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## **II. List of Terms and Acronyms**

Enosis – Movement of Greek Cypriots for union with Greece

EOKA – National Organization of Cyprus

EOKA-B – Ultra right-wing nationalistic para militia pro-union organization

EU – European Union

GC – Greek Cypriots

Greek junta – right-wing military dictatorship in Greece from 1967-1974

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

RoC – Republic of Cyprus

Taksim – Movement of Turkish Cypriots for partition

TC – Turkish Cypriots

TMT – Turkish Resistance Organization

TRNC – Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNSG – United Nations Secretary-General

UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

## 1. Introduction

A divided capital in the 21<sup>st</sup> century within Europe is almost unimaginable, but it is the reality in Cyprus. Moreover, the Cyprus dispute is undoubtedly one of the longest-lasting inter-communal conflicts within Europe and has experienced multiple phases. Over the years, various scholars have endeavored to explain why negotiation attempts keep failing. Therefore, the Cyprus dispute has become a prominent example of an intransigent international conflict (Constantinos, 2014: 5). To exemplify this multiphase and broad topic, one specific saying can be used:

*"Three men are sentenced to death in a faraway country: an English-man, a Frenchman and a Cypriot. On the day of their execution they are asked to name their last wish. The Englishman asks for a cigar; the Frenchman for a glass of wine. The Cypriot asks to be granted a last opportunity to talk to the execution squad about the Cyprus Problem. On hearing this, the Frenchman and the Englishman change their last wish and beg to be shot before the Cypriot starts talking"* (Constantinos, 2014: 65)

The current phase of the conflict has been stagnant since the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of the island (Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz, 2006: 3). Despite multiple attempts of the United Nations (UN) and high-ranking diplomats to find a solution, the island, and its people remain divided. Therefore, the conflict is referred to as the "Graveyard of Diplomats" (Amiel, 2021).

National identity has played a significant role in developing maximalist propositions within the conflict. While in the academic discourse, the national identity of Cyprus is often discussed, factors of its formation are not. The argument presented in this thesis intends to show that geographical circumstances and the historical memory regarding the events since the Turkish invasion of 1974 have contributed significantly to the Greek Cypriot (GC) and Turkish Cypriot (TC) national identity formation.

### 1.1. The Phase of the Cyprus Conflict

A specific period must be defined in order to answer any question regarding the Cyprus conflict correctly. There are three main phases in which the Cyprus dispute can be defined.

During the 1950s, the dispute focused on the GC anti-colonial and *enosis* movement. The GC community hoped to separate from the British Empire and unify the island with Greece. In the 1960s, the conflict developed into violent inter-communal fights between the two ethnic groups on the island, the GC and TC communities. Following the far-right Greek

junta-instigated coup of the GC president in 1974, the Turkish military intervened and occupied 37% of the island. With the illegal Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the problem has developed into an international issue (Mallinson, 2011: 22-33). This Thesis will mainly focus on the events of the third phase.

### 1.2. Literature Review

As the Cyprus conflict remains one of the most protracted conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, the work of academics regarding the dispute is extensive. Especially the literature about the current phase of the dispute is numerous.

The book of James Ker-Lindsay (2011) gives a comprehensive overview of the problem and provides the reader with extensive knowledge of the present situation. The author focuses on the Turkish invasion and the attempts of the international community to resolve the issues. Hannay (2007), who served as a British Diplomat in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) from 1996 to 2003, mainly writes about the time of his diplomatic employment in Cyprus. However, he also gives an overview of the historical background from the 1960s onwards. Unlike the other works, Fisher (2001) mainly focuses on the revival of failed negotiation attempts and is used to provide insights into the peace talks.

For the theoretical part, Korostelina's book "Social Identity and Conflict" serves to approach the definition of social and national identities. Thereby, her work also covers the crucial elements of identities. To get a detailed understanding of the process of national identity formation and support the argument of the Thesis, Smith's five national identity shaping factors are employed.

### 1.3. Purpose, Methodology, and Limits of the Thesis

As the Cyprus problem can be identified as an identity-based conflict, this Thesis intends to evaluate central factors of the identity formation in the Cyprus conflict. Specifically, the chapter presents findings of a thematic qualitative media analysis aiming to answer how the geographical circumstances and historical memory have contributed to the national identity formation since 1974. Based upon these findings, the work tries to define central aspects of the GC and TC national identity.

This Thesis considerably relies on primary qualitative data. Based on the collected letters, the work outlines the framework of the analysis: the cause of identity formation in the Cyprus dispute.

Due to the breadth and depth of the topic, this Thesis occurs with some limitations that need to be acknowledged. Only two of the five factors of national identity formation, as Smith has defined them, could be investigated due to the limited word count. Furthermore, this paper focuses on the national identity, which is represented and shared amongst the high officials of each ethnic community. Within the GC and TC communities, different interpretations of national identity can be seen that are not as much based on Hellenic- and Turko-centric views (Psaltis and Cakal, 2016: 232). Therefore, the examined national identities expressed by the two sides rely on traditional identity perceptions, which are strongly reinforced by their officials' statements and rely on the strong connection to Greek- and Turkishness.

#### 1.4. Outline of the Thesis

This Thesis is divided into three main parts. In the first section, the history of the Cyprus dispute is investigated. It includes an in-depth explanation of how the dispute evolved over the years and provides an overview of the multiple negotiation attempts. Furthermore, an analysis of the current situation is given.

The second part focuses on the theoretical concepts of identity. Firstly, the theoretical framework of identity-based conflicts is explained. Afterwards, the Thesis gives an overview of social and national identity as well as the division of in- and outgroups. Finally, the five factors of national identity formation are defined.

The main points of the first chapter and the second chapter are combined in the methodological part. Thereby, the problem description and the theoretical framework are highlighted with the help of an analysis of primary data. Consequently, presenting how geographical aspects and historical memories have contributed to the national identity formation.

## 2. The Cyprus Problem

To understand the formation of the two narratives and their position in the conflict, a historical overview is necessary. Therefore, the following subchapters outline the events that led to the formation of the two Cypriot communities. Furthermore, this part of the Bachelor Thesis sheds light on the failed negotiations during the almost 60 years of division on the island.

The island is home to the GC and TC. The GC thereby accounted for about 78% of the Cypriot inhabitants during the island's division. The first Greek settlers are believed to have traveled from the Achaean and Mycennanean and arrived during the middle bronze ages (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 2).

At the time of the island's partition, the TC community amounted to about 18% of the total residents. Compared to the GC, this community has relatively recent roots. The first TC members arrived following the Ottoman conquest in 1571. From then on, many more Turkish settlers reached the island. These numbers expanded as GC converted to Islam to profit from the social and financial benefits that did not apply to Christians. They were more heavily taxed or changed their faith to escape persecution (*ibid*: 5-6). The term "Linovamvaki" is used for GC Christians who visibly identified as Muslims but kept their Christian faith in secret. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, they were forced to join the TC community (Mikropoulos, 2008: 92-94).

### 2.1. Historical Background

As Cyprus has always been the subject of outside powers, Cypriots developed the sentiment of not being the decision-maker of their destiny and that their faith will be determined by forces outside the island (Hannay, 2004: 1).

After 300 years of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, the island was annexed by the British Empire. Both Empires agreed after the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78 on the British administration of the island. In return, Britain assured the Ottoman Empire to help prevent further Russian attacks on their eastern areas. During World War I, the British Empire formally annexed the island since both parties supported different allies. As a result, Britain did not see itself obligated to the agreement with the Ottoman Empire. On March 10<sup>th</sup> 1925 Cyprus was officially declared a Crown Colony (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 14-17).

The aspiration of the Greek Cypriot community for unification with Greece, called enosis, arose when the British administration started. Enosis was part of Megali – an idea "to

unify all Greeks living under the Ottoman rule and reconstruct Byzantium based in Constantinople" (ibid: 15).

After World War II and the continuous rejection of the British Empire for enosis, the Greek Cypriot community felt increasingly confident in governing themselves and obtaining freedom. In the 1950s, in a referendum held by the Cypriot Church, 96% of the GC community voted for enosis (ibid: 17). Despite the clear vote, Britain decided not to recognize the referendum. Thus, GC were left feeling that violent means were necessary to realize enosis and formed the *National Organization of Cypriot Fighters* (EOKA). Different from other anticolonial militia groups, EOKA did not demand independence. As the EOKA has declared in a Turkish-language pamphlet, they did not see the TC as enemies. The group understood the British colonial administration as their opponent. However, the TC opposed EOKA and favored the British authorities. Many of the former GC police officers were replaced by Turkish Cypriots, leading to further mistrust against the British colonial power and intensifying division between the two communities. Furthermore, the UK strengthened its military units and introduced harsh punishments for suspected EOKA members. While the archbishop persisted on enosis, the British Empire insisted on staying on the island for strategic reasons and the sake of their diplomatic relationship with Turkey. With the growth of the EOKA, TC formed a countermovement whose goal was the partition into a Greek and Turkish part. This proposition is known as *taksim*. With the support of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot counter organization *Volcano* was renamed to the *Turkish Resistance movement* (TMT). As the EOKA continued its violent actions on the island, the British administration decided to involve the motherlands, Greece and Turkey, in 1955. The three parties met to negotiate peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, Britain acknowledged that the issue was not purely internally (ibid: 20-23).

Both motherlands ultimately did not want to be involved in further aggressions in Cyprus and thus imposed an independence settlement. In 1960 - with the Zurich-London - agreement, the United Kingdom (UK), Greece, Turkey, and the leaders of both ethnic communities conceded the independence of a new state, the Republic of Cyprus (Adams, 1966: 475).

Since the newly founded nation had to ensure the power balance of both ethnic communities, the constitution was of complex structure. To illustrate, the GC president and

the TC vice president, elected by the two communities, had substantial veto rights over bills or proposals (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 26).

However, the constitution failed after only three years. This was the result of the Turkish rejection of a thirteen-point amendment issued by the GC president and archbishop Makarios in the same year. These proposed amendments undermined the TC political saying immensely. The Turkish decision to reject the 13 points fueled even more tensions between the two communities, and inter-communal violence broke out (*ibid*: 34).

Reacting to these developments, the UN started its mission United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), to deescalate the conflict as they established and guarded the buffer zone. (Hannay, 2004: 5).

### 2.1.1. Three Treaties Limiting Cyprus' Sovereignty

Three international treaties were passed to limit and restrain Cyprus' sovereignty (Hannay, 2004: 3).

Firstly, the *Treaty of Guarantee* was supposed to ensure that Cyprus would not be unified with any other state. As guarantor power, Greece, Turkey, and the UK had the duty to maintain the territory and constitutional order of the island. They had permission as guarantor powers to intervene unilaterally to restore the status quo ante.

Due to the *Treaty of Alliance*, a small number of Turkish and Greek military groups were allowed on the island.

Lastly, the *Treaty of Establishment* permitted the UK sovereignty to operate two military bases on 99 mi<sup>2</sup> of the island (*ibid*: 4).

### 2.1.2. Invasion and Partition

In July 1974, the Greek right-wing militia group *EOKA-B* started a military coup encouraged by the Greek regime and overthrew GC president Makarios. With the newly established president Sampson, enosis was closer than ever, and the TC and Turks were certain that the unification with Greece would be imminent. As a result, the Turkish government invaded Cyprus and occupied about one-third of the island (Hannay, 2004: 6, Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 43-44). The partition by the Greenline in the northern and southern parts still exists today. Both communities were devastated by the invasion as many fled their homes, leaving approximately 400.000 internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2021: 2). The occupation of about 37% of the island left thousands homeless, wounded, or dead (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 47).

On November 15<sup>th</sup> 1983 the Turkish administration officially declared its independence in the northern part under the name of the *Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus* (TRNC). The declaration can be attributed to Greece's withdrawal from bilateral talks and their submission of the Cypriot question to the General Assembly of the UN in which Turkish Cypriots and Turks were antagonized (Potapkina, 2020: 64). The TRNC is only recognized by Turkey and is consequently isolated from the world, which leads to a further dependency of Turkish Cypriots from Turkey (Hannay, 2004: 8).

## 2.2. Current Phase

Even after 48 years, the island remains divided. However, the implemented travel restrictions were lifted in 2003, and several crossing points opened (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 61-62).

In 2004 the RoC joined the European Union (EU), but the EU laws and restrictions only apply in the south until the Cyprus problem is solved (Psaltis and Cakal, 2016: 230). However, some TC own a passport of the RoC and, therefore, enjoy some EU membership benefits (Andreou, 2021).

Furthermore, in recent years Turkey's direct influence has become increasingly assertive. With the presidential election of Ersin Tatar, a pro-Turkey right-wing nationalist politician, the positions of the TRNC administration regarding a settlement shifted. Since the beginning of the negotiations, both communities agreed to a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Yet nowadays, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the TRNC President Ersin Tatar both favor a "two-state solution" reinforcing two divided territories (Fella and Curtis, 2022: 23).

## 2.3. Negotiation Attempts

Since 1974, there have been numerous negotiation attempts under UN auspices. In 1977 the leaders of the two communities signed a High-Level-Agreement laying the groundwork for the following peace talks. The two communities agreed to form "an independent, bizonal, bicommunal federation with a central government which would have such reinforced powers to ensure the unity of the country" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Another High-Level-Agreement passed in 1979. Both sides emphasized respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Cypriot citizens. Furthermore, it also addressed the island's demilitarization, independence, and territorial integrity of the RoC. Furthermore, the agreement discussed the return of Greek Cypriots to Varosha (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

In 1984 about one year after the unilateral declaration of independence by the TRNC, UN Secretary-General (UNSG) de Cuéllar invited both sides to a meeting where he presented them with an agreement draft. After all, significant concerns and details were discussed through working groups, de Cuéllar initiated another conference in January 1985. The Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash accepted the agreement. However, Cypriot president Kyprianou rejected the document since the possibility of renegotiations was denied (*ibid*: 315).

After a period of stagnation, both parties reconfirmed the two High-Level-Agreements of 1977 and 1979 in 1988. Both sides created a new onset and drafted their main issues. The UN used these papers to write yet another agreement outline. In early 1990 a high-level meeting was called in New York. But despite all endeavors, no progress was possible. Perez de Cuéllar held the TRNC and their desire for greater recognition accountable (*ibid*: 316).

The new UNSG Boutros-Ghali advanced the set of ideas of 1988-1990 in 1992. He included the idea of “two federated states with identical powers to safeguard the cultural identity and ensure political equality of each community” (*ibid*: 316). While the Greek Cypriots accepted the proposal, Turkish Cypriots refused it on the claim that under the federation, two sovereign states should remain. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots opposed the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) and territorial adjustment (*ibid*: 316).

Another round of talks was instigated in 1997 by UNSG Kofi Annan with the support of the United States (US) and the UK. Initially, the discussions focused on ideas for a comprehensive solution acceptable for both sides. When it became apparent that the EU decided to start accession negotiations with the southern part, Turkish Cypriots heavily opposed this decision, and the talks ended without further action (*ibid*: 317).

From 1999-2004 the most promising talks for Cyprus’ reunification took place. UNSG Annan aimed for a united Cyprus to join the EU. In November 2002, both sides were presented with a detailed plan for a widespread settlement. After two revised versions of the plan, the UNSG invited RoC president Papadopoulos and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktas to talks. On April 24<sup>th</sup> 2004 separate, simultaneous referendums decided on the finalized text – known as *Annan Plan*. While 64,9% of the Turkish-Cypriots voted in favor of the plan, 75,8% of the Greek Cypriots rejected it. The Greek Cypriots justified their rejection of the plan with security doubts regarding the number of Turkish troops. They also expressed concerns about the territorial adjustments of the two parts of Cyprus and the return of IDP to their property (Fella and Curtis, 2022: 10-11).

In 2008 – after the Annan Plan failed – two Joint Declarations were issued. Both leaders agreed once again on a bicommunal and bizonal federation where both parties would have equal rights. Furthermore, the two acknowledged the single citizenship and sovereignty (Napolitano, 2011: 3).

Promising talks started in 2017 under UNSG Antonio Guterres. However, after just ten days, the negotiations were discontinued due to security differences and the difficult matter of how property is given back to the original owners who had to flee after the Turkish invasion (Fella and Curtis, 2022: 12).

Following yet another round of failed negotiations in 2017, the two leaders of the communities did not meet for the subsequent four years. In April 2021, the decision makers of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the three guarantor powers assembled in Geneva informally. Yet, after three days of deliberations, the parties could not reach a sufficient mutual understanding to resume formal talks (*ibid*: 25).

### 3. Identity Formation

Even though both the GC and TC community emphasize their will to find a settlement in the Cyprus dispute, no agreement could yet be reached. After innumerable talks and negotiations, both parties never agreed on enough mutual grounds to reconcile their differences. Therefore, both ethnic communities still live divided on the island. One reason for the constant disagreement is the national identity shaping that has taken place in the Cyprus dispute. The antagonism between the two national identities hinders the overcoming of their differences (Fisher, 2001: 321-322).

As previously stated, the southern part is shaped by the GC identity that wishes for a bi-communal solution. In contrast, the northern part consists of the TC identity that asks for a two-state solution (Fella and Curtis, 2022: 21).

Because the Cyprus dispute can be recognized as an identity-based conflict (Fisher, 2001: 322), this chapter defines the crucial concepts regarding identity-based conflicts and identity formation.

#### 3.1. Identity-Based Conflict

When Rothman first coined the term *identity-based conflict*, he contributed to the works of other theorists who researched conflicts.

Azar's *protracted social conflict* describes opposed and inter-communal encounters created on "deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds and which persist over

long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence" (Fisher, 2001: 308). Furthermore, Azar elaborates that in multiethnic societies, through certain historical events, the domination of one group over the other can be created because of systemic inequalities and unparallel access to political power. Consequently, an increase in discrimination, victimization and the enculturation of inter-communal hostility can be seen in these kinds of conflicts (ibid: 308).

Burton uses the term *deep-rooted conflict* to explain the inequalities between communities or nations. In these situations, the need for identity and participation is not met. Moreover, he suggests that communities seek their needs at all costs, only maintaining valued relationships. Those relationships need to include "consistency, security recognition and distributive justice" (ibid: 308).

Rothman adds to the two theorists by differentiating identity-based conflicts from interest- and resource-based conflicts. Thereby, resource-based aspects are presented in the identity-based conflict but not every resource-based conflict has identity elements. In comparison, identity-based conflicts are far more complex than interest and resource-based conflicts because the outcome of these conflicts is limited to the contested resources (ibid: 308).

To further examine identity-based conflicts, the following defines the terms of social and national identity, as well as the formation of national identity.

### 3.2. Social Identity

Contrary to the assumption that identity is an organizing factor for individuals, it is the individual that shapes and creates the identity (Bush and Keyman, 1997: 315). Through the social construct of identity, people develop a sense of belonging to a group and find refuge from mutual hostility. This feeling of community can be described as a result of the border formation in which the partition between an in- and outgroup is developed (Korostelina, 2007: 15).

Furthermore, social identity serves as a safe haven in the high individualization of the globalized world. It builds a bridge between one's mentality and a large social group's actions (ibid: 17).

Consequently, when identities are being researched, they have to be put in the context of history and the interactions with other groups as these two factors are essential to the formation and reinterpretation of them (Bush and Keyman, 1997: 326). Therefore, identities can change over time. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, such an identity change was seen in Cyprus as GC

converted to Islam during the Ottoman Empire and were now identified as TC (Mikropoulos, 2008: 92-94).

### 3.3. In- and Outgroups of Social Identities

As previously described, the formation of borders regarding other groups and the intergroup comparison are connected to the construction of social identities. The goal is to create ingroup favoring and ethnocentrism (Hogg, 2016: 7). Consequently, as individuals develop a solid connection to their identity and membership, they feel profound differences from other social groups (*ibid*: 8).

A strong differentiation between the insider and outsider groups can be seen especially in ethnic identities, as they consist of two interrelated factors. Firstly, the members understand themselves as a group unique from other societies. Correspondingly, the second component includes an outgroup which intensifies the feeling of community in the ingroup (Bush and Keyman, 1997: 319).

Opposed to the assumption that intergroup hostility develops through conflicts, the theory has shown that antagonism is the reason for conflict. This results mainly from the threat risk perception, which is a rather personal judgment (Richard D. Ashmore, 2001: 28). Furthermore, while certain behaviors of the ingroup are seen as “trustworthy, peaceful, moral, loyal and reliable” (*ibid*:30), when the outgroup performs the same actions, they are interpreted as “clannishness” and possible danger for the ingroup (*ibid*: 30).

Both phenomena can be observed in the Cyprus conflict. When the EOKA was formed, its enemy was the British Empire. However, the TC were worried about their status on the island if enosis would succeed and sided with the British – much to the dismay of the GC. With the formation of the TC countermovement TMT, the mistrust between the groups increased, leading to inter-communal violence. While both groups formed a militia group supposedly for their security, they perceived the other militia group as a threat (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 21).

### 3.4. National Identities

National identities are seen as an element of social and collective identities that serves to integrate people into a national society (Korostelina, 2007: 182).

Thereby, the concepts of national and cultural identity need to be differentiated. While cultural identities are built on a loose social community, national identities involve the political self-determination of a nation. A political community also presupposes mutual state institutions and rules defining the rights and duties of its members. Moreover, the political

community is located in a limited and distinct region, where the members experience a feeling of belonging and identification (Smith, 1991: 8-9).

The phenomenon of national identity includes the feelings of devotion and solidarity to a nation and its members by which the actual resemblance between the individuals is not of concern. Anderson's book "imagined communities" further mentions this need for community, which argues that national identities are a sociocognitive concept (Korostelina, 2007: 182). In the author's line of argumentation, he notes that even in the smallest nation, it is unfeasible to know or meet most fellow members. Yet, they understand each other as a close community (Anderson, 1991: 6). The connection between the members of a nation is, therefore, an envisioned cooperation that can develop as intense as sacrificing one's life for the country (Korostelina, 2007: 182). The will for self-sacrifice has its roots in the desire for validation. The qualities and attributes of the nation and its members within national identities are described and viewed as superior. Thereby, the state sets itself apart from "external foreigners". "Internal foreigners" are either forced to incorporate or rejected from the nation (Marschelke, 2021: 5).

In conclusion, national identity is a shifting and dynamic phenomenon. Resting upon the subjective concept that a community with common characteristics is led to believe they are ancestrally related (Guibernau, 2004: 134).

### 3.5. Features of National Identities

The scholar Smith defines five fundamental features of the national identity formation model. These include:

- "(1) a collective proper name,
- (2) myths and memories of communal history
- (3) a common public culture
- (4) common laws and customs
- (5) a historic territory or homeland " (Smith, 2002: 17)

#### 3.5.1. Name and Self-definition

A collective name symbolizes the uniqueness of the national ideology. Even before the period of nationalism, a suitable name has shown the nation's concept and the people's ethnicity. The formation of national identity relies heavily on names and identifying the culturally distinct population. Through the naming process, members of a community, as well as outsiders, connect specific attributes and unique feelings with a particular collective group.

If the collective name and self-defining language are absent, there is likely a lack of mutual ethnicity or nationhood (Smith, 2002: 18).

### 3.5.2. Myths and Historical Memory

The individuality of nations lies in their cultural heritage, especially in their myths, memories, and traditions (Smith, 2002: 18). The existence of a nation is constructed during the “process of understanding the nation’s history, its current position and possible and desired prospects” (Gusevskaya and Plotnikova, 2020: 1028). Therefore, the government utilizes the influence of historical memory to create a positive image of the nation and its prominent political figures (*ibid*: 1028).

The historical narrative is usually enriched by the heroic attributes the nation aims to emphasize and remember. At the same time, parts of history contrary to the aspired perception are forgotten (Marschelke, 2021: 5). The selective use of history causes the creation of a specific image of the nation and, additionally, creates a negative impression of other countries or political opponents (Gusevskaya and Plotnikova, 2020: 1028). Therefore, collective memory is filled with transcendental moments describing the nation's superior features. Consequently, the self-esteem of the nation's members is increased since they develop a feeling of belonging to a community that indicates the existence of great abilities and the capability of overcoming significant obstacles (Guibernau, 2004: 137).

The historical memory is even more intensified through celebrations around symbolic events and ideas. As the historical events are understood through this narrative, the individual and the community can develop a hatred of the past, rejection of the present, or fear of the future. These narratives are passed on to the people through the educational system. It includes teaching in schools and considers museums a valuable tool to communicate historical memory. Furthermore, the mobilization of remembrance about a specific event, person, or group is often expressed through public holidays, memorials, speeches, and similar. The historical memory eventually serves as a vital element in the information war against contestant countries and political enemies (*ibid*: 1028-1029).

### 3.5.3. Common, Mass Public Culture

A common public culture is often considered an essential national identity element. Thereby, the language, religion, or customs “must become public property and part of an acknowledged, or official distinctive culture” (Smith, 2002: 20). In the identification process with the core culture, the members of the community are strongly emotional invested as they

establish solidarity bonds among the other individuals and, consequently, start to recognize one another as fellow nationals. Moreover, a vernacular language must be established to ensure communication among the national members (Guibernau, 2004: 136).

For national identity formation, sharing traditions and customs without acknowledging them as an essential virtue is not sufficient. In nations, culture is referred to with great consciousness since it functions as a linking element in the community and is used to differentiate certain groups (Smith, 2002: 20). For the expansion of the public culture, nations have established agencies of prevalent socialization. As with the historical memory, public school education and mass media contribute immensely to the spread of the cultural values (Smith, 1991: 11).

#### 3.5.4. Common Laws and Customs

Before the formation of the written legal system, many ethnic groups were governed by their traditions. As written texts emerged, customs, practices, and rituals developed into sets of rules and subsequently into constitutions and laws. Ultimately, leading to the political aspects of the national identity being expressed through laws and institutions. The state members possess rights and duties identifying them as part of a nation (Smith, 2002: 21). As a result of the established laws, one can identify the principle of equality among the members. Citizenship forms the basis of equality within the nation (Smith, 1991: 10).

#### 3.5.5. Historic Territory, or Homeland

A nation always refers to a well-defined region. Yet, a community cannot choose a land arbitrarily. Instead, the territory needs to be of historical origin to the people. Every coast, lake, city, or street is connected to a historic and special meaning. Therefore, this territory is unique to the community members, and so are the resources inside the territory, which are to be protected from outsiders (*ibid*: 9).

The term homeland has become more precise in the modern epoch. It refers to a “recognized, compact, and unified nation territory, symbolized by the ideal of natural borders” (Smith, 2002: 22). However, due to conflicts and treaties, many nations diverge from the definition of natural borders – as the Cyprus conflict has shown (*ibid*: 22).

It can be argued that geographical information is included in shaping social activities. Besides the geographical location of the homeland, the characteristics of other individuals living in the territory shape the national identity. Furthermore, mankind has built monuments, streets, and buildings of significant meaning within the environment and therefore created

culture. Landscapes and architecture often take on an essential role in depicting the national identity. They visually capture a nation's sense of self-definition, which is especially important for countries under a foreign power's control. By displaying a nation's symbols, the society intends to demonstrate its uniqueness (Kaplan and Herb, 2011: 352). It is evident that according to the location, people establish similar characteristics as they share the same historical memory, culture, language, institution, and laws (Smith, 2002: 15)

#### 4. Methodology

So far, this Bachelor Thesis has discussed the history of the Cyprus dispute as well as the theoretical and conceptual framework of social identity, national identity, and national identity formation.

It has been suggested that (national) identities are historically and subjectively constructed based on the belief to share common characteristics. Smith's five factors of national identity formation, which play a significant part in the process, have also been defined. In this context, the following paragraph examines the role of the historical territory and the historical memory as factors of national identity formation in the case of Cyprus after the Turkish invasion in 1974.

##### 4.1. Research Method

The research method employed in this Thesis can be defined as thematic qualitative analysis. This analysis allows to identify and examine specific themes within the data. The thematic qualitative analysis describes participants' experiences, meanings, and reality. Another option of this method is to analyze how events, realities, and specific incidents result from various discourses within society (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 9). The process is divided into three parts: data collection and familiarization with the data, coding, and identifying analytic themes (Avraamidou, 2017: 7).


The evidence used in this work's territory analysis is represented by maps, charts, newspaper articles, and a letter from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN (A/33/62). The study of the two historical memories focused on letters to the UN submitted by the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN as well as the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of TRNC.

Through this analysis, two of Smith's National Identity Forming Factors can be examined in the context of the research question: How are National Identities shaped in the Cyprus conflict?

## 4.2. Historical Territory

### 4.2.1. Ethnic Division on the Island

*Figure 1: Ethnic Division in Cyprus*



Source: Adapted from: Rekacewicz, 2000, <https://mondediplo.com/maps/cyprusmdv49>

*Figure 2: Development of Mixed Villages on the Island*

Year	Mixed Villages	GC Villages	TC Villages	Total Villages	% Mixed	% GC	% TC
1891	346	342	114	802	43	43	14
1931	252	358	84	694	36	52	12
1960	114	392	117	623	18	63	19
1970	48	444	11	503	10	88	2

GC., Greek Cypriot; TC., Turkish Cypriot.

Source: Adapted from: Lytras and Psaltis, 2011: 17

As mentioned in the literature review, communal territory contributes to the national identity as one of the five features of its formation. Through this territory, regional boundaries between insiders and outsiders are created. Furthermore, territory sharing leads to mutual living routines, eventually establishing a collaborative culture and historical memory.

Before the inter-communal violence broke out in Cyprus, both ethnic communities lived scattered over the island. Consequently, the two often shared villages and, therefore, were able to witness, tolerate and participate in the lives and cultures of the other ethnicity. However, after the first inter-communal violence in 1963 and the Turkish invasion in 1974, the island's division into the Northern, TC-controlled part, and the Southern, GC-controlled part

has immensely changed its demography. As seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the mixed communities on the island disappeared completely. In 1960 the last census, including both ethnic groups, indicated that about 114 communities were of mixed ethnicity. Today, only two villages exhibit inter-communal diverse traits because they are located in or near the Greenline. From 1974 to 2003, travel restrictions prevented GC and TC from visiting the other part. After 29 years of demarcation, travel restrictions were lifted, and communities could visit the other side, which had been demonized for so long (Lytras and Psaltis, 2011: 18-20).

During the time of the travel restrictions, the exchange and understanding between the two ethnic communities was almost unavailable. Therefore, it is argued that individuals of each community are unable to witness a different social environment. Ultimately leading to isolated communities.

Social representation and daily interactions resulting in mutual benefits are factors in establishing identities. Due to the division and the inter-communal conflicts, both parties do not experience the chance to form a connection since they are in a contest over territory and resources. Consequently, it can be argued that the partition resulted in a strong association of Cypriot nationality to elements of Greekness or Turkishness. This indicates that the incorporation of Hellenic- or Turko-views among the communities overshadowed the Cypriot self-sense.

#### 4.2.2. Erasing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Traces

Hellenism and Turkishness also expressed themselves by renaming cities, districts, and streets. Before the partition, both Greek and Turkish names were present across the island, and it was “often impossible to distinguish Turkish from Greek villages solely by their names” (Beckingham, 1957: 166). Using the two languages and displaying GC as well as TC names contributed to understanding Cyprus as a multiethnic island. The use of words and names from each other is a sign of a feeling of safety and trust that accompanied the relationship between both communities. However, with the rise of nationalism within Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot societies, additionally to the island's division, the traces and influence of the other started to disappear. Both communities have carried out name changes to districts, villages, and streets (Lytras and Psaltis, 2011: 32).

In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UNSG in 1978 (A/33/6P), the GC presented a list of 216 towns and townships renamed by TC. For instance, Lutro, a district in Nicosia which was formerly of GC descent and fell under Turkish control

after 1974, is now referred to as Bademlikoy. The renaming suggests that the TC have now geographically claimed the district and established their national identity in the region.

More recently, there have been requests to retitle Turkish street names in the GC part. In 2015, Larnaca – a city located in the south part – faced a renaming. The Piale Pasha Street was changed to Tasos Mitsopoulos Avenue in honor of the former RoC Minister of Communication and later on Minister of Defense. However, the Turkish street name is not entirely removed. Only the newly built street sections will be named after the late minister. The historical parts will continue to be called Piale Pasha Street (Jean, 2015). Nevertheless, even renaming parts of a Turkish named road strengthens the national identity. In particular, because it is to honor a former GC minister who ultimately represents the GC state.

It can be argued that the regional exclusion and inclusion continued through renaming cities, districts, and streets even after the division into TC-controlled and GC-controlled parts. Traces of the other community are tried to be erased, and the national identity is built around ethnicity rather than the fact that they are both Cypriot. Thereby, the places are being renamed into something heroic to the nation. Surrounded by this environment, the individuals are inclined to form a feeling of shared history and culture, which leads to ethnic and national identity formation among the two groups.

#### 4.2.3. Holding a City Hostage

Besides the partition and renaming, another major geographical event contributed to Cyprus' national identity formation: Varosha. The city is located in the island's northern part and used to be populated mainly by GC. It was closed off after the war broke out. However, the TC administration has opened the parts of the isolated city for day visits in November 2020. In July of 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced to reopen more parts in Maras – the Turkish name of Varosha – for civilian use (Aljazeera, 2021).

Furthermore, there have been reports that property belonging to GC is planned to be demolished or given to TC. This is highly concerning to GC because properties could easily be traced back to their original owners since the land registry documents are under the control of the TC administration. However, the return of the property has not happened (Gunnar, 2022). Because the city served as a home to many GC, they perceive it as their territory with which they associate a feeling of belonging. The supposed demolishing of their property and the potential allocation of the properties to Turkish and TC investors intensifies the antagonism and strengthens the feeling of intrusion of TC into their territory.

This work argues that the TC administration uses Varosha to demonstrate its power and prove that TC are an equal part of the island with control over the territory and resources. However, the GC social memory perception of Turks and TC taking parts of their territory is confirmed. The fate of Varosha has become a national identity symbol of the GC. The GC community believes to be robbed of their rightful territory and confronted with an opposing negotiation partner.

#### 4.3. Historical Memory

As the previous subchapters have discussed the mechanisms of geographical identity shaping and its impact on the national identity in Cyprus, the following analyses the historical narrative.

To understand the development of the historical memory, corresponding letters of three different occasions are examined. The first exchange of letters is dated 2004, shortly after the rejection of the Annan Plan. The other two letters focus on the opening of Varosha and a discussion between Turkey and Cyprus regarding gas exploration.

All direct citations throughout the following analyzing text are taken from the letters in the Appendix. Therefore, no intext citations are remarked.

##### 4.3.1. The Blame Game

Based on the data studied and the historical narratives of the GC and TC communities, it is evident that each party admits little to no responsibilities concerning the creation of the conflict and its continuance until today. Instead, this subchapter argues that both sides accuse one another of the entrenched situation.

In the letter *A/58/867-S/2004/596*, submitted by the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN, Andreas D. Mavroyiannis talks about opening new crossing points to enable inter-communal exchange. However, he cannot refrain from leaving his offer as it is. He implies that the TC side endangers the “*security and safe traffic of goods and people by both sides.*” The Turkish “*occupation army*” left minefields along the Greenline and the proposed crossing points during the invasion in 1974. They have not dismantled them, and the Turkish army has shown no “*inclination or willingness to do likewise in the occupied area of Cyprus.*” However, Turkey has signed the Ottawa anti-personnel mine ban convention.

Meanwhile, Mavroyiannis states that the GC government has already started demining 4000 mines. In this context, the letter suggests that the Turkish invasion causes risks for both communities as the mines not only endanger GC. Furthermore, mentioning the GC

government's demining process implies that they ensure the safety of all Cypriot people. Consequently, the GC government still perceives an imminent threat in the behavior respectively in the consequences of Turkish and TC actions.

At the end of Mavroyiannis' letter dated 23 July 2004, he expresses the hope that the TC side "*will adopt a constructive approach.*" Thereby accusing the TC party of non-cooperative behavior and ultimately portraying the GC as the only solution-oriented party.

The second letter, dated 26 July 2004 by Mavroyiannis, corresponds to the criticism presented in his previous letters. He refers to the 30<sup>th</sup>-anniversary celebrations of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In his letter, he alleges the Turkish side of distorting the truth and ignoring the suffering of the "*people of Cyprus*" caused by the invasion. Once more, Mavroyiannis mentions the people of Cyprus as he understands the partition as a painful experience in the lives of both communities. This leaves the impression that he was alluding to the narrative of peaceful coexistence.

Furthermore, his letter imputes an alternative motive. He blames the TC administration for causing insecurities for GC and undermining "*continuous efforts toward reconciliation and mutual trust between the two communities*" with the anniversary celebration. Consequently, this implies that Turkey and TC are not interested in finding a solution to the problem. His insinuations reinforce the myth of Turkey's long-lasting goal of the Turkification of Cyprus.

While Mavroyiannis has made it clear in his letters that he identifies Turkey and the TC side as responsible for the division through the invasion, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of TRNC Denktas justified the intervention of Turkey in his response letter, A/58/876-S/2004/675. He even claims the legality of the interference through the Treaty of Guarantee. In this section of the letter, it becomes clear that Turkey and TC see the cause of the military intervention in the violent behavior of GC and their wish for enosis. In the TC narrative, the intervention was a rescue operation from the GC oppression. Denktas argues that the celebrations showcased the appreciation for the freedom and rights the Turkish army has given TC, which they did not experience under GC rule. Here the importance of celebrations to help establish and reinforce historical memories is seen.

Moreover, he states that the TC used their rights resulting from the Turkish intervention "*towards unification.*" He hints at the referendum of the Annan Plan in which TC voted for reunification while GC rejected the plan. Denktas accuses the GC community of not

being interested in finding a solution as they are not ready to “*enter a power-sharing arrangement with the Turkish Cypriots.*” With such a statement, he continues to strengthen the historical memory that Greek Cypriots seized power of the island in 1960 and reinforces the narrative that GC oppressed TC for political authority.

Although 15 years passed, the allegations against each other have remained the same. In letter A/74/500-S/2019/8/15, the GC positioned themselves to the opening of Varosha. The GC government argues that they are alarmed by the prospects of the “*occupying power creating additional faits accomplis on the ground.*” In using the word “*additional,*” the GC administration suggests that the first *faits accomplis* happened with the Turkish Invasion in 1974, therefore, accusing the Turkish Cypriot side of being solely responsible for the island's division and emphasizing the traumas GC have experienced during the invasion.

Just two years after the aggravated situation about Varosha, two warships were seen in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus without the clearance to do so. The Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN, Andreas Hadjichrysanthou, strongly condemns this action as “*fueling tensions and putting at risk peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.*” Hadjichrysanthou interprets this as “*another violation of Cyprus' sovereignty*” and thereby strengthens the argument of Turkey as a long-lasting national antagonist. As the letter A/76/407-S/2021/816 from Hadjichrysanthou was directed to the Turkish government, the Turkish Permanent Representative answered to this letter. Sinirlioglu accused the GC side of destroying the partnership in 1963. Furthermore, he partially denies the jurisdiction of the GC administration as they are, according to the letter, not the only government on the island.

Overall, these accusations led to two different historical memories and, consequently, national identities. These have been established through the battle for hegemony in Cyprus. The GC have built their historical memory around the invasion of 1974 and its consequences for the community, while the TC focus on the history before the invasion and the inter-communal violence. Yet, both parties do not admit to any wrongdoings neither before 1974 nor after.

#### 4.3.2. Discrediting the Legitimacy of the Other

Another strategy identified throughout the letters is the discrediting of legitimacy. Resultingly, the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized state, and the GC government heavily disputes the legitimacy of the TRNC. Within the different letters, the Representatives of Cyprus to the UN as well as the TRNC Deputy Prime Minister and Minister

of Foreign Affairs often use similar methods to express their mutual perceived illegitimacy. To reference their perceived illegitimacy of the other government, both sides do not address the political administration of the other party as a government but instead call it the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot administration. According to the Oxford Learner's Dictionary an administration refers to "the activities that are done in order to plan, organize and run a business, school or other institution" (Oxford-Learner's-Dictionary, n.d.a.). Whereby the government is defined as "the group of people who are responsible for controlling a country or a state" (Oxford-Learner's-Dictionary, n.d.b.). Since the term administration does not automatically imply the management of an independent country, it is not as strongly connected to state sovereignty as the term government. This suggests that both sides hesitate to use the word "government" as they would acknowledge the other's sovereign and political legitimacy.

To strengthen the argument of the GC government, they often speak of occupied territory, which indicates that they understand this as part of their legal state territory being under sovereign control by Turkey instead of recognizing a second Cypriot state. In the letter, A/58/859-S/2004/589, the perceived illegitimacy of TRNC is made very clear as Mavroyiannis argued that Turkey "*will not hesitate to exploit the present circumstances in order to achieve political gains for the illegal regime in the northern part of Cyprus.*" In doing so, additionally to discrediting the sovereignty and legitimacy of the TC administration, it is suggested that the administration is under complete Turkish control without having actual power or saying in matters.

However, the GC side is also incriminated in letter A/58/876-S/2004/675 by the TC administration of occupying "*the government of the once bi-national partnership.*" Denktas uses bi-national instead of bi-communal. This alludes to the TC argument of the existence of two nations on the island rather than two communities united within one nation. Nevertheless, the use of the word partnership could imply there has been a time of peaceful coexistence.

Especially in the letter exchange regarding the opening of Varosha, both administrations hint at the fact that they see themselves as the legitimate government of the territory. When Mavroyiannis addresses the situation in his letter A/74/500-S/2019/815 – additionally to listing various Security Council Resolutions which declare the TC behavior illegitimate – he expresses the wish that Varosha is returned to "*its rightful and lawful owners*

*and inhabitants.*" Thus, it can be argued that the RoC government elucidates no legal right of the Turkish Cypriot administration to decide the future of Varosha. This is heavily contradicted by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Özersay in his letter A/74/515-S/2019/839. He states that "*the owner of this decision as regards the fenced area of Maraş is the Turkish Cypriot Government and not Turkey.*" Özersay emphasizes the TC control by denying that neither Turkey nor the RoC has any influence in the northern part of Cyprus. By using the name *Maraş* to refer to the city of Varosha, it is indicated that he claims the city as TC territory.

In conclusion, comparing the letters shows that both parties claim to be Cyprus' rightful and lawful state representation.

#### 4.4. Discussion

The thematic qualitative analysis showed how the different communities formed their national identity after the partition.

This Thesis' predominant argument is that geographical circumstances contribute to national identity formation. The most apparent territorial factor in the Cyprus conflict is the division into two ethnic parts and the missing inter-communal contact. The individuals do not exchange their customs or share connecting moments. Therefore, it is argued that they can hardly form any relationship, which could eventually lead to a feeling of togetherness and consequently the formation of a mutual nationality. Instead, both have created two different social memories due to the partition and have formed their national identity around either their Greekness or Turkishness. As mentioned above, the renaming of cities expresses a strong connection to the motherland whereby the national identity formation becomes visible.

As shown in this analysis, the historical memory of GC comprehends the partition as a consequence of an unlawful intervention by Turkey, which caused significant suffering to the GC community. Contrary to this national memory, the analysis of TC and Turkey's letters has shown that according to their understanding, the TRNC is a legitimate state representing the TC on the island. Thereby, the Turkish military mission of 1974 and the deployment of troops is claimed to ensure the security of the TC people.

In the GC national identity, the RoC government is understood to be the only lawful government on the island. In parallel, the legitimacy of the RoC and the international recognition of the Southern Cypriot government is often combined, thus linking Cypriotism in specific ways to Greekness and, consequently, excluding the "other" – namely the TC.

According to their social memory, they were robbed of their full decision-making power over Cyprus by an illegitimate regime instigated by Turkey for geopolitical and strategic reasons.

The TC national identity is not only centered around a different historical period but also around the hegemony of GC on the island after the independence. The findings have shown that even in the present day, the TC administration claims the ambition of the GC government to preserve as much power as possible and ultimately obtain predominance over the island. To support the argument of the power-obsessed GC, TC refer to the rejection of the Annan Plan by the GC in 2004.

Yet, both communities emphasize the bicultural origin of the island. The two parties propose their will to strengthen the bicultural exchange through different projects. The analysis argues that the letters submitted by representatives of GC and TC suggest that they are each unilaterally working to resolve the issue. Thereby shaping the national identity of each community as a heroic nation willing to compromise with a community that has caused much suffering in the past in order to reach peace and reunification. Thus, both parties do not relinquish demonizing the other side and their past actions without acknowledging their own mistakes.

Considering the research question, this Thesis suggests that both geographical elements and historical memory factors have significantly contributed to the national identity formation process. The inter-communal exchange was diminished through the partition, and the relationships between individuals of both communities hardly had a chance to be re-established over the years due to the ongoing division. The inside and outside divide was reinforced through the different historical memories that blamed the other side for the predicament, yet, none of the parties took responsibility for the situation. The pattern of emphasizing antagonistic feelings and focusing on maximalist stances between the two communities led to entirely different national identities based on the long-lasting battle and opposite hegemonic perceptions.

## 5. Conclusion

As noted above, the Cypriot people have seldomly been in charge of their own destiny throughout their long history. By that, the Cyprus conflict is not an exception. While the two ethnic communities certainly have paid their fair share, the Thesis made evident that the three guarantor powers have contributed significantly to the emergence of the dispute. The British colonial power and its politics of division and rule in the 1960s fueled tensions between the GC and TC people. The “motherlands” of the two communities were especially important in the 1960s and 70s. In the current phase, the maximalist standpoints and the little willingness to compromise of both parties remain an obstacle in finding a final solution to the problem.

The Thesis has made clear that the Cyprus dispute is an identity-based conflict. The problem derives from the incompatibility of the two national identities and is connected to the perception of the GC and TC groups on how power and land should be distributed among the Cypriot people. The groundwork of the analysis was laid out by explaining social and national identities. It was argued that individuals create an identity to have an organizing factor in an individualized setting of the globalized world. Resultingly, it was explained that in the construction of identities the formation of inside and outside groups establishes an exclusivity and feeling of belonging while differentiating the outside group. Afterwards, national identities were defined as a specific form of social identity based upon a feeling of devotion and solidarity to a nation. For the thematic qualitative analysis, the five factors of national identity formation by Smith were defined. Namely, these consist of a “collective proper name, myths, and memories of communal history, a common public culture, common laws and customs, a historic territory or homeland” (Smith, 2002: 17).

The thematic qualitative analysis concluded that the inter-communal exchange became limited with the island's partition. Therefore, the emphasis on the national identity shifted to the ethnical component instead of understanding the Cypriot identity as multiethnic. The Hellenic- and Turko-centric aspects were strengthened by renaming districts, cities, and streets. These were systematic efforts to remove the influence of the other side and intensify the nationalism within the communities. Lastly, the third geographical aspect of the Cyprus dispute discussed in this Thesis was the city of Varosha. The discussion about the opening of the city is used to measure power. While the GC keep emphasizing that the buildings must be returned to the rightful owners – the majority of them being GC, the TC administration uses the city to showcase its power.

Furthermore, the investigation has shown that the two national identities are based on two narratives. The GC side highlights the Turkish invasion of 1974. The narrative of this community is based on the GC defending themselves against a rebelling minority with a strong ally Turkey. The GC representatives stress the violation of the state's sovereignty with the occupation of the northern part. In the letters of the GC, it is made clear that they only understand the RoC as the lawful political representation of the Cypriot state and understand the TRNC as an illegal regime that the Turkish government established.

On the other hand, TC narrate the history as one where a smaller community struggled to survive in the hostile environment created by GC. In their national identity, the Turkish army saved them from an attempt by GC trying to overpower the whole Turkish community on the island. According to the TC historical memory of the invasion in 1974, they were given their fundamental rights back. The representation of TC and Turkey emphasizes the group's self-determination and, ultimately, their sovereignty as TRNC.

In conclusion, the findings demonstrate that the two main ethnic groups in Cyprus used historical memory to establish two contradicting narratives about the same conflict to shape their respective national identity.

The Thesis illustrates that the geographical division, erasing of bicultural street names, and the political use of historical memory are closely related to the national identity construction. The idea of a nation's partially occupied territory, ethnocentric devotion, and the constant conflict with an eternal enemy has led to the strengthening of two completely opposite national identities and, as a result, the maximalist standpoints amongst the communities.

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#### IV. Appendix

Appendix A: A/33/62

UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
GENERAL

A/33/62  
8 March 1978

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-third session  
Item 28 of the preliminary list\*

QUESTION OF CYPRUS

Letter dated 7 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative  
of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-  
General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to a new unilateral and illegal act of Turkey, seeking, by a "decree" of its instruments in the so-called "Turkish Federated State", to abolish the historic Greek names of 216 towns, villages and quarters in the occupied territory, and to replace them by newly invented and unrelated Turkish names. On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest this new arbitrary act in the invaded part of the Republic.

The existing historic names, which are universally recognized, have appeared on all maps of Cyprus through the centuries. The obvious purport of this latest illegality is to efface the traditional geographic denominations and the historic association of these territories in an attempt to "Turkify" them.

A list of the existing geographic names and of the invented Turkish names as they appeared in the Turkish publication News from the North, of 13 January 1978, is annexed hereto.

It should be recalled in this respect that the legitimate inhabitants of the occupied territories are, by a large majority (82 per cent), Greek Cypriots, who have been forcibly expelled by the invasion army since July 1974 in the wake of Turkey's aggression against Cyprus and rendered refugees to the figure of 200,000, namely, one third of the total population of Cyprus. In their usurped homes and properties, the alien colonizing population, transported from Turkey, is being implanted to fill the vacuum in the pursuit of altering by force the demographic structure of the island.

The right of the indigenous Cypriot people to return to their ancestral homes and properties is universally recognized as an inalienable human right that can in no way be denied to them. Aside from the tenets of international law and of

\* A/33/50.

the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, 1/ subscribed to also by Turkey, is explicit on these rights. General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) on Cyprus, adopted by a unanimous vote, including that of Turkey, and unanimously endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974), called for the urgent return of all the refugees to their homes in safety. Furthermore, the most recent resolution of the General Assembly, adopted by an overwhelming majority at its last session (resolution 32/15), requested the Security Council to take practical measures for the effective implementation of the aforesaid resolution.

The recent arbitrary and illegal interference with the geographic names of the invaded territory, coming as a sequence to the tampering with the demographic structure of the island, purports to convey the character of permanent effect to the international crimes. As such, it further aggravates these crimes and the violation of the aforesaid United Nations resolutions. The perpetration of all these illegal acts has been according to a pre-planned design to demolish the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus with the objective of partition and annexation in prospect.

This policy, cutting across the agreed basis for an independent, sovereign and integral State of Cyprus, has been the cause of rendering nugatory all efforts over the years for a just and workable solution to the problem.

It has become increasingly manifest that a primary and vital need for such a solution is a genuine and constructive approach for positive progress towards a lasting settlement within the framework of implementation of the aforesaid resolutions.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 28 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Cyprus to the United Nations

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1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.

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Annex

List of geographic names of 216 towns, townships and villages purportedly changed to Turkish names, as it appeared in the Turkish publication "News from the North", vol. 67, of 13 January 1978

Nicosia District

<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>	<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>
Argaki	Akcay	Mia Milia	Maspalot
Louridjina	Akincilar	Dhyo Potami	Ikidere
Yerolakkos	Alaykoy	Kalavaki	Kalavac
	Asagi	Kaloheryo	Kalkanla
Kato Zodia	Bostanci	(Kaputi)	
Prastio (Morphou)	Aydinkoy	Kanlikoy	Kanlakoy
Lutro	Bademlikoy	Melousha	Kirikkale
Ambelikou	Baglikoy	Timbou	Kirklar
Palekythro	Balikesir	Trahona	Kizilbas
Beikoy	Beykoy	Kurumanastir	Kurumanastar
Peristeronari	Cengizky	Kserovouno	Kurutepe
Epikho (Aboher)	Cihangir	Kucuk	
Kalokhorio	Camlikoy	Omorphita	Kaymakla
Kythrea	Degirmenlik	Lefka	Lefke
Trachoni	Demirhen	Ayyorgi (Lefke)	Maidenlikoy
Ayiakebir	Dilekkaya	Mora	Meric
Elye	Doganci	Kyra	Mevlevi
Eksometochi	Duzova	Neohoryo	Minarelikoy
Tremetousha	Erdemli	Mintzelli	Ortakoy
Kokkina	Erenkoy	Galini	Omerli
Piroi	Gaziler	Philia (Filya)	Serhadkoy
Gaziveren	Gaziveran	Selemani	Suleymaniye
Karavostasi	Gemikonagi	Masari	Sahinler
Veni	Gokhan	Varisa	Sirinkoy
		Petre	Taskoy
Amadyez	Gunebakan	Angelemi	Tuspinar
Nikitas	Guneskoy	Ayvasil	Turkeli
Ayia Marina	Gurpinar	(Ayios Vasihos)	
Morphou	Guzelyurt	Siryanochori	Vayla
Hamid Mandres	Hamitkoy	Arcoz (Arsos)	Yigitler
Kseros (Xeros)	Denizli	Pano	Yukari
Potamos-Tou-Kambou	Yedidalga	Zodia	Gostanci
Petra-Tou-Mhkeni	Yenicekoy	Katokopya	Zumrutkoy
Limnitis	Yesilirmak		
Pendayia	Yesilyurt		
Sillura (Skyloura)	Yilmazkoy		

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Famagusta District

<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>	<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>
Melangra	Adacay	Kilanemos	Esenkoy
Handres	Agillar	(Gilanemos)	
Lysi (Lisi)	Akdogan	Aphania	Gazikoy
Gypsos (Gipsos)	Akova	Magusa (Famagusta)	Gazi Magusa
Piyi-Peristerona	Alanici	Lefkoniko	Gecitkale
Ayios-Iacovos	Altinova	(Lefkenuk)	
Ardhana (Ardana)	Ardahan	Vasili	Gelincik
Artemi	Aridami	Syngrasi	Golbusi
Angastina	Aslankoy	Knodhara	Gonendere
Aloda (Alog)	Avtepe	Kornokipos	Gornec
Ayios (Symeon)	Avtepe	Akheritou	Guvercinlik
Ayios Yeoryios (Spatharko)	Aygun	Makrasika	Incirli
Vokolida	Bafra	Sinde (Sinda)	Inonu
Pervolye	Sahceler	Triromo	Iskele
Trikomou		Galinoporni	Kaleburno
Platanisso	Balalan	Gastria	Kalecik
Pergama (Pergamos)	Seyarmudu	Dhavlos	Kaplica
Lythrangomi	Boltasli	Kridhia	Kilitkaya
Bogas (Boghez)	Boguz	Gaidhours	Korkuteli
Lapatos	Bogazici	Kouklia	Koprulu
Manarga	Bogaztepe	Koma Tou	Kumyali
Komikebir	Buyukkonuk	Yialou	
Gouphes	Camlica	Mousoulita	Kurudere
Ayios Teodoros	Cayirova	Korovyta	Kurueva
Platani	Cinerli	Avgolida	Kurtulus
Vathylakos	Derince	Arnadhi	Kuzucuk
Rizokarpasso	Dipkarpaz	Melounda	Mallidag
Prastyo	Dortyol	Yialousa (Yalusa)	Maltepe
Ahna	Duzce	Gulatya	Mehmetcik
Ayios Kharitos (Ergeneken)	Ergenekon	Phlamoudhi (Flamuda)	Mersinlik
Ovgoros	Ergazi	Limnia	Mormenekse
Yenagra	Nergizli	Maratha	Murataga
Peristerona	Ovacik	Styllos (Stillo)	Mutluysaka
Asha	Pasakoy	Spathariko	Otuken
Sandallaris	Sandallar	Tavros	Tamuklu
Chatoz (Chaos)	Serdarli	Vidsada	Pinarli
Psilatos	Sutluce	Pyrga (Pirga)	Pirhan
Akatu	Tatlisu	Livadlia	Gazilikoy
Strongylos	Turuncu	Ayia Trias	Sipahi
Patriki (Patric)	Tuzluca	Meta	Taslica
Marathovouno	Ulukisla	Trypimeni (Tirmen)	Tirmen
Ayios Nikolaos	Yamackoy	Yerani	Turnalar
Ephtakomi	Yedikonuk	Engomi	Tuzla
Ayios Andronikos	Yesilkoy	Kondea	Turkmenkoy
Ayios Efstathios	Zeybekkey	Vadili (Vatyli)	Vadili
		Ayios Elias	Yurkey
		Ayios Serghios	Yeni-Bogazici
		Milya	Vildirim
			/...

Kyrenia District

<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>	<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>
Ayia Irini	Akdeniz	Sisklipos (Sisklip)	Akcicek
Agridaki	Alemdag	Karavas	Alsancak
Klepini	Arapkoy	Dikomo-Asagi (Kato Dikomo)	Asagi-Nikmen
Kalogrea (Kallurga)	Bahceli	Bellabayis (Bellapais)	Bellabayis
Trapeza (Teknecik)	Besparmak	Myrtou (Mirti)	Cumlibel
Ayios Epiktitos	Catalkoy	Photo	Bagyolu
Thermia (Termiye)	Dogankoy	Trimithi (Tirmit)	Edremit
Ayios Ambrosios (Aykurus)	Esentepe	Panagra	Gecitkoy
Kutsoventis	Gungor	Pileri	Goceri
Phteryka (Eterika)	Ilgaz	Kambil	Hisarkoy
Karakumi (Karakoumi)	Karakum	Motides	Incesu
Vasilya	Karsiyaka	Kharcha (Harga)	Karaagac
Sykhari (Sinhari)	Kaynukkoy	Karmi	Karaman
Larnaka-Tis	Kozan	Ayios Yeorgios	Karaoglan-oglu
Lapitou		Ayyorgi	
Kondemenos (Kordemen)	Kordemen	Orga	Kayeler
Kazafana (Kazafani)	Czankoy	Kormakiti (Kormacit)	Korucam
Liveras	Sadrazamkoy	Kamurcu (Koumurmucu)	Kamurcu
Vune	Taskent	Lapta (Lapithos)	Lapta
Dhiorios (Yorgoz)	Tepebasi	Paleosofas	Malatya
Temblos	Zeytinlik	Psomatos	Ozhan
		Krini	Pinarbasi
		Ayios Ermolaos (Ayermela)	Sirinevler
		Elea	Yesiltepe
		Dikomo Yukari (Pano Ikomo)	Yukari-ikmen

Quarter names

<u>Town/village</u>	<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>
Nicosia	Ayluka Quarter	Ayyildiz Quarter
Nicosia	Ay Kasiyano Quarter	Kafesli Quarter
Nicosia	Ay Sofya Quarter	Selimiye Quarter
Nicosia	Ay Andrea Quarter	Tophane Quarter

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<u>Town/village</u>	<u>Legal name</u>	<u>Purportedly changed to</u>
Guzelyurt	Ay Paraskevi Quarter	Ismet Pasa Quarter
Guzelyurt	Ay Yorgi Quarter	Mala Mustafa Pasa Quarter
Guzelyurt	Ay Mama Quarter	Piyale Pasa Quarter
Alsancak	Bladini Plaji	Kavuz Maji
Bogaz	Vrisules Meniz	Kocatepe Meniz
Girne	Milan Adasi Plaji (Snake Island)	Irtugrul Plaji
Karsivaka	Vavila	Muzelyali
Timbou	Timbo Kavaalani Cape Apostoloy Andreas Timbou Airport	Ercan Havaalani Zafer Iornu

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United Nations A/58/857-S/2004/596

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 **General Assembly  
Security Council**

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**General Assembly**  
**Fifty-eighth session**  
Agenda item 30  
**Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council**  
**Fifty-ninth year**

**Letter dated 23 July 2004 from the Permanent Representative of  
Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I would like to bring to your attention the following confidence-building measures that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus announced on 16 July 2004 aimed at promoting cooperation and confidence between the two communities in Cyprus and developing a sense of security among Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, thus contributing to the efforts towards resolving the Cyprus problem.

The Government proposed the opening of eight additional crossing points along the ceasefire line, demining by both sides of the existing minefields, disengagement of military forces from the walled part of the capital, Nicosia, and from the wider Dherinia-Famagusta and Strovolia areas, as well as restricting military manoeuvres. Of the eight new crossing points proposed, four are of top priority and provide for the crossing of people, vehicles and goods. Those four crossing points are: Kato Pyrgos-Karavostasi, Astromeritis-Zodia Morphou, Dhali-Louroujina and Dherinia-Famagusta. Along the proposed crossing points there exist minefields, mainly of the occupation army, that need to be dismantled in order to create conditions of security and safety. In particular, the opening of the Dherinia-Famagusta crossing point will benefit both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, especially the latter, in transporting their goods to the government-controlled area, thus enabling them to use the Republic's ports for exporting their products.

The other four crossing points proposed to be opened at a later stage are Pomos-Pachyammos-Kato Pyrgos, for vehicles and goods, Ledra Street for pedestrians and cyclists, Athena Avenue-Agios Kassianos for people and vehicles and the area of Kantara Avenue-Mia Milia for vehicles, goods and people.

The Government also proposed that the process of demining, which has already been started unilaterally by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus for minefields of the National Guard within the buffer zone, be extended for reasons of security and safe traffic of goods and people by both sides. It should be noted that the Republic of Cyprus has ratified the Ottawa anti-personnel mine ban convention, which came into effect in Cyprus on 1 July 2003, and has since proceeded with the destruction of 4,000 anti-personnel mines. Although Turkey has also ratified the

04-44180 (E) 290704

\* 0 4 4 4 1 8 0 \*

Ottawa convention, it has not shown, as yet, any inclination or willingness to do likewise in the occupied area of Cyprus.

The confidence-building measures also include a proposal for the unmanning of military posts in the walled town of Nicosia and in the area of Dherinia-Famagusta, and the prohibition of military manoeuvres across the ceasefire lines and extending two kilometres on either side of the lines.

Furthermore, the Government proposed the reopening of the port of Famagusta in a legitimate manner for the benefit of both communities and in conjunction with the return of the closed town of Famagusta (which has been occupied and has remained a "ghost town" since 1974) to its lawful inhabitants.

We believe that the implementation of these measures will make an important contribution in further defusing tensions on the ground and in improving conditions for allowing the mingling together and cooperation between members of the two communities in Cyprus. In particular, at this juncture, it is essential to help all Cypriots to remain focused on the prospect of the reunification of their country.

Accession to the European Union is already playing a constructive role and is creating a new dynamic in this direction, and we hope a new window of opportunity for a settlement will open soon that will respond to the aspirations of all Cypriots. We expect that the United Nations, through its good offices mission, will once again play a central role.

We earnestly hope that the Turkish side will adopt a constructive approach and cooperate in the implementation of the above measures for the benefit of all.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 30, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Andreas D. **Mavroyiannis**

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United Nations A/58/859-S/2004/598

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 **General Assembly  
Security Council**

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27 July 2004

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**General Assembly  
Fifty-eighth session  
Agenda item 30  
Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council  
Fifty-ninth year**

**Letter dated 26 July 2004 from the Permanent Representative of  
Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to refer to the thirtieth anniversary of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, a very sad occasion for my country and its people, and to strongly protest against the “celebrations” that took place in the occupied area of Cyprus on that occasion. The “celebrations” were attended by high-ranking Turkish government officials, headed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gul. In the framework of these “celebrations”, three vessels (two frigates and one submarine) of the Turkish military navy arrived at the occupied port of Famagusta.

It is with great disappointment that we witness, for yet another time, Turkey’s insistence on distorting the historical truth about Cyprus. It is also ironic that Turkey attempts to present a permanent violation of international law, namely, a military invasion against a sovereign State Member of the United Nations, and a subsequent illegal occupation, as an event worthy of enthusiastic commemorations and power demonstrations. Such acts not only constitute a blatant insult to the people of Cyprus, who still suffer from the painful consequences of Turkish invasion and occupation, but also heighten feelings of insecurity and undermine continuous efforts towards reconciliation and mutual trust between the two communities.

Unfortunately, at a time when Turkey’s European perspectives and Cyprus’s accession to the European Union create a new momentum for reconciliation and reunification, Turkey’s policy on Cyprus remains unaltered. Instead of fulfilling its Cyprus-related obligations that arise from its agreements with the European Union, as well as from international law, Turkey attempts both by word and by action to promote secession, in complete defiance of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and to consolidate the existing unacceptable status quo. The speech delivered by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs during the military parade in occupied Nicosia on 20 July leaves no room for doubt as to Turkey’s real intentions with regard to Cyprus. It is evident that Turkey will not hesitate to exploit the present circumstances in order to achieve political gains for the illegal regime in the northern part of Cyprus and will thus try to legitimize the results of partition imposed upon Cyprus through the use of force and sustained by military strength.

04-44173 (E) 290704

\* 0 4 4 4 1 7 3 \*

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 30, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Andreas D. **Mavroyiannis**

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United Nations

A/58/876-S/2004/675



**General Assembly  
Security Council**

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General Assembly  
Fifty-eighth session  
Agenda item 30  
Question of Cyprus

Security Council  
Fifty-ninth year

**Letter dated 23 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative  
of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 20 August 2004, addressed to you by Mehmet Dana, Chargé d'affaires a.i. and Deputy Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 30, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Ümit Pamir**  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

04-46988 (E) 260804  
\* 0 4 4 6 9 8 8 \*

**Annex to the letter dated 23 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

20 August 2004

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of a letter dated 18 August 2004 addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Serdar R. Denktaş, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 30, and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Mehmet Dana*  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

**Enclosure**

18 August 2004

I have the honour to refer to the two letters from the Greek Cypriot representative to the United Nations in New York, dated 26 and 23 July, respectively, and circulated as documents A/58/859-S/2004/598 and A/58/857-S/2004/596, and to bring to your kind attention the following views and considerations.

In his first cited letter, the Greek Cypriot representative portrays the Cyprus question as a problem of “invasion and occupation” in an attempt to escape the Greek Cypriot side’s grave responsibility in the creation and the continuation of the dispute.

It is, in fact, true that there is an occupation in Cyprus but this is the 41-year-old usurpation and continued occupation of the seat of government of the once bi-national partnership Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot side. The Turkish intervention on Cyprus carried out in accordance with its rights and obligations emanating from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee was fully legal and legitimate under article 4 of the said Treaty. The Turkish Army is in Cyprus under legal obligations to keep peace pending a solution and the Turkish military presence on the island is a vital security requirement for the Turkish Cypriot people, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive political settlement. It is, of course, very convenient that the Greek Cypriot representative chose to overlook that it was the Greek Cypriots who rejected your comprehensive settlement plan which effectively addressed and eliminated that requirement.

It is a well-documented reality that the Cyprus question did not arise overnight on 20 July 1974 but is the result of a long history of events perpetrated by the Greek Cypriots in order to annex the island to Greece (Enosis). Following the destruction in December 1963 of the Republic of Cyprus and their rejection by force of arms from the partnership government, the Turkish Cypriot people outlived the agonies and losses of the Greek Cypriot armed attacks, were confined to small enclaves, subjected to gross violations of human rights including being rendered refugees many times over, living under open-air prison conditions. Thousands of Turkish Cypriot civilians lost their lives, were maimed or wounded, hundreds more went missing under the 11-year Greek Cypriot oppression.

It is only natural that the Turkish Cypriot people commemorate the anniversary of the timely Turkish intervention which not only saved them from total annihilation but freed their vested rights to speak and act for themselves through their separate will, which they used towards unification. The 65-per-cent majority at the Turkish Cypriot referendum on your plan demonstrated beyond doubt that the expressed will of the Turkish Cypriot people is in favour of a just and viable solution rather than secession as suggested by the Greek Cypriot representative. As for the participation of Turkey at the commemorations, it needs to be stressed that she chose to honour the Turkish Cypriot invitation despite the fact that her presence carried the risk of Greek Cypriot distortion regarding her policy on Cyprus.

It is, however, well known that the official Turkish policy on Cyprus has not deviated from the one demonstrated during the negotiating period on your settlement plan. As also recorded by you, Turkey has been more than forthcoming in not only

cooperating to develop a solution in Cyprus but strongly encouraging the Turkish Cypriot side to opt for the approval of your comprehensive settlement plan, which you had described as the only choice opposed to no settlement. It is, therefore, uncalled for to accuse Turkey of pursuing anything other than a bi-zonal, bi-communal solution based on political equality, the responsibility for the absence of which rests solely with the Greek Cypriot side.

The rejection of your plan by 76 per cent at the Greek Cypriot referendum demonstrated that, in overwhelming majority, neither the Greek Cypriot people nor their political leaders are ready to enter into a power-sharing arrangement with the Turkish Cypriots. Instead, they choose to continue to enjoy the benefits of the usurped title of the “Republic of Cyprus” and their new European Union membership. The reason behind this rejectionist attitude was openly stated by the Greek Cypriot leader Mr. Papadopoulos in his address on 7 April 2004, when he demanded a “resounding no” to the Annan plan from the Greek Cypriots. It was to achieve the “joint strategic goal” of “politically upgrading and shielding their internationally recognized state”.

The so-called “confidence-building measures” which comprise the second cited letter of the Greek Cypriot representative are also designed to achieve the very same goal. It is beyond comprehension how the Greek Cypriot administration can present the said measures as an act of goodwill aimed at confidence-building when their refusal of your plan ensured that every single one, and all its added benefits including unification, did not materialize under a power-sharing arrangement.

I wish to stress, at the outset, that the Turkish Cypriot side has always been and is committed to promoting the search for resolution through the creation of confidence between the two peoples of the island. In fact, the sincerity of our expressed will in this regard has been repeatedly demonstrated by unilateral actions including our landmark decision providing for mutual crossings across the two sides as well as the recent sequence of decisions waiving all restrictions with regard to crossings as to time and duration of stay, organization of tourist tours and the requirement for producing a valid passport. As you are well aware our humanitarian initiative regarding the opening of a Greek Cypriot secondary school in the Karpaz peninsula has been praised as a major step of goodwill by the international community.

The nature of the Greek Cypriot proposals, on the other hand, constitute a striking example of their proficiency in presenting what they originally hamper as positive openings and skilfully exploiting the situation for political gain. As is known to the United Nations forces in Cyprus, the so-called military initiatives of the Greek Cypriot administration have been on the agenda for a long time and despite our constructive approach the efforts towards this end remained futile due to the political impediments created by the Greek Cypriot administration. Regarding the opening of additional crossing points, the Turkish Cypriot Government has long declared its unilateral intention and preparations on this issue in consideration of practical and economic needs. As for the opportunity for Turkish Cypriots to export their goods through Greek Cypriot ports, we witness a glaring example of the Greek Cypriot administration’s intention to continue holding our economic development hostage to its political considerations as well as extending its illegal authority over Turkish Cypriots.

The above-stated mentality is evident on the issue of opening the port of Famagusta to international trade in addition to a cunning attempt to curtail international efforts to support the economic and social development of the Turkish Cypriot people. The European Union Council proposals on special conditions for trade with North Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot objections in this regard are well known and need no further elaboration. The timing and formulation of the Greek Cypriot proposals on this issue leave no room for doubt that they are mainly aimed at preventing the Council proposals from materializing in conjunction with the added benefit of acquiring land for Greek Cypriots, much more of which was on offer on a give-and-take basis in the very plan they overwhelmingly rejected.

For its part, the Turkish Cypriot side has certainly proved its dedication to reunification on the basis of partnership and political equality and that its firm conviction in this regard remains unchanged.

As for the Greek Cypriot side, we share the international opinion that if the Greek Cypriot side truly desires a bi-zonal, bi-communal solution based on power-sharing and equality, it is high time this is expressed not in words but in concrete actions isolated from any other political or tactical considerations. We only hope that the Greek Cypriot side will soon adopt the necessary constructive approach and instead of impeding international efforts start cooperating towards lifting the economic, social and political restrictions preventing the development of the Turkish Cypriot people, which is the only way to create another window of opportunity from the present impasse they have created.

We trust that your valuable efforts will play an effective role in bringing about this most desired outcome.

(Signed) Serdar R. **Denktaş**  
Deputy Prime Minister  
and Minister for Foreign Affairs

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United Nations

A/74/500-S/2019/815



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Security Council**

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**General Assembly  
Seventy-fourth session  
Agenda item 41  
Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council  
Seventy-fourth year**

**Letter dated 11 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative  
of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

My Government has brought to the attention of the United Nations several times in recent months a matter of grave concern for us, namely the threats by Turkey to open the occupied city of Varosha, in violation of Security Council resolutions on Cyprus. Alarmed by the prospect of the occupying power creating additional *faits accomplis* on the ground and anxious to secure compliance with the said resolutions, the Cyprus Government decided to resort to the Council under article 35.1 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Following my Government's request to the Security Council to be seized of the matter, the latter issued press statement SC/13980 on 9 October 2019, in which it stated that the members of the Council "recalled the importance of the status of Varosha as set out in previous Security Council resolutions, including resolution 550 (1984) and resolution 789 (1992), and reiterated that no actions should be carried out in relation to Varosha that are not in accordance with those resolutions".

The special status of Varosha has been defined through a number of stipulations adopted either directly by the Security Council or endorsed by it, including:

(a) A specific framework for the return of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under United Nations administration, as a priority and without awaiting the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, was shaped as early as 1979 pursuant to the High-level Agreement between the leaders of the two communities. This Agreement was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 482 (1980);

(b) Resolution 550 (1984) of the Security Council, in which the Council expressed deep concern "about recent threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants", considered "attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible", and called "for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations";

(c) Resolution 789 (1992) of the Security Council, in which the Council urged that "with a view to implementation of resolution 550 (1984), the area at present under the control of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus be extended to include Varosha";

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(d) Resolution [2483 \(2019\)](#), the most recent Security Council resolution on Cyprus, adopted in July 2019, in which the Council recalled “the status of Varosha as set out in relevant resolutions”.

Additionally, the status of Varosha, as an area under the direct control of the Turkish army and an area for which Turkey has control and responsibility, is explicitly stated in reports of the Secretary-General, which affirm that “the United Nations continues to hold the Government of Turkey responsible for the status quo in Varosha”. It is recalled that Varosha was occupied and its inhabitants violently expelled during the second phase of the Turkish military invasion of 1974, looted, and fenced by the Turkish army, which, to this day, has exclusive access to the city.

The Cyprus Government expects the Government of Turkey and its illegal subordinate administration in the occupied part of Cyprus to comply with the clear calls of the Security Council to respect the status of Varosha. Any actions that might adversely affect the right of return and the property rights of the city’s lawful inhabitants must be avoided. We also expect Turkey to put an end to declarations by high officials of its Government threatening to open Varosha, and to cease violations of relevant Security Council resolutions on the ground by undertaking “inventory studies” in Varosha.

My Government will continue to exert every effort for the return of Varosha to its rightful and lawful owners and inhabitants under the auspices of the United Nations, as a matter of priority and in line with relevant Security Council resolutions and the 1979 High-level Agreement, pursuant to which we have repeatedly made specific proposals to realize the return of Varosha, not only as an obligation but also as a means to create a win-win situation. We remain convinced that such a venture would serve as a tangible confidence-building measure and could prove to be a gamechanger, contributing greatly to the efforts for creating a climate conducive to the resumption of the peace process and eventually leading to a fair and durable comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 41, and of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Andreas D. **Mavroyannis**  
Permanent Representative

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United Nations

A/74/515-S/2019/839



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Security Council**

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**General Assembly  
Seventy-fourth session  
Agenda item 41  
Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council  
Seventy-fourth year**

**Letter dated 23 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative  
of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 October 2019, addressed to you by İsmet Korukoğlu, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu  
Permanent Representative

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**Annex to the letter dated 23 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of the letter dated 17 October 2019 addressed to you by Kudret Özersay, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see enclosure).

(Signed) İsmet Korukoğlu  
Representative

**Enclosure**

I am writing to kindly inform you as regards my Government's decision on the fenced area of Maraş (Varosha) and what is aimed by this decision, in view of the letter dated 11 October 2019, addressed to you, by the representative of the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus in New York, which is fraught with misrepresentations and defamation.

I would like to state, at the outset, that the pretext for the propaganda, contained in the above-mentioned letter, had, in fact, collapsed, particularly following the rejection of the confidence-building measures as regards the fenced area of Maraş on numerous occasions as well as the overwhelming rejection of the comprehensive settlement plan for Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot side in 2004 and the breakdown of the Cyprus Conference held in 2017 in Crans-Montana, Switzerland – at the crux of all of which is their unwillingness to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriot side ([S/2004/437](#)).

The Greek Cypriot leadership and political elite's policy on the fenced area of Maraş, just like on the Cyprus question, has, unfortunately, been one of intransigence. In fact, a former prominent Greek Cypriot inhabitant of the town, namely, Andreas Lordos, has called on the Greek Cypriot administration "to cease its intransigent mentality and stop abusing Maraş as a political tool to put the onus on the Turks" (Greek Cypriot daily Politis, 25 August 2019). No doubt, the repercussions of this antagonistic policy have been heavy for the fenced area of Maraş as well as its former inhabitants, including Greek Cypriots and Evkaf foundation.

In view of the above and in the absence of a prospect for a negotiated settlement in Cyprus in the near horizon, my Government has decided that some gradual steps need to be taken as regards the fenced area of Maraş, which will be in line with international law and the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, first and foremost, protecting and respecting the rights of former inhabitants of this town. As a first step, our Council of Ministers took a decision tasking the Maraş Inventory Commission, composed of specialists and experts, to conduct a scientific inventory, identifying and studying the condition of the moveable and immovable properties and the environmental risks, which would allow us to see the whole picture as regards the fenced area of Maraş, thus facilitating the determination of any future steps, including changing the military status of the area so as to realize the rights of its former inhabitants. It is crystal clear that none of these steps violate the relevant United Nations resolutions, which call for respect for the rights of its former inhabitants without awaiting a settlement. In fact, maintaining the unacceptable status quo at the expense of the rights of the said inhabitants would be a violation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. It must also be underlined that my Government's decision does not in any way prejudice a possible negotiated settlement on the island.

I am pleased to state that former Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the fenced area of Maraş are very excited and supportive about my Government's said decision, publicly stating that this decision will provide for them to go back to their properties, which they are ready to do (*Cyprus Mail* online, 10 March 2019). I trust that these steps will be very constructive in terms of addressing the deep crisis of confidence between the two sides and their peoples on the island, allowing all former inhabitants, including Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to work together and to cooperate, building confidence and creating interdependencies – all conducive steps to a negotiated settlement on the island.

However, it is apparent from the letters of the Greek Cypriot representative that the Greek Cypriot leadership and political elite, which has created for itself a "comfort zone" within the form of the unacceptable status quo on the island, is

terrified of any disturbance to this unacceptable status quo, hence is doing its utmost, including calling for a closed meeting of the Security Council with the aim of preventing any steps to be taken as regards the fenced area of Maraş, despite the former Greek Cypriot inhabitants' support for these steps and despite the detriment to the realization of their rights after many decades.

In the face of the Greek Cypriot allegations, I must also emphasize that the owner of this decision as regards the fenced area of Maraş is the Turkish Cypriot Government and not Turkey. It must be borne in mind that neither Turkey nor the Greek Cypriot administration of South Cyprus has any jurisdiction or control in North Cyprus. My Government exercises full control, jurisdiction and authority in North Cyprus and is the only legitimate and competent authority to decide on matters pertaining to North Cyprus. Furthermore, references to the Turkish Cypriot Government by the Greek Cypriot side as "subordinate administration" is an insult to the democratic will of the Turkish Cypriot people, which elects and forms the said administration, and the will of which will determine any future negotiated settlement on the island, as was the case at the 2004 separate and simultaneous referendums for the comprehensive settlement plan on Cyprus, overwhelmingly approved by the Turkish Cypriot side and rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. Such an approach on the part of the Greek Cypriot administration is not surprising since this is the very mentality that repetitively rejects the political equality of the two peoples on the island, also referred to in the relevant United Nations resolutions that the Greek Cypriot side cherry-picks when quoting.

Lastly, the claim of "occupation" is a sheer fallacy. Turkey, in accordance with its rights and obligations under article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, legally intervened on the island in July 1974, to end the forcible suppression perpetrated against the Turkish Cypriot people by the Greek Cypriot side between 1963 and 1974, preventing annexation of the island to Greece and the total annihilation of the Turkish Cypriot people. I also would like to underline that the presence of the Turkish army, in line with the consent of the Turkish Cypriot people, is the deterrent, which has been providing peace and stability on the island since 1974.

I trust that you will duly take into consideration the above facts and considerations.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 41 of the agenda of its seventy-fourth session, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kudret Özersay  
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

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United Nations

A/76/407-S/2021/816



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Security Council**

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**General Assembly  
Seventy-sixth session**  
Agenda items 44 and 78

**Question of Cyprus**

**Oceans and the law of the sea**

**Security Council  
Seventy-sixth year**

**Letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative  
of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention, as a matter of urgency, the latest developments regarding the unlawful and aggressive actions of the Republic of Turkey within the southwest areas of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus, thus fuelling further tensions and putting at risk peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In particular, on 3 October 2021, two (2) Turkish warships, namely the frigate "ORUC REIS" and the corvette "BAFRA", harassed and prevented the Maltese-flagged and Italian-owned survey vessel "NAUTICAL GEO", duly licensed by the competent authorities of Cyprus, from carrying out a survey on the potential route of the "EASTMED PIPELINE PROJECT". The project is of significant regional importance and has also been designated a Project of Common Interest of the European Union in the field of energy.

The Turkish warships performed dangerous manoeuvres and illegally obstructed the course of the survey vessel, forcing it to abandon the area, under the fallacious argument that the area falls within Turkish maritime jurisdiction. However, the incident took place at a distance of only 22 nautical miles from Cyprus's southwestern coasts within its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf already delimited in accordance with international law, between the relevant opposite coastal States, namely the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt, by means of the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone of 2003. Just to illustrate the implausibility of Turkey's claims, the closest Turkish shore to the incident lies at a distance of 112 nautical miles (a relevant map is attached depicting the exact position of the vessel "NAUTICAL GEO" when it was harassed). Hence, the assertions made on the part of Turkey lack any legal basis and run counter to geography.

Turkey's new unlawful actions aiming at hindering Cyprus from exercising its legitimate rights constitute yet another severe violation of the sovereign rights of

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Cyprus under international law: both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and customary international law. The position of Cyprus regarding its rights to maritime zones is reflected in my previous letters addressed to you and circulated as documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. Moreover, the aforementioned Turkish conduct constitutes a threat of use of force, in breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.


Regrettably, Turkey continues to refuse the invitation of Cyprus to enter into negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus for the delimitation of their respective maritime zones, as prescribed by international law and the law of the sea. In this respect, Cyprus reiterates its invitation to Turkey to commence negotiations with a view to delimiting their maritime zones. In the alternative, Cyprus restates its proposal to Turkey with respect to the conclusion of a special agreement ( *compromis*) to jointly submit the issue of the delimitation of their maritime boundaries to the International Court of Justice, thus putting its assertions to the test.

I reaffirm that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has no doubt about its sovereign rights over its continental shelf/exclusive economic zone and remains determined to continue exercising, upholding and protecting them in good faith and in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, using all peaceful means at its disposal.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 44 and 78, and of the Security Council, and published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, as well as in the next edition of the *Law of the Sea Bulletin*.

(Signed) Andreas Hadjichrysanthou

**Annex to the letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**



United Nations

A/76/557-S/2021/961



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Security Council**

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**General Assembly  
Seventy-sixth session**  
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**Question of Cyprus**

**Oceans and the law of the sea**

**Security Council  
Seventy-sixth year**

**Letter dated 18 November 2021 from the Permanent  
Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General**

With reference to the letter of the representative of the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus dated 13 October 2021 ([A/76/407-S/2021/816](#)), I would like to bring to your attention the following:

First, the Greek Cypriot administration does not represent the whole of the island of Cyprus, as there has been no single authority that is competent to represent jointly the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots since the Greek Cypriots destroyed the Partnership State in 1963, in material breach of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance and Establishment, and the Constitution. The Greek Cypriot administration cannot therefore claim de jure and/or de facto jurisdiction or sovereignty over the island as a whole, nor can it make such assertions, by itself, as regards the maritime jurisdiction areas of the island.

Second, Turkey made it clear, through the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 2 October 2020, that, while she has always been on the side of de-escalation and dialogue, she will not negotiate, in the absence of the Turkish Cypriots, maritime delimitation with the Greek Cypriot administration as that entity does not represent the Turkish Cypriots, and that this could only be possible following the settlement of the Cyprus issue. In the meantime, the counterpart of the Greek Cypriot administration is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Third, Turkey has made public the outer limits of her continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean with geographical coordinates and a map (see annex) through our letter transmitted to the United Nations on 18 March 2020 ([A/74/757](#)).

Fourth, and following on from the third, the Maltese-flagged and Italian-owned survey vessel "NAUTICAL GEO", being aware of these coordinates, attempted to enter the Turkish continental shelf on multiple occasions for seabed-related survey activities without obtaining prior consent and authorization from Turkey, despite all diplomatic demarches having been timely lodged with the flag State and operator

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State of the said vessel, as well as the subsequent hails made at sea in accordance with international practice, with due consideration to safety of navigation at sea.

Fifth, it should also be noted that the Turkish Cypriot side, as the co-owner of the island having equal rights over its offshore resources, made proposals to the Greek Cypriots, most recently on 13 July 2019, to establish a cooperation mechanism, including equitable revenue-sharing, on offshore hydrocarbon resources. As in previous cases, this latest proposal is fully supported by Turkey, as it will provide a prompt solution to the tensions stemming from the ongoing offshore programmes of both sides on the island.


Turkey therefore rejects the arguments and allegations of the Greek Cypriot administration in their entirety.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 44 and 78, and of the Security Council, and published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, as well as in the next edition of the *Law of the Sea Bulletin*.

(Signed) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**  
Permanent Representative

**Annex to the letter dated 18 November 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

**Geographical coordinates of the outer limits of the Turkish continental shelf in the Mediterranean**



United Nations

A/76/601-S/2021/1036



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**General Assembly  
Seventy-sixth session**  
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**Question of Cyprus**

**Oceans and the law of the sea**

**Security Council  
Seventy-sixth year**

**Letter dated 14 December 2021 from the Permanent  
Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to  
the Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my government, I would like to draw your attention to the following points regarding the content of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, dated 18 November 2021 ([A/76/557-S/2021/961](#)):

Firstly, I should recall that the international community has no doubts that there is only one state in Cyprus that is constituted by the entire island of Cyprus, and that Cyprus is represented by the sole legitimate Government on the island since the Republic of Cyprus emerged into statehood in 1960. The unlawful use of force against Cyprus by Turkey has created no legal effects and has in no way altered the fact that the Republic of Cyprus has sovereignty over the whole island of Cyprus and enjoys all the rights stemming therefrom. Cyprus will continue to protect all its rights and legitimate interests in its territory, maritime space and airspace, including its *ipso facto* and *ab initio* sovereign rights over its continental shelf, in line with international legality and applicable international law.

The circulation of a chart, annexed to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Turkey dated 18 November 2021 ([A/76/557-S/2021/961](#)), depicting a divided island of Cyprus, with the names of the so-called “TRNC” and “GCASC” inscribed thereon, is a violation of international law and Security Council resolutions in itself. Security Council resolutions [541 \(1983\)](#) and [550 \(1984\)](#) deplored the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus and considered the declaration of the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” as legally invalid. Furthermore, the Council called repeatedly upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, while the International Court of Justice, in its 2010 Advisory Opinion, upheld the invalidity of the so-called “TRNC” since it was established as a result of the unlawful use of force on the part of Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus.

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Secondly, the maritime claims put forward by Turkey through the purported submission of purported geographical coordinates have no legal basis and create no legal effect or obligations, either vis-à-vis Cyprus, or any other third State. The maritime area claimed by Turkey is maximalist, unreasonable and encroaches on Cyprus' maritime zones and on the lawful rights of Cyprus therein, in violation of international law. With reference to the letter dated 18 March 2020 of the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations ([A/74/557-S/2020/50](#)), my government's position has been recorded in document [A/74/824-S/2020/332](#), dated 24 April 2020, where the submission by Turkey of a list of geographical coordinates concerning the outer limits of Turkey's purported continental shelf, was rejected *in toto*. Likewise, in a letter dated 20 January 2020 ([A/74/660-S/2020/50](#)), my government rejected the coordinates submitted by Turkey through its letter of 13 November 2019, contained in document [A/74/550](#).

Thirdly, Turkey continues to put forward the Turkish Cypriot community as a pretext for claiming rights over Cyprus, including in this context. The map attached to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Turkey ([A/76/557-S/2021/961](#)) clearly demonstrates that Turkey aims at depriving Cyprus – Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots alike – of approximately 44 per cent of the country's Exclusive Economic Zone, by appropriating it, in order to exclusively serve its own outlandish claims. It therefore invalidates, to say the least, Turkey's argument about safeguarding the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. If Turkey is interested in the rights and well-being of Turkish Cypriots, it could demonstrate it by cooperating to achieve Cyprus' reunification as swiftly as possible, instead of keeping them hostage in a secessionist entity in order to use them as bargaining chips for its own expansionist objectives. The management of natural resources in a reunited Cyprus has already been agreed in bicommunal negotiations, whereas, irrespective of the settlement of the Cyprus problem, the rights of all Cypriot citizens from any revenues accrued from the exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits are safeguarded through a National Sovereign Fund, established by the Cyprus Government in 2019 based on the Norwegian model.

The issue at hand is not bi-communal but inter-state. Turkey misleadingly attempts to divert attention from the fact that it is blatantly violating the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Cyprus within its maritime zones. The only solution to this is the delimitation between Cyprus and Turkey of their respective maritime zones, in accordance with international law. Cyprus once more reiterates its invitation to Turkey to enter into negotiations to this end, or alternatively, reach a special agreement (*compromis*) to jointly submit the issue to the International Court of Justice for the designation of a definitive maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf/Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus and Turkey, in conformity with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 44 and 78, and of the Security Council, and published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, as well as in the next edition of the Law of the Sea Bulletin.

(Signed) Andreas Hadjichrysanthou  
Permanent Representative

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