In February, Mexican armed forces killed Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho", the leader of the powerful Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) in the Mexican state of Jalisco. In our blog post, Achim Kemmerling, Professor of Public Policy and International Development at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, together with his students Víctor Aurioles Díaz and Carlos Alberto Cruz Alcántara, explores the question of whether a "time bomb" has been defused just a few months before the 2026 FIFA World Cup and what impact the death of Mexican drug lord "El Mencho" will have:

On Sunday 23rd of February, Mexican armed forces killed Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho,” leader of the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) in the Mexican State Jalisco. In the immediate aftermath, members of the cartel created chaos in several Mexican states, burning cars and trucks on roads and highways, attacking police stations and the National Guard and army troups. It is estimated that up to 75 people including civilians, cartel members and security forces died. Traffic and many everyday activities stopped for several days in the most affected regions.

El Mencho was one of the most wanted drug traffickers. His death represents a blow to one of the country’s most violent and expansive criminal organizations. Founded around 2009, the CJNG managed to position itself as a dominant actor in international drug trafficking, alongside the Cártel de Sinaloa. CJNG is present 23 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities and estimated assets exceeding 20 billion dollars (START 2023). Beyond its geographic footprint, CJNG had an estimated size of close to 30 thousand members (Prieto-Curiel, Campedelli, and Hope (2023). The question is whether the events leading to El Mencho’s death will debilitate the cartel or not.

CJNG’s Expansion Model and its Social Functions

CJNG’s alliance structure is hierarchical and top-down, with a clear and centralized chain of command (Jones et al. 2022). This architecture facilitates strategic control, operational discipline, and territorial coordination. Yet, CJNG has also been described as operating under a franchise-type model, incorporating of less experienced local criminal actors who operate under its brand and supervision (Jones et al. 2022, 79). This design helped the cartel to rapidly expand and absorb or replace regional criminal structures. The government’s hope seems to be that the ‘decapitation’ of the cartel leads to a long-term weakening. However, experts warn that this may lead to fragmentation or replacement by rivaling cartels (Jones et al. 2022, 77). Hence, the events on the 23rd could also strengthen autonomous cells with less cohesion, but a greater propensity for predatory violence.

CJNG uses various techniques to embedded in communities and effectively take over governance functions (Sampó, Jenne, and Ferreira (2023)), ranging from spreading fear, to distributing goods to people, a kind of “criminal philanthropy”. It also acts as a quasi-government guaranteeing security and income in those regions, where the Mexian state has lost its monopoly of power.

Mexico’s Struggle Between External Influences and National Sovereignty

The operation also reveals the international dimension of the strategy. U.S. press reports insinuate that US intelligence was crucial in locating El Mencho, while the Mexican government emphasized that the operation was executed exclusively by national forces. The government also tries to calm down fears about Mexico`s role as a co-host in the upcoming football World Cup 2026. The operation can therefore be read as an act of state reaffirmation in the face of external narratives of territorial loss of control.

It remains to be seen whether this attempt to reduce the breadth and scope of CJNG will be affective in this sence. Past experiences, e.g. as the arrest of Joaquín Guzmán, called El Chapo, and boss of the Sinaloa cartel, show that these solutions are at partial and cartels may quickly rebound.