Prof. Dr. Manfred Königstein

• Since October 2002: Professorship of Applied Microeconomics at the University of Erfurt 
• 2002 Acting Chair of Economic Theory at Saarland University 
• 2001 Habilitation at Humboldt University, Berlin
• 1997 Doctorate at Humboldt University of Berlin
• 1992 MA from the University of Iowa in Iowa City 
• 1991 Diplom in Economics from Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

(2000). Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games With Joint Production, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 216 pages. (Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Vol. 483.)

1. (2024). The influence of peer information and personality on social exclusion in a three-person dictator game, Managerial and Decision Economics, 45 (5), 3434–3443. DOI: 10.1002/mde.4209, co-authored with Miriam Zschoche, Tashauna Brown and Moritz Königstein.
2. (2022). Anti-competitive effects of partial cross-ownership: Experimental evidence, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organisation, 193 (December 2014), 399–409, co-authored with Wasilios Hariskos and Konstantinos G. Papadopoulos.
3. (2018). Voluntary Leadership and Asymmetric Endowments in the Investment Game, *Games* 9, 51 (July 2018), 1–21, co-authored with Fabian Kleine and Balázs Rozsnyói.
4. (2014). Voluntary Leadership in an Experimental Trust Game, *Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organisation*, 108 (December 2014), 442–452, co-authored with Fabian Kleine and Balázs Rozsnyói.
5. (2010). Efficiency and Behavioural Considerations in Labour Negotiations, Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (4), 599–611, co-authored with Marie-Claire Villeval. (also: IZA Discussion Paper No. 1762).
6. (2009). Hiring Chances Are Bad For Older Workers, *Management Online Review*, September, co-authored with Victoria Büsch and Dennis A.V. Dittrich.
7. (2009). Design a Contract: A Simple Principal-Agent Problem as a Classroom Experiment, *Journal of Economic Education*, 40 (2), 173–187, co-authored with Simon Gächter.
8. (2003). Long-Term Work Contracts Versus Sequential Spot Markets; Experimental Evidence on Firm-Specific Investment, Labour Economics, 10 (4), 407–425, co-authored with Vital Anderhub and Dorothea Kübler.
   (also: SFB Discussion Paper, No. 43-1999, Collaborative Research Centre 373, Humboldt University of Berlin, ISSN 1436-0640).
9. (2003). Fairness in a One-Principal-Two-Agents Game – A Post-Experimental Questionnaire Analysis, Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 491–503, co-authored with Judit Kovács and Enikõ Zala-Mezõ.
10. (2003). Learning to Bid: An Experimental Study of Bid Function Adjustments in Auctions and Fair Division Games, The Economic Journal, 113 (4), co-authored with Werner Güth, Radosveta Ivanova‑Stenzel and Martin Strobel.
11. (2002). Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment, Experimental Economics, 5 (1): 5–25, co-authored with Vital Anderhub and Simon Gächter.
12. (2002). Bid Functions in Auctions and Fair Division Games: Experimental Evidence, *German Economic Review*, 3 (4): 461–484, co-authored with Werner Güth, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Martin Strobel.
13. (2001). Personality Influences on Ultimatum Bargaining Decisions, European Journal of Personality, 15: S53–S70, co-authored with Hermann Brandstätter.
14. (2001). Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Game with Indirect Reward, *Homo oeconomicus*, XVIII (2): 241–262, co-authored with Werner Güth, Nadège Marchand and Klaus Nehring.
15. (2001). Optimal Contracting with Boundedly Rational Agents, *Homo oeconomicus*, XVIII (2): 211–228.
16. (2001). Equitable Choices in Bargaining Games with Joint Production, *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation*, 46 (2): 209–225, co-authored with Anita Gantner and Werner Güth.
17. (2001). Fairness Within Firms: The Case of One Principal and Multiple Agents, Schmalenbach Business Review (Journal of Business Research), 53: 82–101, co-authored with Werner Güth, Judit Kovács and Enikoe Zala-Mezõ.
18. (2001). Why firms should care for customers, *Economics Letters*, 72 (1): 47–52, co-authored with Wieland Müller.
19. (2001). ‘Imperfect Monitoring in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma – A Strategy Tournament’, Homo oeconomicus, XVIII (1): 31–46, co-authored with Anita Gantner.
    (also: SFB Discussion Paper, No. 92-1998, Collaborative Research Centre 373, Humboldt University of Berlin, 1998.)
20. (2000). Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach, *Metroeconomica*, 51(3): 235–256, co-authored with Wieland Müller.
    (also: Discussion Paper, Economics Series, No. 136, Humboldt University of Berlin, 1998.)
21. (1998). An Experimental Study of a Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationship, Managerial and Decision Economics, 19:327–341, co-authored with Werner Güth, Wolfgang Klose and Joachim Schwalbach.
22. (1998). An Experimental Study of a Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationship, *Managerial and Decision Economics*, 19:327–341, co-authored with Werner Güth, Wolfgang Klose and Joachim Schwalbach.

1. (2004). Fairness and Greed in Stackelberg Games, in: Steffen Huck (ed.): Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, co-authored with Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller.

2. (2002). Comment on Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr, in: Friedel Bolle and Marco Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (eds.), Surveys in Experimental Economics – Bargaining, Cooperation, and Election Stock Markets, Heidelberg and New York: Physica-Verlag, 133–137.

3. (2002). Experimental Research, in: Hans-Ulrich Küpper and Alfred Wagenhofer (eds.): Concise Dictionary of Management Accounting and Controlling (HWU), 4th edition, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, 504–512, co-authored with Simon Gächter.

4. (2001). Principal–agent relationships in experimental economic research, in: Peter-J. Jost (ed.): Principal–Agent Theory in Business Administration, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, 541–560.

5. (1999). Optimal Contract Choice in the Behavioural Principal-Agent Model – An Experimental Study, in: Uschi Backes-Gellner, Matthias Kräkel and Christian Grund (eds.): Remuneration and Working Time Arrangements within the Framework of Organisational Human Resource Policy, Munich: Hampp-Verlag, 55–75.

1. (2000). The Effect of Horizontal Fairness on Production in a One Principal-Multiple Agents Game, in: Erik Hölzl (ed.), Proceedings of the 25th IAREP Colloquium and SABE 2000 Conference in Baden, pp. 223–227, co-authored with Judit Kovács.

2. (1999). Incentive Compatibility and Fairness in Experimental Work Contracts, in: Università del Piemonte Orientale ‘Amedeo Avogadro’: Inquiries into the Nature and Causes of Behaviour, Proceedings of the 24th IAREP Colloquium, pp. 561–571, Turin, co-authored with Vital Anderhub and Simon Gächter.

3. (1999). Fairness in One-Principal, Multiple-Agents Situations: A Post-Experimental Questionnaire Analysis, in: Università del Piemonte Orientale ‘Amedeo Avogadro’: Inquiries into the Nature and Causes of Behaviour, Proceedings of the 24th IAREP Colloquium, pp. 452–463, Turin, co-authored with Judit Kovács and Enikõ Zala-Mezõ.

4. (1999). Discriminating Incentive Schemes in One Principal-Multiple Agents Situations: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis, in: Università del Piemonte Orientale ‘Amedeo Avogadro’: Inquiries into the Nature and Causes of Behaviour, Proceedings of the 24th IAREP Colloquium, pp. 442–451, Turin, co-authored with Werner Güth, Judit Kovács and Enikõ Zala-Mezõ.

5. (1997). Personality Influences on Ultimative Bargaining, in: Ismael Quintanilla Pardo (ed.), Proceedings of the 22nd International Colloquium of Economic Psychology, pp. 456–486, Valencia, co-authored with Hermann Brandstätter.

6. (1997). Equity Anchoring in Simple Bargaining Games with Production, in: Ismael Quintanilla Pardo (ed.), Proceedings of the 22nd International Colloquium of Economic Psychology, pp. 487–502, Valencia, co-authored with Anita Gantner and Werner Güth.

7. (1996). Trust and Reciprocity in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Experiment, in: Christine Roland Lévy (ed.), Social and Economic Representations, Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium in Economic Psychology by the International Association for Research in Economic Psychology (IAREP), pp. 1228–1238, Université René Descartes Paris, co-authored with Werner Güth, Wolfgang Klose and Joachim Schwalbach.

1. Performance Incentives and the Dynamics of Voluntary Cooperation, co-authored with Simon Gächter and Esther Kessler.

2. Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2697, co-authored with Gabriele Ruchala.

3. Hold-up, Inefficiency and Fairness – An Experimental Study.

4. Inequality Aversion and Asymmetric Cooperation in N-Player Public Good Games (16 December 2017), available on SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089183, co-authored with Wasilios Hariskos.