women, extant literature has shown that some major sending countries in Southeast Asia have turned a deaf ear or sometimes even operate against family cohesion. These countries ignore the social consequences attached to the migration of women in favor of the economic value of remittances despite an alarming trend in the negative effects on family coherence and the childrearing process (Parreñas 2001, 2005). While international migration serves as a critical issue within the region for the past several decades, predominantly, "family issues continued to be viewed as if international migration were not taking place" (Asis 2000, p. 256). Put simply, in Asia there is an overall absence of aligning migration policies within the backdrop of the family and specifically on the role of women (Asis 2000).

Taking the case of the 2002 Nursing Act of the Philippines, we showed that it was an example where we can visibly observe the strong image of neoliberal policies, reflecting a supposed "Western" economic order. While the Nursing Act was framed as a reform of the higher education sector and the professional practices of Filipino nurses, a closer look at the deliberation process revealed another policy approach: the Nursing Act sought to prepare these nurses through higher education reform for foreign employment so as to further promote remittance-led economic growth (see also Cabanda 2017).

In the policy narratives we identified, we observed that any existing tensions between the centrality of family (as part of Asian values) and labor market policies in the Philippines were absent in the eyes of the policy-makers. Indeed, during the policy discussions, the policy-makers strongly emphasized the economic gains for the country by projecting Filipino nurses as primary sources of foreign remittance.

While Eng and Blake (1998) explained that policy sensitivity of the governments in Southeast Asia is greater when the vulnerability of family life is at stake as a core value of Asian values, this was not the case in the deliberation process we analyzed. The Philippine lawmakers remained surprisingly silent throughout the enactment process about the negative effects that emigration of nurses may have on general family life. When references were made to nurses, nursing, and family life, they were mainly positive and glowing. Consequently, we conclude that policy-makers in the

Philippines generally do neither acknowledge nursing as a highly feminized profession nor the export of nurses as potentially disruptive to family life. This is surprising given how frequently migration scholars have singled out nurse mobility as a migration stream composed mainly of females (see Choy 2003; Yeates 2009). This allowed us to conclude that there is a disconnection between Asian values and the design of migration policy in the Philippines.

By aggressively advancing a generally neoliberal economic agenda through the Nursing Act, policy-makers in the Philippines have ushered in the transformation of female labor as a form of exportable commodity. Indeed, some Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines capitalizes on the production of feminized labor for foreign employment as a primary strategy to achieve economic development (Parreñas 2001, 2005, 2007; Yeates 2009). While we focused on the nursing sector in this chapter, this tendency is also observable in the well-established labor export industry of domestic helpers from the Philippines. Indeed, this neoliberal agenda is noticeable in several Southeast Asia countries—such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar—that have ventured into the female migrant worker industry. What is remarkable is that this trend is taking place against the assumed centrality of the family in the context of Asian governance, which remains far less visible in comparison to the more economic-centric policy-making in the region. Our findings invite debates on how to reconcile the tensions between material and normative considerations in the migration-related policy-making process, which is especially pertinent in an era of sustained emigration from the Global South.

Annex: Codebook in Analyzing Legislative Documents

Major codes	Sub-codes	Definition
Nurse as economic migrants	*Motivations for nurses' emigration*—high unemployment, underemployment, low salary, neglected workers, better opportunities overseas	Pertains to nurses who work in foreign countries
	Domestic demand and supply of nurses in the Philippines—surplus, shortage of nurses in local hospitals, exporter of nurses	
	International demand and supply of nurses—surplus, shortage of nurses in foreign countries, nurses employed in foreign countries, foreign recruitment of Filipino nurses	
	Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)—modern heroes, lifeblood of the economy	
Gender dimension of nurses	*Both male and female*—parents, mother and father, men and women	Pertains to the gender of professional nurses
	Female—mother, aunt, housewife	

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Afghan Migration and Pakistan's Policy Response: Dynamics of Continuity and Change

Anwesha Ghosh

1 Introduction

Afghans started fleeing abroad in the aftermath of the Saur Revolution of April 1978 which resulted in People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) coming to power, in April 1978. This event marked the beginning of an unprecedented flow of refugees out of Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in December 1979, further accelerated the exodus substantially. A whole generation of Afghans has witnessed this more than 30-year-old conflict watching it morph into various forms of violence from actual war to the ferocity of minefields and the destruction of livelihoods which pushed a third of its population into exile. According to many estimates, up to five million Afghans sought refuge abroad from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (Dupree 1983, 1984; Dunbar 1987, 1988; Cronin 1989; Eliot 1990; Tarzi 1992, 1993; Khalilzad 1995). Over the past four decades, millions of Afghans have sought refuge in Pakistan due to various factors ranging from geographical proximity to ethnic ties, religious affiliations, and pre-established trans-regional networks. Although figures have fluctuated over the years according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugees from Afghanistan around the world today number around 2.5 million, making Afghanistan the second largest refugee-producing country worldwide (UNHCR 2016). According to United States Institute of Peace (USIP), in early 2016, an estimated one million registered Afghan refugees and a further 1.5 million unregistered Afghan refugees were living in Pakistan making it one of the largest hosts to Afghan refugees in the world today (Ahmadi and Lakhani 2017).

For obvious reasons, cross-border population movement has constituted one of the most significant aspects of Afghanistan–Pakistan relations over the past few decades. One of the primary aims of this paper is to provide insights into Afghan migration to Pakistan and to understand the host country's policy response to the

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refugee population over the years. Acknowledging that cross-border movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan has existed for generations, the discussion in this paper will revolve around the four major waves of population movement between the mentioned countries since the Soviet intervention, in 1979. However, before dealing with that, this paper will deal with the political context that triggered this large-scale population displacement both within and outside Afghanistan. As one of the major hosts of Afghan refugees, an attempt will be made to look at the continuities and changes in Pakistan's policy response to the refugee population over the years and to identify the major factors that might have influenced the policy shifts of the host government. To conclude, this paper will assess if the Afghan refugees have been an asset or a liability for Pakistan.

2   The Context of Afghan Migration to Pakistan

Regarded as the coveted prize of empires, Afghanistan has evolved through the modern era from the status of a buffer state to a Cold War battlefield, to a mere hideout of the so-called terrorist outfits, and finally to a derailing democracy in an unstable political landscape. The country has found itself at the hinge of imperial ambitions since the beginning of recorded history, from the world's first transcontinental superpower, the Persian Empire, to the largest, the United States. The Soviet intervention in 1979 and the subsequent turn of events marked a period of endless political turmoil and resulted in pervasive conflict across the country, which reached its highest intensity when the country faced its virtual civil war in the 1990s. However, a careful study of Afghanistan's political history indicates that the advent of conflict in Afghanistan cannot be merely attributed to the Soviet intervention or the particular year of 1979 even though it did mark the beginning of a phase of very intense political turmoil armed conflict. Decades of conflict in Afghanistan have unleashed a never-ending wave of destruction that has swamped traditional protection for civilians and swept away long-accepted rules of wartime behaviour. The social cost of decades of violence and destruction has been colossal. Millions have been killed, and millions more have been forced to flee their homes fracturing the social fabric of the country. The physical, emotional, and psychological development of generations of Afghans has been severely affected by conflict and wars.

Afghanistan's population has historically been moulded by a high degree of spatial mobility. The country was crisscrossed by important caravan routes on the Silk Road until the early nineteenth century, and it has always been dominated by nomadism and other forms of movement from place to place (including peripatetic groups). Large caravan cities such as Kandahar, Herat, and Kabul also had Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities, which served as bases in transcontinental ethno-religious trade networks until well into the twentieth century (Hutter 2009). Historically, migration has been integral to Afghan livelihood and survival strategies with nomads travelling from one valley to another in search of pastures, peasant families sending their young men to work in the region's trading centres, and

localized disputes, internal strife, and foreign invasions leading to displacement and new alliances with neighbouring tribes, *quam*,[1] or ethnic groups. Even today, hundreds of thousands of nomadic people travel across the country and migrate seasonally. In the course of the twentieth century, this high degree of mobility had adapted to modern innovations. This is exemplified by the fact that many nomads have moved into the transport sector and become truck or bus drivers. All over Afghanistan, the basis of nomadism lies in the differences in altitude from one part of the country to another as well as seasonal changes in the weather. Many of the eastern Pashtun nomads from Afghanistan have traditionally utilized low-level grazing lands in Pakistan, situated on the other side of the border.

While the mapping of Afghanistan's borders by the late nineteenth century constrained many traditional migratory routes, it did not end population movements. Shared ethnic, religious, and cultural identities enabled people to move to and from Afghanistan as economic or political incentives arose. No Afghan government ever accepted the Durand Line[2] as an international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which separated the Pashtun population. This refusal has continued for more than a century under regimes of all political stripes, some of which called for the reincorporation of the territory into Afghanistan or the creation of a new state of Pashtunistan. Pakistan, by contrast, has always insisted that the Durand Line constitutes its recognized international border with Afghanistan since its creation in 1947. Pashtun tribes still believe that their homeland encompasses both sides of the Durand Line. Other ethnic Afghans, such as central highland Hazaras, were also regular migrants, first to British India and then to Pakistan, including the trading centre of Peshawar, the mines of Balochistan, and the agricultural land of the Indus Valley. Scholars observe that even in the present time, practically the entire transport sector in Afghanistan and Pakistan is in the hands of former nomads (Titus 1995). The conflict that has significantly affected the country since the late 1970s has not changed these patterns so much as it has altered the scale of this regional migration, which has transformed into one of the world's largest population displacements.

The issue of Afghan refugee has been a protracted one, spread over almost four decades. Decades of war and instability have forced one in three Afghans to flee their home. On the eve of the *Taleban*'s ouster in 2001, an estimated one million Afghans were internally displaced; almost six million had sought refuge in Pakistan and Iran, the main refugee-hosting countries (UNHCR 2002). However, in the case of Afghanistan, the refugee figures need to be treated with a degree of scepticism.

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[1] 'The term *qawm* can refer to an ethnic group, a clan or a tribe (defined by a common patrilineal descent), a professional group (artisans, Mullahs), a caste (Syyad) or a religious minority (Ismaili), or even people from the same village, neighbourhood, or valley'. Oliver Roy, 'Ethnies et appurtenances politiques en Afghanistan', in J.P Digard (ed.), Colloques Internationaux: le fait ethnique en Itan et en Afghanistan (Paris 1988, p. 202). In general, however, the qawm is composed of family members, friends, and neighbours who share an attachment to a common *watan* (a geographical location that they recognize as their place of origin), whose families have known each other for generations and are bound by relations of mutual trust and obligations.

[2] The Durand Line demarcated Afghanistan and British India, in 1893, dividing the Pashtun tribes.

Nonetheless, even approximate numbers may give some idea about the importance of the refugee trend. However, before getting into that, it would be relevant to understand the political context that paved way for a large-scale population displacement both within and outside Afghanistan.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was marked by a series of interesting developments all over the country. It transformed—virtually overnight—the strategic significance of Afghanistan to its regional neighbours and to the Western powers. First, it provided an opportunity for exiled Afghan Islamist parties to strengthen their position by claiming leadership of the resistance to the invasion of Afghanistan by a non-Islamic power.[3] These parties which were known as *Mujahideen or* 'fighters in *Jihad*' brought Islamic character to the resistance. Consequently, the fighters of the *Jihad* or holy war sought to build international support for their cause. From late 1979 until February 1989, the Soviet military forces remained in Afghanistan, a period that was also marked by fierce resistance from the *Mujahideen*, who were mainly financed and equipped by the United States, the various Gulf States, and the Pakistani Intelligence Agency, the ISI, as well as China and Iran (Basu Roy 2010, pp. 30–32). The Soviets sent around 530,000 troops to Afghanistan, although there were never more than 120,000 in Afghanistan at any one time. Altogether, Soviet losses numbered around as many as 85,000 (Ewans 2002, p. 148). Second, support was readily forthcoming from the then president of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, who had come to power in a military coup in 1977 and who had clear ambitions to build an Islamic bloc incorporating Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian Republics as a counterweight to India (Turton and Marsden 2002). Thousands of tons of arms crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan. The revelation of Pakistan's Brigadier Yousuf indicates that these arms were bought with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Saudi Arabian funds from the United States, Britain, China, Egypt, and Turkey, among others. The Pakistani army teams inside Afghanistan also provided training to the *Mujahideen* in secret camps and covert assistance to guerrillas (Yousuf and Adkin 1992, p. 138). Third, General Zia's ambition was consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Taking over the historic role of Britain in the region, the United States saw the *Mujahideen* as a mechanism for weakening the Soviet Union by engaging it in protracted guerilla warfare. Because it did not want to be seen, at least initially, as providing support to the *Mujahideen*, it used the government of Pakistan as a conduit for arms supplies and other, supposedly humanitarian, resources.[4] Suddenly General

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[3]Many of the high-profile leaders of these parties (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ahmed Shah Masoud) had fled to Peshawar, in Pakistan, in 1975, when the then president of Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammed Daoud, moved against the Islamic radicals, whom he saw as a direct threat to his power.

[4]In an interview published in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (January 15–21, 1998), Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was US President Jimmy Carter's National Security Chief at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, said that the United States began giving secret aid to the *Mujahideen* in July 1978 and that this was expected to increase the likelihood of a Soviet invasion. 'The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving the

Zia, who had shocked the world with his execution of Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, in April 1979, and his ruthless suppression of democracy in Pakistan, became a darling for the West, a bastion of support for the free world in its 'war' against communism (Turton and Marsden 2002). The *Mujahideen* at that time were fed, cared for, and supplied with every necessity and were recruited from among the thousands of refugees. The refugee camps were huge reservoirs of potential recruits for *Jihad* (Dixit 2002, p. 144).

3   Waves of Afghan Migration Post-Soviet Intervention

In the late 1970s, when the Afghans started fleeing to Pakistan and Iran in large numbers, the world became aware of a new refugee problem. Initially the Kabul regime had tried to forward its own explanation of the phenomenon: the refugees were merely *kuchis* (nomads) who were used to crossing the border into neighbouring countries. The fact that some of them then decided to stay there for more than just a winter season on foreign soil was explained as being merely traditional fluctuations within nomadic societies (Pedersen 1990, p. 154). As the number of refugees grew following increasing persecution of the Afghan population, it became evident to all that the refugees were not merely nomads adjusting to various changes in conditions but that the region faced a serious refugee problem, which by the early 1980s had grown to be the largest in the world. The patterns of migration in and out of Afghanistan can be broadly divided into four distinct phases. These phases, discussed below, deal with the population waves that had left and returned back since Soviet intervention in 1979.

3.1   The First Wave (1979–1988)

On December 25, 1979, the 40th Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) arrived at Afghanistan's Kabul airport, an action that to most of the other world powers was equivalent to an invasion. This event accelerated the exodus. Within days, thousands upon thousands of people started to flee Afghanistan, and most of them took refuge in the two Muslim neighbouring countries sharing a border with Afghanistan, namely, Pakistan and Iran, although the regime consistently

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USSR its Vietnam. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war insupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the break-up of the Soviet empire'. When asked by the interviewer whether he regretted having given arms to future terrorists, Brzezinski replied: 'What is more important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? A few crazed Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?' (Quoted in T. Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity. Verso, London and New York:* 2002, pp. 207–8).

denied the presence of refugees in neighbouring countries. Out of an estimated population of 18 million, 1.2 million Afghans became refugees in Pakistan in 1980; by the end of 1981, there were an estimated three million refugees in Iran and Pakistan combined (Wafadar 1981, 1982). During 1980–1981, the flood of refugees peaked at 80,000 to 90,000 a month, which meant an average of about 3000 people per day in Pakistan. There were 3.5 million refugees in 1982—three million refugees in Pakistan (Dupree 1983). Afghans continued to flee in 1983, but in smaller numbers. At the end of 1983, Afghan refugees in Pakistan ranged from 1.5 to 3.2 million according to different estimates, but the official total was set at 2.8 million (Dupree 1984). The difference in numbers can be attributed to practical reasons, such as the unrestricted mobility of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, which makes any evaluation difficult. However, Louis Dupree also speaks of a 'number game', which he sees as 'a favorite pastime between the government of Pakistan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme, bilateral donors, and the approximately 18 voluntary agencies involved in refugee programs' (Dupree 1984, p. 232; see also Crisp 1999). One has to bear in mind that official estimates of the number of Afghan refugees and returnees have always been more or less inaccurate and subject to discrepancies whereby any similar research needs to treat all such figures with caution.

Conflict between Afghan soldiers, Soviet troops, and *Mujahideen* groups created an unstable environment for carrying on a normal life in Afghanistan. Others left in response to a call for *Hijra*.[5] A spiritual call for *Hijra* required an Afghan to leave his or her country because it had been taken over by people who are not followers of Islam. Thousands of Afghans moved to different parts of the country to escape conscriptions, which were being forced to enlist in the military. To avoid the same fate, many young men from the rural areas left for bigger cities. During this first wave of migration following the Soviet intervention, the population of Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, increased from about 600,000 to more than two million (National Geographic Report). At the peak of the first wave, approximately six million Afghans were forced to migrate. About 3.5 million went to Pakistan, two million to Iran, and the rest to other regional countries or the West (UNHCR 2000). However, the Soviets were never able to consolidate their control over the country, and for 10 years they fought an insurgency—a loosely organized alliance of *Mujahideen*, or holy warriors, who were supplied with arms and cash by the West. Over the course of this bloody decade, hundreds of thousands more fled Afghanistan.

3.2 The Second Wave (1989–1992)

After the Soviet-backed government collapsed and the Islamic fundamentalists seized power in April 1992, the relative peace and fragile stability evaporated as

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[5]*Hijra* is an Arabic word meaning 'flight' or 'migration'.

Islamic warriors were again engaged in a brutal battle for control of the country. This marked Islamization of an already Muslim society based on a rather narrow understanding of Islam (Emadi 2013). As a scourge of ethnic cleansing raged throughout the country, the religious minorities such as Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan, among others, were systematically targeted and were forced to flee. The developments in this phase caused a second and new wave of population movement, both inside (the return of those who fled the Soviets) and out (flight of many Soviet sympathizers).

After the overthrow of President Najibullahin 1992, Afghanistan finally saw the first large-scale return of refugees since the Soviet invasion. No sooner had they returned, however, was the country—and Kabul in particular—plunged into war between its erstwhile *Mujahideen* liberators. Five different groups vied for supremacy in the embattled Kabul (i.e. *Hizb-Islami*, *Jamiat Islami*, *Ittehad Islami*, *Hizb Wahdat*, and *Junbish Milli*). One-third of Kabul city was laid to waste, and the remaining portions of the city were seriously damaged. For many Afghans, this period is remembered as even bloodier than the Soviet war, and it launched a new exodus of refugees and, especially, internally displaced persons (IDPs). As reflected in the following figures issued by UNHCR (Table 1), between 1989 and 1992, there was a significant increase in the number of refugees in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan.

3.3 The Third Wave (1992–1996–2001)

In 1992, the UN-negotiated plan for President Najibullah to step down and a transitional authority to take over were jeopardized. President Najibullah's overthrow in 1992 left the victorious *Mujahideen* the task of forming a government of national reconciliation. Over two million refugees from Iran and Pakistan returned home (International Crisis Group Report 2009). Peace was, however, short lived. The struggle against the occupying Soviet forces mutated into an internal power struggle as the different factions within the *Mujahideen* regime fought each other. Those institutions that were untouched during the intervention rapidly disintegrated, and an institutional vacuum became apparent. Apart from such state disintegration, ethnic divisions came to fore, and Kabul was carved up along ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. With the fragmentation of political power and territory under the control of different militias, the country plunged into lawlessness. Alliances and hostilities between the warring factions were often based on personal loyalties, some of which were tactical and short lived. As territories changed hands after long battles, local populations were subjected to violent retaliatory punishments by various forces. Children were subjected to abduction and sexual abuse by armed political groups. Young girls in particular were abducted and detained for sexual purposes or sold into prostitution. The rape of women and young girls by armed guards appeared to have been condoned by leaders as a method of intimidating vanquished populations and rewarding soldiers. Amnesty International referred to the situation

Table 1 Afghan refugee population by country of Asylum, 1979–1999

Year	Pakistan[a]	Iran[a]	India[a]	Russian Fed.[a]	Others[b]	Total
1979	402,000	100,000	–	–	–	502,000
1980	1,428,000	300,000	–	–	–	1,728,000
1981	2,375,000	1,500,000	2700	–	–	3,877,700
1982	2,877,000	1,500,000	3400	–	–	4,380,400
1983	2,873,000	1,700,000	5300	–	–	4,578, 300
1984	2,500,000	1,800,000	5900	–	–	4,305,900
1985	2,730,000	1,880,000	5700	–	–	4,615,700
1986	2,878,000	2,190,000	5500	–	–	5,073,500
1987	3,156,000	2,350,000	5200	–	–	5,511,200
1988	3,255,000	2,350,000	4900	–	–	5,609,900
1989	3,272,000	2,350,000	8500			5,630,500
1990	3,253,000	3,061,000	11,900			6,325,900
1991	3,098,000	3,187,000	9800			6,294,800
1992	1,627,000	2,901,000	11,000	8800	3000	4,550,800
1993	1,477,000	1,850,000	24,400	24,900	11,900	3,388,200
1994	1,053,000	1,623,000	22,400	28,300	12,300	2,739,000
1995	1,200,000	1,429,000	19,900	18,300	9700	2,676,900
1996	1,200,000	1,415,000	18,600	20,400	10,700	2,664,700
1997	1,200,000	1,412,000	17,500	21,700	12,500	2,663,700
1998	1,200,000	1,401,000	16,100	8700	8400	2,634,200
1999	1,200,000	1,325,000	14,500	12,600	10,000	2,562,800

Source: Five Proxy Wars in Africa, Asia and Central America, United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Report (UNHCR) (2000, p. 117)
Notes: As of December 31 of the given year
Asylum seekers registered with UNHCR only. By the end of 1999, an additional 100,000 Afghans were in need of protection according to UNHCR
[a]Countries of Asylum
[b]Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan

as 'human rights catastrophe' of 'appalling proportions' (Basu Roy 2010). During the lengthy phase of conflict, large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) escaped battle zones. City dwellers, mainly Kabulis, were forced into exile in the neighbouring countries.

The *Taleban*, which emerged in the Afghan political scene in November 1994, marked a new phase in Afghan politics. Over this period, there had been changes in the nature of the conflict, and human rights abuses had taken on a new dimension. In contrast to the *Mujahideen* groups of the past, the *Taleban* appeared as a more cohesive force in 1994 and 1995, bringing a degree of order in the areas of the country that they brought under their control. Their policy of disarming opposition groups resulted in a reduction in acts of banditry and extortion, winning them popular support from traditional Afghan families. They attracted media attention not because of their remarkable success in capturing a large area in a very short time, but because of their strict enforcement of dress codes and treatment of women

(Marsden 2002). Since the capture of Kabul on September 26, 1996, the *Taleban* government issued a series of edicts based on their interpretation of Sharia. The edict's ban on women's employment and education and restricting women's movement had undermined, especially in urban areas, women's ability to contribute to the financial well-being of the family. Many young male children were forced to work, at times, with the livelihood of the entire family depending solely upon them. Thousands fled from Afghanistan during that time, especially women, the educated population, religious minorities, and political moderates. Drought and the lack of economic opportunities in the war-torn country led to further displacement. By this time, both Iran and Pakistan had started suffering from acute 'asylum fatigue' (Turton and Marsden 2002).

3.4 The Fourth Wave (Since 2001)

The US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 forced thousands to become internally displaced and even cross borders, at least temporarily. The subsequent fall of the *Taleban* government and the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration after the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 led, in turn, to the largest and most rapid return movement of Afghan refugees ever and the largest UNHCR-assisted repatriation programme in almost 30 years (UNHCR 2008, 2009). With the international community's commitment to reconstruction and peace building, Afghans grew more optimistic about their country's future. By returning to their homeland after years or even decades in exile, Afghans expressed their confidence in the post-*Taleban* political order. In 2002, UNHCR assisted the voluntary repatriation of almost two million refugees from Iran and Pakistan (Turton and Marsden 2002). The initial enthusiasm resulted in the return of almost five million Afghan refugees to Afghanistan in the first few years, although, according to UNHCR figures, around three million continued to remain abroad (Schmeidl 2009). However, these refugees returned to a politically unstable environment, and the motives behind the push for repatriation were not necessarily in the best interests of the refugees or Afghanistan. In the post-9/11 world, Afghan repatriation was needed to legitimize the US-led intervention, the subsequent peace process, and the fledgling government. These factors seemed to outweigh more careful considerations of the feasibility of return and the impact that such large numbers of returnees would have on a poor and war-stricken country which was already struggling to accommodate those who had remained.

There were innumerable blockages from the very beginning, and the repatriation was never meant to be an easy task. Afghan case painfully demonstrated the problems with resolving protracted displacement where considerations other than refugee protection were at the heart of the activities of international actors and where the human security of refugees was in competition with national, regional, and international security agendas. Even UNHCR later acknowledged that 'the Afghanistan experience has highlighted the complexity of the repatriation and reintegration

process, which has proven to be a much more sustained and complex challenge than initially anticipated' (UNHCR 2008). With the escalation of insurgency since 2005, a reverse flow has been noticed. The withdrawal of the Western troops and further deterioration of the security situation, drying of opportunities, and the unwillingness of the neighbouring countries to accommodate Afghans any further forced thousands of Afghans to migrate to Europe. Along with Syrians, the Afghans constitute one of the largest refugee groups during the European Refugee Crisis that unfolded in 2015. Post-2001, Pakistan's position and policies on Afghan refugees changed drastically. The welcoming attitude by then had transformed into an expelling one. The following section attempts to locate the continuities and changes in Pakistan's response to Afghan migration by focusing at the policy shifts adapted by the Pakistani government.

4 Pakistan's Policy Response to Afghan Refugees: Dynamics of Continuity and Change

During the early days of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan's policies towards Afghan refugees were notably liberal. Afghanistan provided the military dictator of Pakistan, General Zia, with the opportunity to connect with the world, establish his credentials, and obtain assistance for hosting Afghan refugees. Policies were designed in which the United States, joined by Western and other extra-regional powers, could inflict crippling financial losses on the Soviet Union at minimal risk to themselves. The West found a willing partner in Pakistan where the unlawful regime of a military dictator sought international legitimacy and material support. Therefore, there was no dearth of international support to assist Pakistan in dealing with the Afghan refugees.

In Pakistan, the refugees were primarily ethnic Pashtuns, and the sought refuge mainly in Pashtun-dominated parts of the country, mostly in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and a few in Balochistan. More than 300 'refugee villages' were established by UNHCR and majority of the refugees lived there (UNHCR 2000). Although, Pakistan has largely been a generous host to Afghan refugees, its policy has been ambivalent. Except at the very beginning, from 1978 to October 1979, when Pakistan had to support the refugees with its own resources (in the absence of an UNHCR office in the country), Pakistan has been generously supported by various international organizations in its refugee assistance programmes. At the outset, the refugees turned to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for help. UNDP, in turn, asked UNHCR for funds to provide temporary assistance to the needy cases. In April 1979, the government of Pakistan formally requested UNHCR's assistance. UNHCR along with other UN agencies, individual government and dozens of international NGOs, provided the refugees with food, water, health care, sanitation, and education. By the 1980s, there were over 100 international NGOs involved in aid operation in Pakistan (Lamb 1987). From 1984,

UNHCR along with the World Bank and the Pakistani government initiated income-generation projects for refugee areas for which US$85 million was invested in the next 12 years in sectors such as reafforestation, watershed management, irrigation, road repair, and construction (UNHCR 1996). Over the years UNHCR has continued to play a significant collaborative role along with the host government in the management of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In addition to the government of Pakistan and UNHCR's assistance, several voluntary organizations (VOLAGS) from many countries, including Pakistan and Afghans in exile, had established refugee assistance programmes in Pakistan. Several organizations carried out special programmes under contracts with UNHCR. Additionally special agencies within the United Nations System such as World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), etc. had facilitated the initiation of Afghan refugees' assistance programmes in Pakistan since 1979 (Dupree 1988). International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children Fund US (SCF), Church World Services, Project Director Health of the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, and Frontier Primary Health Care were some of the organizations that provided both primary health and reproductive health care to the refugees. Afghan refugees in Pakistan did not suffer from any large-scale epidemics or malnutrition, which is often seen during large-scale mass displacement.

Like most South Asian countries, Pakistan is also not a signatory of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and has no legislation that recognizes refugees. However, it is bound by the provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows expulsions only by law and requires the government to allow those it wishes to expel to defend themselves. Furthermore, it requires that competent authorities review their case. It is also a signatory of the 1984 Convention against torture and other 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which prohibits *refoulement* of anyone in instances where there is a substantial risk that the individual will be tortured (World Refugee Survey)'. The 1973 Pakistani Constitution granted the same protection against detention to all persons in Pakistan. Pakistan is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for basic health services, general rights of freedom of movement, and choice of residence. Islamabad did not impose restrictions on the movement or residence of registered Afghans nor on assistance to those living outside camps, although the government did not issue international travel documents to refugees. In 2008, Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognizes a general right to work. Although, Pakistan's Foreigner Act of 1946 prohibits the hiring of illegal residents, the authorities have always tolerated refugees working in the informal sector. In the formal sector, refugees officially need Pakistani partners and cannot hold immovable property or the requisite documents to own a business (Grare and Maley 2011). However, the law has been bypassed regularly with the support of authorities. In the NWFP, for example, refugees cannot officially own trucks, but in reality they dominate the entire transport sector.

Despite having several rights granted, it is nevertheless true that Afghan refugees have been facing increasing constraints. The US State Department noted, in particular, that refugees do not always have access to courts, are harassed by the intelligence agencies, or are asked by police to pay bribes (Grare and Maley 2011). With the degradation of Pakistan's economic, political, and security situation, the tolerance of the authorities tends to decrease, and the new generation of refugees does not enjoy the same degree of protection. For example, the National Database and Registration Authority stopped providing Proof of Registration (PoR) cards in 2007. This card allowed registered refugees to stay in Pakistan, until 2009, if they did not wish to return immediately under the UNHCR voluntary repatriation programme. That was extended to 2012 under an agreement between Pakistan and UNHCR in March 2009 to allow some 1.7 Afghans to continue living in Pakistan. The Pakistani and Afghani authorities, along with UNHCR, agreed that those with PoR cards would be entitled to the UN assistance/incentive package including transportation and reintegration assistance.

A case study conducted by Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) on Afghans in Karachi indicated that in August 2001 the government of Pakistan established the National Aliens' Registration Agency (NARA) under the Ministry of Interior. NARA was a sister organization of the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA), which was mandated to issue new computerized national identity cards (CNICs) to Pakistani citizens. NARA, in turn, was charged with registering non-citizen residents with the purpose of regulating those considered to be irregular or illegal migrants (AREU 2005). Before the US-led military offensive and the fall of the *Taleban g*overnment in Afghanistan, the Pakistani government's policy was moving in the direction of 'regularization'. NARA was supposed to register Afghan migrants in order to provide them with some legal cover. This was partly in light of the fact that the earlier 'refugee' status granted to migrants who had arrived during the period of the Soviet military intervention was no longer viable politically, legally, or economically. In principle, registration with NARA would have afforded some legal protection to people of Afghan origin to live and work in Pakistan. After the fall of the *Taleban* government, the policy changed dramatically from 'regularization' to 'regulation'. All people of Afghan origin were to be registered now, with the purpose of eventually repatriating them back to Afghanistan. Repatriation was to be voluntary, of course, but it was also clear that the option of 'regularization' was closed at least for the time being (AREU 2005). Evidently, such an ad hoc approach to the issues of refugees has been possible because the host country did not ratify the international laws on refugees. In 2013, Islamabad came up with a new National Policy on Afghan Refugees, drafted in synergy with the multiyear Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), which focuses on voluntary repatriation, sustainable reintegration inside Afghanistan, and assistance to refugee host communities. Considering that Afghanistan continues to be one of the most unstable and fragile states, with rapidly evaporating aid and opportunities, a rapidly deteriorating security situation that includes insurgencies, diminishing government control over its territory, and a news cycle that is consistently punctuated by news of

suicide bombing, deaths, and destruction—it is not very difficult to gauge how far these refugee repatriations are 'voluntary'.

5 Afghan Refugees: Liability or Asset for Pakistan?

It is evident from the above discussion that Pakistan's policies over the years have undergone remarkable shifts. Thus, it becomes necessary to understand the host government's concerns and interests that may have triggered those shifts. Today, the government of Pakistan largely believes that Afghans are a net drain on the economy. The refugee presence may have resulted in some clearly defined changes in income distribution, leading to occasional friction with local Pakistanis, even if it did not necessarily affect the overall economy. Moreover, incoming refugees created a larger demand for goods and generated inflation in some parts of the country as a consequence. At the same time, some local economies did grow because of the sheer number of refugees, which enriched local markets. The international aid that Pakistan received because of Afghan refugees stimulated consumption and contributed to the regional infrastructure. It is indeed difficult to make a balanced cost/benefit analysis since a major part of Pakistan's economy belongs to the informal sector. The environmental price that Pakistan paid by hosting Afghan refugees has also been raised along with the question of the security impact. With Afghanistan producing about 92% of the world's opium, part of it has to be smuggled out through Pakistan where informal tax collection systems by militant groups of various affiliations have transformed narcotics trafficking into an additional source of insecurity (Peters 2009).

Over the years, Islamabad has pursued several parallel objectives in Afghanistan. Firstly, it has tried to persuade Afghan refugees against the idea of Pashtunistan, as it would deprive Pakistan of a chuck of its territory. Secondly, Pakistan has always tried to limit its foremost enemy India's influence in Afghanistan in order to avoid the risk of two-front war if a conflict were to erupt with India. Therefore, a political dispensation in Kabul that does not have a favourable relationship with New Delhi and shares the opposite with Islamabad is seen to be the best-case scenario from the Pakistani perspective. The *Taleban* period provided Pakistan with a favourable situation, but it did come with a cost in the form of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which according to observers has turned out to be 'Frankenstein's monster' (Waldman 2010). Thirdly, like the Soviet intervention, the 'War on Terror' also provided Pakistan with yet another lucrative opportunity to amass funds from the international community. At another level, Pakistan's desire to keep the United States tied down in Afghanistan has two clear advantages: one, the continuation of the supply of international assistance and two, it provides a guarantee against a predominant Indian influence if *Taleban* fail to return to power. Seen from Islamabad's perspective, it makes sense for Pakistan to maintain a low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan, in which case the Afghan refugees in Pakistan constitute to be the ideal cannon fodder. It is clear that the continuation of the war in Afghanistan,

thanks to Pakistan's continued support of the *Taleban*, is also an important factor in convincing the refugees directly (because of the consequences of the conflict) and indirectly (because of the inhibition of Afghanistan's reconstruction) to stay in Pakistan (Grare and Maley 2011). The mentioned objectives do not necessarily oppose each other, but they do influence the position on the refugees, who are no longer exclusively a potential strategic liability but also a strategic asset.

6 Conclusion

From a position of relative openness to and facilitation of refugee migration from Afghanistan (from the late 1970s to 1988), official policy went through a period of openness without facilitation (from around 1988 to 2001) to a posture of regulation and repatriation; from 2001 onwards, Pakistan's policy towards Afghan refugees has undergone drastic shifts. Evidently, the fact that Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol allowed it to implement drastic policies. The absence of legal obligations made the refugees a potential source of leverage whenever Islamabad considered the problems intractable and a bargaining tool with the international community when the situation demanded. This article highlights that Pakistan's management of the refugee issue has been fraught with contradictions, and not necessarily linked to logical cost-benefit assessments. The context of population displacement from Afghanistan aptly indicates the crucial role played by Pakistan in influencing the course of Afghan history. Although other international and regional players pursued their selfish interests in Afghanistan, the impact of Pakistan's policies has been most significant. Unlike the 1980s, when Pakistan was suffering from the consequences of the Soviet occupation and strategies, today it suffers because of its own policies in Afghanistan, which is one of the reasons why it still has to cope with a refugee problem of a significant magnitude. Today, Afghan refugees in Pakistan constitute both a liability and an asset. It would not be surprising if the international community continued to be held hostage by Pakistan's policies conducted on its neighbour's territory in the years to come.

The future of the Afghan refugees will largely depend on the political stability and economic viability of Afghanistan, which certainly appears to be a distant dream at the moment. The increased attacks by the *Taleban* and other militant groups including Islamic State and the Haqqani network have jeopardized the security situation in Afghanistan considerably. Tackling of the security situation will require appropriate resourcing and preparation from the Afghan National Security Force, which is currently overstretched and seemingly fatigued—as evidenced by the expansion of the Taliban footprint. All these factors are not only disheartening but also discouraging for Afghan refugees in Pakistan or elsewhere to contemplate returning to Afghanistan. The long-standing strenuous relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan has had direct effect on Afghan migration particularly in regard to repatriation and the extension of Proof of Registration process. Evidently, the Afghan refugees have constituted some kind of asset for the political dispensation in Pakistan, but time has come for the policymakers in Islamabad and Rawalpindi to

re-evaluate the socio-political and most importantly economic impact of the presence of Afghan refugees for their country and stop using these refugees as mere pawns for their own advantage. Pakistan has the most significant role to play in bringing stability in Afghanistan, but it is important for the political dispensation to see merit in that prospect and reformulate policies accordingly. Not only Pakistan and Afghanistan but the world at large has suffered because they tried to follow their narrow and selfish interests in Afghanistan. The problems that grip Afghanistan and the region at large have a history behind them and were not created in a short span of time; therefore, a shortcut solution will not be effective. It is crucial that the regional powers and the international community stay committed to Afghanistan as the failure to do so will speak much more about them as opposed to the Afghans.

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Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program Through the Lens of Multiple Streams Framework

Maitreyee Mukherjee

1   Introduction: Do Systemic Patterns of Agenda Building Exist in Governmental Policy Dynamics?

Agenda setting is the first and a crucial step of the policy cycle, whereby important issues are highlighted and begin to receive attention from the government. This has a critical influence on the entire trajectory of a government's policy process. Activities in this initial phase, for example, may determine whether an issue would be addressed by the government or abandoned at later stage (Howlett et al. 2009). Therefore, it is important to study the mechanisms and patterns of agenda setting in different countries or regions to gain insight into the means by which social, economic, and environmental issues are highlighted in government action plans.

Pressure to act on certain agenda items often comes from domestic or international actors, and this is usually cited as the reason for why government takes an issue up for further consideration (Princen 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005). The key question is, nonetheless, what is the exact pattern and sequence of the interactions that lead governments to choose one or a few policy issues for agenda setting out of a probably large cluster of topics? Who are the key players influencing agenda setting and how do they co-ordinate this dynamic? What circumstances facilitate such co-ordination? This is indeed a fascinating area of inquiry. The identification of a chain or pattern of events that lead to successful issue attention may be useful for understanding and managing future agendas. It can also help academics or policy practitioners better formulate policy tools in bringing important issues to the government's attention.

Various theoretical explications of the agenda setting process have been suggested by different proponents (Lasswell 1956; Downs 1972; Cobb Ross and

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Ross 1976; Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Empirical studies to support heuristic models have been mostly conducted in the United States, Canada, and some European countries, as evidenced by the works of McFarland (1991), Baumgartner and Jones (1991), Sabatier (1993), Howlett (1997, 1998), Birkland (2004), Guldbrandsson and Fossum (2009), Vliegenthart et al. (2016), and others. While these studies deal with various procedural parameters of agenda setting dynamics mostly in Western countries, there is a dearth of similar research in Asian countries. To bridge this gap, my article investigates the dynamics of agenda setting in India, specifically the roles played by different actors in the policy arena. Using a single case study of the pollution control program in the Ganges river basin, I try to identify key motivations behind these actors and their respective behaviours.

This chapter intends to add to the existing knowledge regarding the nature of agenda setting dynamics in the Global South, by investigating issue-attention patterns addressing Ganges river pollution in India over the span of three decades (1985−2016). The rationale behind choosing this case study is that issues such as pollution abatement, river restoration, and basin management in the Ganges river system have been matters of issue attention since the mid-1980s. The enormous scope of the Ganges restoration project and a rather incompetent planning process and numerous government projects launched since 1985 resulted in limited success, while fast and unplanned urbanization, economic development, and excessive water withdrawals have deteriorated the river's overall condition, resulting in the worst quality levels since ever. As a result, in recent times, the Ganges river basin has captured significant national as well as global attention due to its deplorable condition and repeated demands for restoration.

The fundamental research questions investigated in this study are as follows:

- What were the key drivers involved in setting up the agenda for pollution abatement in the Ganges river and its rejuvenation?
- Who were the prominent policy entrepreneurs in this process?
- What was the motivation behind their actions?

To address the above queries, I have used the discourse analysis to study agenda dynamics in the Ganges river basin through the lens of the multiple streams framework (MSF) model (Brunner 2008; Lorenzoni and Benson 2014). I have focussed on the history, repeated governance attempts, and subsequent failures to control pollution in the Ganges and documented how these have been influencing related policy-making (or lack of policies) in the region. Tracing the evolution of the Ganges clean-up program since the mid-1980s, I have attempted to categorize the simultaneous development of Kingdon's three streams over years and how they were finally converged into a favourable policy window driven by policy entrepreneurs to initiate enough governmental commitment. By examining the country's political situation during these periods of enhanced issue attention, it was found that gaining electoral advantage served as the key driver in the whole process. I further applied the theory of collective action (Ostrom 2007) to analyse the motivation behind the cooperative behaviour of political leaders prior to parliamentary elections to push their preferred policies to the limelight. They had exploited the existing situation to

their favour by igniting massive public sentiments and facilitated the formation of a 'national mood' which demanded immediate action and visible outcomes from the government.

2 Multiple Streams Framework

At any given time, there exists an almost infinite set of societal problems or public issues that could require government attention; however, only a few make it into a government's agenda. What classifies these issues as special events seeking immediate attention and how? John Kingdon, in his 1984 seminal work, attempted to integrate the physical, social, and state components influencing the problem universe by taking a broad system approach. By observing policy proceedings in the US Congress, he proposed that, generally, the policy agenda expands through the parallel processing of three distinct subsystems, that is, the problem stream (inherent properties of the problem issue), the policy stream (development of feasible solutions by different interest groups), and the politics stream (creation of receptive policy institutions or right political motivations). The right opportunity is created when these streams function simultaneously with each other towards the realization of similar interests, opening a narrow fertile window for prospective policy considerations. However, this does not occur spontaneously. Each stream in the system generally develops individually, with serial processing of events that accumulate over time to create enough weightage. Simultaneous parallel processing of the three distinct streams then converges together to give rise to an impending situation that policy-makers cannot ignore anymore (Zahariadis 2014).

How, then, do these three separate streams converge towards one another? Kingdon (1984) had noted that several trigger factors might predictably or unpredictably activate the creation of a window. Among those, sudden external shocks or 'focussing events' (unpredicted events such as a plane crash or natural calamity) have been cited as an important agent in drawing attention from the public as well as from the government. When such a situation occurs, the presence of cognitive, opportunity seeking interest groups, government or community leaders, policy entrepreneurs, or social media members may play a central role in expanding those interests or agendas to facilitate the path for policy consolidation. This also increases the likelihood that influential policy actors with similar interests will come together and collectively create pressure on dominant policy communities, thus initiating the breakdown of the status quo (Birkland 1998). They further realize their agenda through group mobilization, a change in public image, and capturing of public venues, thus bringing it to the forefront of an agenda.

Apart from the role of influential policy actors, certain crucial events might be directly highlighted through the media. The strength and sensitizing capacity of the focussing event play an important role in determining how much media attention it would attract (Birkland 2004). Alternately, political institutions themselves might

play an instrumental role in initiating the expansion and entry of an agenda to the governmental list of topics under consideration.

> "Basically a window opens because of change in the political stream (for example, a change of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats (. . .) or a shift in national mood); or it opens because a new problem captures the governmental officials and those close to them." (Kingdon 1984, p. 176).

Thus, institutionalized events like impending elections or budgetary sessions are often key factors that motivate governments to focus on impending problems (Howlett 1998). Successful politicians are often seen to exploit such events to combine them with the existing national mood to generate an emotional attachment of public towards certain policies (Neuman et al. 2007; Zahariadis 2016).

Kingdon's three-stream model of policy window creation has been further expanded by the works of Zahariadis, which he restructured in the form of the multiple streams framework (MSF). According to Zahariadis (2014), the utility of MSF over other propositions is that it considers the ambiguity, temporal aspect, and multiple levels of analyses involved in the study of agenda dynamics. The development of streams and their subsequent convergence in the framework allows researchers to study the process at multiple levels as well as from the angles of single units of analysis. Zahariadis's research (1992, 1995a, b, 2007, 2014) further highlighted how policy entrepreneurs (or influential policy actors) used their access to key policy venues and resources (in form of time, energy, reputation, and money) to facilitate the convergence of three streams. He also proposed that policy entrepreneurs utilize a variety of strategies to form the agenda, which are issue framing, utilization of symbols, salami tactic (piecemeal or step-by-step approach), and affect priming (emotional endowment of the issue). Of these, the last two are of interest to scholars of agenda setting. Salami tactics are the way in which complex or wicked problems are addressed through temporal structuring, that is, by breaking the process through subsequent stages, taking one step at a time, and facilitating holistic agreements sequentially. On the other hand, affect priming handles the ambiguity aspect of policy problems by strategically manipulating public emotions and creating favourable images on certain agenda items (Zohlnhöfer and Rüb 2016).

The key contributions of Kingdon's model (or MSF) have been that it has inspired a large volume of empirical literature enabling researchers to apply the concept beyond the Anglo-American paradigm. Owing to its simple, broad approach, flexibility to adapt to different contexts, and low barriers to entry, MSF has been effective in explaining issue complexities and drivers of change in the policy process. Furthermore, it has also facilitated the development of evolutionary policy theories like that of punctuated equilibrium (Cairney and Jones 2016). To list a few examples, MSF has been widely used as a theoretical base in explaining the dynamics of US foreign policy-making (Wood and Peake 1998); the policy process of the European Union (Ackrill et al. 2013); politics of privatization in Britain, France, and Germany (Zahariadis 1995a, b; Zahariadis and Allen 1995); characteristics of US antidrug policy (Sharp 1994); agenda dynamics in Canada (Howlett 1998); alliances between industry and environmental groups in pushing certain

antipollution policies in the United States and Europe (Lober 1997); and many more. Such extensive empirical studies have shed light on different aspects of the agenda setting process leading to the refinement of Kingdon's original propositions.

In this line, research by Thomas Birkland emphasized the importance of 'focussing events', triggering media coverage, public attention, group coalescence, and mobilization, finally leading to the convergence of opinions regarding the nature of the problem as well as commitment to address it (Birkland 2004, 2006; Birkland and DeYoung 2012). Simultaneously, studies by Vliegenthart et al. (2016) reconfirmed that political motivation and multiparty competition play a pivotal role in the final promotion of an agenda to the government's discussion table. In fact, Guldbrandsson and Fossum (2009) identify politicians as the key policy entrepreneurs in augmenting the opening of a policy window in the Swedish healthcare sector. From yet another perspective, Soroka (2003) and Soroka et al. (2012) discussed the role of media in issue attentiveness and policy framing. They pointed out that media does not necessarily play a constructive role in agenda framing due to regular shifts in its attention from one topic to another along with the possibility that potential false news feeds lead to an untruthful hype. Furthermore, the interaction of political motives and media attention often results in the shifting of foci away from the real policy issues. According to them, this is the reason why long-term environmental issues may not be adequately addressed by media due to the lack of sustained interest in a complex issue along with the presence of other easily available and at first sight more attractive events for coverage.

Despite its wide applicability, MSF has been simultaneously criticized for several limitations. Sabatier (1999) argue that although MSF has a broad flexible structure, providing it a wide base for empirical applications, the framework suffers from a lack of testable hypotheses. Thus, falsification of the empirical findings based on MSF is very difficult. Kuhlmann (2016) argues that the MSF theory has a limited scope for quantitative assessment and lacks a micro foundation. Brunner (2008) further observed that MSF lacks the explanatory power to explain modern-day features like multilevel governance structures, policy changes due to the effects of learning processes, and social network linkages. Therefore, he suggested that MSF needs to be complemented with other illustrative theories to increase its explanatory capacity. In line with this argument, Lorenzoni and Benson (2014) showed that combining Kingdon's model with discursive institutionalism provides a better understanding of the evaluation of institutional innovations in the case of the UK's environmental governance.

As specified earlier, the following sections will contribute to this vast, already available literature on agenda dynamics by applying a policy discourse and by reviewing the chain of events regarding the Ganges river clean-up program in India over three decades. Additionally, I will identify crucial factors that played a vital role in pushing the agenda from the local to the national level and subsequently to the limelight of international significance.

3   Ganges River Basin: A Short History of Issue Agenda Dynamics

The Ganges river basin covers 1.09 mio. km^2 spread over India, Nepal, and Bangladesh. It is one of the largest and most complicated river basin systems with transboundary issues both interstate and across countries. The basin accounts for over a quarter of India's land and water resources, 37% of human resources (more than 500 million people); nearly half of it is irrigated area (The NGRBA[1] program, online documents from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, MoEF) The main stem of the river is about 2500 km length and passes through five different states of India before entering Bangladesh. The river has enormous cultural and religious significance for Hindus and is the source of great ecological wealth in the region (Singh and Singh 2007).

The water quality of the Ganges has deteriorated radically over the past decade due to the uncontrolled discharge of untreated sewage, solid waste, industrial effluent, and reduced stream flow caused by the diversion and control of the water for human use (CSE 2013; MoEF documents). The Ganges ranks among the five most polluted rivers in the world. Restoration efforts over the last three decades have failed to achieve any notable results. The situation deteriorated constantly. Therefore, the ruling political leadership has vowed to implement short-term and long-term interventions with the goal of significantly improving the river's conditions, at least in visible parameters by the year 2019. Against this background, the handling of the Ganges river pollution is of high interest in context of agenda setting dynamics in the Indian context. Figure 1 displays the evolutionary path of the government initiatives taken regarding the 'Ganga rejuvenation' project since 1985.

The Indian government had initiated efforts to clean up the river back in 1985 with the Ganga Action Plan I. However, this and subsequent action plans[2] had little impact on water quality and other ecological parameters in the basin. The sheer enormity of the project, inadequate planning, communication gaps between central and state agencies, inappropriate technologies, delays in investment, low utilization of treatment facilities, lack of appropriate monitoring mechanisms, ambiguous legal and institutional structures, limited involvement of stakeholders, and numerous other factors have hindered the process from the beginning (CSE 2013; Das and Tamminga 2012; GRBMP 2010; The NGRBA program). At the same time, over the last three decades, the Ganges river basin has undergone extensive development in terms of urbanization, economic growth, population explosion, and amplified waste generation. There have been substantial changes in geographic, environmental, ecological, and socio-economic parameters as well. Unpredictable meteorological conditions regularly wreak havoc in the basin in the form of severe water shortages in summer months due to devastating floods, cloudbursts, or flash floods

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[1]National Ganga River Basin Authority.

[2]Ganga Action Plan I (GAP I) ran between 1985 and 2000; Ganga Action Plan II (GAP II) ran between 1991 and 2001.

Fig. 1 Schematic flow chart showing the major milestones of the Ganges clean-up program. Source: Compiled by Author. Abbrviations used: Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF); Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR)

during monsoon season that often claim many lives and destroy livelihoods. Thus, each year a major share of resources, time, and efforts are utilized for ad hoc disaster management, shifting the pollution abatement effort to the background.

In addition, rapid economic development in the region has raised several types of water use demand leading to indiscriminate water extraction from the river. Irrigation is the largest form of water consumption in the basin. Currently, there are nearly 480 (major and medium) functional irrigation projects in the Ganges basin (India-WRIS website, b). To ensure water (as well as energy) security in the area, the Indian government has sanctioned numerous dams and hydroelectric projects. According to official sources, 38 hydroelectric projects are operational over the Ganges and its tributaries (India-WRIS website, a). These projects have caused considerable ecological disruption and reduced water flow in many regions of the basin. Furthermore, different large-, medium-, and small-scale manufacturing industries such as tanneries, sugar mills, paper, jute, textiles, cement, fertilizers, machinery, coal mining, and many more have thrived in the region. There are 764 grossly polluting industries dumping waste into the river. The Central Pollution Control Board report states that existing wastewater treatment capacity in the region can address only 45% of the total generation.[3] However, even if every drop of polluted water is treated, Ganges cannot be revived to bathing type water quality unless its natural flow can be restored (CPCB 2013).

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[3] 36 Class I cities and 14 Class II towns discharge approximately 2723 MLD of urban sewage, of which only 1208 MLD is the capacity of installed STPs (sewage treatment plant). Additionally, 6087 MLD of open drain water from different run-offs flow into the river.

Right after the GAP I and II ceased to function post 2000, issues related to the Ganges slowly faded out of the public as well as the governmental agenda. As a result, exploitation of the river basin resources (pollution, water withdrawal, sand mining, extinction of species) continued indiscriminately. This stimulated internal interest groups like NGOs, autonomous academic institutes, and various local community groups to start campaigning against government inaction and the alarming deterioration of the riverine system. Eventually, widespread media attention, along with collective pressures from environmentalists, religious leaders, international agencies, and policy entrepreneurs, forced the Indian government to revive the Ganges clean-up project under fresh leadership and organizational capacities (Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012).

In the year 2008,[4] the Ganges river received 'National River' status. Since then, a series of activities followed in order to revive the Ganges clean-up project. Unsure about the multi-tiered nature of the problem, the government was still making ad hoc decisions by 'muddling through' different policy solutions. The National Ganga River Basin Authority (NGRBA), an advisory organization responsible for supervising overall planning and progress, was formed under the MoEF. GAP was relaunched as the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG) in 2011 and placed under NGRBA. A comprehensive Ganga River Basin Environmental Management Plan (GRBEMP) was sanctioned to be prepared by a panel of experts in order to establish an extensive management plan for integrated basin level management.

Following the 2014 parliamentary elections, a change in the ruling government brought political focus back to the Ganges clean-up agenda. The Ganges rejuvenation program was shifted from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation. The 'Namami Gange Program' (2014) was launched with an integrated goal of developing sewage treatment infrastructure, riverfront development, river surface cleaning, biodiversity protection, afforestation, public awareness, industrial effluent monitoring, and Ganga Gram development (open defecation free villages). The memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been signed with different ministries to cooperate in integrating government schemes for the Ganges program into their planning as well (NMCG website[5]).

To date, the NMCG retains its role as the implementation arm of the government to take measures on pollution abatement, conservation, and the rejuvenation of the Ganges river. However, the NGRBA has been dissolved since October 2016, and a new organization the 'National Ganga Council' (NGC) under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of India has been established. A five-tier institutional structure (from national to state to district level) has been formed to ensure the smooth functioning of the Ganges rejuvenation program. The five levels are as follows[6]:

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[4]Incidentally these activities coincided with the upcoming May 2009 general elections.

[5]http://nmcg.nic.in/NamamiGanga.aspx (accessed 08/09/17).

[6]http://nmcg.nic.in/about_nmcg.aspx (accessed 08/09/2017).

1. National Ganga Council under the chairmanship of Honourable Prime Minister of India (federal authority)
2. Empowered Task Force (ETF) on Ganges river under the chairmanship of Honourable Union Minister of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation (ground force appointed by the central ministry)
3. National Mission for Clean Ganga—NMCG (implementation arm of the federal system)
4. State Ganga Committees (state agency)
5. District Ganga Committees (district level agency)

4 Discussion and Analysis

From the above description, it is evident that the Ganges river pollution and its abatement programs have continuously faced entry and exit on the public as well as state agenda for nearly three decades, thus generating a long pattern of issue-attention behaviour. This provides an excellent opportunity to inspect the case for the existence of Kingdon's three streams, their interaction, and how they subsequently merged together. Figure 2 shows schematically the major events occurring under each stream, their time sequence, and their eventual convergence. Starting

Fig. 2 Schematic representation of the sequence of stream development and stream convergence. (Note: 2009 and 2014 were election years. Mr. Narendra Modi is the current Prime Minister of India.). Source: Compiled by Author. The Multiple Streams Framework has been adapted from Zahariadis 2003. [Abbreviations used: *GAP* Ganga Action Plan, *CPCB* Central pollution Control Board, *NGRBA* National Ganges River Basin Environmental Plan, *IIT* Indian Institute of Technology, *MoEF* Ministry of Environment and Forestry, *MOWR* Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, *JICA* Japan International Cooperation Agency]

from the problem stream, resentment and frustration about the plight of the Ganges river had been building up for a long time. With the failure of GAP, the government had been unsuccessful in initiating an efficient river restoration program that could match the enormous scale of the problem at neither the river basin level nor the regional levels. In addition, whatever infrastructure was developed under GAP was either under-performing or closed down due to lack of operation and maintenance funds at the state government level. Dams and hydropower projects, along with diversion canals on the river course, had substantially restricted its water flow. Additionally, severe pollution from industries as well as residential/municipal sewage choked the river at various stretches. In fact, during the summer and winter months when river flow is limited, many stretches of the river become ecologically dead due to high biological oxygen demand (BOD) and a deadly concoction of organic and inorganic wastes. Apart from this, cultural activities like religious events on the river banks, immersion of idols, the throwing of dead bodies into the river, and similar activities add to the magnitude of the problem, rendering the river unusable at many points.

Concerned about the fast deterioration of the river resources, many (government, independent, and academic) reports investigating the scale of the damage were published. Of these reports, the most eye-opening ones were the government's own reports such as the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report, 2000 (Business Line 2000), and reports from Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB). The CAG report, 2000 had criticized GAP by noting that between 1993 and 2000, only 39% of the stipulated target for building sewage treatment plants could be achieved. The CAG report further pointed out that GAP had laid out a static plan without considering the extensive trend of population increases or economic development that would have taken place. The report also highlighted that GAP was a centralized program, which failed to be efficiently executed at the state levels. Although central government had borne the capital cost of STP construction, state governments were responsible for setup, operation, and maintenance. In many instances, it was found that state governments lacked the necessary expertise or funds to operate those STPs. Simultaneously, the CPCB reports on water quality status revealed that between 2009 and 2015, the number polluted river stretches in the country had doubled (CPCB 2009, 2013, 2015). The Ganges river basin is also no exception.[7]

The policy stream was initiated by giving the Ganges river a special 'National River' status, in 2008. The government also started revamping the river restoration program with the formation of new organizations dedicated to river basin management activities on a national scale. The National Ganges River Basin Authority (NGRBA) was formed in 2009, which sanctioned the development of a working environmental management plan, GBREMP, by a consortium of Indian experts. The

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[7]Nearly 16% of the country's total sewage generated is discharged in Ganges only (Ganga River Basin Management Plan Interim Report 2013, Avaialbe at: https://nmcg.nic.in/writereaddata/fileupload/25_GRBMPInterim_Rep.pdf (accessed 17/12/2018); CPCB Report 2013).

National Mission for Clean Ganga was launched as the central implementation arm for coordination with state and district level agencies. Several programs were lined up for rigorous water quality monitoring, industrial effluent checks, and the installation of wastewater treatment facilities in settlements along the bank. Simultaneously, independent academic and NGO groups[8] continued their campaign by writing blogs, posts, newspaper articles, publishing reports, religious messages, drawing media attention, joining various government committees, and negotiating with them on future strategies. International aid organizations such as World Bank and JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) extended financial aids worth more than US$1 billion, for various projects under the Ganges rejuvenation project (around 2011−2012).

Meanwhile, with the development of problem and policy streams, political incentives to sensitize the issue to draw public support were growing too. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the opposition party leader Narendra Modi first brought up and highlighted the Ganges issue in his election campaign. In fact, Ganga rejuvenation was declared as one of his priority promises to be delivered once he came to power. As an iconic gesture, he decided to contest the election from a prime constituency on the Ganges river bank, Varanasi. Varanasi occupies a sacred position in the Hindu religion, and has significant cultural implications, too. All these ignited pro-religious sentiments among the majority of voters in the region and led to the creation of a poignant 'national mood'.

Narendra Modi and his party, namely, The Bhartiya Janata Party, translated as Indian People's Party, won the 2014 federal elections with an overwhelming majority. In his first speech as Prime Minister elect, which he delivered at the river bank of Varanasi, he underlined the 'need of the hour (is) to restore the glory of the Ganga. Today Maa (mother) Ganga is calling us, her children to make the river clean once again'.[9] He announced two important projects that day, which were the Ganga river clean-up and 'Clean India Mission'. In doing so, a politically charged policy window was forced to open, triggering lot of interest, discussions regarding the problem, and future planning. As promised, Modi mobilized a series of policy directives after taking office. The Ganga program was transferred to the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation (MOWR). The NGRBA was dissolved to form a new supervisory board called the National Ganga Council directly under the leadership of the Prime Minister. A five-tier institutional structure, including national, state, and district organizations, was formed for more efficient management. The Namami Gange Program was launched with integrated river development targets.

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[8]Autonomous research institute like Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) and NGOs like Eco Friends, Kanpur; Sankat Mochan Foundation, Varanasi; and more.

[9]Zee News; http://zeenews.india.com/news/general-elections-2014/narendra-modi-attends-ganga-aarti-in-varanasi-thanks-people-for-support_932777.html (accessed 08/07/17).

5   Conclusion: What Induced the Convergence of Streams?

This contribution traces historical discourse of the Ganges river basin rejuvenation program and analyses its development to evaluate the nature of agenda setting dynamics in India. The occurrence of multiple streams convergence and the opening of an institutionalized policy window were identified in two instances, which also coincided with election years. Strictly speaking, the process was initiated before the 2009 parliamentary elections with designation of River Ganges as India's national river, however the ripening of streams occurred in the successive 2014 election with a change in ruling party and political ideology. Although political motives to gain electoral advantage appeared to be the single major stimulus in facilitating stream convergence, window opening was possible due to the simultaneous development in the problem as well as the policy sectors, along with constant pushes from relevant policy entrepreneurs.

Interestingly, if we study the development of events over past three decades, adequate political interest was already present from the beginning, much before 2009 or 2014. One could ask, what was special during this time that triggered such massive sensitization of public sentiments, creating distinct public images and attracting so much interest from politicians, communities, and media? I suggest that the final convergence of streams or the opening of a window was possible due to the carefully planned collective action of a handful of political actors that shared similar political ideologies. These political leaders managed to arouse necessary passion and public sentiments regarding the issue using stories, images, and symbols of cultural significance to build support for their electoral candidature (Neuman et al. 2007; Zahariadis 2016). As a result, it led to the creation of a national mood (Kingdon 1984) charged with religious sentiments and an urgent need to address the impending situation.

The Ganges river, being an important common pool resource and a significant national asset, must be well managed and sustained for the nation's future well-being. Therefore, policy initiatives to act on the issue had already started, with the declaration of the Ganges as the national river of India in 2008. This was followed by the formation of planning committees, expert group consultations, budgets set aside for numerous projects, and the acceptance of extensive international funds. Once those funds were released, the initiated projects had to be rolled over, the money spent, and promised output achieved (irrespective of change in political ideology). However, sensitizing the sentiments of millions had the potential to generate substantive electoral leverage in any political party, an opportunity readily grasped by the then opposition party (before 2014). The concerned leaders, mobilized by common political interests, then worked collectively to promote their dedication for rejuvenation of the Ganges river. Mutual trust, creation of good will, high levels of co-operation (due to sharing of similar ideologies), and well-coordinated actions enabled the creation of a national mood that demanded better environmental policies (Ostrom 2007). Nonetheless, the pivotal role in agenda setting was played by the then Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, who took up the issue again and

again in his election campaigns. Simultaneously, media also played a supporting role in inspiring public sentiments by covering the governmental proceedings, reports, and party agendas regularly. Eventually, all these activities converged together when finally the opposition party won the election, in 2014, which then realized its promises through respective actions.

However, the opening of a policy window does not ensure any significant outcomes (Howlett et al. 2009). Continuous discussion and constant trials keep the process rolling and cause the subsequent attention to persist. The agenda focussing of the Ganges river has triggered a series of policies targeting river clean-up, stringent pollution rules, and long-term strategic planning. The MOWR has finally announced that no more new dams on the main river course would be permitted. Several new STPs have been sanctioned along with funds for the construction of toilet facilities in villages. Continuous monitoring of water quality has been initiated to detect industrial effluent discharge (113 stations with real-time monitoring systems). A Ganga Task Force (Empowered Task Force) has been deployed along the banks to check any illicit waste disposal as well as to spread public awareness. Additionally, the Supreme Court has declared the rivers Ganga and Yamuna (tributary) as living entities, implying that these rivers also have the right to good health and well-being. Anybody infringing upon these rights can be prosecuted. Nevertheless, in spite of so much enthusiasm and good will, the latest official reports admit that most projects under the Ganges clean-up program are way behind their scheduled targets, with the allocated development funds severely underutilized in most cases (compiled from several newspaper reports).

Despite an elaborate discussion on agenda setting behaviour in the Indian context, findings from this chapter should be interpreted very carefully. Since the chapter deals with a single case study, it is insufficient to suggest any normative pattern of agenda setting for developing nations or countries in the Global South. However, certain patterns have been identified in this chapter and these form its key contributions. For example, evidence for the presence of three distinct streams and political motivation to push relevant agenda items before elections reinforce the application of MSF in the context of the Global South as well. The findings also resemble agenda dynamics patterns found in the United States or the EU as documented by relevant literature. However, more empirical research in future is needed on agenda dynamics for other sensitive issues as well, such as air pollution, nuclear power, and alternative energy sources to be able to draw more convincing conclusion.

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Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development: The Case of Pilar, Paraguay

Fernando Luis Ramirez Gonzalez

1 Introduction

In both developed and developing countries, entrepreneurs have been viewed as important actors in the promotion of innovation, job creation, and employment (Hynes 1996; Piperopoulos 2012; Wong et al. 2005; Kuratko 2005), while small businesses have been argued to be the main economic units where these actors can contribute to the socioeconomic development and prosperity of their communities (Ghina 2014; Matlay 2006; Baldwin et al. 2001). Particularly in small business-dependent developing countries, these economic units have been regarded as catalysts of income growth, unemployment reduction, and poverty alleviation (Grimm et al. 2012; Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Ahmad 2013). Congruently, policy makers have increasingly been focusing their attention and resources on promoting the development of startups through, for instance, Entrepreneurship Education Programs (EEPs), as a way to teach them lifelong entrepreneurial soft skills and competences and, at the same time, increase their entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward business development, based on the conviction that EEPs are also valid channels to make a society more entrepreneurial and competitive in this globalized world (Hynes 1996; Samwel Mwasalwiba 2010; Franco et al. 2010).[1]

However, in the academic world, there is an ongoing debate regarding the effectiveness of those EEPs in promoting the development of startups. Assessment of the effectiveness of EEPs is commonly measured by increases in EEP

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[1]It should be clarified that the promotion of startup development refers to the increase of students' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward the development of startups. Likewise, the terms "startups," "small business," and "small firms" are implicitly used interchangeably by the study's author, unless otherwise stated.

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participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes (personal attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control), as defined by Ajzen's (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Fayolle and Linan 2014). Through meta-analysis studies, some scholars argue that a majority of studies suggest that EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes are overall increased after having completed an EEP (Pittaway and Cope 2007; Liñan and Fayolle 2015); however, results remain contradictory (Lorz et al. 2013; Fayolle and Linan 2014; Rideout and Gray 2013). Having noted these controversial results, Alberti et al. (2004) stressed the need for further research on the assessment of the effectiveness of EEPs. Liñan and Fayolle (2015) argued that further studies and a strengthening of evidence in the subfield of "EEP evaluation" are compulsory, and Valerio et al. (2014) claimed that there is a need to study the impact of particular types and characteristics of EEP on participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes. In the same line, research linking entrepreneurship education with entrepreneurial intentions and the promotion of startup development is also argued to be limited (Pittaway and Cope 2007; Sanchez 2013). Moreover, although Karimi et al. (2016) provided some empirical evidence from a developing country context, Khalid (2016) and Byabashaija and Katono (2011) reported that empirical studies related to the assessment of the effectiveness of those EEPs carried out in the context of developing countries remain underdeveloped. Finally, there is an increasing call for the implementation and assessment of EEPs that should take into consideration the local context and economic ecosystem where it is implemented (Giacomin et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2011; Bruyat and Julien 2001).

As a way to fill in the above exposé gaps in academia, this study aims at assessing the effectiveness of a particular type of EEP, an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP, as measured by significant increases in EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward startup development, after having completed the referred type of EEP.[2] The EEP type to be tested has been chosen due to the fact that it has been regarded as the most relevant type of EEP (Liñan 2006; Liñan 2004), because of its emphasis on practical, real-life, and learning-by-doing exercises, as well as its focus on developing lifelong entrepreneurial soft skills and mindsets (Lackeus 2015).

2   About Entrepreneurs, Entrepreneurship, and Startups

The positive role of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurship, and startups in a society has been noted by several studies, often with overlapping perspectives. At the individual level, entrepreneurs have been described as individuals who are able to innovate and create something that has not been done before, regardless of the risk or uncertainty

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[2]This paper is based on the thesis titled "Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Small Business Development: The Case of Pilar, Paraguay," which was submitted by the author for the degree of Master of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany, on 7 July 2017.

that such actions might imply (Schumpeter 1934; Drucker 1985). Van Gelderen et al. (2008) point out that entrepreneurs have been described as creative, self-reliant, risk-takers, and action oriented. Baldwin et al. (2001) notes that entrepreneurs are those who are able to create new firms by taking advantage of the opportunities available in their surroundings and continuously innovating. Shane and Venkataraman (2000) claim that entrepreneurs are able to recognize opportunities and introduce disruptive new products and services in the market. In this study, an entrepreneur may be broadly described as the individual "who creates and innovates something recognized around perceived opportunities by accepting risks and failures" (Eroglu and Piçak 2011, p. 150). Seen from a macro context, entrepreneurship is thus believed to be an important factor for socioeconomic development, growth (Keat et al. 2011), and sustainability (Porter 1990). In fact, it has been argued that the global economy has been greatly shaped by the phenomena of entrepreneurship (Lee and Peterson 2000) due to the increased internationalization of markets and changes in people's attitudes toward entrepreneurship (Luthje and Franke 2003). Zahra (1999) claims that entrepreneurship increases economies' overall competitiveness and productivity, while Wong et al. (2005) and Piperopoulos (2012) point out that entrepreneurship serves as a source of employment, income generation, and innovation. Entrepreneurship may also be understood as a process or mindset toward value creation, particularly during times of economic stagnation (Klein and Bullock 2006).

Similarly to the role of entrepreneurship in a nation, in both developed and developing countries, small businesses have been viewed as economic units that are crucial "engines" or sources for economic prosperity, growth and diversification, competition, innovation, and job generation (Baldwin et al. 2001; Hynes 1996; Piperopoulos 2012; Birch 1979, as cited in Valerio et al. 2014). Although startups are susceptible to high failure rates (World Bank 2012), and small businesses have shown to be unable to grow in size and number of employees in the long run (Nichter and Goldmark 2009), they are the chief economic units for poverty reduction, income growth, and employment in many developing countries (Grimm et al. 2012; Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Ahmad 2013).

For instance, the importance of small businesses in terms of their socioeconomic impact and job generation is clearly evidenced in Paraguay, where its economic structure is mainly composed of these economic units, which account for 90.9% (203,936) of all registered economic units (224,242) and employ 49.4% (394,707) of all registered workers (799,153) (General Directorate of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses of Paraguay 2013a). At the city level, in Pilar, small businesses are almost universal, accounting for 98% (1817) of all formally registered economic units (1854), employing 68% (3807) of all registered workers (5614) (General Directorate of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses of Paraguay 2013b).[3] Having noted these

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[3]In a population of around 40,000 inhabitants in Pilar, Paraguay, according to official data, there are only 5614 "registered workers." As such, "registered workers" may only refer to those who are officially employed and included in the Paraguayan social security system and exclude those employed in the informal sector.

characteristics of the Paraguayan economic structure, the prevalence of small businesses, and the role that entrepreneurs play in their communities, not surprisingly, the Paraguayan government has recently focused its attention and resources on EEPs (National Service for Professional Development of Paraguay 2015a, b) in order to make the Paraguayan society, particularly the young segment of the population, more entrepreneurial.

3 Defining Entrepreneurship Education Programs

EEPs vary greatly across regions and are imparted differently based on several factors such as teaching methods, content, objectives, and differences in understanding on what an EEP is about (Fayolle et al. 2006). For instance, according to Gottleib and Ross's 1997 study (as cited in Chen et al. 2015), EEPs should be imparted in the business field and should include features of innovation and creative thinking. Chen et al. (2015) reported that EEPs should pedagogically raise entrepreneurial awareness and develop innovative skills and practical competences. Similarly, Raposo and do Paco (2011) pointed out that EEPs should include creativity nurturing, as well as innovative and critical thinking as key components, so that students should be able to identify opportunities to develop businesses. Mcmullan and Long's 1987 study (as cited in Mayhew et al. 2012), nevertheless, suggested that, besides those competences related to innovation and business and product development, EEPs should also teach soft competences such as negotiation and leadership, as well as include technology-related skills. Gibb's 1999 study (as cited in Packham et al. 2010) proposed that an effective EEP should make students first understand what entrepreneurship is about, develop their entrepreneurial mindsets, and provide insights on how to start and subsequently maintain a business, while Fayolle et al. (2006) maintained that EEPs are about promoting positive attitudes toward entrepreneurship.

Having noted the abovementioned divergences, Pittaway and Cope (2007) claimed that, among scholars, there is no consensus on what entrepreneurship education actually is and on what and how skills and competences should be nurtured. For the purpose of this study, in general terms, EEPs may be described as "any [short or long term] pedagogical program or process of education for entrepreneurial attitudes and skills, which involves developing certain personal qualities" (Fayolle et al. 2006, p. 702).

4 Types of Entrepreneurship Education Programs

In an attempt to categorize EEPs, Caird (1990) divided them into three types, Education for, about, and through Enterprise, terms which were later referred by Lackeus (2015) as Education for, about, and through Entrepreneurship:

"Education for Entrepreneurship" is aimed at providing skills to start and manage a startup and includes guidance in terms of legal and financial procedures for the registration of a startup (Caird 1990). This may be regarded as equivalent to Liñan's (2004) Education for startup type of EEP.

(a) "Education about Entrepreneurship" is imparted in the traditional, theoretical way to conceptually transfer knowledge to students and raise awareness about entrepreneurship in general as well as the business and industry environment (Caird 1990). Samwel Mwasalwiba (2010) reports that this type of EEP is the dominant one in universities. This may be regarded as equivalent to Linan's (2004) "Entrepreneurial awareness education" type of EEP.

(b) "Education through Entrepreneurship" may be considered equivalent to Linan's (2004) "Education for entrepreneurial dynamism," as it refers to those programs devoted to instruct "life skills" through "enterprise activities" (Caird 1990, p. 139), as well as develop entrepreneurial values, attitudes, and soft skills such as team management, negotiation, decision-making, problem-solving, communication, and leadership skills through real-practice and real-life experiences (Caird 1990; Kent 1990; Lackeus 2015). Not surprisingly, this type of EEP has also been referred to as action-based EEP (Ansteensen 2015).

Finally, in a comparison of EEP types, the latest "Education through Entrepreneurship" has been considered the most important type of EEP (Liñan 2006; Liñan 2004; Garavan and O'Cinneide 1994) due to its focus on learning-by-doing and real-life exercises (Ansteensen 2015; Politis 2005; Mayhew et al. 2012) and its emphasis on the promotion of several lifelong skills that are thought to be essential in the entrepreneurial process of starting a small business and maintaining it in the long run (Vesper and McMullan 1987; Liñan 2007).

5 The Theory of Planned Behavior

The Theory of Planned Behavior stipulates that prior to conducting a behavior, there needs to be an intention to carry out that behavior (Ajzen 1991). In Ajzen's (1991) words, "intentions are indicators of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior" (p. 181). Accordingly, when the intention to conduct a particular behavior is higher, the conduction of that behavior is more likely to be carried out (ibid.). Not in vain, Kim and Hunter (1993) pointed out that intention is an immediate predictor of behavior, while Krueger (1993), in the entrepreneurship field, further stressed that entrepreneurs need, first, an intention to start a behavior. For the purpose of this study, entrepreneurial intentions may be defined as:

a conscious state of mind that directs attention (and therefore experience and action) toward a specific object (goal) or pathway to achieve it (means). Entrepreneurial intentions aim toward the creation of new venture or new values in existing ventures. (Bird 1989, p. 8)

Fig. 1 Ajzen's (1991) Theory of planned behavior. Source: Ajzen (1991, p. 182)

Additionally, as displayed in Fig. 1, Ajzen (1991) notes that intentions to carry out a behavior can be "predicted with high accuracy" (p. 179) through three "antecedents of intention" (p. 188), which are personal attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. According to Ajzen (1991), these antecedents, also termed altogether as "attitudes" (Souitaris et al. 2007), predict intention, which, at the same time, predict the proposed behavior. These attitudes are described as follows:

1. Personal attitude toward the behavior: refers to the "degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question" (Ajzen 1991, p. 188). According to Kolvereid (1996), in the field of entrepreneurship, a higher attitude toward that behavior implies a higher desire to be self-employed, instead of being employed by an organization. In other words, it captures how attractive the behavior in question is.
2. Subjective norms: serve as a "social factor" and "refers to the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior" (ibid., p. 188). It refers to the individual's perception about what other people, particularly relatives and closer ones, might think about his proposed behavior.
3. Perceived behavioral control: is about "the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior and it is assumed to reflect past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles" (ibid. 1991, p. 188). In other words, it captures an individual's confidence and his/her own perception of being able to control the proposed behavior (Ajzen 2002).

Krueger and Carsrud (1993) who were some of the first scholars to apply Ajzen's (1991) theory in the entrepreneurship field claimed that his Theory of Planned Behavior is a "well-grounded" theoretical framework, which "robustly predicts a wide variety of planned behaviors" (Krueger and Carsrud 1993, p. 315), and proposed that "researchers might use [Ajzen's model] to analyze how the process of doing a business plan or entrepreneurial education affects intentions" (ibid., p. 327). Not surprisingly, the use of Ajzen's model in entrepreneurship intentions research has increased considerably in the last decades (Entrialgo and Iglesias 2016; Liñan and Fayolle 2015).

6 Assessment of the Effectiveness of Entrepreneurship Education Programs

In the assessment of the effectiveness of EEPs, Ajzen's (1991) model has been extensively used in order to capture significant alterations in EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes (Fayolle and Linan 2014). Although most scholars believe that entrepreneurship, or at least certain aspects of entrepreneurship, can be effectively taught (Kuratko 2005), results have been controversial. This is the case for studies that measured EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes in ex ante and ex post occasions, that is, prior to and after their participation in EEPs.

On the one hand, a number of studies have found that after the culmination of an EEP, participants have higher entrepreneurial intentions than at the beginning of the program (Souitaris et al. 2007; Fayolle et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2008; Sanchez 2011, 2013). In the same way, other studies found that only certain entrepreneurial attitudes of EEP participants were higher after the program (Souitaris et al. 2007; Fayolle et al. 2006; Harris et al. 2008). In the case of "Education through Entrepreneurship" EEPs, Ansteensen (2015), Politis (2005), and Mayhew et al. (2012) claim that the positive impact that these EEPs have on participants is due to the practical and real-life exercises used in those programs.

On the other hand, there are other studies that have produced quite different results. For instance, Chen et al. (2015) and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012) found no significant changes in EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and/or attitudes, whereas von Graevenitz et al. (2010) found that EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions decreased somewhat after the program. Finally, Oosterbeek et al. (2010) found that EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions were even significantly lower after the program. These scholars have frequently pointed out that these results might be due to students' cumulative understanding during the EEP about the financial difficulties and other challenges that entrepreneurs face when intending to develop and effectively manage a business (ibid; Gouveia Rodrigues et al. 2012).

As these previous experiences suggest the appropriateness of Ajzen's (1991) model to assess the effectiveness of EEPs on participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes (personal attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control), as measured in ex ante and ex post occasions, and taking note of the research gaps that need to be addressed in the field, namely, the call for further studies focused on a particular type of EEP, conducted in developing countries, and in accordance with the local context and economic ecosystem, this chapter, further considering the predominance of small businesses in the context of Pilar, Paraguay, aims at answering the following research questions.

Research Question 1 Do EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions to develop startups increase significantly after having completed an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP?

Research Question 2 Do EEP participants' entrepreneurial attitudes (personal attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control) toward the development of startups increase significantly after having completed an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP?

Congruently, the null and alternative hypotheses are suggested as follows:

H_0 EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward the development of startups do not increase significantly after having completed an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP.

H_1 EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward the development of startups increase significantly after having completed an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP; $\alpha = 0.05$.

7 Methodology

In the research design process, a key challenge in the assessment of the effectiveness of EEPs and the subsequently comparison of results is the inexistence of a generally accepted methodological framework, as noted by Armitage and Conner (2001). Considering that longitudinal methods using pretest and posttest research designs have been suggested and considered superior as compared to cross-sectional methods (Martin et al. 2013; Fayolle and Linan 2014), this study adopts Ajzen's (1991) TPB-based Fayolle et al.'s (2006) study as a source of support, taking into account that other recent studies have also followed the same methodology (Hamzah et al. 2016) and that its suitability has been suggested for the assessment of the effectiveness of small-size, short-term EEPs (Fayolle et al. 2006), key characteristics of the experiment carried out as part of this study.

In Fayolle et al.'s (2006) methodological framework, independent variables may be constituted by one or a combination of the characteristics of the EEP that one wishes to assess (as shown in Fig. 2). Those characteristics include "institutional setting, audience, types of EEP, objectives, content, and teaching approaches and methods" (ibid., p. 710). Taking into consideration that "Education through Entrepreneurship" types of EEPs have been considered the most relevant category of EEPs (Garavan and O'Cinneide 1994) and that EEP should be elaborated in close relation to the local context and economic ecosystem (Giacomin et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2011; Bruyat and Julien 2001), this study determined "Education through Entrepreneurship" EEP types, with a focus on the promotion of startup development, as the independent variable. Successively, in accordance with Fayolle et al.'s (2006) methodological framework, the dependent variables, which are the EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes (attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control), should be measured prior to and after the culmination of the EEP.

Fig. 2 Fayolle et al.'s (2006) methodological framework. Source: Fayolle et al. (2006, p. 710)

As such, this is a longitudinal study with a pretest and posttest experimental research design on a single group of participants who took a 3-day-long workshop named "Entrepreneurship Education and Creation of Small Businesses" in Pilar, Paraguay, which, taking into account its content, objectives, and teaching approach, should be considered as an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP. In terms of the selection of the location where the experiment was carried out, from a theoretical perspective, it should be interpreted as a response to recent calls for more EEP evaluation-related research in developing countries (Byabashaija and Katono 2011). In relation to the target population, the workshop was designed for the "youth," that is, individuals between the ages of 15 and 29, as determined by the National Youth Secretariat of Paraguay (2014).

With respect to data collection, participants' basic demographic and background information was first requested using an adapted version of Aragon-Sanchez and Baixauli-Soler's (2014) questionnaire, instrument that allowed to gather participants' gender, age, place of residence, socioeconomic background, education level, subject of study, and own and families' experience in employment and entrepreneurship.[4] Then EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes were collected through Liñan and Chen's (2009) Entrepreneurial Intentions Questionnaire (EIQ), a TPB-based structured questionnaire survey, with Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 to 7, which is composed of four constructs: personal attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and entrepreneurial intentions. The EIQ was administered two times: prior to and after the culmination of the EEP. Both questionnaires were administered in the local language (Spanish). Upon completion of Cronbach's reliability tests at both times, a paired t-test for means was carried out

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[4]The results of participants' basic demographic and background information are available upon request.

to determine whether EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes increased significantly upon completion of the EEP.

7.1   Methodological Limitations

The study has certain limitations. As noted by Fayolle et al. (2006), in this methodological framework, the impact of EEPs is not intended to measure "in terms of specific entrepreneurial behavior [of creating a startup] (. . .) instead, it is measured in terms of [significant] changes in attitudes and intentions" (p. 712). Therefore, the present does not directly assess the effectiveness of EEP in terms of how many startups were immediately created upon completion of the program. Instead, it assesses its effectiveness in promoting the development of startups, as measured by significant increases in EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes. In this aspect, although in the assessment of the effectiveness of EEPs, attitudes, and intentions have been desired as parameters due to its more volatile nature, as compared to personality, which is more static (Harris et al. 2008; Hatten and Ruhland 1995; Robinson et al. 1991), this approach may also imply, by the same token, that it might not be possible to determine whether the effect of an EEPs on participants' entrepreneurial attitudes and intentions will be constant and will not corrode over time, as contended by Fayolle et al. (2006). Not surprisingly, Pittaway and Cope (2007) reported that a weakness of entrepreneurship-related studies based on intention-based methods is that they may not explicitly tell us that those increases in entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes will in fact be reflected in actual behavior or "activity," and long-term "success," in case students end up creating their own businesses (p. 493).

Moreover, due to time constraints, this study only studied whether significant increases existed in participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes after the culmination of a 3-day-long "Education through Entrepreneurship" EEP type. As such, it is unable to determine that this particular type of EEP is superior to other types, an inference which may only be made through cross-sectional studies. Moreover, since ex ante and ex post measurements were only carried out on the same treatment group (EEP participants), this study lacks the strengths of other studies that also measured the entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes on another (control) group of nonparticipants. Additionally, although the population size ($N = 22$) is superior to other studies such as that of Fayolle et al. (2006), it is rather small, and thus, the relevance of the results may be subject to challenges, as a bigger population size would have been desired in order to increase its statistical robustness. Moreover, although this study focused on the youth, that is, participants aged 15–29, who belonged to either secondary or higher education institutions, a more representative participation of high school students (36%), as compared to university students (64%), would have been desired.

Finally, taking into account that the arranged workshop was promoted through conferences at a local high school, social media, and local mass media (radio

Table 1 Cronbach's alpha reliability test

Construct	Cronbach alpha (t1)	Cronbach alpha (t2)
Personal attitude toward the behavior	0.65	0.69
Subjective norms	0.72	0.76
Perceived behavioral control	0.88	0.83
Entrepreneurial intentions	0.62	0.64

stations), it is possible that the study may be susceptible to self-selection biases, as noted by Liñan (2004), Fayolle and Gailly (2015), and McMulland and Long's 1987 study (as cited in Mayhew et al. 2012), considering that the workshop might have attracted participants with an already high interest in entrepreneurship and positive attitudes toward business development.

7.2 Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test

As it can be seen in Table 1, the first construct (personal attitude toward the behavior) received "moderately reliable" scores at both times, 0.65 at *t*1 and 0.69 at *t*2; the second construct (subjective norms) obtained "highly reliable" scores at both times, 0.72 at *t*1 and 0.76 at *t*2; the third construct (perceived behavioral control) got "highly reliable" scores at both times, 0.88 at *t*1 and 0.83 at *t*2, whereas the fourth construct (entrepreneurial intentions) obtained "moderately reliable" scores at both times, 0.62 at *t*1 and 0.64 at *t*2. Taking into account that these coefficients show "moderate" to "high" internal consistency (reliability), as measured in Hinton et al.'s study (2014), the author of this chapter thus considered satisfying the adoption of the adapted EIQ as the key instrument to measure EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes.

7.3 Paired t-Test for Means

First of all, it should be stressed that a *t*-test (paired two samples for means) has been chosen as it is commonly used when the independent variable (in this study, the workshop) has two sets of observations (pretest and posttest values) from the same population (EEP participants). Taking into account that the hypothesis posited in this study aims at determining whether EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes increased significantly after the completion of an EEP, and considering that, as contended by Siegel and Castellan (1988), one-tailed tests should be carried out when the tested hypothesis already indicates one direction or side (in this case, positive/higher entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes), as opposed to a two-tailed *p* value (which are aimed at determining whether significant differences, either positively or negatively, exist between the two sets of observations). For this

study, a one-tailed p value has been selected to determine statistical significance, which, as briefly presented in the introductory chapter, is set at a $\alpha = 0.05$ level. Microsoft Excel was chosen as the software to do all the statistical calculations.

As it can be seen from column 1 through 4 in Table 2, the mean values and standard deviations of each of the items for each participant were first calculated for both times, $t1$ and $t2$. Then, the mean difference and its standard deviation of the items for each participant in all four constructs were calculated, as it can be seen in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2. Finally, prior to conducting the paired t-test for means, the sum of the scores of each participant in all items composing each of the constructs was calculated for both times, $t1$ and $t2$. Then, a paired t-test for means (values) was conducted for each of the four constructs and each of the items composing those constructs. Results of the t-values are observed in column 7, whereas its significance (one-tailed p value) is highlighted in column 8.

8 Discussion of Results

First, as shown in Table 2, at a $\alpha = 0.05$ significance level, the construct related to "personal attitude toward the behavior," which measured the "degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question" (Ajzen 1991, p. 188), had on average, a positive, yet not significant, increase (mean difference = 0.3; p value = 0.077), noting that the mean value at $t1$ was 6.109, while at $t2$ was 6.409. This result is in line with the findings made by previous studies such as that of Souitaris et al. (2007), von Graevenitz et al. (2010), and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012) who also found no statistically significant differences between pretest and posttest mean values. As it has been already recognized that the experiment might be subject to self-selection bias issues, taking into account that people who voluntarily participated in the workshop might have already had a positive attitude toward entrepreneurship, as well as certain familiarity with business-related studies (in fact, through Aragon-Sanchez and Baixauli-Soler's (2014) adapted questionnaire, it was found that 55% of all participants indicated to be business-related studies). The reason why there was not a statistically significant increase in the mean value at $t2$ might be due to the fact that, although quite disperse (standard deviation = 1.184), participants, from the very beginning, prior to the beginning of the EEP, already scored relatively high in their personal attitudes toward the behavior (mean value = 6.109 at $t1$). This paradox has already been noted by Diaz-Garcia et al. (2015) who stated that students voluntarily taking part in EEPs, as was the case for this experiment, might already have positive attitudes toward entrepreneurship even before the beginning of the program, and as such, room for statistically significant increases would be reduced. In addition, results within this construct indicate, nevertheless, that the experiment caused some contradictory effects on participants' personal attitudes toward the behavior. For instance, participants had statistically significant increases in PA1 ("being an entrepreneur implies more advantages than disadvantages to me") (mean

Table 2 Paired *t*-test results

Measure	Mean value (t1)	SD	Mean value (t2)	SD	Mean diff. (t2 minus t1)	SD	t stat	p value (one-tail)
Personal attitude toward the behavior (5 items)	6.109	1.184	6.409	1.258	0.3	1.338	1.475	0.077
PA1. Being an entrepreneur implies more advantages than disadvantages to me	5.773	1.445	6.136	1.490	0.364	0.727	2.347	0.0144*
PA2. A career as entrepreneur is attractive for me	5.955	1.046	6.545	1.143	0.591	1.403	1.976	0.0307*
PA3. If I had the opportunity and resources, I'd like to start a small firm	6.636	0.727	6.591	1.333	−0.045	1.463	−0.146	0.4427
PA4. Being an entrepreneur would entail great satisfactions for me	6.545	0.858	6.318	1.323	−0.227	1.232	−0.866	0.1983
PA5. Among various options, I would rather be an entrepreneur	5.636	1.399	6.455	1.011	0.818	1.532	2.505	0.0103*
Subjective Norms (3 items) (if you decided to create a small firm, would people in your close environment approve of that decision?)	6.091	1.092	6.197	1.011	0.106	1.010	0.594	0.2796
SN1. Your close family	6.636	0.727	6.636	0.848	0.000	0.690	0	0.5
SN2. Your friends	5.955	1.253	6.182	0.958	0.227	1.307	0.815	0.2119
SN3. Your colleagues	5.682	1.041	5.773	1.066	0.091	0.971	0.439	0.3326
Perceived behavioral control (6 items)	4.561	1.361	5.674	1.066	1.144	1.255	5.387	<0.001*
PBC1. To start a small firm and keep it working would be easy for me	4.227	1.110	5.136	0.889	0.909	1.065	4.004	<0.001*
PBC2. I am prepared to start a viable small firm	4.591	1.221	5.818	1.053	1.227	1.152	4.997	<0.001*

Table 2 (continued)

Measure	Mean value (t1)	SD	Mean value (t2)	SD	Mean diff. (t2 minus t1)	SD	t stat	p value (one-tail)
PBC3. I can control the creation process of a new small firm	4.818	1.500	5.727	1.032	0.909	1.411	3.022	0.0033*
PBC4. I know the necessary practical details to start a small firm	4.364	1.465	5.773	1.066	1.409	1.297	5.096	<0.001*
PBC5. I know how to develop an entrepreneurial project	4.318	1.524	5.727	1.162	1.591	1.403	4.958	<0.001*
PBC6. If I tried to start a small firm, I would have a high probability of succeeding	5.045	1.253	5.864	1.125	0.818	1.097	3.498	0.0011*
Entrepreneurial Intentions (6 items)	5.947	0.731	6.417	0.601	0.470	0.646	3.412	0.0013*
EI1. I am ready to do anything to be an entrepreneur	5.227	1.478	5.591	1.652	0.364	1.136	1.502	0.0740
EI2. My professional goal is to become an entrepreneur	5.818	1.651	6.409	0.908	0.591	1.563	1.773	0.0454*
EI3. I will make every effort to start and run my own small firm	6.227	0.973	6.364	1.002	0.136	0.640	1.000	0.1644
EI4. I am determined to create a small firm in the future	6.182	0.958	6.818	0.395	0.636	0.953	3.131	0.0025*
EI5. I have very seriously thought of starting a small firm	6.136	1.207	6.636	0.581	0.500	0.964	2.434	0.0119*
EI6. I have the firm intention to start a small firm some day	6.091	1.377	6.682	0.646	0.591	1.333	2.079	0.0250*

Note: (*) statistically significant at $\alpha = 0.05$ level. $N = 22$ (matched questionnaires; responses in both $t1$ and $t2$). Degrees of Freedom (Df) = 21

difference $= 0.364$; p value $= 0.0144$), PA2 ("a career as entrepreneur is attractive to me") (mean difference $= 0.591$; p value $= 0.0307$), and PA5 ("among various options, I would rather be an entrepreneur") (mean difference $= 0.818$; p value $= 0.0103$); however, they scored lower, yet not significantly, in PA3 ("if I had the opportunity and resources, I'd like to start a small firm") (mean difference $= -0.045$; p value $= 0.4427$) and PA4 ("being an entrepreneur would entail great satisfactions for me") (mean difference $= -0.227$; p value $= 0.1983$). These effects, on the one hand, might be understood as the increased interest and understanding of participants about the advantages of being an entrepreneur, be it the independence, freedom, and economic return enjoyed by the entrepreneur, upon the completion of the EEP, measured through PA1, PA2, and PA5. On the other hand, the workshop might also have negatively contributed to participants' in-depth understanding of the initial and imperative struggle and need for financial resources suffered by entrepreneurs in the early stage of small firm creation, as measured through PA3 and PA4.[5] Piperopoulos (2012) argues that "entrepreneurship is inherently more risky and more demanding compared with working in an established business" (p. 463); thus, for certain participants, the workshop might have caused them to shift their attraction from entrepreneurship away to other employment options, for instance, working for someone else in an already established firm. It should be noted that, through Aragon-Sanchez and Baixauli-Soler's (2014) adapted questionnaire, it was found that the majority of participants have/had experience working for someone else.

The second construct, related to subjective norms, which measured participants' perception about what "reference people," that is, close relatives, friends, and colleagues, might think about their behavior also brought nonsignificant increases taking into account that the mean value captured at $t2$ was slightly higher (mean value $= 6.197$) than the one at $t1$ (mean value $= 6.091$), but it was not statistically significant (mean difference $= 0.106$; p value $= 0.2796$). This result is in line with the studies of von Graevenitz et al. (2010) and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012), which also found no statistically significant differences in terms of mean values after the completion of their studied EEP. However, it contradicts the findings made by Souitaris et al. (2007) who did find a statistically significant increase in participants' subjective norms after their participation in an EPP. Similar to the first construct, the non-statistically significant increase in participants' subjective norms or perception about what other people might think about their behavior might be due to the fact that they already scored relatively high at $t1$, an indication that suggests that they may already enjoy an entrepreneurship-friendly environment (Liñan and Chen 2009). This finding clearly reflects the context where the experiment was carried out, as they all indicated that they live in Pilar, Paraguay, where, as noted previously, the economy largely depends on small businesses (98%), with a huge number of entrepreneurs, be it in the formal or informal sector. Moreover, the existence of some

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[5]Contradictory results within a construct were also reported in the study made by Fayolle et al. (2006) and Krueger and Carsrud (1993).

entrepreneurs in participants' families (for instance, 60% indicated that their fathers have experience in entrepreneurship) might also be attributed to why they scored relatively high at $t1$, a situation also noted in the study of Fayolle and Gailly (2015). However, after a closer look at the results, interestingly, it was participants' perception about what their friends and colleagues would think about their behavior that, although not significantly, increased the most (mean differences of 0.227 and 0.091, respectively), while their close family did not increase at all (mean difference = 0.0). This might be due to the quite supportive and entrepreneurship-friendly environment created among them throughout the workshop, as they constantly motivated each other, shared their experience, and provided constructive feedback to improve their recently created startups. Finally, as noted by Iglesias-Sanchez et al. (2016), the non-statistically significant increase in the item related to participants' close family might be due to the fact that this item refers to the participants' perception about their relatives' opinions, although they were not direct beneficiaries of the EEP. Taking into account the short duration and intensity of the workshop and the limited communication the participants might have had with their relatives related to the workshop and their entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes, it is understandable why participants' perception on what those "reference people" might think would not even show a marginal increase. It is also, not surprisingly, due to the argued irrelevance of this construct in short-term studies that some scholars completely omitted it from their studies (Fayolle et al. 2006).

With regard to PBC, which asked participants their level of agreement to six statements related to their "perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior" (Ajzen 1991, p. 188), Table 2 indicates that, on average, participants showed statistically higher levels of perceived behavioral control at $t2$ (mean value = 5.674) than at $t1$ (mean value = 4.561) (mean difference = 1.144; p value = <0.001). When compared with previous studies, this result is similar to that of Harris et al. (2008), who found statistically significant differences in participants' "perceived personal control of business outcomes" upon completion of an EEP. However, this result contradicts the findings of Souitaris et al. (2007), Fayolle et al. (2006), and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012) who did not find any statistically significant difference between participants' mean values measured prior to and after completion of an EEP. These contradicting differences might be due to the type of EEP implemented for this study. For instance, the description of the experiment given by Souitaris et al. (2007) and Fayolle et al. (2006) suggested that the EEP that they studied was an "Education about Entrepreneurship" type of EEP, whereas the experiment carried out for this study was an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP, which, taking into account that it challenged participants to actually—in real life—create a startup, as well as to dedicate a particular amount of time to nurturing entrepreneurial soft skills, might have directly affected participants' perceived ability to not only start a small business but also to maintain it.

Finally, in relation to the Entrepreneurial Intentions construct, which through "pure-intentions" items (Liñan and Chen 2009, p. 600) interrogated participants about their intentionality toward the development of small firms, as shown in Table 2, there was also a statistically significant increase (mean value

difference = 0.470; p value = 0.0013) from a mean value of 5.947 at t1 to a mean value of 6.417 at t2. This result, on the one hand, is similar to those of Souitaris et al. (2007), Fayolle et al. (2006), Jones et al. (2008), and Sanchez (2011, 2013), who also found statistically significant differences between EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions measured prior to and after the completion of an EEP; however, on the other hand, it refutes the findings made by Chen et al. (2015) and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012) who did not find any statistically significant difference between the mean values of EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions collected before and after their studied EEP, as well as the findings made by Oosterbeek et al. (2010) who found a statistically significant decrease in EEP students' entrepreneurial intentions upon the completion of an EEP, and those of von Graevenitz et al. (2010) who concluded that the entrepreneurial intentions of EEP students "somewhat" decreased after their participation in an EEP. This latest group of scholars who found significant decreases or non-statistically significant differences in participants' entrepreneurial intentions has attributed their results to the learning process experienced by the students who, according to them, have a more realistic understanding of the challenges and difficulties faced by entrepreneurs when trying to start their own business (Oosterbeek et al. 2010; Gouveia Rodrigues et al. 2012) or that, throughout the EEP, they simply "understand they are not suitable to pursue an entrepreneurial career" (Chen et al. 2015, p. 558). Taking into account that, in the context of the experiment conducted for this study, students were challenged to create a startup and commercialize a product or service without formally doing a structured business plan or emphasizing legal procedure to formally register their business, as an "Education about Entrepreneurship" or "Education for Entrepreneurship" type of EEP would do, the conclusions made by these authors may not apply to the findings of this study due to the fact that, in this study, students have already experienced the creation of a startup, a process which at the same time could have positively affected their intention and motivation to follow an entrepreneurial path in the future. As previously noted, the emphasis on soft skills, such as negotiation, communication, teamwork, and opportunity recognition, among others, and the quite supporting and motivating environment created among EEP participants, which was incited through exercises that promoted even joint ventures and business opportunities outside of the classroom and upon completion of the EEP, are also claimed to have impact on participants' entrepreneurial intentions. Not surprisingly, within this construct, statement items such as "my professional goal is to become an entrepreneur" (EI2) (mean difference = 0.591; p value = 0.0454), "I am determined to create a small firm in the future" (EI4) (mean difference = 0.636; p value = 0.0025), "I have very seriously thought of starting a small firm" (EI5) (mean difference = 0.500; p value = 0.0119), and "I have the firm intention to start a small firm someday" (EI6) (mean difference = 0.591; p value = 0.0250) increased significantly upon the completion of the EEP. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although in this study, the entrepreneurial intentions of participants, on average, were statistically higher after the EEP, when taking a closer look at the remaining statement items composing this construct, some of them, although positive, did not increase significantly ("I am ready to do anything to be an entrepreneur" (EI1) (mean difference = 0.364; p value = 0.0740) and "I will

make every effort to start and run my own small firm" (EI3) (mean difference = 0.136; *p* value = 0.1644)), probably due to the fact that their intentions toward the creation of a startup are planned in the long run, and not immediately upon completion of the EEP, noting that, through Aragon-Sanchez and Baixauli-Soler's (2014) adapted questionnaire, it was found that they all were either high school or university students, who, besides having entrepreneurial plans in the long run, may also have, in parallel, other short-term aspirations that were most likely related to their specific fields of study.

In summary, the results of this study confirm that participants, after having completed an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP, which focused on small firms' creation, showed an increase, yet not significantly, in their personal attitude toward the entrepreneurial behavior and subjective norms, whereas they did show a statistically significant increase in their perceived behavioral control and entrepreneurial intentions toward the development of small businesses. As such, the alternative hypothesis, which is *EEP participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward the development of startups increase significantly after having completed an "Education through Entrepreneurship" type of EEP*, is partially accepted.

The results of this study lend credibility to the works of Souitaris et al. (2007), Fayolle et al. (2006), Harris et al. (2008), Jones et al. (2008), and Sanchez (2011, 2013), whereas it contradicts the findings of Oosterbeek et al. (2010), von Graevenitz et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2015), and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012). It belongs to the interesting "EEP evaluation" subfield of entrepreneurship education-related studies, as classified by Liñan and Fayolle (2015), which is still restricted in terms of numbers of empirically tested studies (Sanchez 2013; Byabashaija and Katono 2011; Pittaway and Cope 2007). Moreover, by testing a particular type of EEP, this study fills in the gap noted by Valerio et al. (2014) and Pittaway and Cope (2007) who contended that further research is needed based on particular types and characteristics of EEPs in order to observe which types of EEP effectively increase participants' entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes and by Byabashaija and Katono (2011), who claimed that further empirical evidence from developing countries is still needed. In fact, this study brings evidence from a developing country, in a rural context, a contextual setting that as of now has yet to be covered by sufficient empirically tested studies (Byabashaija and Katono 2011). Additionally, it supports Fayolle et al.'s (2006) methodological framework, which was developed in response to the methodological weakness in the EEP evaluation subfield noted by Lorz et al. (2013), Glaub and Frese (2011), and Rideout and Gray (2013), while testing a newly developed instrument in the field, that is, Liñan and Chen's (2009) Entrepreneurial Intentions Questionnaire (EIQ). In that same vein, it is related to the study of Fayolle et al. (2006) who have indicated that Ajzen's (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior can be used to measure the impact of EEPs, "even in small-scale experiments" (p. 715).

9 Policy Recommendations

The results obtained from the experiment carried out as part of this study have several implications. In fact, besides the formal procedures often needed to start a firm, as an "Education for Entrepreneurship" type of EEP would do, or regular business plan writing exercises, as most "Education about Entrepreneurship" types of EEPs generally adopt as key components, these results should be interpreted as a call for the implementation of "Education through Entrepreneurship" types of EEPs. In other words, program designers and administrators at governmental agencies, high school, and higher education institutions are called to implement EEPs with objectives, content, and teaching methods that should focus on learning-by-doing, practical, and factual experiences, for instance, by challenging students to not only write a business plan but also to create real-life startups and commercialize products and services. As observed in the experiment, these factors, besides participants' real-life interaction with actors outside of the classroom, were fundamental in nurturing not only participants' perceived behavioral control and entrepreneurial intentions but also certain soft skills and mindsets, regardless of whether they follow an entrepreneurial career or enter the labor market by working for someone else.

Moreover, taking into account the significant increase in participants' entrepreneurial intentions, and slight increase in participants' perception about what their friends and colleagues would think about their entrepreneurial projects, program designers should regard EEPs as avenues for mutually supportive and motivating environments for participants. In the same line, EEPs may be projected as networking spaces that should be strengthened in the long run, for instance, through follow-up group activities, which should be aimed at providing constant feedback and facilitating business and funding opportunities among former participants in an entrepreneurship-friendly circle.

Finally, joint programs between EEP-sponsoring governmental agencies and other stakeholders such in academia, businessmen, and investors are also encouraged, as they may provide constant and crucial updates on the market, link participants' entrepreneurial projects with the needs of the market, and serve as potential incubators for innovation and funding sources.

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Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory Education in Pakistan

Atif Ikram Butt

1 Introduction

In 2012, the Parliament of Pakistan passed the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act guaranteeing the right to free and compulsory education. The Act applies to all schools run by the Federal Government or those situated in the capital territory of Islamabad. The Act provides for free and compulsory education to all children from ages 5 to 16 years and defines "free education" as free of any education-related costs including expenditures on stationary, school bags, and transportation. The Act affirms the fundamental right of every child to free and compulsory education and further provides that "No child shall be liable to pay any kind of fees, charges, expenses, etc., which may prevent him or her from pursuing and completing the education". The Act includes, among others, provisions for disadvantaged children, special education, and monitoring of standards and even makes private schools responsible for providing free education to disadvantaged children from their neighbourhood up to 10% of the strength of a class. It has been more than 5 years since the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act was passed, and it still awaits implementation (Wazir 2017).

Even at the time it was passed, the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act received, at best, cautious and passive optimism among policy analysts. It was termed as a "little more than a metaphorical pat on the back for its catalysts", referring to parliamentarians and donor agencies that supported the Bill (Iqbal 2012). Nasir (2012) makes a similar assertion that a "cost-benefit analysis, which is now at the core of public policy formulation in developed countries, is seldom conducted with the result that even well-intentioned public policies finally do not produce the intended results", and he continues that "In their present condition, the penal provisions of the 'Right to Free and Compulsory Education Bill 2012' unanimously passed by the National Assembly to ensure free and compulsory education to all

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children within the age bracket of 5–16 years are also likely to flounder badly at the end of the day". The international development organisations, on the other hand, generally welcomed the passage of the Bill. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) hailed the passage of the Bill (Memon 2012). Similarly, the Child Rights Movement, a network of more than 100 organisations working for the rights of children, also welcomed the enactment of the Act (Abbasi 2012). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its 2012 report on the country's performance on fundamental rights and freedoms considered the legislation as a "positive development" (HRCP 2013, p. 179). The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), another specialised agency of the United Nations, writes in its 2012 annual report that it was due to its "policy dialogue for education reform, particularly via provincial parliamentary caucuses [that were] pivotal for the passage of the 'Right to Free and Compulsory Education' Bill" (UNICEF 2013a, p. 4). For the critics of the Bill, the question whether it will be implemented or implemented with any effectiveness becomes less important. Perhaps, the more meaningful quest is to understand why lawmakers enacted such a policy despite its obvious flaws. For the proponents too, there is solace in this quest to comprehend why a policy as fundamental as the one that ensures the basic right of education of every child took this long to be passed. This chapter employs *ideational* institutionalism, which gives supremacy to the role of *ideas* and draws attention to discursive practices and meaning creation in policymaking, to examine the passage of the 2012 Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act. Central to ideational institutionalism is the understanding that *ideas* are the blueprint of a dialectical relationship among policy agents in that they become their cognitive filters to interpret environmental signals and shape political problems, giving definition to political goals and strategies that are used as a currency to communicate about politics. Using the Ideational Framework of Public Policy presented in the introductory chapter, the policy decision to enact the 2012 Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act is studied to understand the interplay of a myriad of *ideas* that have cognitive, normative, and material characteristics and how the policy actors have used these to interpret and construct their situation in shaping their interests, preferences, and identities, either in the background or in the foreground of the policy debate.

2   The State of Education in Pakistan

In Pakistan, according to estimates from UNICEF and UNESCO, one-third of primary-school-age children (34.4%) from age 5 to 9 or around 6.5 million children are out of school. Another 2.7 million children from ages 10 to 12, which equates to 30.1% of all children in this age group, are also out of school (UNICEF 2013b, p. ix). This together equates to nearly 10 million children in the age group of 5- to 12-year-olds who are not attending any form of schooling. According to official statistics, only half (51%) of Pakistan's population has completed primary schooling (FBS 2013). Net enrolment rate, which is

children ages 5–9 years enrolled in primary schools divided by the number of children in the same age group, is only 57% (FBS 2013). Similarly, the net enrolment rate at the middle level among children aged 10–12 years is 22% (FBS 2013). In terms of educational facilities, government statistics show that only 40% of schools have electricity, less than 60% have drinking water and latrine facilities, and a little more than 60% have boundary walls (NEMIS 2013, pp. 45–47). According to a 2010 report by Transparency International, Pakistanis consider education the fourth most corrupt sector (Gilani 2013, p. 40). The report also highlights thousands of so-called ghost-schools and ghost-teachers that exist on the government's roster but "provide no services to students, although the teachers or administrators assigned to these schools continue to receive a salary" (Gilani 2013, p. 40). The National Education Policy of 2009, introduced before the subject of education was delegated to provincial governments of the federation under the 18th amendment of the Constitution, recognises that "education in Pakistan suffers from two key deficiencies: at all levels of education, access to educational opportunities remains low and the quality of education is weak" (MOE 2009, p. 13). Under overarching priorities for widening access and raising quality, the policy asks provinces and area governments to "affirm the goal of achieving universal and free primary education by 2015 and up to class 10 by 2025" (MOE 2009, p. 19). The policy, however, did not delve into an affirmative legislative measure whereby education is made "free and compulsory". Subsequent to the 18th constitutional amendment, the subject of education has been devolved to the provinces. On September 16, 2011, a National Education Conference was held in Islamabad and presided over by the then-Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani where a Joint Declaration on Education was issued stating "National Education Policy 2009, subject to such adaptations as are necessitated in view of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, shall continue to be a jointly owned national document" (Mujahid-Mukhtar 2011, p. 25). The 18th constitutional amendment also added Article 25A that states, "The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 5–16 years in such manner as may be determined by law", that eventually paved the way for federal legislation on "free and compulsory education" in 2012. The 18th amendment and ensuing Article 25A to the Constitution of Pakistan is discussed in more detail in the next section. However, it is important to note that even before Article 25A, the right to free and compulsory education was obligatory for the State of Pakistan as the country is signatory to various international covenants, declarations, and frameworks of action. At the time that the bill was signed into parliamentary law, the then-President Asif Ali Zardari also referred to such normative contents and said that it is a "historic day for the people of the country as the government has fulfilled the promise of protecting all fundamental rights after declaring education as the basic right of the citizens" (Khan 2012). He further said:

> Law would ensure that no child remains out of school hence realising the country's international commitments...(and) we will honour our international commitments and will achieve the targets set in Education for All and Millennium Development Goals. (Khan 2012)

Other government parliamentarians had expressed similar sentiments when the National Assembly had passed the bill. Shahnaz Wazir Ali, who was the Advisor to the Prime Minister, had said "the entire National Assembly should take pride in it because the law would ensure a bright future for children" (Ghumman 2012). Yasmeen Rehman, the government parliamentarian who had tabled the bill in the National Assembly as a private member bill while speaking to the House on the day that the bill was passed, said, "provision of a compulsory education was a fundamental right of every child and the bill would ensure better education for the children" (APP 2012). In its statement of objects and reasons, the bill refers to Article 25A of the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which provides for free education to all children of ages 5–16 as a fundamental right and designates its provision as a responsibility of the state. The ideational forces that shaped the process and eventual policy outcomes at the global level and within Pakistan have been at play for a long time.

3   The Ideational Forces Behind the Right to Free and Compulsory Education

The right to free and compulsory education first came onto the world stage out of the democratic movement of the early twentieth century and general cause of "right of the people" (Warde 1960). John Dewey, in particular, is credited with providing the theoretical basis for "education for all", and seeing all people as engaged in the educative process and in seeing children as individuals with rights and claims of their own (Dumbleton 1990, p. 17). In the context of Pakistan, however, its roots are connected to the country's colonial past. In Britain, the Compulsory Education Act was first passed in 1870, and by 1881 it had been established all over the country with enrolment having increased from less than half to nearly 100% (Besant 1917). In 1882, the British Raj established the first commission on education called Hunter Commission with an objective to assess the state of elementary education in the Indian empire. The Commission, in its recommendations, placed special emphasis on the need to make primary education universal, and for extending it to backward districts (Aggarwal 2002, p. 56). In 1883, the princely ruler of Baroda introduced compulsory education for boys in one of the districts and in 1906 extended to the rest of the state. Gopal Krishna Gokhale, who was President at the time of the Indian National Congress, presented a private bill on compulsory education to the Imperial Legislative Council, but it was rejected. The first law on compulsory education in British India, popularly known as the Patel Act, was eventually passed in 1917, and by 1921 every province had enacted similar legislation (Panagariya et al. 2014, p. 261). Soon after the independence, when the first National Education Conference was held in Karachi in 1947 to recognise the colonial education system, it upheld the principle of compulsory education and recommended that primary education be made free and compulsory till Class-VIII (Durrani 2013, p. 224). The notion of

free and compulsory education was retained in the constitutions of both India and Pakistan and was reflected in subsequent policies as a desirable goal.

At the global level, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights laid out the principle of free and compulsory education for the first time and demanded a policy response from member states. Pakistan was among the 48 countries that signed on to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the United Nations General Assembly's session held on December 10, 1948. Article 26 of the Declaration states, "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory". The declaration essentially became the bedrock for all subsequent policy and legislative measures for the provision of and in efforts for ensuring "free and compulsory education" across the world. Chapman (2007, p. 122) writes, "The right to education is one of the most affirmed economic, social and cultural rights". In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there are a number of other international instruments listed in Table 1 that recognise the right to education. It is important to note that Pakistan did not assent to most of the human rights treaties emanating from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights until the turn of the twenty-first century. Each of these has their own ideational trajectories, an analysis of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Pakistan was, however, among the pioneering countries that signed onto and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, which demanded State Parties to make primary education compulsory and available free to all in its very first Article.

In addition to its colonial heritage, these various international instruments on free and compulsory education became ideational forces of their own and started impacting how country-level policies and legislation on education were formed. Periodic reporting from member states plays an instrumental role in advancing particular legislative and policy agendas. Periodic reporting is an established mechanism through which the United Nations exercises its supervision of the implementation of international human rights treaties (Connor 2008, p. 513; Olowu 2010, p. 180). Drinan (2001) views periodic reporting mechanism of the United Nations as one of the strongest weapons in its human rights arsenal through which it names and shames those who refuse to adhere to international human rights standards. Drinan (2001, p. 94) argues that ultimately "this is the moral power which, more than laws or economic sanctions, will induce nations to follow the less travelled road that leads to democracy and equality". Periodic reporting procedure as a form of monitoring of the State's fulfilment of its international obligations has been questioned on its effectiveness and receives its fair share of criticism. However, at minimum it has the advantage of reminding public authorities of the deadlines and obligations that must be met (Chazournes 2007, p. 60). Humphrey (1976, p. 530) agrees and argues, "Periodic reporting is the implementation system with which the international community has had the longest, and probably the best, experience [among other tools]". Beitz (2009, p. 35) also argues in defence of the periodic reporting that such "treaty monitoring systems seek to influence the behaviour of states by requiring them to give public accounts of their conduct". In the case of Pakistan, the Human Rights Committee, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee

Table 1 International instruments on free and compulsory education and status of Pakistan

Instrument	Reference	Status
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948	Article 26: Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory	Voted in favour in 1948
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960	Article 4: The States Parties to this Convention undertake furthermore to formulate, develop and apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to national usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education and in particular: (a) To make primary education free and compulsory	Not ratified
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965	Article 5: States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: (v) The right to education and training	Signed and ratified in 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966	Article 13: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that, with a view to achieving the full realisation of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all	Signed in 2004 and ratified in 2008
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979	Article 10: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women	Ratified in 1996
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989	Article 1: States Parties recognise the right of the child to education and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: (a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all	Signed and ratified in 1990
ILO Convention 182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999	Article 7: (c) Ensure access to free basic education, and, wherever possible and appropriate, vocational training, for all children removed from the worst forms of child labour	Ratified in 2011

on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child all have conventional mechanisms and require periodic reporting on the implementation of provisions of these treaties.

In the build-up to the legislation on the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, a number of international treaties' instruments and national policies and plans of action highlighted the need for such legislative and policy actions. For instance, Pakistan submitted its third and fourth periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2009 wherein it stated that one of the measures needed to improve the quality of education was to make "primary education free and compulsory". Late in 2009, in its Concluding Observations, on the reports submitted by Pakistan, the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended setting up "clear implementation plans for achieving universal free primary education by 2015 by raising the age of compulsory education to the minimum age for admission to employment". The Concluding Observations also showed concern that not all provinces have a compulsory education law and where they exist they are often not properly enforced. Similarly, in its fourth periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2009, Pakistan boasts of Article 37 of the Constitution which calls for removing illiteracy and providing free and compulsory secondary education and a Compulsory School Attendance Bill introduced as a private member bill in 2008. The 20th periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also identifies Article 37 of the Constitution as well as to the National Education Plan as some of the steps taken by the Government towards improving the quality of education in the country. One of the three goals set under the National Plan of Action on Education for All was to ensure that "by 2015 all children with special emphasis on girls and children in difficult circumstances have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality". Under the National Plan of Action, the measures to be taken to achieve universal primary education for boys and girls were to be reinforced by legislation for compulsory primary education (MOE 2002, p. 94). The National Plan of Action is the outcome of the Dakar Framework for Action adopted by the World Education Forum in April 2000 in Senegal. One of the six goals set out under the framework is to ensure that "by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality". Under the Regional Framework for Action, the E-9 countries representing nine high-population countries, including Pakistan, set one of its goals to make "changes in legislation to extend basic education and include education for all in policy statements" (UNESCO 2000, p. 71). The National Education Policy for the years 1998 to 2010 also envisaged promulgation and enforcement of free and compulsory primary education act in a phased manner (MOE 2008, p. 54). At around the same time, another trigger came from the neighbouring India. In 2009, India enacted the Right to Free and Compulsory Education as an act of the Parliament making education compulsory for children between 6 and 14 years of age.

In 2002, as per the directives of the Supreme Court of India, the Indian Government made an 86th amendment to the constitution and inserted a new Article 21A. Article 21A provides for the right to education to every child in India between 6 and 14 years of age. Before 2002, the right to education in the Indian Constitution, much along the same lines as in Pakistan, was incorporated as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy, subject to economic resources, and unenforceable by courts (Ullah 2013, p. 332). The constitution making process and framing of the fundamental rights and freedoms both in India and Pakistan reflect their British heritage and are a mirror of the 1945 United Nations Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ullah 2013, p. 332). The first constitution of Pakistan, promulgated in 1956, stated in Article 28, Clause-B, as the Directive Principles of State Policy, not enforceable by law, "remove illiteracy, and provide free and compulsory primary education within the minimum possible period". In the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, the same was retained in Article 7 under the Principles of Policy as "illiteracy should be eliminated, and free and compulsory primary education should be provided for all, as soon as is practicable". In the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, which stands to date, the same principle was reflected in Article 37(b) as "the State shall remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education within a minimum possible period". So when in 2009, the Indian Government enacted the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, it had already made education a fundamental right in 2002, and with the comprehensive law, it provided statutory guidelines for its enforcement. For Pakistan, the opportunity came in 2008 when the coalition government at the time took on the task of reversing amendments made to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan under the military rules of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf through which the office of the president had amassed considerable powers. The 18th Amendment was enacted in 2010 and made more than 100 changes to the Constitution of Pakistan. In addition to limiting presidential powers, giving greater role to the parliament and the prime minister and clarifying composition, and appointments of senior judiciary, it also entailed devolution of power and greater autonomy to provinces. The 18th Amendment added the Article 25A in the chapter on the Fundamental Rights stipulating the responsibility of the State to "provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 5 to 16 years in such manner as may be determined by law". As a result of the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, several issues once dealt with at the federal level, including education, are now the prerogatives of the provinces. The reference to "may be determined by law" in Article 25A required provincial governments to formulate corresponding laws on the provision of free and compulsory education.

The Federal Government first took the initiative and enacted The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act in 2012, which was only applicable to the Islamabad Capital Territory and educational institutions that fall under its purview. The most recent report submitted by Pakistan to the Committee on the Rights of the Child refers to both Article 25A and the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act as being among the measures taken to ensure the rights of the children in Pakistan. In particular, the enactment of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act in

2012 coincided with the visit of the former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the capacity of the United Nations Special Envoy on Education to Pakistan in November to commemorate Malala Day. On November 10, he met the then-President Asif Ali Zardari and presented him a petition signed by over one million people in support of the cause of "education for all" and conveyed the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's aspirations to continue building "on the momentum of UN's Education First initiative and show that education is a right of everyone, and not a privilege for a few" (Web Desk 2012). The Center for Education and Consciousness (2013), a nongovernmental organisation working in Pakistan, which had spearheaded the One Million Signature campaign, gives credence to Gordon Brown's visit because the ratification of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2012 by the National Assembly for Islamabad Capital territory could become possible. It is important to underscore that as a British Prime Minister until 2010, Gordon Brown had made two visits to Pakistan in December 2008 and April 2009, respectively, and hosted his Pakistani counterparts at the 10 Downing Street in the months of May, August, and December in 2009. In April 2009, Gordon Brown gave a speech to the House of Commons in which he outlines his Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy whereby Britain's development assistance to Pakistan became their second largest worldwide, providing £665 million in assistance over the next 4 years with refocus on education spending (Shackle 2010). This assistance, among other initiatives, also launched two of the biggest ever advocacy campaigns [both in terms of duration and volume], namely, Zara Sochiye and Alif Ailaan, in the history of Pakistan aimed at bringing reforms in the education sector. By late 2012, enough momentum had been built through these various ideational forces, which eventually culminated with the passing of the legislation on the Right to Free and Compulsory Education (Table 2).

In the context of Pakistan, the ideational traces for the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, thus, goes further back than her existence and are found in the colonial past and British constitutional heritage. All three constitutions of 1956, 1962, and 1973 made the right to education as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy, while almost all education policies aspired to reach this goal in the foreseeable future. The forces, however, that continued demanding a legislative response came from the international human rights treaties under the United Nations and its various specialised agencies. The momentum started building up during the last decade of the twentieth century with Pakistan having signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The first Periodic Report by Pakistan in 1993 to the Committee on the Rights of the Child refers to a resolution passed by the Senate in its efforts to universalise children's education urging Government to "ensure compulsory and free education to all its citizens at the primary level" and that "The education departments of four provinces have been requested to initiate necessary steps/action for the implementation of the resolution". The third and fourth Periodic Reports, submitted together in 2009, stated as one of the achievements that although "national compulsory primary education law cannot be devised as this action is done at the provincial level," however, "three of the four provinces, Federally Administered Areas and the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) [all] have compulsory primary education laws". So much so, the 2008 Mid-Decade

Table 2 Timeline to the right to free and compulsory education act in Pakistan, in 2012

1947	Soon after independence, All-Pakistan Education Conference was held that made three basic recommendations including making elementary education free and compulsory (Khan 1997, p. 648)
1948	The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed with Article 26 explicitly declaring education as the right of everyone
1956	The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan made free and compulsory primary education as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy
1959	A National Commission on Education was established that aimed at making education compulsory for age group 6–11 within 10 years time (Khan 1997, p. 649)
1970	The first education policy was announced reaffirming the commitment "to the objective of universal elementary education" accepting it as a "basic principle of State Policy in the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962", and proposed ... compulsory, universal and free primary education as a target for 1980" (Bengali 1999, p. 6)
1972	Education Policy 1972–1980 was announced declaring "education will be made free and universal up to Class X for all children throughout the country" (Bengali 1999, p. 6)
1973	The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan retained free and compulsory primary education of the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy
1979	Education Policy 1979 was announced that set out the goal "to provide minimum acceptable level of functional literacy and fundamental education to all citizens of the country" (MOE 1992, p. 4)"
1985	The Literacy Ordinance was promulgated that for the first time made provision of passport, driving and arm licences and employment with the local body or in an establishment or institution under the control of Federal Government only to a literate person
1990	Signed and ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child, which categorically asks State to make primary education compulsory and available free to all. It is pertinent to note that at the time Pakistan had not signed other human rights treaties, namely International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1990	The World Conference on Education For All was held in Thailand, attended by Pakistani delegation, which issued a World Declaration on Education for All reaffirming the notion of education as a fundamental human right
1992	As per the goals set in the World Conference on Education for All, National Education Policy was introduced that set the objective of making the primary education compulsory and free to achieve universal enrolment in 10 years time
1994–2002	During this period, laws on compulsory education were passed in Punjab, NWFP [now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], Sindh and for the Islamabad Capital Territory, namely The Punjab Compulsory Primary Education Act, 1994; The NWFP Compulsory Primary Education Act, 1996; The Sindh Compulsory Primary Education Ordinance, 2001; The ICT Compulsory Primary Education Ordinance, 2002
1998	The National Education Policy 1998–2010 was launched which stated that primary education will be made compulsory through legislation and will effectively be implemented and recalled provisions made under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child that it is State's duty ensure that primary education is free and compulsory (Bengali 1999, p. 24)

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

2000	Ten year later as targets set in the World Conference on Education for All remained unachieved, World Education Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal and Pakistan signed to its goal for achieving Education for All by year 2015
2001	Education Sector Reforms program was initiated and National Plan of Action for Education for All was developed to realise Education for All goals by the year 2015
2009	In 2002, India had made education a fundamental right from a directive principle of state policy and in 2009 enacted The Right to Free and Compulsory Education as an act of the Parliament making education compulsory for children between 6 and 14 years
2010	The 18th Amendment was made to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, which included Article 25A that made responsibility of the State to provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 5–16 years
2012	On October 9, 2012 Malala Yousafzai was shot in an assassination attempt that sparked international outrage and brought the issue of education in general and specifically of girls education in Pakistan on the top of the policy agenda
2012	The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act was passed and received assent of the President and made into a law

Country Assessment Report on Education by Ministry of Education stated that there "are no legislative hindrances [left now] for children in access to education [as] all federating units have made primary education free and compulsory" (MOE 2008, p. 112). This report was published only 2 years before the 18th Amendment to the Constitution was made which provided that free and compulsory education as a fundamental right of citizens of Pakistan and one of the duties of the state.

Greenberg et al. introduce the concept of points of "last significant controversy" and "first significant controversy" to identify beginning and ending points in the policy process (Greenberg et al. 1973). The point of "last significant controversy" in the policy process is a stage after which substantial changes in the outcome are no longer realistic alternatives, at least for a time being, such as voting on a proposed legislative bill. The point of "first significant controversy," however, is more elusive, and its identification is relative on actors' perception of the instance that triggered the policy process in the first place. The first significant controversy could also be considered when the need for legislation is publically expressed for the first time, either in form of a legislative proposal, press statement, or similar instrument by a policymaker. The Article 25A thus marks the "first significant controversy" for the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012 recreating the need for such legislative interventions when previously they were reported to have sufficed. Interestingly, while the ideational roots for the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012 are the deepest, the time between the "first significant controversy" and the "last significant controversy" is of only 2 years. During these 2 years, the bilateral role of the British government is significant in the education sector with triggers coming in various forms and formats, both from inside Pakistan with the assassination attempt on Malala Yousafzai and from the outside with the Indian government having passed the national Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act. The main ideational force thus constituted of the international community, with the human rights treaties

serving as the bedrock, engaging though multilateral and bilateral means and shaping education sector policies and legislation in Pakistan.

At the time the bill was passed and made into law, the normative roots had become so strong that there was virtually no disagreement with the notion that education is a fundamental right and responsibility of the state to every child. It took Pakistan 65 years to cede to normative forces due to the near absence of the feasibility of such a decision. At the foreground of the policy debate, the momentum building through the normative forces culminated only when the material interests of passing the legislation outweighed the opposing forces.

4   The Underlying Ideational Dimensions

The underlying ideational dimensions of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012 have been studied by means of taking stock of the opinions and experiences of key policy actors involved in the legislative process. There is a general agreement among them that the insertion of Article 25A on the right to education, as a result of the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, is a cornerstone of the legislation on free and compulsory education. Ms. Yasmeen Rehman (personal communication, February 22, 2014), who was the member of the parliament from the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party and had tabled the bill, elucidates the same: "I believe the 25A was the main trigger". Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014), who was the Senior National Specialist with UNESCO and spearheaded technical backstopping during the legislative process, agrees: "This bill had two stages; the first was to have the Article 25A added into the Constitution". Ahmad Ali (personal communication, February 24, 2014), who is working as Research Fellow at the Institute of Social and Policy Studies, which was one of the think-tanks behind the legislation, also support this assertion: "The day the article [25A] got inserted into the Constitution, the debate also started. . .and. . .people started discussing education as their right".

However, the insertion of Article 25A into the Constitution was unexpected. There was no movement, visible or otherwise, or specific demand from any sections of society for such a commitment. Ahmed Ali (personal communication, February 24, 2014) calls it a "mystery" and explains:

> we have gone through the minutes of the meetings of the Constitutional Commission, we have looked at the applications filed to the Commission and its responses and when the Commission solicited inputs from the citizens and you will be surprised there was no such demand [for Article 25A]. . .if you compare this with the Right to Education Bill passed in India there was a huge crowd outside the legislature standing and demanding the right to education but in this particular case you will be surprised that not even a single vocal or a written demand was there.

Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) agrees: "The surprise for me [during legislative process] was to have the 25A inserted into the Constitution". Faisal Bari (personal communication, February 18, 2014), who is the Senior Advisor at the Open Society Foundation that promotes education, is of

the opinion that "25A is the least discussed provision of the 18th Amendment. Most of the discussion revolved around other bigger political issues, such as presidential power".

Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) believes that perhaps parliamentarians were not cognizant of the implications of Article 25A: "People perhaps let it made part of the Constitution thinking that it does not mean a lot and carry not much weight". The insertion of Article 25A into the Constitution through the 18th Amendment was mainly the result of efforts of one person—Senator SM Zafar. Ahmad Ali (personal communication, February 24, 2014) recalls, "Article 25A is the result of one person only—SM Zafar. The person who in fact introduced this in the 18th Constitutional Amendment and also the bill that eventually became a law at the Federal level was SM Zafar". Senator SM Zafar (personal communication, March 4, 2014) himself spoke of his involvement in Article 25A:

> From my party side, I moved an amendment on education. I was also at the time Chairman of the Standing Committee on Education, there was some debate that whether it can become a fundamental right, and I said that education is now the most basic thing one needs in life. So when I moved this amendment fortunately most of the members accepted it and the language was very clear.

Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) believes, "If people like SM Zafar were not there it would have become very difficult". The choice of Senator SM Zafar to champion the cause of education for civil society organisations in the policymaking corridors seems an obvious one. He has been Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, as well as the Chancellor of Hamdard University, and was at that time the Chairman of the Senate's Standing Committee on Education. More so, as Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) captures, SM Zafar's involvement made sense:

> Senators are easier to get hold of, they don't have their constituency to worry about. We involved Senator SM Zafar, a highly respected figure, and invited him to our discussions and he was the Chairman of the Senate's Standing Committee on Education at the time.

Senator SM Zafar (personal communication, March 4, 2014) himself agrees that his background in education made him interested in the legislation: "I otherwise was very interested; I have been the Chancellor of Hamdard University. So it is in my background and so we moved this bill". Senator SM Zafar (personal communication, March 4, 2014) recalls the time when he presented the bill in the Senate, and he could not pursue it further as his term ended:

> The bill was presented by me as a private member, from there it was referred to the Standing Committee on Education, and it brought it to the Senate and it took a long time. And by the time I was able to bring it back to the Senate my third term had ended. We had to find another private member to continue with it. So it took a long time there and so when it went to the National Assembly, somebody had to be selected there.

From the time that Article 25A was inserted into the Constitution to when the legislation was passed hardly took two years. Khalida Ahmad (personal communication, February 17, 2014), who was working as Education Officer at UNICEF and pressed for the legislation, believes, "The bill was passed hurriedly...international

community was looking at them and asking why aren't you [Government of Pakistan] doing your job". Even Yasmeen Rehman (personal communication, February 22, 2014), who is a former member of the National Assembly, member of the Pakistan Peoples Party, and had tabled the bill in Parliament, spoke of her surprise that in no time the bill was passed: "The surprise for me was that this bill was instantly passed and became legislation". She and others interviewed believe that the visit of Gordon Brown played a critical role in its passing. Ms. Khalida Ahmad (personal communication, February 17, 2014) opines:

> Gordon Brown visited in last November in 2012, and he met with ministers and the Prime Minister and asked that something needs to be done [for education] urgently, and one thing that could have been done immediately was passing the legislation.

Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014), who was the Education Advisor at the United Kingdom's Department for International Development in Pakistan, agrees that "There was high-level strategic dialogue with the UK in the last few months of the Gordon Brown and it would have been a nice thing to present internationally". Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) also supports this assertion:

> What had happened, the bill was sitting in the National Assembly and we feared that it would lapse. Gordon Brown was visiting Pakistan during that time and the Malala incident had also happened. These two incidents also provided impetus to passing of the legislation.

Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February 20, 2014), who is the Additional Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Education and Trainings, recalls, "This bill was enacted right before the second visit of Gordon Brown and during that time President [Asif Ali Zardari] was also scheduled to visit UNESCO's headquarter". Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) also believes that "Once the bill had reached the assembly. . . the bill was passed due to the visit of Gordon Brown".

However, the normative base that had been established over the past decades should not be discounted. Dr. Faisal Bari (personal communication, February 18, 2014) argues:

> Historically, there has been a conversation in Pakistan that primary education should be free and before the amendment it was part of our principles but stated not as a basic right. In provinces, however, there were laws on primary education but they were not implemented.

Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) believes:

> the impetus was also provided by the 1973 Constitution, its article 37b under Principles of Policy that contained that State remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education within minimum possible period.

The timing of the legislation was, nevertheless, primarily defined by a strategy of appeasement. Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) agrees that the legislation was the "result of influential politicians who wanted to signal to the international world that the federal government is serious about education". For Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) such gestures encourage international donors, i.e. Department for International Development, as it shows political

will "to justify a huge investment needed in Pakistan for the next 5 years". Mehnaz Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014), who is the Chief Executive Officer at the Children's Global Network, is of the opinion that similar activism in the region must have also had an impact on the legislation in Pakistan: "There is pressure on our governments to adhere to what is happening in the region and as per the global reality, and a similar act is also passed in India. We took the influence from our region". Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) further substantiates:

> The biggest example I had was from India in form of their Eighty-sixth Amendment passed in 2003, I used to show that to everyone on PowerPoint that this is the law passed in 2003 and their indicators have since improved so why cannot we do the same.

This was coupled with international instruments, i.e. conventions and treaties that also had a role to play in bringing this issue to the forefront of policymakers' agendas. Khalida Ahmad (personal communication, February 17, 2014) highlights the same: "It's very embarrassing for the Country and the parliamentarians too when reports come out . . . in respect to the status of education in Pakistan".

Insertion of Article 25A and the subsequent legislation is highly similar to the case of India. Yasmeen Rehman (personal communication, February 22, 2014) pointed to the same: "When ever we pass some legislation, some how or the other we always look towards our neighbours, especially India and Bangladesh, and we do keep an eye on their legislative businesses". Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) recalled how the Indian legislation was used to draft the bill in Pakistan: "We advertised it twice [for drafting the legislation], the first time we did not receive any quote and even the second time no one applied. We then took a lot of help from a similar act in India". Dr. Faisal Bari (personal communication, February 18, 2014) was also of the same opinion: "It is almost exactly the same that the Indian Constitution has, the only difference is that the change the age from 14 years to 16 years". The drafting of the legislation, thus, took a lot of references from similar legislative work in India and other countries of the region. Interestingly, the Ministry of Education was completely detached from both the insertion of Article 25A and subsequent legislation on free and compulsory education. Mehnaz Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014) claims, "even parliamentarians had not been involved. . .and the technical assistance came from UNESCO mainly". Sheikh Waqas Akram (personal communication, April 1, 2014), who was the Federal Minister of Education and Member of Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid at the time, confessed, "I came to know about this bill in 2012 when Yasmeen Rehman, who represented PPP, presented this bill as a Private Member. . .this should have been tabled by the government in the first place".

The Federal Minister and the Bureaucracy, in their statements, seemed unhappy with the legislation. Sheikh Waqas Akram (personal communication, April 1, 2014) believes, "It should have been the responsibility of the Ministry to do that. But it came through a private member". Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February 20, 2014) is of the opinion that "There was no thought behind how this bill is going to be implemented". Mehnaz Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014)

believes that it was merely a "tick mark that you have this legislation but its technical dimensions were not looked into". Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February 20, 2014) speaks of the legislation along similar lines:

> It is a dilemma of our country, we get very beautifully drafted rules and regulation but they are not implemented. They passed the legislation in a single day under pressure and did not pay much attention how it is going to be implemented.

With the legislation being applicable only in the Capital Territory, which has the best infrastructure, implementation of the law had been a difficult undertaking. Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) agrees:

> Compared to the big provinces obviously ICT is very small so they don't have that much to lose from a legislation. They have a semblance of an infrastructure and they are deputed in each area that are not difficult to reach and they can make a good start towards implementing it and probably they can also find the money.

Mehnaz Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014) thinks that if:

> Gordon Brown had come to Punjab and asked for such a law, they would have not done this. They know that their voter is very smart and if they pass such a law then the people will demand for services that they cannot provide. It could be the reason that they wanted to showcase this bill for his [Gordon Brown] visit.

Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) believes that it is "absolutely essential that some signal [of government's commitment] is given [to the international community] because of the scale of the problem". In Faisal Bari's (personal communication, February 18, 2014) opinion, at least activists like him "can go to the Supreme Court and claim that provision of education is the responsibility of the State and not being provided". Mehnaz Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014) thinks that now the bill has put the government "between the rock and the hard place because . . .now things have to be improved". If the bill faced any opposition, it mainly came from the bureaucracy. Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) elucidates the same: "Bureaucracy has such a mind-set that after looking at every proposed bill their first question is from where will the money come". SM Zafar (personal communication, March 4, 2014) agrees, "In case of education, the bureaucracy showed reluctance, they had put hurdles".

The Article 25A of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, inserted through the 18th Amendment in 2010, can be considered the main reference point for the 2012 Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act. The Review Committee tasked with drafting the 18th Amendment did not delve much into discussion on the then-proposed Article 25A, and it was added to the package mainly because of the initiative of Senator SM Zafar. Perhaps most significant is the last section of Article 25A, which left the determination of free and compulsory education to all children "as may be determined by law", comforted members of the Review Committee to not contest or debate otherwise. The main reason the 18th Amendment was enacted was to reverse amendments made to the Constitution under the military rules of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf, through which the office of the president had

amassed considerable powers. While subjects such as devolution of power and greater autonomy to provinces were hotly debated and contested, declaration of education as a fundamental right did not gain any limelight. Once Article 25A was made part of the Constitution, the civil society saw this as an opportunity to further the agenda of provision of free and compulsory education. Arshad Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) recalls being invited to the meeting of the Standing Committee by Senator SM Zafar, in which he briefed the members on the status of education and offered UNESCO's technical assistance through provision of legal experts for drafting law. In drafting and during the process of legislation, Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February 20, 2014) agrees, "UNESCO and UNICEF played a very crucial role and they were at the forefront". The legislation was mainly the result of international pressure and the expectations placed upon the government of Pakistan because of its international commitments. The role of Gordon Brown is crucial, whose visit to Pakistan as a UN special envoy for global education in the backdrop of the assassination attempt on Malala Yousafzai was the main catalyst which caused the legislation to be passed. In July 2012, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appointed Mr. Brown as UN Special Envoy for Global Education. In October 2012, a month before his scheduled visit to Pakistan, Mr. Brown had said, "I have asked Pakistan's President [Asif Ali] Zardari to pledge that Malala's suffering will not be in vain. In response, he has invited me to lead a delegation of education leaders to visit him in Pakistan in November to talk about how he can improve opportunities for children". His spokesperson further added that the aim of Mr. Brown's visit to Pakistan was to "to get governments, international non-governmental organisations and businesses to agree practical proposals to turn the promise of universal education into reality" and that "in recent talks, President Zardari has agreed that there should be a plan to get the five million Pakistani girls and boys presently not schooled into education" (BBC News 2012). The legislation was passed a month later in December 2012, and 2 months later President Zardari went on an official visit to the United Kingdom. The process had negligible involvement from the public, in the form of mediation of any interest groups in formulation of the policy agenda.

5 Concluding Thoughts

The preceding discussion shows that actors' orientation to policy issues, i.e. the right of children to free and compulsory education, is not a contextually given fact but constructed over many years and undeniably ideational. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent international conventions, treaties, and covenants have played a pivotal role. In the case of free and compulsory education, the ideational roots can be traced back to the country's colonial past and its constitutional history. This is in support of the assertion of "policy-as-discourse" theorists who see policies not being framed in response to existing conditions and problems, "but more as a discourse in which both problems and solutions are created"

(Goodwin 1996, p. 67). The discussion also shows that both the actors outside the formal legislative process and those tasked with legislation are strategic and rely upon multiple levels of criteria for making strategic policies. In the case of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012, in the lead-up to the legislation, the reporting requirements of a number of international treaties, instruments, national policies, and plans of actions highlighting the need for policy action had begun exerting considerable pressure on the government. This coincided with the visit of the former British Prime Minister in his capacity as a United Nations Special Envoy on Education, who was asked to specifically press upon the need for visible actions on part of Pakistan to show that education is a right of everyone and not a privilege for a few. The insertion of Article 25A further provided impetus to the international community, especially UNICEF and UNESCO, to demand that the state of Pakistan translate their constitutional obligations into actionable polices.

This analysis shows that the dominant ideational construct in public domain is based on the normative dimension but that the timing, which is defined the "last significant controversy", is based on the material dimension. The visit of Prime Minister Gordon Brown to Pakistan and the subsequent visits of President Asif Ali Zardari to the United Kingdom, together with the demand for visible action on the part of the government of Pakistan on universalisation of education and for release of funds, played a pivotal role. Also, this case highlights that both the problematisation of the policy and its prescription originated from and was defined by forces acting outside the legislature. UNESCO provided the technical assistance in drafting the legislation, and it was presented as a private member bill to the Senate. Importantly, the normative roots of these ideational constructs originated from outside Pakistan. In the case of the Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012, both the instrument, the piece of legislation, and the *idea* originated from outside the locale of actors engaged in this legislation. Not only was this legislation not widely discussed, but its implications were not fully considered either. As a result, the legislation still remains a law on paper without any implementation. The legislative process lacked both public participation and contestation in the phases of development and the formulation of the public policy agenda and was primarily the result of ideas in the background of the policy formulation.

One of the intentions of this contribution is to advance the scholarship in policy studies with an interest in ideas and discourse. The analysis presented herein advances the basic claim of ideational institutionalism, that it has the capacity to inform an endogenous account of complex institutional evolution, continuation, adaptation, and innovation.

In the case of the legislation to make education free and compulsory, not only the ideational process informs how institutions evolve and continue over time and how, in the context of Pakistan, adapted and innovated, if at all. Unlike the other three established schools of new institutionalism, this analysis confirms that actors involved in the policy process are oriented subjectively, through the ideation process to which they are exposed to and later expand it further, rather their desires, preferences, and motivations being contextually given facts. This analysis further confirms that actors in the policy process are strategic and that they rely on multiple

criteria for favouring certain strategies over others. The criteria, as per the proposed ideational framework, can be categorised into three levels, namely, material, normative, and cognitive. This analysis shows that ideas at the normative level are used in the foreground of policy formulation for justification of proposed policy prescriptions. Also, ideas at the cognitive level are used in the foreground of policy formulation and are essentially policy prescriptions from subject experts outside the policymaking realm to help policymakers in taking specific courses of policy actions. The material dimension, interestingly, appears more forcefully at the moment of "last significant controversy", essentially meaning when a particular piece of legislation has to be passed and, as expected, is in the background of policy formulation in the form of self-interested ideas. In contrast to the three established new institutionalisms, agents in ideational understanding are sentient beings who do not just operate or adapt to existing institutions, but who can also create and maintain new institutions through their ideational abilities. While this goes beyond the scope of the existing writings, it is contended that if an ideational institution is such where, for instance, free and compulsory education is seen as a right of every child, it could only be changed if a new set of ideational constructs were created not only refuting this existing premise but also establishing new ones, i.e. education is essentially a service that needs to be procured like any other service available on the market.

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