Global Journalism for Global Governance?
Theoretical Visions, Practical Constraints

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In the past globalization debate there has been much talk of a global public sphere or even a global village. Real time coverage around the world and thousands of satellite TV programs seemed a realization of those visions. The mass media presumably have the capacity to unite the world behind global events like the Olympic Games or the inauguration of president Obama, which billions of people watched on their TV-sets. The era of so-called globalization has seemingly arrived after a period of much critique of the fragmentation of international communication. During the debate of the New International Communication Order in the 1980s many experts and politicians complained about the worldwide dominance of Western news agencies and other Western media. UNESCO’s famous McBride Report revealed that coverage of the developing countries in the West was full of irrelevant news, joining disparate facts to artificial world views, that foreign coverage around the world was loaded with negative concepts of the “other”, and the report complained about a failure to examine significant developments in international political and economic relations (Many Voices – One World 1980).

The end of the Cold War plus the technological developments in the media sector, satellite television and the internet, seem to have changed everything. But is this turn to globalization a reality or is it a myth (Hafez 2007)? Have we overcome the problems mentioned in the Mac Bride report? Let’s consider some basic empirical facts. Some may sound simplistic, but they are needed as a starting point for theoretical debates. My main questions are: How can we describe the foreign news agenda of mainstream journalism of both nationally and transnationally based media? And how are the events on the media agenda framed in different national media systems?

The foreign news agenda, or: the tip-of-the-iceberg-phenomenon

The vast bulk of national or local news produced in any country is never reported in the foreign news, whether on television or in the press, of any other country. For example, we did a long term study on Middle East coverage in German newspapers, analyzing more than 12,000 articles, with the result that renowned national newspapers in Germany only published two to three full articles on a region stretching from North Africa to Pakistan and consisting of almost thirty countries (Hafez 2002). If we compare this to the domestic news produced by newspapers in any of those countries we can easily understand the enormous information gap that exists between foreign and local news. Germany’s biggest newspapers statistically dedicate something like 0.1 articles to each North African and Middle Eastern country every day. This is surely not enough to capture the complexity of the lives of millions of inhabitants of
those regions. To make things worse, regular regional newspapers in Germany publish even less than that.

You might say that German foreign newspapers are not representative, but there were some studies in the past which argued that German newspapers publish more foreign news than papers in other Western countries (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1985). These studies are relatively old but anecdotal evidence makes me think that their results are valid even today. While at regular times even neighbouring countries like England and France are no big news, German papers extensively cover events like national elections in those countries. However, when I lived in England for some time in 2005, I was not even able to follow the German national elections because there was hardly any coverage in the British press. I had to tune into old-fashioned foreign broadcasting, Deutsche Welle, or resort to very new forms of internet communication.

The situation of foreign coverage in regular national television programs around the world is even worse. A number of studies point to a decline in foreign news output in the big US TV networks in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War (Norris 1995). The same is true for Germany, where producers continually complain about their shrinking capacity to cover world affairs. The only exceptions are sweeping news like 9/11. The era of so-called globalization is not a time of increasing foreign news coverage in the mainstream media.

There are many more problems concerning the volume of the foreign news agenda. Many countries never or hardly ever occur in the news of most other countries because they are not deemed news worthy. It is mostly during wars or violent crises that we take notice of them; just think of countries like Ruanda or Somalia that only gain attention in times of civil war and flagrant piracy. This means that our perception of the world is not only extremely limited in scope but also fragmented. We inhabit news geographies containing some hot spots and many pale areas. You may say that the importance of foreign news differs from media system to media system: this is very true, but every country in the world has metropolitan and peripheral spheres of news attention, and it is mostly Western countries that get more attention than the rest of the world, indicating that there is a North-South gap in international news.

Other aspects come to mind: the bulk of foreign news coverage is purely political news. There is hardly any coverage of economic, cultural or environmental developments. Around 60-80 % of a regular Western newspaper’s news about non-European countries is purely political (Hafez 2002). One may argue that politics is the natural field of news, because the media are part of international political relations. But then we must be aware that most of the activities of our own foreign affairs ministers are never reported on. You might get to know when your foreign minister is on tour, but have you ever heard that the Bush government while fighting a violent war against terrorism and Islamism had contact with the Muslim Brethren in Egypt? That type of news is produced by specialist media for information elites: but it hardly ever appears in the Western mainstream press or television news.

In sum, the foreign news agenda of mainstream journalism in modern times at best just touches the tip-of-the-iceberg of all events and news produced daily around the world. Even though media discourses are always incomplete, foreign news worlds are incomparably more fragmented than domestic news cultures. For most people – not experts, not information elites, but ordinary citizens – the era of “globalization” has not allowed them to leave their in-

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1 MB Meeting with Congressmen Raises Controversy in Egypt, 30. Mai,
formation ghettos of national discourses (Pintak 2006). The size and diversity of foreign news agendas is tiny and unstable. Foreign news coverage is patch-work journalism. The limitation of the world in the mainstream news to tiny bits of event-centred information leads to an enormous fragmentation, de-contextualization and a dangerous loss of complexity. The average Westerner holds Iran to be the forecourt to hell. Why? Because Western media reduce Iran to the nuclear issue, Muslim veiling and Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial. At other times the media are fascinated by civilian protest movements as occurred during the national elections in 2009. In both cases, the enormous complexities of the country, which is neither stubbornly Islamist nor revolutionary in a Western sense, go unnoticed. Meg Greenfield of the Washington Post asked herself in 1978, the year the Iranian revolution broke out, whether her fellow citizens would be ready to understand those events. And, she compared the American audience to Columbus when he thought he had reached India but had in fact discovered America. Are we today really that much further than Columbus was?

Of course, simple metaphors are inappropriate, and that is not only true for Columbus but also for my iceberg metaphor. By far the most important, and for ships also the most dangerous, part of icebergs lies below the surface. But, this might not be true for the media. Perhaps foreign news, even though limited, tells us what we need to know. Why should news about Madagascar be important in Sweden? The world is simply too complex, you might say, a reduction of complexity is inescapable. All these interventions are legitimate, but this is also the reason why I would argue that the idea of globalization in the media sector is at least in part a myth. But let us discuss all this a little later and let us, for the time being, continue to collect some more empirical evidence.

Foreign news framing, or: the missing dialogue

Looking closer at the tip of the iceberg of the news on the media agenda, we find events that are simultaneously covered in most media systems, for example, 9/11, the Iraq war, or more positive events like the Olympic games or the inaugurations of the US American president Barack Obama. They often create an astounding amount of news output. If anything seems to prove that we are living in a global public sphere, it is these world events.

However, there are many problems emanating from how media construct these events in various media systems. A study done in the Eurovision context shows that even on the basis of identical sources, media produce different and at times even contradictory interpretations (Gurevitch et al. 1993). Let me give you some small examples. I once visited Sweden during the Winter Olympics and Swedish television broadcast curling all day long. This was the only sports event that was of Swedish national interest at that time, since the Swedish curling team was one of the best in the world while other Swedish athletes in other disciplines had no chance of winning Olympic medals. I had a comparable experience in Syria once, when during the Summer Olympics Syrian television covered handball all day long. Media systems construct events according to national preferences. Seemingly homogenous events like the Olympic Games are simultaneously reported in a very different manner around the world.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the war in Iraq in 2003 were other examples of such particularistic tendencies in media coverage. US mainstream media, for instance, told a substantially different story of the Iraq war to that told by the Arab media. Thus, on the one side their was

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much mass mediated gossip of “weapons of mass destruction” while on the other “American imperialism” was a key issue. Mainstream mass media around the world sometimes construct an identical media agenda, but they frame events according to their own home-grown narratives. Today’s international exchanges of images and information, it seems, are no guarantee for global intertextuality in news, for a growing awareness of the other’s stories and perspectives, or for an more complexity in the mass media’s world view and beyond. 9/11 and the Iraq war demonstrated the enormous fragility of global journalism. It was Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” in TV format, and it was old fashioned propaganda in modern disguise. We cannot yet talk of global journalism as a form of successful, plural and diversified communication. There are, at best, various zones of transnationality, a Western, an American, a European, Muslim, Arab or whatever sphere, with different narratives, frames, master-frames of the same story and often completely divergent definitions of what Hallin called “legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1989). A debate on US imperialism? Not in the US mass media. A debate on Palestinian terrorism? Not in Arab mass media (Glück 2007).

Of course, this picture is a little black and white. Discourses in different countries may also overlap to a certain degree. As a rule: the less involved a country is in a war or international conflict, the bigger the chance that the conflict is treated in a neutral and fair manner. The chance that the event is completely ignored is also bigger. A good example for this is the transnational network CNN. US involvement in world affairs often dictates that the CNN’s coverage has a heavily patriotic bias. CNN prides itself on being the leading global news network, but during the Iraq war, for example, it was, like many other US networks, tremendously biased. On the other hand, there are case studies on CNN’s coverage of the war between Russia and Chechnya in the 1990’s showing that CNN can be quite able to oppose US foreign policy (Koller 1993). It is true, that at regular times CNN, to stay with the example, is quite capable of integrating various view points from around the world. Many European mass media were much more critical of the Iraq war than the big US papers and networks.

However, that culture of global intertextuality and fairness is very fragile. Journalism cultures around the world are susceptible to patriotic, ethnocentric and other biases. A study done by the US NGO Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) complained that the major newspapers, The New York Times and Washington Post, scarcely allowed opponents of the Iraq war any space to express their views.3 My own study of German Middle East reporting showed that German foreign news concentrates on representatives of the state and on counter elites, like terrorists, blending out the voices of large parts of Middle Eastern civil societies (Hafez 1999a).

Intertextuality and the ability to integrate the most important voices and view points of various national discourses into a globalized journalistic product are no sufficient guarantee for objectivity. There are many theories of an ethics of truth in journalism, and objectivity, balance and neutrality are not at all identical concepts (Starkey 2007). But intertextuality is an approach that reminds us that we need to open up our national discourses to the discourses of “the other” in order to produce dialogic journalism (Kleinsteuber 2004). The idea of a global public sphere demands that we not only agree on a global agenda, but also live up to the idea of transparency in media discourse. It seems to me that we need much more debate on the specificities of the ethics of global journalism. Existing codes of ethics hardly ever pay attention to these questions so central to the globalization issue (Hafez 2003).

Effects of foreign news coverage on politics and society

Empirical facts alone will not help us to understand the fact or fiction of global journalism. Is the global agenda big enough or too small? Is the degree of intertextuality sufficient or not? Is the glass half full or half empty? All this is a matter of perspective and of theory. It is my impression that there is a lack of theoretical insight when it comes to current debates on international reporting. Perhaps one reason is that theoretical debates in media and communication studies have been concentrating to a large degree on mid-range theories like agenda setting or cultivation rather than debating macro theory.

There are at least two main roads to follow when analyzing international relations. The classical realist theory holds that international relations are a loose network of state interactions. The nation state, in this perspective, is the dominant political actor and inter-state relations are a loose framework designed mainly to protect the state, to secure resources and to safeguard foreign trade and investment (Morgenthau 1948). A second approach is systems theory with all its variations from world systems theory (Wallerstein 1974) to a theory of interdependence (Nye/Keohane 1977), which argues that political, economic and environmental interdependencies between states are growing, that the dominance of the nation state is waning and that the state is not the sole actor of international relations anymore, with the forces of civil society becoming stronger and stronger. This kind of interdependence thinking has been at the core of the globalization debate during the past twenty years.

The reality of international relations, it seems, can be located somewhere between those perspectives. The nation state is still strong and forecasts of its decline, widely debated in the 1990s, have proved to be premature. But at the same time, there are signs of growing interdependencies, especially in economic and political fields; just think of the European Union, the G8 or NATO. There are more specific theories of globalization that have sought to describe conditions for global system exchange. It is my impression that they can broadly be grouped around three major categories of theory building that are important in almost all the social sciences, including media and communication studies, namely: knowledge, values and human action. In other words, theory building in the field of international relations and globalization focuses on the cognitive, emotional, and operative sphere of human existence. Most theories of globalization focus on one of those spheres, largely ignoring the other aspects, for example: Cosmopolitanism concentrates on values, the Knowledge Society paradigm on knowledge, and the idea of Global Governance seeks to explore political action. Let us consider how these variations in globalization thinking affect our understanding of the current state of global journalism.

Cosmopolitanism

In this field the theory of Global Citizenship by Nigel Dower (2003) is very well known. It is no coincidence that one of the leading globalization thinkers, David Held, has reviewed Dower’s work. Dower pleads for global solidarity as a basic value in the era of globalization. According to this author, we can keep our own separate and at times even contradictory values, but we also need to develop super-values of tolerance and world-wide understanding if we want globalization to expand peacefully. To what extent have the mass media helped to bring about cosmopolitan values? Empirical studies may at times demonstrate that cosmopolitanism is a weak culture world-wide and that patriotism prevails. For example, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in Vienna has carried out compara-
tive research on media and racism with the result that the image of foreigners and migrants is still distorted in many ways (ter Wal 2002). The era of so-called global media, for example, has not affected the enormous number of stereotypes that exist in the West of Islam and of Muslims. Aside from within certain cosmopolitan elites the modern media have hardly global-ized values of many ordinary people.

We must surely be fair enough to ask to what extent the mass media are capable of influencing values. The media can certainly attract attention, “hate-media” have the capacity to stir up violence or biases in war time and they are certainly partly responsible for the so-called rallying-round-the-flag patriotism in war times, but also for positive solidarity campaigns after a Tsunami or likely catastrophes. In the end, however, I doubt that Cosmopolitanism is a valid theoretical point of departure for the analysis of global journalism. I am not convinced that mass media are very effective in influencing values. We know from public opinion studies in the field of foreign policy that the media are able to influence foreign policy opinion only to the degree that they do not contradict core values that exist within populations concerning, for instance, war and peace (Hurwitz/Peffley 1987). In that respect, countries’ political cultures differ as a result of historical experiences, and within any population, people show different either “hawkish” or “dovish” predilections. To a large degree values seem to develop during primary and secondary socialisation, in families and in schools, and I am not to sure whether mass media affect them substantially. I also believe that Cosmopolitanism is unpractical as a theory because it can hardly be tested empirically. There are so many intervening variables influencing values that we simply have difficulty defining the exact role of the media.

Knowledge Society

One of the core assumptions of the Knowledge Society paradigm is that with current tech-nologies, knowledge need not be constrained by geographic proximity and can overcome the Eurocentric limitations of the classical Enlightenment. Manuel Castells in his famous book on the Information Society describes the media as the main place for modern societies (Castells 2001 ff.). Things that are not present in the mass media, he argues, are limited to personal networks and have no presence in collective identities and memories (Vol. 1: 375 ff.).

Looking at the realities of the foreign news agenda we must confess, however, that modern journalism is far from that utopia. It creates fragmented media agendas and knowledge about the world, especially outside of its native geo-cultural spheres. There are many more “un-knowns” than “knowns”. Of course, the world is too complex to be explained in foreign news reporting, but one could transform at least some of the “un-knowns” into “knowns” and the rest into “known un-knowns”. From this perspective we should seek to enlarge the space for international coverage also in mainstream media, and we should help our audiences to develop a “culture of non-understanding” (Scheunpfug 2000). In addition, we need paradox interventions that, at least occasionally, turn the routines of agenda-setting and framing upside down. Instead of labelling countries, journalism needs to enable audiences to develop truly dialogical and intertextual global knowledge.

Global Governance

It is tempting to adhere to the formula: the internet is made for the Knowledge Society, but journalism is made for Global Governance. If you think the task of the mainstream media is to inform citizens about the most pressing world affairs with international relevance, the limited
agendas of foreign news reporting seem less depressing. They might not allow for a post-ethnocentric turn, but they could be used as a tool for dealing with some major political issues of war and peace. Of course, this is no longer the vision of a “global village”, but an echo of realist theory. And even this view is problematic.

Can we really separate the global from the local? It is a widespread reaction among media makers to differentiate between “locally” and “internationally” relevant news. But this notion is erroneous. When Afghanistan became world news, much of the world was not prepared for it. The idea that people can understand “global issues” without having to learn about their local contexts is misleading. We must never forget that the tip of the iceberg of international reporting is connected to the much bigger iceberg below the surface. A journalism concentrating on a bundle of global affairs will almost certainly lose its competence for broader explanations in other countries and other issues, and it will certainly miss the short moments when the local becomes a global issue. Therefore, it is my suggestion that even if we accept the idea of Global Governance as a guiding and somewhat limiting and modest principle of international journalism, we will never be able to afford to restrict the work of the media to a few global topics. On the contrary, journalism must seek to diversify the political agenda, fill in the white spots of the Ruandas, Somalias, and Afghanistans in order to make its audience understand world politics.

How can we define the global core of agenda setting? Terrorism, for example, is not as important to many countries as it is to the US. What is news for France is not necessarily news for India. Even if it comes to the most pressing issues, debates in the United Nations show different predilections around the globe.

How do we deal with the fact that the bulk of national foreign policy and global policies is not in the news? Horizontal “global” communication can only be successful if vertical “national” communication between policy makers and civil societies becomes more transparent and democratised. My immediate concern, however, is that news values and policy values very often collide. What counts for policy-making is often hardly attractive to the media: all those dull conferences and diplomatic processes: how do we cover them? Before we try and integrate nation states into bigger, global systems, we should not forget to integrate foreign policies and civil society within the nation state itself. Horizontal and vertical integration in that sense are dependent on each other. Global Governance is done by state actors, but it can only be successful by peaceful means if it is part of wider public debates (just think of Immanuel Kant’s “Eternal Peace” and his vision of the intimate relationship between foreign policy and democracy).

Even if we could successfully arrive at a minimal global agenda, is the media’s framing good enough for Global Governance? The more pressing an international political problem becomes – war and peace – the less you can trust the mass media as a source for Global Governance. For journalism to achieve a positive function in Global Governance it would have to adhere to the principles of intertextuality and to refrain from biases, especially at times when its own country is directly or indirectly involved in conflicts and when the political pressures are very strong (see below).

The easiest way to achieve that would be to establish real transnational media of reference. But today’s transnational networks like CNN or Al-Jazeera are really hybrids of national media. They are not so much neutral guardians of Global Governance but agents of patriotic emotions.
Influences on foreign reporting

We started the theoretical debate by considering whether the world is driven by loose international relations between strong nation states or by growing global interdependence, or whether both tendencies are effective in our times. It is also quite obvious from what has been laid out so far that information interconnections and exchanges in mainstream journalism (television and the press) remain very fragile, from whatever theoretical angle you look at them. In the following chapter the reasons for and causes of those deficits will be debated.

In media studies global journalism has so far been defined by some scholars as a system of “newsgathering, editing and distribution not based on national and regional boundaries” (Reese 2008). This definition, however, is incomplete. Potential interconnections are unlimited, but actual interconnections are limited, as we have seen, and the driving forces behind media are often rather national than global in scope. The deep structures and the real interdependencies of journalism are in many cases anything but boundless.

The “system” of Reese’s definition is not the “system” of the systems theory. Nick Couldry is quite right when he argues that we need a better understanding of what comprises the world media system (Couldry 2006). Manuel Castells’ idea of global networks is not sufficient. We might be technically connected, but in actual journalism many of the networking channels are congested and the reason is that foreign reporting in journalism is not globally interdependent. The mass media are a news gathering machine whose interactions reach beyond borders, but whose system imperatives remain national or at best regional. With the exception, maybe, of media operating transnationally, national foreign reporting in most national media systems remains dissociated from foreign markets and its main ties of interdependence are with domestic subsystems of markets, politics and corporations.

Proof of this can again be found in Afghanistan or Iraq: two media spheres, in the US and in the Arab world, interpreted the same events in totally different ways, often heating up propaganda-like media discourses. Now, was that proof of the existence of a fully interdependent global media system? Certainly not, but the situation rather pointed to the coexistence of national or regional media subsystems. In such disparate systems, propaganda is quite functional and comprises a substantial element of discourse or even culture, as Jacques Ellul once argued (Ellul 1965). Audiences in one country are hardly aware of what kind of media information audiences in other countries get about them. Media markets are national rather than transnational, which comprises a substantial difference to the trade sectors where producers in one country want to sell products in other countries.

We live in an era of growing economic interdependence, but not of growing media interdependence. The result of this “tectonic heave” (Hafez 1999b) is a dangerous increase in international tensions. More and more money and goods are transferred around a world that we still do not understand so much better than in earlier times.

What are the precise conditions of non-integrated journalistic systems? We can group them on three different levels, a micro, a meso and a macro level, or, influences exerted on the journalist, on the media organization/media system and on domestic politics and society.

Macro-influences

On the macro level one has to deal with influences by consumers, markets and political actors. How do they influence foreign reporting?
Modern media consumers are certainly not ideal cosmopolitans. Most of them hardly ever tune into foreign networks using technical means such as satellite television or internet live stream to access news. They might do so more often for films, but hardly ever for news. Those small information elites, like migrants, academics, who are interested in global affairs on a daily basis are neither very large nor well organised as a social force. Media-watch initiatives acting against stereotypes in domestic media are nuclear. It is very disappointing that consumers in Western democracies are patriotic enough to let politicians like Blair and Bush get away with the most sincere media distortions.

The effects of global tourism on the liberalization of world views are often very disappointing. People see what they want to see and they often stick to existing stereotypes. It is my impression that the globalization debate around media has almost totally neglected audiences. There is much anecdotal evidence about individual trans-border media interactivity, especially through the internet, but solid data on cross-national mass media consumption are almost nonexistent. We must be careful not to adhere to premature assumptions about the new global human being. To have a more critical and cosmopolitan consumer at his or her side would be of great value to any critical journalist.

The media markets react to those deficits. Why sell international products to people who are not internationalized? Europe, by far the best integrated transnational political zone in the world, has not yet developed any considerable transnational television networks (except for Euro News, Euro Sports). With the exception of certain branches of the entertainment sector like big screen filming, media capital in Europe is much more national than transnational in scope. Arab markets, because they comprise a homogenous linguistic area, are better developed and there are certainly other regionalization tendencies, for instance in Latin America. But regionalization is not globalization. On the contrary, many forms of regionalization serve as a bulwark against globalization. For example, Arab media capital controls Arab media markets (Sakr 2001). The big media giants of the West are comparatively minor investors in Asian broadcasting and press markets (Compaine 2002). If they invest transnationally, their investment is often silent capital with no internationalising effect. Even what appear to be international products, like MTV or CNN, have developed local branches. CNN today might be considered a mix of Americanised or Westernised framing and a slightly localised agenda. Neither Western framing nor the localisation of agendas, however, is an indicator of growing intertextuality in news and an increasingly global media agenda.

Governments interfere in public media sectors and they are, very often, the natural enemies of independent journalism. Both autocratic and democratic governments very often misinform the media when feeding them with very one-sided information. The demarcation line between public policy, public diplomacy and propaganda is very thin, but also hard to define. Government propaganda is handed down to the media either directly or through news agencies that are often ill-equipped to check the information, because the same governments, for instance, do not allow access to battlefields in wartime. Domestic governments are usually closer to domestic media in the sphere of foreign news than other governments. The political system is not yet internationalized, and therefore influences on the media are systematically national in character.

The literature has also debated influences in the other direction, from the media to politics, the so-called CNN-effect (Robinson 2002). In short: the more vital the crisis becomes, the smaller the effects of the media on politics. There are certain cases such as Somalia, and the Iranian-European dialogue in 1990s, in which foreign policies seem to have been influenced by mass media. But in most cases, foreign policy seems to remain firmly in the hands of the political system. George W. Bush could go to war in Iraq despite the fact that world opinion was over-
whelmingly against this policy. Public opinion seems to be a weak factor that can easily be emotionalized (Chouliaraki 2006) and exploited by political interest.

Meso-influences

It is my impression that the capacity of media organizations to invest in foreign news-making in this era of so-called “globalization” is rather shrinking than expanding. The number of foreign correspondents is much lower than it should be. Many of them are “parachutists” rather than accredited journalists. News agencies are helpful when circulating news, but they are often cash-strapped institutions, and their services certainly do not replace in-depth journalism that has to be done within the media organisations.

A positive sign is that we are witnessing more cooperation among media of different nations, for example, between German television and Al-Jazeera. But this cooperation mostly leads to an exchange of images rather than of texts and this does not enhance intertextuality. We do not get the Al-Jazeera perspective as part of our own coverage simply because our media are cooperating in the market with them. Even Al-Jazeera’s images are filtered according to the needs of Western media (Samuel-Azran 2009).

Market pressure is handed down to newsrooms and transformed into gate-keeping mechanisms in tune with what is considered “news worthy”. But news values defined in market terms must not necessarily be compatible with a sensitive definition of news along the lines of Global Governance or Knowledge Society. Many correspondents and media makers complain about the limited capacity for new topics in foreign reporting. Hierarchies also play an important role in international news. My own study on Middle East reporting in German newspapers revealed that whenever there is a big international debate or crisis, chief editors and columnists tend to marginalize the real experts within their media organisations and take over the lead in interpretation, with the result that ideology and old-boys networks, even between media and politics, often prevail over expertise (Hafez 2002). I remember during the Rushdie scandal that one chief editor of Die Zeit, the major liberal weekly in Germany, used the front page to inform his readers that there were millions of potential Muslim murderers on European streets. CNN is proof of the fact that even though the staff of media organizations might have an enormously international background from various countries and heritages, power structures within the media organization can prevail and multicultural representation is what has sometimes been called “representation without participation”.

Micro-influences

However, it would also not be wise to idealize the motivation of the individual journalist and contrast his best global intentions with the repressive mechanisms of the media organization. Journalists have their stereotypes too, and they often lack the necessary qualifications for internationally and interculturally qualified journalism. Hardly any German Middle East correspondent, for example, speaks Arabic, an enormous hurdle when trying to collect and evaluate sources.

Remedies and Reforms
How can we increase interaction and interdependencies? Various approaches are possible. One might be called the *cultural reform approach*, and it is based on the hope that perhaps in the long run our schools and societies will educate a more mature consumer who will ask for more or better foreign news. Modern developments in information technology like the internet, blogging, *YouTube* and *Twitter* may have some positive effects on the development of those parts of populations who are interested in international news. The consumer, however, can hardly be called a “system”, because he/she is more a disperse “environment” for media systems. Therefore I put more hope on international organisations like NGOs to have positive future influences. But even in this segment we must face the fact that public opinion in the field of foreign policy is in most cases structurally weak and badly equipped to cope with the dominance of politicians and traditional foreign news makers.

I do not have much trust in the globalizing effects of markets on journalism because corporations tend to sell whatever consumers want to buy. Therefore, I am afraid, that public service media will have to lead any reform of foreign reporting, and I would call this approach the *political reform approach*. It is antithetical to the idea of free and autonomous media, but are we really that free in democratic media systems? What if the state could help to develop transnational formats based on ideals like the Knowledge Society, Global Governance. Perhaps it would be logical for the nuclear international political system, for example the European Union or the United Nations, to take the lead in any kind of reform of international communication and develop models of “good practice”, like the German-French television network *ARTE*. Likely plans do exist on EU administrative levels (Vissol 2006), but I am not sure whether they are yet operational. The last time I asked a German public service director, he seemed very sceptical, because, as he said, the consumer would not accept new international formats. Perhaps this is our major problem: that the public service media increasingly think like commercial enterprises.

Media organisations and even individual journalists can certainly do a lot to improve the situation, and I would call this the *professional reform approach*. We should support journalists in learning languages and following up on international studies. One should seek ways to better integrate international journalism education into relevant training programs. It is also vital for journalists to learn how to get access to new sources, not only through the internet, but also through field research.

All these approaches combined could make a veritable reform in the sphere of international reporting by big mass media; a reform that is desperately needed on the way to globalization.

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