

STUDYING EASTERN ORTHODOX ANTI-WESTERNISM: THE NEED FOR A COMPARATIVE RESEARCH AGENDA

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Introduction

Any discussion of the relationship between Orthodox Christianity and (Western) Europe must inevitably take into account a phenomenon, which is not only widespread and multifaceted, but is also quite influential both in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, namely that of Orthodox anti-Westernism.¹ The whole issue revolves around certain established and standardised forms of an anti-Western critique found among countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, whose overall culture has been influenced in a decisive way by Orthodox Christianity over the course of a long history. The forms of anti-Western attitudes can be observed at the level of statements and expressions as well as at the level of behaviour and actions. These include, for example, specific discourses, habitual practices, particular positions, social organisational forms and patterns of action. These characteristics do not appear in isolation, but are often connected with one another for the optimisation of their effects. These empirically observable anti-Western features suggest further the existence of certain anti-Western mentalities too, which are taken to be the motivating forces behind these attitudes. These presupposed mentalities can be seen to exist among individuals and societies, among short-lived trends and institutions, among diffusely expressed opinions and deliberate political strategies, and among movements of protest and power structures.

Nevertheless, the term 'anti-Westernism' should not be taken as an unquestioned historical fact, although it has been coined and established in academic usage for many years.² In other words, it should be made clear that anti-Westernism as a mentality is a specific construction invented by scholars dealing with such phenomena and applied to them. Certain Orthodox authors of the past have thus been classified under the anti-Western front because in their works there were signs of a particular enmity towards the West. Yet, we are not in a position today to know exactly their particular motives, their specific objectives and the intellectual climate of their surrounding milieu. Therefore, our easy and convenient schematisation 'anti-Westerners' may, in many cases, not be particularly revelatory, if not actually misleading. These caveats intend to show, from the outset, the relativity of the terminology created - often in an uncritical way - and call into question its broad applicability. In the case of Orthodox anti-Westernism, one has thus to compare this phenomenon with what others have considered up to now to be 'anti-Westernism' and to see their similarities, analogies and differences. In addition, the Western perspective on these anti-Western currents must itself be taken into account, since it is related to the main issue under discussion here, namely the West and its wider impact.

In examining anti-Westernism in Orthodox Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, let us state here that we are not dealing with a phenomenon restricted to these geographical and cultural areas alone. On the contrary, it is about a much more widespread, if not global phenomenon, which can be observed with varying frequency and intensity both in the past and the present

¹ Cf. Holm Sundhausen, 'Was ist Osteuropa?', *Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin* 1 (1998), pp. 4-22, here: p. 18.

² Cf. Leften S. Stavrianos, 'The Influence of the West on the Balkans', in: Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds.), *The Balkans in Transition* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1963), pp. 184-226, here: p. 184-187.

time: in Islamic countries as well as in Asia, Latin America and Africa.³ Anti-Westernism reached its peak in the violent anti-American attacks of the 11th September 2001 in the United States. These forms of anti-Westernism are mostly the direct corollary of the Western political, economic and cultural expansion across the world in modern times in the wake of imperialism and colonialism. This had often led to the simple export or the forcible implementation of Western societal and cultural models upon indigenous peoples, while the West as a whole had served as a model of imitation for many civilisational complexes across the globe.

As expected, the adulterating influences of this Westernisation process, often identified with the modernisation of indigenous cultures, did not remain either unanswered or unchallenged. The latter did react in quite distinct forms and in many cases tried to preserve their own identity, as for example, through the so-called nativistic and revitalisation movements. Generally, in S.P.Huntington's terminology, there are three basic models of appropriating the West by indigenous cultures: rejectionism, Kemalism, and reformism.⁴ Aside from the earlier identification of Westernisation with modernisation, another model is in vogue nowadays, that of syncretic, non-Eurocentric modernisation. This includes, among other things, a respect for the local indigenous tradition during the process of social and cultural transformation without uncritically endorsing the entire Western model. In our case, Eastern Orthodox anti-Westernism is related not only to the former, but also to the latter model of modernisation.

In addition to the anti-Western critique 'from outside', let us now look at the existence of another anti-Western critique coming 'from within'. This concerns an older philosophical critique of the Western world which was established during the course of the 20th century. This has been carried out by scholars such as Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee and Noam Chomsky, by Cornelius Castoriadis and other Marxists of various provenance, by the Frankfurt School, by poststructuralist deconstruction, by anarchists, by the 'Unabomber' alias Ted Kaczynski in the United States and by various social alternative movements. The interconnection between these two forms of anti-Westernism is in some cases more than evident. It is in this context that the Russian theologian Georgy P. Florovsky has taken the term 'pseudomorphosis' from O. Spengler,⁵ which he has used to criticise the Western influence upon Orthodox theology. However, the intriguing, multifaceted and far-reaching critique of the West 'from within' will not be considered in this article because its presuppositions and objectives are clearly distinct from those in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

The Term "West": Its Historical and Contemporary Meaning

Any contemporary dealing with anti-Westernism has necessarily to take into consideration the meaning and the significance of the term 'West' nowadays. What is actually meant by this term? It is quite clear that it does not any longer merely signify the specific and narrow geographical area of Western Europe alone, whose development in modern times has been marked by decisive breakthroughs in many domains.⁶ Today the West includes all the

³ See, for instance, Mehrzad Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West* (New York, 1996); David Gress, *From Plato to NATO. The Idea of the West and its Opponents* (New York, 1998).

⁴ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London, 1998), pp. 72-78.

⁵ See Dorothea Wendebourg, 'Pseudomorphosis – ein theologisches Urteil als Axiom der kirchen- und theologiegeschichtlichen Forschung', in: Robert F. Taft, S.J. (ed.), *The Christian East. Its Institutions and its Thought. A Critical Reflection* (Rome, 1996), pp. 565-589, here: p. 565.

⁶ Cf. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 68-72.

places of the world which have been influenced and impregnated by Western ideas, orientations and ways of living (in society, politics, economy, culture etc.). The US is thus the Western country *par excellence*. This is the reason why the older anti-Westernism is often transformed nowadays into an anti-Americanism.⁷

Through the ongoing influence of modern communication technologies and the globalisation process the world has become a single place to a greater degree today than ever before in history. As a result, differences between cultures within the global melting-pot have largely been minimised, while certain predominant patterns of thinking and acting which had originated in the West, have acquired nearly universal application and establishment. Consequently, anti-globalisation in many instances has taken the guise of anti-Westernism. Yet, it cannot be denied that certain developments of contemporary global significance originally had their roots in the specific cultural framework of Western Europe. This discussion therefore calls into question the significance of the term 'West' nowadays, together with its analytical potential. For some scholars, the splendid rise of the Western world has already come to an end. What we are experiencing today is the intertwined global mass society, which has not only transcended local and national frontiers, but has also acquired planetary characteristics.⁸

Thus, the term 'West' has more an historical than a present-day significance and it must be replaced by a more successful word to describe the present situation. This implies, additionally, that modern anti-Westernism is not identical with the anti-Western currents in eighteenth century-Eastern Europe or in late Byzantium. In other words, the evolution of anti-Westernism itself throughout history and the interconnectedness of its various expressions are issues equally worthy of systematic investigation. This caveat, however, does not pertain exactly to Orthodox Christianity, in which history continues to play a very vital role. In our specific context, the term 'West', despite recent developments, has so far not lost its historical value and is closely related to the specific genesis of Orthodox anti-Westernism in Byzantium. Historical events still remain vivid in the Orthodox collective memory, as if time since the past has not elapsed. To mention a very recent example: When Pope John Paul II during his visit in Greece in May 2001 asked for forgiveness for the sacking of Constantinople by the crusaders in 1204, the trans-temporality of such historical events for Orthodox believers was rendered quite evident. The publicity given to this gesture of apology for an event that happened about 800 years ago among Orthodox media underlined the significance of the past in this religious tradition.

The Roots of Orthodox Anti-Westernism and the Consequences of the Great Schism

Historically speaking, the phenomenon of Orthodox anti-Westernism is related to the cultural, socio-political and religious opposition between the East Roman (Byzantine) and the West Roman (Latin) world, which culminated in the Great Schism of 1054. There have been several earlier indications of the progressing alienation between these two worlds, such as the abolition of the West Roman Empire in 476. At the level of religion, there have also been several minor schisms before 1054 with the temporary break of ecclesiastical communion between Rome and the four Patriarchates of the East (e.g., during the Acacian schism between 484-519). Thus, the Great Schism of 1054 was nothing but the climax of an earlier

⁷ See e.g. Richard Pells, *Not Like Us. How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York, 1997); Philipp Gassert, 'Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus, Amerikanisierung', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39 (1999), pp. 531-561.

⁸ See Panajotis Kondylis, 'Was heißt schon westlich?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19. November 1994.

estrangement process.⁹ It is worth mentioning, however, that the Great Schism was not at that time perceived as a permanent separation of the two worlds. The Russian evaluation of the events of 1054 attests to this¹⁰, despite the existence of a Russian anti-Latin theological literature too¹¹. Until 1204 one does not find any predominant inimical attitude or hatred towards the Byzantines in Latin sources.¹² Things changed, however, especially after the events of 1204, which left an indelible mark upon the Orthodox world.¹³ In the course of history, the Great Schism contributed further to the creation of a religious and cultural barrier between the Orthodox East and the Latin West. Although this issue had today been forgotten by many, especially by those outside the religious camp, and seemed to belong, rather, to a distant past, its significance became evident again in Huntington's geopolitical conceptualisation in the mid-1990s.¹⁴ This perpetuation of the Great Schism towards a post-Cold War cultural and religious dividing line in Europe caused many reactions and concomitant discussions, because it affected the issue of the wider European integration. The newly acquired geopolitical significance of this old event was indicative of the role played by religion in this context. Needless to say, Huntington's ideas were judged negatively by the majority of the non-Western world and thus offered fertile ground for a renewed appearance of critical anti-Western voices. The whole controversy again brought into prominence the two diverging ways of seeing each other, namely on the one hand the Western view of the East (and the rest of the world), and on the other hand the non-Western responses towards the West. Apart from this, the cultural gap between Eastern and Western Europe and the role of religion in this process also become evident by examining the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. There the majority of the population is Roman Catholic or Protestant, while the Orthodox presence is very limited. These countries – not least because of their common religious ties with Western Europe – tend to identify themselves with the West and thus are eager to strengthen their relationship to Western Europe.¹⁵ It is not accidental, therefore, that the new potential members of the European Union consist mainly of countries that have a common religious tradition with the West.¹⁶

Let us now consider the consequences of the Great Schism, especially with regard to anti-Westernism. It is perhaps more accurate to say that, from the point of view of the Orthodox East, the contrast with the West has been much more emphasised until today than has Western opposition to the East. This is due to the fact that, from the fifteenth century onwards, the Eastern Orthodox world found itself in a position of backwardness in relation to the West, due to various reasons (e.g., Ottoman rule in the Balkans, cultural lag in Russia). This separation was further exacerbated by the religious opposition between the two worlds, which was deepened even further during this period. Taking advantage of the inferior situation of the Orthodox East, the Roman Catholic Church systematically attempted to expand its religious

⁹ See Peter Brown, 'Eastern and Western Christendom in Late Antiquity: A Parting of Ways', in: Derek Baker (ed.), *The Orthodox Churches and the West* (London, 1976), pp. 1-24.

¹⁰ See Wil van den Bercken, *Holy Russia and Christian Europe. East and West in the Religious Ideology of Russia* (London, 1999), pp. 42-74.

¹¹ See Gerhard Podskalsky, *Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiever Rus' (988-1237)* (Munich, 1982), pp. 170-184.

¹² See Bruna Evels-Hoving, *Byzantium in westerse ogen, 1096-1204* (Assen, 1971); Michael Rentschler, 'Griechische Kultur und Byzanz im Urteil westlicher Autoren des 10. Jahrhunderts', *Saeculum* 29 (1978), pp. 324-355; idem, 'Griechische Kultur und Byzanz im Urteil westlicher Autoren des 11. Jahrhunderts', *Saeculum* 31 (1980), pp. 112-156.

¹³ See Athina Kolia-Dermizaki, 'Die Kreuzfahrer und die Kreuzzüge im Sprachgebrauch der Byzantiner', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 41 (1991), pp. 163-188.

¹⁴ See Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 157-163.

¹⁵ See Oskar Halecki, *Europa. Grenzen und Gliederung seiner Geschichte* (Darmstadt, 1957), pp. 94-128.

¹⁶ Cf. Victoria Clark, *Why Angels Fall. A Journey Through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo* (London, 2000), p. 7.

influence there. As might be expected, this resulted in the articulation of various anti-Western responses on the part of the Orthodox East. Their consequences included dichotomising and polarising attitudes towards the West as well as the generalisation of differences. The initially relative and contingent separation of the two worlds was thus transformed into a metaphysical gulf, which acquired the status of an ontological dualism.¹⁷

For the overwhelming majority of the Orthodox, from the late Byzantine times onwards, the West signified a place out of which originated mainly dangers for Orthodox Christianity. Orthodox anti-Westernism became even stronger after the fall of Byzantium in 1453, when Eastern Europe tried to compensate in various ways for its multiple deficits vis-à-vis the increasing significance and worldwide impact of the West. The West as a whole - and not only in religious terms - was further demonised as a place inhabited by heretics, who had not preserved the inherited Orthodox faith in its unadulterated form. Such attitudes can be observed among numerous Orthodox groups ranging from the Russian Old Believers in the seventeenth century¹⁸ to the rigorist Old Calendarists in twentieth century-Greece.¹⁹ Due to this generalisation of differences, modern science was rejected by several Orthodox groups in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as representing something coming from the fallen and heretical West.²⁰ Dreading the strong Western influences upon the East, many Orthodox went so far as to construct perpetual and eternal enemies out of the West and to suspect a general Western conspiracy which aimed at conquering the Orthodox East. In reality, such Orthodox fears were not altogether imaginary and unfounded, if one considers the clear intention of the Roman Catholic Church at that time, which was to infiltrate and to control the Orthodox East.²¹ The foundation of the *Collegio San Atanasio* in Rome in 1577 by Pope Gregory XIII to educate Orthodox students who had converted to Roman Catholicism and the foundation of the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* in 1622 are two cases in point.²²

It is particularly interesting to observe certain anti-Western coalitions along otherwise incommensurable lines which took place at that time, namely between Orthodox and Muslims in the Eastern Mediterranean area. This phenomenon of anti-Western solidarity, which can already be observed *in nuce* at the period of the Crusades²³, was further strengthened during the last remaining centuries of Byzantium. Despite the organised efforts of many Byzantine emperors to achieve a union with Rome at any price in order to face the imminent Ottoman threat, this compromising policy never found a positive reception among the large Orthodox population, clergy and laity alike. The failure of the most important attempt at a union in Ferrara / Florence in 1438/39, i.e., fifteen years before the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans, attests to this. In fact, many Orthodox at that time seemed to prefer an Ottoman domination over Byzantium than subordination to Rome. The former was considered to be a lesser evil, while the latter was seen as leading directly to the loss of the Orthodox faith. This

¹⁷ For the Russian case see Yurii M. Lotman / Boris A. Uspenskii, 'Rol' dual'nykh modelei v dinamike russkoi kul'tury (do kontsa 18 veka)', *Trudy po russkoi i slavyanskoi filologii* 28 (1977), pp. 3-36.

¹⁸ See Daniel L. Schafly, Jr., 'The Popular Image of the West in Russia at the Time of Peter the Great', in: Roger P. Bartlett, A.G. Cross and Karen Rasmussen (eds.), *Russia and the World of the Eighteenth Century* (Ohio, 1988), pp. 2-21.

¹⁹ See Vasilios N. Makrides, 'Aspects of Greek Orthodox Fundamentalism', *Orthodoxes Forum* 5 (1991), pp. 49-72.

²⁰ For the Greek case see Vasilios N. Makrides, *Die religiöse Kritik am kopernikanischen Weltbild in Griechenland zwischen 1794 und 1821. Aspekte griechisch-orthodoxer Apologetik angesichts naturwissenschaftlicher Fortschritte* (Frankfurt a.M. et al., 1995).

²¹ See Charles A. Frazee, *Catholics and the Sultans* (Cambridge, 1983).

²² Gerhard Podskalsky, *Griechische Theologie in der Zeit der Türkenherrschaft (1453-1821)* (Munich, 1988), p. 33.

²³ See Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (eds.), *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World* (Washington D.C., 2001).

strong anti-Western spirit is exemplified vividly in a characteristic saying of the time: *Better a Turkish turban than a Latin tiara*.²⁴

Furthermore, Orthodox anti-Western feelings were strengthened during the long period of Ottoman rule. The privileges bestowed upon the Patriarch of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmed II (1444-1446, 1451-1481) had a clear political motivation, namely to alienate Eastern and Western Christians and to avoid a renewed common Christian crusade against the Ottoman Empire. This preference for the Ottomans instead of Western Christians was also religiously legitimised under Ottoman rule and was used to wipe out Orthodox 'revolutionary' plans for liberation. The main argument was that Ottoman rule over the Orthodox was ordained by divine providence. God's plan was to save the Orthodox East from a potential subjugation to Roman Catholicism, which would have led to the final loss of Orthodoxy. That is why God allowed the Ottomans to conquer the Orthodox East, who had in fact left Orthodoxy intact. In addition, the Sublime Porte occasionally tried to use these ideas for its own interest (e.g., during Napoleon's campaign in the Levant). This can be inferred from a booklet entitled *Πατρική Διδασκαλία* (= Paternal Exhortation) published in Constantinople by the patriarchal press in 1798 under the name of the Patriarch of Jerusalem Anthimos.²⁵ Orthodox and Ottoman anti-Westernism were far from being identical, but their eventual 'cooperation' was not out of the ordinary. It is also worth mentioning that an analogous attitude towards Muslims and Western Christians can be observed in thirteenth century-Orthodox Russia. Tsar Aleksandr Nevsky gave preference to a coalition with the Tatars and Mongols over an anti-Muslim alliance and a union with Rome, which had been proposed to him in 1248 by Pope Innocent IV.²⁶

A closer examination of a certain phenomenon is crucial for understanding the ongoing - general and not only religious - estrangement between East and West at that time and the concomitant Orthodox anti-Westernism. This factor is the continuous bivalent comparison between the two worlds and the quest for superiority of the one over the other. This can already be observed in the Byzantine period, although the Byzantines, considering themselves to be the new elect people of God, were generally convinced of their superiority over other peoples.²⁷ This sense was mainly due to their Orthodox faith and their additional achievements (in technology, in arts, in politics and diplomacy etc.). Only during the last 150 years of the Byzantine Empire was there a growing dissatisfaction with the Empire's observed decline and with the quest for fresh knowledge and ideas from other sources including the West.²⁸ Such an innovation was attempted not only in the domain of science and technology (e.g., Cardinal Bessarion's appeal in the 1440s to the leader of Mystra - and later last Byzantine emperor -, Constantine XI Paleologue, to send certain young people to Italy to be educated in modern technology and to import this knowledge back to Byzantium in order to face the expanding Ottoman threat²⁹).

²⁴ See Halina Evert-Kappesowa, 'La tiare ou le turban', *Byzantinoslavica* 14 (1953), pp. 245-257; Stavrianos, 'The influence of the West', p. 186.

²⁵ See Richard Clogg, 'The 'Dhidhaskalia Patriki' (1798): An Orthodox Reaction to French Revolutionary Propaganda', *Middle Eastern Studies* 5 (1969), pp. 87-115.

²⁶ See van den Bercken, *Holy Russia and Christian Europe*, pp. 124-125.

²⁷ See Herbert Hunger, *Byzanz, eine Gesellschaft mit zwei Gesichtern* [Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser 51:2] (Kopenhagen, 1984), pp. 10-11.

²⁸ See Ihor Ševčenko, 'The Decline of Byzantium Seen Through the Eyes of its Intellectuals', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 15 (1961), pp. 169-186.

²⁹ See A.G. Keller, 'A Byzantine Admirer of 'Western Progress': Cardinal Bessarion', *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 11 (1955), pp. 343-358.

The same is true in the domain of theology too, as the Greek translation of Thomas Aquinas by Dimitrios Kydonis clearly shows.³⁰ Yet, although Byzantine refugee scholars did contribute a lot to the rise of the Italian Renaissance, the cultural seclusion of the Orthodox East from the tremendous developments in the West after 1453 was still the case for a long period of time. This seclusion was further intensified in the Balkans by the impact of the Ottoman domination, which up to the seventeenth century was not particularly open to Western influences. At the same time, the undeniable progress of the West, together with its unavoidable influence and attractiveness, enhanced its general image as a model worthy of imitation. This was a reality for the Orthodox East too, where the demand for Westernisation was publicly voiced in various contexts from the eighteenth century onwards.

This new situation, however, proved to be a stumbling block for the Orthodox adversaries of the West, who tried to continue the long line of anti-Western polemics which had been raging since the late Byzantine times. During the modern period they developed various compensatory mechanisms against the growing Western influences. Their aim was to compensate for the multiple deficits of the Orthodox East and its inferiority complex in comparison to the West by formulating counterarguments and by articulating specific defensive strategies. In the end, they intended to prove that Western superiority was not only a deception, but was also a trivial and unwelcome element for the Orthodox East. For instance, from an Orthodox perspective Western scientific achievements have been often considered as problematic, because they were associated with atheistic or irreligious worldviews and could be detrimental to the salvation of the soul. For this reason, Orthodox Christians were admonished to look for more holistic approaches to science, as had traditionally been practised in the East.³¹

Further, it was argued that the Orthodox East had no reason for feeling inferior to the West. Among the arguments adduced, one placed particular emphasis upon the possession of religious truth. In other words, Orthodox, being in possession of the authentic Christian truth, were considered superior to the heretics of the West. The latter were mistakenly proud of certain advances in mundane domains, but were far behind in terms of religious authenticity.³² This criterion was thought to be sufficient for establishing Orthodox superiority. The whole process of bivalent comparison between East and West belongs to the typical aspects of Orthodox anti-Westernism. It can be observed in differing forms throughout the history of the Orthodox world, ranging from the patriarchal encyclicals against the West under Ottoman rule up to the Slavophile controversy in the nineteenth century and to the neo-Slavophile renaissance in post-communist Russia. This comparison between different cultures with axiological interest has been examined by Rainer Grübel and Igor' P. Smirnov³³, who termed this particular aspect of Russian cultural philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries *culturosophy*. The latter can be defined as a binary structured and bivalently-oriented thinking in comparing different cultures, in which the quest for differences prevails

³⁰ See Franz Tinnefeld, 'Das Niveau der abendländischen Wissenschaft aus der Sicht gebildeter Byzantiner im 13. und 14. Jh.', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 6 (1979), pp. 241-280, here: pp. 267-280; Photios Demetracopoulos, 'Demetrius Kydonis' Translation of the *Summa Theologica*', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 32/4 (1982), pp. 311-319.

³¹ See e.g. Ivan V. Kireevskii, 'O kharaktere prosveshcheniya Evropy i ego sootnoshenii k prosveshcheniyu Rossii', in: *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v dvukh tomakh*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1866), pp. 229-280.

³² See e.g. Aleksei Khomyakov, 'Neskol'ko slov pravoslav'nogo khristianina o zapadnykh veroispovedaniyakh', in: *Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh*. Vol. 2, *Raboty po bogosloviyu* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 25-195.

³³ See Rainer Grübel and Igor' P. Smirnov, 'Die Geschichte der russischen Kulturosophie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert', *Wiener Slavistischer Almanach. Sonderband* 44 (1997), pp. 5-18.

over the quest for common elements.³⁴ It is obvious that this pertains especially to the comparison under discussion, i.e., between East (culture 1) and West (culture 2).

Anti- and Pro-Western Currents: Their Encounter, Conflict, and Antinomies

This last issue brings us to another side of the whole story, namely to the strong pro-Western currents and attitudes found in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As expected, the Western superiority in various domains did not only have a general impact upon the East, but also created a series of admirers there. This included particular social strata (political leaders, students, scholars, merchants), who had entered at some point in their lives into contact with the West and vividly experienced the multifaceted Western progress. As a result, they began to support closer ties with the West, exercised severe self-criticism and intended to bring Eastern Europe as a whole into the group of Western civilised nations. The impact of the West upon the East was achieved through various channels (from 'above' and from 'below' alike) and was further deepened by the physical presence of Western people in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (from clergymen and ambassadors to scientists and merchants). In this way, alongside the group of anti-Westerners there have always been various pro-Western movements, ranging from moderate to enthusiastic admirers of the West. The coexistence of these currents is a constant phenomenon in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and can be observed from the late Byzantine times up to the renaissance of anti-Western discourses in post-communist Russia.³⁵

It goes without saying that these opposing orientations and binary oppositions (East vs. West, Pro-Eastern vs. Pro-Western) fell into fierce conflict with one another. This continues in various expressions today and still creates huge dichotomies that reveal the major identity problems among the Orthodox in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.³⁶ This is basically the reason why Huntington has called Russia and Greece *torn countries* pointing to the divisive consequences of these divergent orientations.³⁷ This bipolarity in the construction of the specific Russian culture at least up to the eighteenth century had already been examined by Yu.M.Lotman and B.A.Uspensky.³⁸ In their view, all the basic cultural values (ideological, political, religious) in Russia are placed in a bipolar value field, which was dichotomised by a sharp demarcation line and did not allow the existence of a neutral axiological zone. Although this theory is not entirely accurate with regard to particular aspects of the entire Russian culture³⁹, it can still be argued that the aforementioned binary, disjunctive model had a certain priority in Russian cultural and historical philosophy. This pertains, of course, to the opposition between Orthodoxy and the West, as was the case in the Russian cultural

³⁴ Cf. Dirk Uffelmann, *Die russische Kulturosophie. Logik und Axiologie der Argumentation* [Slavische Literaturen, 18] (Frankfurt a.M. et al., 1999).

³⁵ Cf. Alexander Agadjanian, 'Public Religion and the Quest for National Ideology: Russia's Media Discourse', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40 (2001), pp. 351-365, here: pp. 354-356.

³⁶ See Georg Stadtmüller, 'Aufklärung und 'Europäisierung' als Entwicklungsbruch bei den Völkern Südosteuropas', *Neues Abendland* 7 (1952), pp. 434-439; Boris Groys, 'Russia and the West: The Quest for Russian National Identity', *Studies in Soviet Thought* 43 (1992), pp. 185-198; Christiane Uhlig, 'Die unendliche Suche Rußlands nach seiner historischen Bestimmung', *Osteuropa* 45 (1995), pp. 812-816; eadem, "'Rußland ist mit dem Verstand nicht zu begreifen'. Die Modernisierungsdebatte in den russischen Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften', in: Aleida Assmann and Heidrun Friese (eds.), *Erinnerung, Geschichte, Identität* (Frankfurt a.M., 1998), pp. 374-400.

³⁷ See Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 138-144, 162-163.

³⁸ See Lotman and Uspenskii, 'Rol' dual'nykh modelei', passim.

³⁹ See Susanne Frank, 'Sibirien. Peripherie und Anderes der russischen Kultur', *Wiener Slavistischer Almanach. Sonderband* 44 (1997), pp. 357-382; Uffelmann, *Die russische Kulturosophie*, passim.

philosophy of the nineteenth century. It is also worth examining to which degree the Lotman / Uspensky theory may be applied - *mutatis mutandis* - to other Orthodox cultures.

It should be made clear, however, that the aforementioned rather sharp distinction between anti- and pro-Western orientations is more or less schematic, for it does not do justice to various paradoxical cases that belong to neither of the two categories. To mention but a few examples: there are nowadays many Greek Orthodox rigorists who are outspoken and firm opponents of any Western influence upon Orthodoxy and consider themselves as faithful keepers of the authentic Christian tradition. These, however, do not hesitate to translate American Protestant literature of fundamentalist provenance against the evolution theory into modern Greek.⁴⁰ Such a theological transfer takes place in a smooth way without any questioning of the great differences between the two religious and cultural traditions and despite the general anti-Western orientations on the Greek Orthodox side. One reason explaining this peculiar situation may be found in the Biblical literalism, which exists, though with a different historical and theological background, in both traditions.

In some other cases, the use of modern scientific ideas or technical devices of Western provenance is considered as a *sine qua non*, while the Western spirit underlying them is categorically denied. Finally, in his *Rossiya i Evropa* (1869) Nikolai Danilevsky (1822-1885) often used Western science in order to demonstrate the basic cultural difference between East and West.⁴¹ Regarding the different Christian confessions, he followed Khomyakov and accepted his *sobornost'* (catholicity) as an antidote to the Western emphasis upon particularity. Nonetheless, in the opposition between these cultures *sobornost'* was not much of a help. This is why Danilevsky resorted here to war as the sole means of success, which, however, had also been associated with Western aggressiveness.⁴²

Such cases reveal exactly the antinomies and the cultural 'schizophrenias' connected with this polarity between East and West. In such paradoxical cases, it is always helpful to look at their particular background and their objectives. In this way, despite oversimplifications and easy categorisations, we may focus on these paradoxical phenomena that reveal the many 'grey areas' between the main two opposite camps. For some Orthodox though, this – falsely called schizophrenic – attitude towards the West is neither a problem nor a disease. Rather, it exactly embodies a central characteristic of the particular Orthodox ethos, namely thinking and acting in contradictory ways. The abolition of all contradictions is considered by them to be a Western neurosis, which has led to an uncritical social optimism, to the creation of 'great mythologies' and finally to their tragic fall. On the contrary, the Orthodox East has always been moderate and from the very beginning recognised the inherent contradictions in all things and situations. This is why it has acknowledged early enough the relativity of all human endeavours and the fruitless Western attempt to abolish all contradictions. According to these Orthodox, the continuous coexistence of good and evil is not something wrong, but represents the complementary way of all things in the past, at present and in the future. To acknowledge this is not a schizophrenic, but on the contrary a well-thought out and deeply realistic position.⁴³ The link between this contradictory philosophising underlined by authors with an Orthodox background and poststructuralist strategies of self-contradiction (L.Shestov - J.Derrida)⁴⁴ deserves further investigation.

⁴⁰ See e.g. Duane T. Gish, *Εξέλιξη; Τα απολιθώματα λένε όχι!* (Preveza, 1985); Cf. Apostolos Frangos, *Από τον πίθηκο; Τα επιστημονικά στοιχεία για την θεωρία της εξέλιξης* (Athens, 1985); idem, *Εξέλιξη ή δημιουργία;* (Athens, 1991).

⁴¹ See Nikolai Ya. Danilevskii, *Rossiya i Evropa* (Sankt Petersburg, 1995).

⁴² See Uffelmann, *Die russische Kulturosofophie*, p. 259.

⁴³ See e.g. Kostas Zouraris, *Θεοείδεια παρακατιανή. Εισαγωγή στην απορία της πολιτικής* (Athens, 1989).

⁴⁴ Cf. Lev Shestov, *Αποφειος bespochvennosti. Opyt adogmaticheskogo myshleniya* (Leningrad, 1991); Jacques Derrida, *La Dissémination* (Paris, 1972).

It is also interesting to explore, in the present context, the change of course among certain Orthodox, namely from the pro-Western to the anti-Western camp and vice versa. This is extremely vital in order to avoid viewing anti-Westernism as a monolithic and clear-cut phenomenon. This change of attitudes is often connected with significant events in one's own life (biography), which directly affect the realm of ideas. These cases also show that, with regard to the West, it is often difficult to keep solely one basic and uncontaminated stance. Radical changes and concomitant discontinuities are thus not out of the ordinary.⁴⁵ Vladimir Solovyov's (1853-1900) intellectual evolution is an example of an early anti-Western attitude, which later turned into an all-encompassing religio-philosophical vision that included the Western tradition. He started his philosophical career with his dissertation *Krizis zapadnoi filosofii* (1874) and his systematic exposé *Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znaniya* (1877). In these two works there are clear signs of Slavophile ideas and topics: a critique of Western individualism, atomocentrism and rationalism⁴⁶; in addition, a critique of the supposedly hyper-rational Scholasticism, a theme already present in Ivan Kireevsky's thought. Solovyov began to relativise his earlier anti-Western invective from 1880 onwards, while in his *Chteniya o bogochelovechestve* both positions had been still evident. In the 1880s and 1890s, Solovyov integrated previous one-sided positions and included the one regarding the West in an all-encompassing ecumenical teleology, which was reminiscent of a conciliatory abolition of bipolarities within a Hegelian frame. In this way, Solovyov created his whole *oeuvre* in the form of a dialectic, which intended to integrate everything.

There is also another direction, namely the dialectical and radical abandonment of a theory that had been believed previously. In the present case, this has to do with a turn from a pro-Western to an anti-Western attitude. This has been exemplified by the *Vekhi*-authors, the later well-known religious philosophers, who had contributed to this collective volume of 1909: Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944), Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948) and Semen Frank (1877-1950). These had left behind their early fascination with Marxism and started criticising socialistic utopias of a this-worldly salvation as mistaken and misleading. Through an intermediate stage (Bulgakov's *Ot marksizma k idealizmu* and the collective volume preceding the *Vekhi*, *Problemy idealizma*) they gave up the immanentist Marxist eschatology, which appeared to them as a Western one, and instead embraced Eastern Orthodox models.⁴⁷

Similar radical turns in personal biographies can also be observed among the Neo-Orthodox current in Greece in the 1980s. This diffused and unorganised elitist intellectual current consisted to a great degree of former Marxists. These had suddenly started to look for the authentic elements of the indigenous Greek tradition in order to build a Marxist theory specifically destined for the Greek case and to avoid importing foreign (Western) ideas. During this quest they were unavoidably confronted by the religious past of the country, namely by the Orthodox tradition, and thus they began to consider it from another, more positive angle. A common element in the Neo-Orthodox current has been its strong anti-Westernism and the greatest possible dissociation between Eastern and Western Christendom. These intellectuals also came into contact with some Greek theologians (C.Yannaras) who were trying to locate specific common ideals and objectives. Consequently, their obvious solidarity on the issue of anti-Westernism became immediately a major point of convergence.⁴⁸ To mention also another relevant example: more recently, the phenomenon of

⁴⁵ Cf. Christos Yannaras, *Ta kath' eavtón* (Athens, 1995), pp. 41-51, 71-76, 81-86, 125-133.

⁴⁶ See J. Kondrinewitsch, *Die Lehre von der integralen Einheit bei V. Solov'ev*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Vienna, 1963), p. 147; Uffelman, *Die russische Kulturosoophie*, pp. 319-320.

⁴⁷ See Wil van den Bercken, *Christian Thinking and the End of Communism in Russia* (Utrecht, 1993), pp. 13-90.

⁴⁸ See Vasilios N. Makrides, 'Neoorthodoxie - eine religiöse Intellektuellenströmung im heutigen Griechenland', in: Peter Antes and Donat Pahnke (eds.), *Die Religion von Oberschichten: Religion - Profession - Intellektualismus* (Marburg, 1989), pp. 279-289; idem, 'Byzantium in Contemporary Greece: the Neo-Orthodox

transition from Marxism to Orthodoxy has been witnessed among the so-called 'regenerated' or 'new-born' Orthodox in post-communist Serbia too.⁴⁹

The 'Secularisation' of Orthodox Anti-Westernism

Orthodox anti-Westernism is not a phenomenon of a purely religious nature. Rather, there are many other parameters that often play a significant role either directly or otherwise in this conjunction. There are, for example, political and social anti-Westernisms, which are equally widespread in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Although never purely religious, the initial opposition between East and West has thus to a certain extent been 'secularised'. Anti-Western mentalities may be embodied by quite distinct societal sectors in today's functionally differentiated societies. In this way, aside from religious needs, anti-Westernism may satisfy various psychological, social or political needs, and may be promoted by various independent groups. It may harden national and social identities and create boundary-posturing mechanisms. We may even talk of the socio-political exploitation of Orthodox anti-Westernism, which had already been practised in another context by the Ottomans. If one takes into consideration the anti-Western orientations of the early socialist government of PASOK in Greece (in the 1980s), one gets a better idea of the wider function of anti-Westernism.⁵⁰ This has also caused Huntington to claim that Greece has never been a good partner of NATO and the West, and that this can be attributed to its specific religious tradition too.⁵¹ In the Russian case, during the Soviet period though, a particular anti-Western (anti-capitalist) policy was followed, whereas even the Russian Orthodox Church was used systematically by the anti-religious regime to keep the distance to the West (cf. the initial sceptical attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards the ecumenical movement).⁵² Nonetheless, this does not imply a complete identification or linear continuity between the Orthodox and the Soviet anti-Westernism.⁵³ This constellation of various anti-Western currents can also be observed in Serbia during the 1990s, where the Orthodox Church suffered a lot from its systematic exploitation by the regime of Slobodan Milosevich in his opposition to the Western world. This whole situation gave rise again, among other things, to a considerable amount of anti-Western literature.⁵⁴ Generally speaking, however, the particular reasons as to why a certain social, political or intellectual group may choose a pro or anti-Western attitude must be examined in a differentiated way against concrete historical material.

Current of Ideas', in: David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.), *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity* (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 141-153.

⁴⁹ See Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, pp. 60-62.

⁵⁰ See Nikolaus Wenturis, *Griechenland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft. Die soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen griechischer Europapolitiken* (Tübingen, 1990), pp. 185-194; Panayiotis Dimitras, 'L'antioccidentalisme grec', *Contacts* 36 (1984), pp. 350-358.

⁵¹ See Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 162-163.

⁵² See Dmitri V. Pospelovsky, *Russkaya pravoslavnaya tserkov v XX veke* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 364-371.

⁵³ Cf. Dmitri Obolensky, 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 1 (1950), pp. 37-63, here: pp. 59-60. See also Tatjana Eggeling, 'Die Sowjetunion und 'der Westen' - Imaginationen des kapitalistischen Auslands in der sowjetischen Jugendpresse', in: Holm Sundhausen (ed.), *Osteuropa zwischen Integration und Differenz* (Frankfurt a.M., 1999), pp. 105-125.

⁵⁴ See Zoran Milosevich, *Zasto Papa putuje?* (Sabac, 1996); Ivan Čolović, 'Europa als Gegenstand der zeitgenössischen politischen Mythologie in Serbien', in: Harald Heppner and Grigorios Larentzakis (eds.), *Das Europa-Verständnis im orthodoxen Südosteuropa*, (Graz, 1996), pp. 193-201; Anne Herbst, 'Stumbling-blocks to Ecumenism in the Balkans', *Religion, State and Society* 26 (1998), pp. 173-180; Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, pp. 47-101.

The same pertains to the anti-Western Orthodox mass responses, for example, towards the decisions of political elites, who played a principal role in initiating and imposing Westernisation - even with the use of force - (e.g., in Russia by Peter the Great, whose pro-Western reforms later became a model deemed worthy of imitation in the entire South-Eastern Europe, and in the various Balkan states after their gradual liberation throughout the nineteenth century). Popular protest movements of an overtly religious character often had a different hidden character. In other words, they reflected social and economic dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the policies and influences of Westernisation. A popular protest movement of this kind appeared in Greece in the 1840s under the leadership of a monk named Christophoros Panayiotopoulos, alias Papoulakos. He reacted in this way against the policies of the Bavarian regime of King Othon of Greece.⁵⁵ This attests to the fact that anti-Westernism possesses a great potential both for the transformation and the transposition of conflicts. In other words, purely religious conflicts may be transposed into secular contexts and lose their religious specificity. The 'worldliness' of Orthodox anti-Westernism thus has many facets. Anti-Westernism may take the form of an extreme nationalism, which can function as a surrogate for religion too.⁵⁶ Orthodox anti-Westernism and its resentments can also be translated into their cultural equivalents. They can acquire a general philosophical or a literary status (cf. the debate between Slavophiles and Westernisers in nineteenth century-Russia and then F.M.Dostoevsky's literary reproduction of the above debate).

Apart from this, both the meeting and the collision between Eastern and Western societal and economic models of development have also led to the merging of anti-Western attitudes with East European economic and social theories. The search for alternatives within the indigenous culture and based on its own intellectual tradition was a defensive mechanism for the East against the wholesale importation of foreign, Western models of development. In this way, there have been interesting alliances of anti-Westernism with anti-capitalism (e.g., Slavophile agrarian communism)⁵⁷ and anti-Marxism (e.g., agrarian anarchism)⁵⁸. Transnational Pan-Orthodox alliances against the West have been common, while, on the political and cultural levels, the phenomenon of Pan-Slavism exhibited clear anti-Western features too.⁵⁹ These kinds of reactions against the West should also be viewed in relation to the Orthodox sense of mission towards the West and the rest of the world.⁶⁰ Many Orthodox are still fully convinced of their real superiority towards other peoples and of their salvific mission in the world. They intend to propose solutions to world problems from the Orthodox repertoire, which are seen as unique and realistic. This Orthodox messianism compensates again for the inferiority complex of the East towards the West.

⁵⁵ See Theoni Stathopoulou, *Το κίνημα του Παπουλάκου. Οι θρησκευτικές, πολιτικές και κοινωνικές διαστάσεις του*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Panteion University, Athens, 1990).

⁵⁶ Cf. Ernst Gellner, *Nationalismus, Kultur und Macht* (Berlin, 1988).

⁵⁷ See João Frederico Normano, *The Spirit of Russian Economics* (New York, 1945), p. 91

⁵⁸ See Roumen Daskalov, 'Ideas About, and Reactions to Modernization in the Balkans', *East European Quarterly* 31 (1997), pp. 141-180.

⁵⁹ See Abdul-Raouf Sinno, 'Pan-Slavism und Pan-Orthodoxie als Instrumente der russischen Politik im osmanischen Reich', *Die Welt des Islams* 28 (1988), 537-558.

⁶⁰ See Peter J.S. Duncan, *Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism, and After* (London, New York, 2000); Vladimir Fedorov, 'Messianismus und Heilige Rus', in: Alois Mosser (ed.), *'Gottes auserwählte Völker'. Erwählungsvorstellungen und kollektive Selbstfindung in der Geschichte* (Frankfurt a.M., 2001), pp. 243-260; Ioannis Petrou, 'Nationale Identität und Orthodoxie im heutigen Griechenland', in: *op. cit.*, pp. 261-271; Hans-Dieter Döpmann, "'Gottes auserwähltes Volk' im Verständnis der Bulgaren", in: *op. cit.*, pp. 273-294.

Orthodox Anti-Europeanism and the Role of Western Bias

The relevance of Orthodox anti-Westernism today is evident from its close relationship to another parallel phenomenon, namely to Orthodox anti-Europeanism. The latter is rather a recent phenomenon, but is closely related to the negative attitudes developed by the Orthodox towards the West in earlier centuries. Orthodox anti-Europeanism today is not directed against the idea of Europe as such, but against the specific conception and construction of Europe promulgated and disseminated by the West. Historically speaking, the term 'Europe', though originally of Greek origin, has had quite another significance in the East than in the West. For instance, the Byzantines did not have a clear geographical conception of Europe as a continent, because their empire lay in the middle between Asia and Europe.⁶¹ Furthermore, in the eighteenth century Europe was not simply a geographical term for including the entire European continent up to the Urals, but a term of exclusion in a political, religious and cultural sense and - interestingly enough - became synonymous with the West. The Orthodox in the Balkans under Ottoman rule and in Russia did not feel to be part of Europe.⁶² Enlightened Europe (*Europe éclairée*) has thus been for them an external model for imitation.

Although this older identification of Europe with the West has principally vanished today, it is still interesting that in East European everyday usage (e.g., in Bulgarian, Greek, Russian) Europe is often considered as something lying outside one's own realm and as referring to the others.⁶³ Surprisingly enough, this can be observed even in Greece, although this country has been a full member of the European Union since 1980.⁶⁴ Thus, while some previous alliances (e.g., with anti-Marxism) have lost their relevance today, contemporary Orthodox anti-Europeanism represents an important social phenomenon, whose roots and background are not fully captured by politicians and policy makers, who tend to underestimate or neglect these factors. This has to do with the fact that Europe as a political-cultural idea has experienced a considerable evolution along different religious, historical and political lines and has been articulated in quite distinct ways. For this reason, it has become difficult to create a permanent idea of Europe which would be capable of including all the various notions about it which have been developed in history. The danger of exclusivism and of subjective criteria in the present issue, both internal and external, always remains imminent, as N. Danilevsky has noted. To the question if Russia belonged to Europe, he answered that this was rather a matter of personal taste. For some, it belonged to Europe and for others it did not. For others though, it belonged partly to Europe, while the extent to which it belonged was again a matter of taste.⁶⁵

To do justice to both sides, it must however be mentioned that the cultural and religious separation between East and West cannot be reduced to the impact of Orthodox anti-Westernism alone. Without denying its role and impact, it should not be forgotten that the

⁶¹ See Herbert Hunger, *Phänomen Byzanz – aus europäischer Sicht* [Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 1984, 3] (Munich, 1984), pp. 6-8.

⁶² See Ekkehard Klug, 'Europa' und 'europäisch' im russischen Denken vom 16. bis zum frühen 19. Jahrhundert', *Saeculum* 38 (1987), pp. 193-224; Mark Bassin, 'Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space', *Slavic Review* 50 (1991), pp. 1-17.

⁶³ See Klaus Roth, 'Wie 'europäisch' ist Südosteuropa? Zum Problem des kulturellen Wandels auf der Balkanhalbinsel', in: Nils-Arvid Bringéus et al. (eds.), *Wandel der Volkskultur in Europa. Festschrift für Günter Wiegelmann zum 60. Geburtstag*, Vol. 1 (Münster, 1985), pp. 219-231; Gabriella Schubert, 'Aspekte kultureller Beziehungen Südosteuropas zu Westeuropa', *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie* 32 (1996), pp. 91-108, here: pp. 101-102.

⁶⁴ See Harald Heppner and Olga Katsiardi-Hering (eds.), *Die Griechen und Europa. Außen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit* (Wien / Köln / Weimar, 1998); Efterpe Fokas, 'Greek Orthodoxy and European Identity', in: Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mosialos (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Aldershot et. al., 2000), pp. 275-300.

⁶⁵ Danilevskii, *Rossiya i Evropa*, p. 47.

West has produced several counterparts to Orthodox anti-Westernism, which have also contributed to the estrangement of the two worlds. We are referring here to the various ideologies within the Western world that have shaped the perception of the non-Western others. In fact, the exclusion of the Eastern Europe from the European continent and civilisation is also due to Western Europe itself, which identified Europe with the West.⁶⁶ For example, if the European idea is traced from the time of Charlemagne onwards, then this amounts to a complete neglect of earlier historical developments. In addition, the history of Eastern Europe as a special academic field did not usually fall under 'European History', a fact which has only recently been called into question.⁶⁷ In this way, even modern Western historians are still perpetuating exclusivist notions of Europe that do not do justice to the richness and the variety of European culture.

The lack of understanding and prejudice against the East and Orthodoxy are characteristics already observed during the Byzantine era, even before the Great Schism.⁶⁸ These have experienced a long evolution and contributed to the creation of the specific construct of Eastern Europe and of Orthodox Christianity in the West today.⁶⁹ This was often caused by writers who had never set foot on Eastern soil, such as Voltaire with regard to Russia and Rousseau with regard to Poland. Even when Western thinkers visited Eastern Europe, their observations failed to depict Eastern reality and, instead, merely revealed the prejudices of their authors. In addition, almost all Western commentators on Eastern Europe up to the late eighteenth century looked upon it as half-barbarian and half-civilised (S. Herberstein, A. de Custine *et al.*). This double process of 'inventing' the other and partly adopting its otherness thus became dominant in modern Western perceptions of Eastern Europe.⁷⁰ The same process was observed vis-à-vis the Orient in general, including the European parts of Turkey, which led to the formation of the ideology of 'Orientalism'.⁷¹ The same was also true in relation to the Balkans and the relevant ideology of 'Balkanism'.⁷² Ironically enough, some of the Western clichés about the East have sometimes been adopted as self-images and promoted by contemporary radicals in Eastern Europe, as was the case with the paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovich alias Arkan (assassinated in January 2000) in Serbia or with the nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in Russia.

It has become evident from the foregoing discussion, we hope, that an understanding of contemporary Orthodox anti-Westernism requires a systematic analysis of the events and the conflicts of the past, which have been perpetuated in the collective memory of the Orthodox world. One can, for example, barely capture the background behind the Orthodox reactions against the visit of the Pope to Greece⁷³ and to Ukraine⁷⁴ in 2001 without taking history into consideration. The same pertains to the Serbian vivid memories of the genocide committed by Ustashe Croats during World War II.⁷⁵ Thus, the past is constantly being re-enacted through

⁶⁶ See Michail Ryklin, 'Hinter den Spiegeln. Zur Geschichte der Grenze zwischen Rußland und Europa', *Transit* 16 (1999), pp. 158-166.

⁶⁷ See Jörg Baberowski, 'Das Ende der osteuropäischen Geschichte', *Osteuropa* 8/9 (1998), pp. 784-790.

⁶⁸ See Michael Rentschler, *Liudprand von Cremona* (Frankfurt a.M., 1981).

⁶⁹ See Elisabeth Prodromou, 'Paradigms, Power, and Identity: Rediscovering Orthodoxy and Regionalizing Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 30 (1996), pp. 125-154.

⁷⁰ See Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994).

⁷¹ See Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978).

⁷² See Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford, 1997). See further Kerstin S. Jobst, 'Orientalism, E.W. Said und die Osteuropäische Geschichte', *Saeculum* 51 (2000), pp. 250-266.

⁷³ See *International Herald Tribune*, 5-6 May 2001.

⁷⁴ See Thomas Bremer, *Konfrontation statt Ökumene. Zur kirchlichen Situation in der Ukraine* [Erfurter Vorträge zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums, 1] (Erfurt, 2001).

⁷⁵ See e.g. Veljko B. Durich, *Ustaše i pravoslavlje* (Belgrade, 1989); Milan Bulajich, *Never Again: Ustashi Genocide in the Independent State of Croatia from 1941-1945* (Belgrade, 1992).

appropriate rituals and still remains a focus for prospective orientation for the Orthodox. The former President of the European Union, Jacques Delors, wrote once about the *ideologies of exclusion* within the very culture of the member states inhibiting European integration.⁷⁶ This may refer to the Orthodox case too. Yet, the Orthodox policy of exclusion is mitigated to a large degree by several other factors, which contribute to the contradictory phenomena discussed above.

The Bearers of Orthodox Anti-Westernism

Anti- and pro-Westernism operate at different levels and may very well coexist. It is thus not surprising to observe differing and contradictory notions of Europe among the Orthodox. On the one hand, there is a polemical notion of Europe, in which a demarcation line is drawn between East and West. In this case, Europe signifies mostly the ‘others’ living in the West. On the other hand, there is also another normative and ethical notion Europe, which is mostly identified with the economic and other kinds of aid expected by Eastern Europeans on the part of the European Union. This paradox can be illustrated by an example taken from the monastic community of Mount Athos, in which after the Great Schism anti-Western attitudes prevailed. In 1999 this monastic community thus officially prohibited the President of the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity, Cardinal Edward Cassidy, from visiting Mount Athos. In recent years strong criticism was also voiced against the European Union, usually within an apocalyptic frame. Yet, the same monks are generally very eager to receive large amounts of money from the European Union in order to restore their time-honoured monastic community, a fact which in recent years resulted in an unprecedented modernisation and ‘worldliness’ of this bastion of Orthodox tradition.⁷⁷ This peculiar situation again attests to the present relevance of these bipolar Orthodox attitudes towards the West and to the variety of motives underlying them.

Aside from this, it should not be forgotten that Eastern Orthodox Europe is ethnically, politically and religiously quite complex.⁷⁸ Even in countries with a predominant Orthodox population, anti-Westernism remains an isolated factor and not the strongest one. Pan-Orthodox visions against the West may be attractive, influential and valid for a while, but Orthodox countries in the end follow the path of *Realpolitik* or pragmatism in agreement with the international (Western) community. This was the case for both Russia and Greece during the Yugoslav wars, despite the widespread pro-Serbian sentiments among their respective populations.⁷⁹ On the other hand, this *Realpolitik* hardly signifies the taming of anti-Western feelings among Orthodox believers. The specific bearers of anti-Western mentality in Orthodox countries are equally diverse and multifaceted.

Firstly, there are some groups, which have traditionally been anti-Western and still continue *mutatis mutandis* the same attitude nowadays. These include the various groups of Orthodox rigorists (fundamentalists), such as the broad and diffused current of the Old Calendarists in Greece. Another group that is very critical of the West includes, as already mentioned above, Orthodox monks (e.g., on Mount Athos in Greece or in Sergiev Posad in Russia after 1991), who often keep close contacts with the Orthodox rigorists.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Jacques Delors, ‘Europe’s Ambitions’, *Foreign Policy* 80 (1990), pp. 14-27, here: pp. 17-18.

⁷⁷ See Hieromonk Nikolaos (Hatzinikolaou), *Άγιον Όρος. Το υψηλότερο σημείο της γης*, (Athens, 1999), pp. 125-139.

⁷⁸ Cf. Edgar Hösch, ‘Kulturgrenzen in Südosteuropa’, *Südosteuropa* 47 (1998), pp. 601-623.

⁷⁹ See Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, pp. 199, 331-332, 348-349.

⁸⁰ For various examples of anti-Western Orthodox monks in various settings see William Dalrymple, *From the Holy Mountain. A Journey in the Shadow of Byzantium* (London, 1998), pp. 9-10, 280-281, 291-293, 308-309.

Secondly, anti-Western views are also widely found among various Orthodox educated clerics and theologians, who criticise the West on another level and with the help of more sophisticated arguments and theories.⁸¹

Thirdly, anti-Western attitudes may be found in various forms among certain intellectuals and writers who are directly or indirectly influenced by the Orthodox tradition and look for Orthodox (Russian, Greek or otherwise) specificity and uniqueness through a demarcation from the West. This is the case of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who has always presented the West as a source of disappointments and humiliations for Russia, as an untrustworthy partner and as an enemy of the Russian nation.⁸²

Fourthly, the official hierarchy of the Church presents a rather mixed image on this issue. Some hierarchs may show a predilection for anti-Western attitudes, not least due to their ties with Orthodox monks and rigorists (e.g., Metropolitan Augustinos Kantiotis of Florina, Greece). But in general the Church hierarchy tries to convey a positive image abroad⁸³ by holding a more conciliatory attitude towards the West without, however, putting at stake the basic tenets of the Orthodox tradition. This position has again been criticised by monks and rigorists, for they are adamant in keeping an uncompromising and negative stance towards the West.

Finally, as far as the wider mass of Orthodox believers is concerned, these are influenced to some degree by the surrounding anti-Western climate, but their overall behaviour usually exhibits the cultural 'schizophrenia' between xenophilia and xenophobia.⁸⁴ Yet, their anti-Westernism presents a lot of facets and cannot be attributed to religious reasons alone, since other motives (e.g., psychological, political, social, cultural) may sometimes play a more vital role. After all, many Orthodox are, for example, hardly familiar with the particular theological differences between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism and their anti-Westernism is primarily not religiously motivated. All in all, this diversity among the Orthodox bearers of the anti-Western spirit attests to the enhanced complexity of the issue under examination.

The Ideologisation and the Implicit Forms of Orthodox Anti-Westernism

The same complexity pertains equally to the multiple and diverse functions of anti-Westernism, which are not always of a religious nature. To be more specific, in some cases anti-Westernism represents a convenient means for providing ready-made answers and outlets for various problems of the Orthodox world. In this way, major problems of the Orthodox East are uncritically attributed to the pernicious influence of the West, religious or otherwise. This mechanism of alleviating personal responsibility and guilt feelings by constantly externalising the main sources of evil (here the West) is a typical phenomenon in the Orthodox East as well as being a form of diverting social dissatisfaction and unrest. This phenomenon clearly points to the ideologisation of the entire debate between East and West, which has already been evident within the contradictory attitudes of many Orthodox towards the West. The antithesis between East and West is often invented, artificially construed and deliberately exaggerated by many Orthodox clerics, theologians and intellectuals in order to make the incommensurability of the two worlds even greater. The criteria adduced to separate

⁸¹ See Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, pp. 195-197.

⁸² See Armin Knigge, 'Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn über den Westen: Feindbilder der 'russischen Idee'', *Zeitschrift für Slawistik* 46 (2000), pp. 3-18.

⁸³ See e.g., Bartholomée I, Patriarche de Constantinople, 'Ici, au Patriarchat de Constantinople, nous n'avons aucune hystérie anticatholique', *Service orthodoxe de presse* 167 (1992), pp. 11-15.

⁸⁴ With regard to Greece see Dorothea Schell, 'Nationale Identität, Fremdstereotypen und Einstellungen zu Europa in der griechischen Peripherie', in: Harald Heppner and Grigorios Larentzakis (eds.), *Das Europa-Verständnis im orthodoxen Südosteuropa* (Graz, 1996), pp. 177-194, here: pp. 188-194.

the two worlds are in many cases fictitious, generalised and abstract, and so they can hardly be supported by solid historical research. The need to look constantly for various demarcation criteria from the West is omnipresent and in the Orthodox East has actually turned into a kind of a collective neurosis.

In order to understand the ideologisation of the whole matter, we may consider the enormous diversity of criteria used to locate the allegedly authentic Orthodox elements and separate them from the Western influences (e.g., G. Florovsky's theory of the 'pseudomorphosis' of Russian Orthodox theology⁸⁵). If, however, one closely examines the Orthodox anti-Western arguments, one cannot escape from observing their often contradictory evaluations. In the end, one is often left with a big question mark as to what is Orthodox and what is not. For example, an Orthodox theologian of the past is considered by some as being genuinely Orthodox, while other see him as a pure Westerniser. This is the case with Feofan Prokopovich (1681-1736) and his contribution to the Church reform of Peter the Great.⁸⁶ This signifies that the criteria used to locate authentic Orthodoxy are mostly subjective and that in many cases anti-Westernism is an artificial construct of the present, which is conveniently projected into the past in order to legitimate specific positions and ambitions. The same also pertains to the generalising claims and categorisations about East and West (e.g., the rationalistic West versus the affectionate East; the individualistic West versus the communitarian East), promoted by many Orthodox who put emphasis upon the incompatibility between the two parts of Christendom. Although there may be some truth in the above arguments, the way they are presented within the anti-Western paradigm is misleading and deliberately perpetuates the disjunction of the two worlds.⁸⁷

Needless to say, anti-Westernism in Orthodox cultures is not the sole attitude towards the West within the wider ecclesiastical organism. In fact, there are many other more friendly attitudes on the part of Orthodox Church hierarchy towards the West. In their joint message in Athens in May 2001 Pope John Paul II and Archbishop of Greece Christodoulos made positive reference to the European Union and emphasised the need to preserve the religious and national identity of the nation members as well as to keep the Christian roots of Europe intact.⁸⁸ The picture conveyed by such declarations hardly conforms to Orthodox anti-Westernism, which should, however, not be overestimated as the single and most powerful element in the Orthodox world. Yet, we should take into consideration that in today's globalised environment ecclesiastical diplomacy is hardly indicative of the actual but hidden dispositions and intentions of certain Orthodox actors. The outward image conveyed by Orthodox prelates to outsiders does not always reveal inward attitudes and practices. All these diversifications clearly illustrate why one should examine all forms of Orthodox anti-Westernism with great care and sensitivity. For example, there is widespread tension between the Orthodox residing in the motherland and the Orthodox residing abroad - in our case, mostly in the West. The theological production, the attitudes and the positions of the latter are not necessarily accepted by the former. The gap dividing motherland and diaspora, despite the common Orthodox bond, is in some cases unbridgeable. A basic reason for this phenomenon

⁸⁵ See George P. Florovsky, 'Westliche Einflüsse in der russischen Theologie', in: Hamilcar Alivisatos (ed.), *Procès-verbaux du Premier Congrès de Théologie Orthodoxe à Athènes (29 novembre – 6 décembre 1936)*, (Athens, 1936), pp. 212-231.

⁸⁶ See Volodimirus Gregor Kowalyk, *Ecclesiologia Theophanis Prokopovycz: Influxus Protestantismi* (Rome, 1947); Hans-Joachim Härtel, *Byzantinisches Erbe und Orthodoxie bei Feofan Prokopovič* (Würzburg, 1970).

⁸⁷ Cf. Gerhard Podskalsky, 'Probleme der Vermittlung zwischen östlicher und westlicher Kultur', *Stimme der Orthodoxie* 3 (1996), pp. 53-55; idem 'Ostkirchliche Theologie in der Westkirche: Alternative (Antithese), Annex oder Allheilmittel?', in: Robert F. Taft, S.J. (ed.), *The Christian East. Its Institutions and its Thought. A Critical Reflection* (Rome, 1996), pp. 531-541; idem, 'Entwicklungslinien des griechisch-byzantinischen theologischen Denkens (bis zum Ende der Turkokratie)', *Ostkirchliche Studien* 47 (1998), pp. 34-43.

⁸⁸ See *Εκκλησία* 78/5 (May 2001), pp. 391-392.

is found in the fact that the diaspora has closer ties to the West. Therefore, the suspicion concerning its direct or indirect contamination by the West is constantly present in the minds of certain Orthodox.

Such cases have been observed both in the past and the present. In the sixteenth century, when printing was barely existent in Russia, there was some mistrust about Greek liturgical books that were printed in Roman Catholic Venice.⁸⁹ More recently, in the 1990s there have been tensions between certain Orthodox rigorists from Greece and the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of Australia because of the latter's allegedly modernist attitudes. This situation has created conflicting factions there, a fact which has caused the intervention of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In another case, some 'heretical' books from the seminary library in Ekaterinburg (Russia) written by 'modernist' Russian theologians abroad (Alexander Schmemmann, John Meyendorff) as well as by Father Aleksandr Men' were burnt on 5 May 1998 under the instruction of the diocesan council chaired by the local bishop Nikon.⁹⁰ This autodafé in the seminary courtyard was an isolated incident incited by a rigorist bishop. But it was given much publicity by the mass media and may be explained to some degree by the present differences between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia. Many of the Russian theologians abroad are ecumenically-oriented and more open towards international developments, religious or otherwise. In all these cases we can trace elements of an anti-Western mentality and practice, which are not only directed against the West itself, but also against anything that had entered in relation to it. In this respect, it is vital to distinguish between explicit and implicit forms of anti-Westernism. The first one may be propagated and disseminated openly and thus can be more easily detected. The second one is more difficult to trace, because it may exist - also unintentionally - in latent forms, even in apparently pro-Western Orthodox attitudes. The latter case is therefore even more interesting, for it shows the wide range of anti-Western mentalities within the Orthodox world.

Orthodox Anti-Westernism: The Need for a Comparative Research Agenda

Despite the fact that Orthodox anti-Westernism has already been examined within specific socio-cultural contexts (in Byzantium, Greece, Russia, Romania etc.) and from various perspectives, a more holistic approach to this phenomenon from a comparative perspective is still missing. Scholarly research in this domain has so far produced quite interesting and useful results. But these have to be integrated into a broader and more meaningful comparative framework. As far as Greece is concerned, there is a study by a theologian and philosopher, Christos Yannaras⁹¹, who personifies the anti-Western critique in the contemporary Greek world *par excellence*.⁹² Yet, this interesting study, which considers the relationship between East and West since the late Byzantine times, remains bound to the Greek situation alone and does not treat parallel processes in other Orthodox countries. On the other hand, it is an examination of the whole issue from a value-oriented perspective - the West as a problem for the Orthodox East. This drawback diminishes significantly the validity of Yannaras' overall theory and specific arguments.

As far as Serbia is concerned, there is a recent study on the ideas of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovich (1880-1956), who extolled the role and the significance of the Serbian people

⁸⁹ See van den Bercken, *Holy Russia and Christian Europe*, p. 163.

⁹⁰ See Sourozh. *A Journal of Orthodox Life and Thought* 73 (August 1998), pp. 43-45.

⁹¹ See Christos Yannaras, *Ορθοδοξία και Δόση στη Νεώτερη Ελλάδα* (Athens, 1992).

⁹² See Christos Yannaras, 'Orient-Occident. La signification profonde du schisme', *Service orthodoxe de presse* 150 (1990), pp. 29-35.

for Europe and who had almost sacralised the Serbian nation. In this way Serbia was given a messianic and salvific mission, which had to be implemented for the sake of the Western world. The latter was then presented in need of salvation, which had to come again *ex oriente*, i.e., from Orthodoxy.⁹³ But a comparative perspective on this sort of Orthodox mission, which is widespread in the various Orthodox cultures, is again missing. For example, the same sense of a special messianic role of the Orthodox is found explicitly in the Russian case.⁹⁴ Among the Slavophiles and their specific Russian-centred perspective there was an intention to transcend the opposition to the West and to ‘russify’ Europe. Seen from this optic, Russia’s mission was to take from the West solely the best elements – according to its specific character and spirit –, to ‘russify’ them and to give them back to Europe. In this way, the latter would be ‘cleaned’ and saved from the evils of the past.⁹⁵ In addition with regard to Russia, there is a classical study by the eminent theologian Georgy Florovsky on the development of Russian theology and its contacts with the West.⁹⁶ There Florovsky has tackled the issue of the Western influences upon Eastern Christianity and coined the term ‘pseudomorphosis’ to discredit them. Since then this term has been established in many Orthodox anti-Western discourses, although it has been criticised from a Western point of view as both misleading and biased.⁹⁷ But again Florovsky’s detailed study refers basically to a single Orthodox culture and country, namely Russia, and is structured along the East-West polarisation.

What is missing, therefore, is the comparative analysis and examination of two or more Orthodox cultures not only in terms of anti-Western discourses and practices, but also in terms of their interrelations, the transfer of ideas from one Orthodox culture to the other and their differences. In this way, the inter-Orthodox exchange of anti-Westernisms may come to light and many trans-Orthodox aspects of this phenomenon will be revealed.

This diagnosis with regard to the present research gap also has another methodological background. A scholarly examination of the whole issue should not simply reproduce the basic feature of the research object, namely the polarity between East and West. Rather, it should also examine the ways in which the entire research object is constituted; in other words, the internal operations, influences and interactions between the different Orthodox cultures in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe from the point of view of anti-Westernism. In addition, one has to look at how the West is construed at this level as a picture puzzle, how this image is transferred between Orthodox cultures and the consequences resulting from all these. If an element is transferred from one Orthodox culture to another, its original form, significance and function may change radically. The complexity of this subject matter and the many factors playing a role here thus bring us to the point when it is more appropriate to speak of anti-Westernisms (in plural) and to examine their mutual relations.

To be more specific, modern Greek Orthodox anti-Westernism has been influenced by the critique of the West among the Russian Orthodox emigration, which has additionally led to a neo-Patristic revival in Greece. Several Greek theologians have studied in Paris at the *Institut de Théologie Orthodoxe Saint-Serge* and have had close contacts with the eminent Russian theologians teaching there. They also openly acknowledged their spiritual debt to Russian theology.⁹⁸ In Yannaras’ words, Russian Orthodoxy helped him to understand the

⁹³ See Chrysostomus Grill, *Serbischer Messianismus und Europa bei Bischof Velimirović († 1956)* (St. Ottilien, 1998).

⁹⁴ See Emanuel Sarkisyanz, *Rußland und der Messianismus des Orients. Sendungsbewußtsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens* (Tübingen, 1955).

⁹⁵ See A.I. Zimin, *Evropotsentrizm i russkoe kul’turno-istoricheskoe samosoznanie* (Moscow, 2000).

⁹⁶ See Georgii P. Florovskii, *Puti russkogo bogosloviya* (Paris, 1937).

⁹⁷ See Wendebourg, ‘Pseudomorphosis’, *passim*.

⁹⁸ See Christos Yannaras, ‘Der Beitrag der russischen Orthodoxie zur Klärung der orthodoxen Identität’, in: Karl Christian Felmy et al. (eds.), *Tausend Jahre Christentum in Rußland. Zum Millennium der Taufe der Kiever Rus’*

Westernisation of the Greek Orthodox Church and theology as well as to look for the authentic sources of Orthodoxy in earlier times.⁹⁹ It is not accidental, therefore, that the Palamite renaissance in Greece since the 1960s was very much influenced by the earlier discovery of Gregory Palamas by the Russian theologians (J. Meyendorff and others). Yet, this appropriation has been adjusted to the needs and idiosyncrasies of the Greek situation, while the consequences were typical of the nature of the specific Greek milieu.

Moreover, in the Serbian case, we can locate two major sources of anti-Westernism: one comes from Russia and is influenced by Slavophile thinking. This is clear in Justin Popovich's book on Dostoevsky and his critique of the West, which has been re-edited today in a virulent anti-Western context.¹⁰⁰ Of great significance for the spread of the Russian influence upon Serbia was the interwar period (1920s-1930s) when many Russian theologians had emigrated there. Popovich (1894-1978), who lived banished until his death in a monastery due to his critique of Communism, represented the expression of Serbian anti-Westernism *par excellence* and is nowadays well-known not only in Serbia, but also among theological circles in Russia and in Greece. The other source of Serbian anti-Westernism comes from Greece and the traditional Byzantine background. Many of Popovich's students (Atanasije Yevtich, Amfilohije Radovich, Ireneje Bulovich) studied in Greece, thus became deeply familiar with Greek Orthodox culture and its Byzantine heritage, and propagated anti-Western ideas from the 1980s onwards. These various lines of trans-Orthodox influence are again in need of a systematic comparative study.

As far as Russia is concerned, it is vital to examine further its particular relation to and appropriation of the Byzantine tradition. For example, the nineteenth century-philosopher Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856) is known for his critique of Western rationality as 'one-sided' (*odnostoronni*) and 'abstract' (*otorvannyi*). His parallel method reflecting that of Schelling is also well-known. In addition, his inspiration from his reading of the Greek Church Fathers has also not been forgotten. Scholars often cite an anecdote from his life related to his wife. She was a spiritual child of St. Serafim of Sarov. One day she told her husband that everything he learned from Schelling she had already known from another source, namely from the Church Fathers.¹⁰¹ If we take this anecdote to be true, we still do not know what exactly were her recommended readings from the Church Fathers and what Kireevsky actually read. The fact that Kireevsky tried to re-unite the structure of the bipolar thought initiated by the Great Schism is an Orthodox common good. But from where exactly does his argument come that Scholasticism has been the first clear realisation of this Schism? Are Kireevsky's commonplaces on Thomas Aquinas and the 'twisting of words' (*slovopreniya*) of Scholasticism taken from the popular anti-Western theology of his day or are they derived directly from Byzantine sources? For instance, a detailed examination of the critique of Thomas Aquinas by Varlaam of Calabria and Neilos Kavasilas¹⁰² on the one hand, and Kireevsky's arguments on the other does not exist. The reception of the early Church Fathers and Byzantine theology among the circle of Paisii Velichkovsky and later by the monastery Optina Pustyn', which was often visited by Kireevsky (and other anti-Western philosophers like Leont'ev and writers like Dostoevsky), is not sufficiently examined. It goes without saying that this pertains to the potential modern reception of an old Byzantine pattern of anti-Western argumentation.

(Göttingen, 1988), pp. 953-960. See also Anthony-Emil Tachiaos, '«Russkaya epokha» v Parizhe', *Μοσχολία. Problemy vizantiiskoi i novogrecheskoi filologii* 1 (2001), pp. 531-539.

⁹⁹ See Yannaras, *Ta kath' eautón*, pp. 87-94.

¹⁰⁰ See Justin Popovich, *Dostoevski o Evropi i slovenstvu* (Belgrade, 1995).

¹⁰¹ See Sergej A. Levickij, *Russisches Denken. Gestalten und Strömungen. Bd. 1. Von den Anfängen bis zu Vladimir Solov'ev* (Frankfurt a.M., 1984), pp. 62-63.

¹⁰² See Gerhard Podskalsky, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz* (Munich, 1977), pp. 180-195.

Bearing this in mind, it is important to locate, here, the two main processes of Orthodox anti-Western exchange. Firstly, there are vertical influences coming from the main stream and original Orthodox culture or, in other words, from Byzantium and its traditional opposition to the West, which can be found in various open and latent forms in many contemporary Orthodox cultures. Secondly, there are also horizontal influences between these cultures in the wake of their mutual contact and interaction. The ways in which anti-Western material is appropriated, transformed and articulated vary considerably within those cultures.

In Greece, for instance, there is an unparalleled continuity with the ancient classical tradition as well as a claim for an exclusive occupation of Byzantium and the Patristic tradition. In addition, the anti-Westernism of the Old Calendarists and of neo-Orthodoxy are rather typical Greek phenomena.

Regarding Slavic cultures as a whole, we could first mention the interrelated phenomena of Pan-Orthodoxism and Panslavism, which are connected with a specific calling of the Slavic peoples. In the particular case of Russia, we could mention the notion of Moscow as being the Third Rome, the anti-Westernism of the Old Believers, the Slavophile movement, the later Eurasianism, and the theological emigration to the West after the October Revolution.

In the Serbian case, we could refer to the interaction and competition between the supranational notion of *pravoslavljje* (Orthodoxy) and the specific Serbian national element of *svetosavlje* (centred on St. Sava Nemanja, who in 1219 created the first independent Serbian Archdiocese, a fact closely associated with the first Serbian state¹⁰³). The latter term was created in the interwar period and originated in the ranks of professors and students of the Theological Faculty in Belgrade. In this way, *svetosavlje* represents Orthodox Christianity in its Serbian form and experience, as this has been realised and expressed in the lives of the most eminent representatives of the Serbian nation and especially by Saint Sava Nemanja.

Further, in the Ukraine and in Romania anti-Westernism is intrinsically connected to the strong presence of Uniatism in both countries (in Western Ukraine and Transylvania).¹⁰⁴ In Bulgaria, which is also a special case¹⁰⁵, Serbia, Romania and Greece there have historically been some thoughts about a potential Balkan confederation as a counterreaction to Western political and cultural influences.¹⁰⁶ This was thought to represent a form of continuation of the 'Byzantine Commonwealth', which continued to exist under Ottoman rule until it was destroyed by the emergent nationalism in the nineteenth century. This vision of a trans-Orthodox coalition should not, however, obfuscate the fact that historically there has been a long tension and rivalry between the Byzantine-Greek and Slavic (especially Russian) forms of Orthodoxy and their respective ecclesiastical institutions. Basically this entire conflict pertains to the struggle for primacy and supremacy within the Orthodox world as a whole.

Finally, in Greece there is another model of a future coalition, namely the building of an 'intermediate region' (ενδιάμεσος περιοχή) between East and West based on unambiguous anti-Western orientations by setting up a Greek-Turkish confederation.¹⁰⁷ A preference for the

¹⁰³ See Klaus Buchenau, 'Svetosavlje und Pravoslavljje: Nationales und Universales in der serbischen Orthodoxie', in: Martin Schulze Wessel (ed.), *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation in Ostmittel-, Südost- und Osteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 2002 forthcoming).

¹⁰⁴ See Michael Hrynchshyn, 'The Current Situation of the Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine', in: Bert Groen and Wil van den Bercken (eds.), *Four Hundred Years Union of Brest (1596-1996). A Critical Re-evaluation* [Eastern Christian Studies, 1] (Leuven, 1998), pp. 163-171; Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, pp. 218-228.

¹⁰⁵ See Harald Heppner and Rumjana Prešlenova (eds.), *Die Bulgaren und Europa von der nationalen Wiedergeburt bis zur Gegenwart* (Sofia, 1999).

¹⁰⁶ See Vasilis Xydias, *H Βαλκανική Κοινοπολιτεία* (Athens, 1994); Pavlos Tzermias, 'Die historische Stellung des Balkans innerhalb Europas', *Südosteuropa* 49 (2000), pp. 88-104, here: pp. 96-97, 101-102.

¹⁰⁷ See Dimitri Kitsikis, *The Old Calendarists and the Rise of Religious Conservatism in Greece* (Etna, CA, 1995), pp. 6-7.

Turkish element and concomitant Turkophile feelings within an anti-Western frame do exist in other Orthodox countries too, such as in Russia (Ivan Peresvetov, Konstantin Leontyev).

Apart from the above incomplete list of Orthodox national anti-Western specificities, we can still discern certain basic trans-Orthodox characteristics of anti-Westernism in the light of the foregoing overall discussion. To mention a few important ones: the inner logic of anti-Western discourse and arguments; the use of Orthodoxy as a compensatory mechanism to overcome Eastern European deficits and to minimise Western progress and superiority; the formation of academic theology in the Orthodox world under Western influences; the general depiction of the West as a threat to, and conspiring force against, Orthodoxy; the idea of a just suffering (from the West, the Ottomans etc.); anti-Westernism in the wake of social evolution and change and the 'secularisation' of Orthodox opposition to the West (e.g., anti-rationalism, anti-individualism, anti-formalism, anti-modernism); the politicisation and instrumentalisation of Orthodox anti-Westernism in the context of various anti-acculturation policies; the impact of Orthodox anti-Westernism upon the disputed 'Europeanness' of Eastern Europe; Orthodox solidarity and cooperation on issues of common interest in critical historical moments, despite inter-Orthodox dissensions, and the building of an Orthodox front against the West; the mysticism of the past, namely the romantic regression processes towards idealised and allegedly paradisiacal pre-modern conditions and the necessity to revitalise them nowadays (e.g., modernisation as a re-Hellenisation; the search for alternative social structures such as the Byzantine communities or the Slavic *zadruga*, *artel* and *mir*); the construction of 'progressive' models of social organisation and utopias based on the indigenous culture (e.g., utopian models of a third way) and as alternatives to Western models of social and economic modernisation; Orthodox communitarianism versus Western individualism; the sacralisation of nation, the strong interplay between church and politics, and the rise of nationalist discourses, Greek and Slavic alike (e.g., Panslavism with its expressions of Pan-Russianism and Pan-Serbism; Neo-Orthodoxy and Greekness); historiosophical interpretations of Orthodox history; and the particular Orthodox sense of being an elect people among the Christian nations and of having a salvific mission to fulfil towards the West and the rest of the world. All these attest to the importance of the multiform phenomenon of Orthodox anti-Westernism, whose comparative examination is perhaps nowadays more needed than ever before in order to capture the significance of an important factor shaping Orthodox culture in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.