Antitrust law is by nature a very fast-moving subject. It must try to reflect the highly dynamic markets and prevent distortions of competition. To do this, it must be able to capture the constantly changing, innovative market strategies of companies and their effects on competition.

A particular challenge at present lies in coping with the digitalization of economic activity. Companies are making increasingly use of computerized Technology not only for internal processes, but also for direct market entry. With the 9th GWB amendment, the German legislator has created the first special rules for highly digitalized markets and new types of risks posed by the Big Data society (Section 18 (3a) GWB: on this, Wolf, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Wettbewerbsrecht, Vol. 2 GWB, 3rd ed. 2020, Section 18 marginal no. 44 et seq. ). The increasing use of algorithms, for example, must be dealt with. The use of AI Technology does not in itself raise competition concerns, nor does the use of user data, even if the simultaneous use by several companies leads to an increase in the price level. However, the type and manner of use, such as locking the consumer out of the process of supply and demand via the speed of reaction associated with computer-assisted evaluation, can exceed the limit of what is permissible under antitrust law (on this, Wolf, NZKart 2019, 283 et seq. ). It must also always be questioned to what extent a supplement to antitrust law or, by way of catch-all, to fair trading law is necessary in order to be able to cope with the communication behavior towards consumers based on digital algorithms as well as the competitive dangers of digital platform markets with network effects (cf . Wolf, WRP 2019, 283 et seq. Against this background, the legislator introduced a new type of risk in Section 19a GWB with the 10th GWB amendment (Section 19a GWB draft bill; see Wolf's commentary on this in Vol. 2 of the forthcoming 4th edition of the Münchener Kommentar zum Wettbewerbsrecht).

Intellectual property law can be developed from two perspectives: 1) from the perspective of the rights holder or 2) from the perspective of the general public (e.g. consumers, competitors). While the first variant tends to expansively emphasize the protection of the monopoly interests of the rights holder, the second variant, at the interface with general antitrust law, emphasizes in particular the dangers to competition inherent in a monopolization of knowledge. The outer limits of intellectual property are thus drawn in the case of their indispensability, among other things, by access obligations under antitrust law (on this Wolf, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Wettbewerbsrecht, vol. 1 Europ. WbR, 2nd ed. 2015, Einl. Rn. 1393 et seq. ). However, in individual cases, cooperations to avoid conflicts of property rights can also manifest themselves in restrictions of competition (on trademark delimitation agreements Wolf, NZKart 2015, 90 ff. ).

In the digital context, the social significance of intellectual property law is now changing. Already due to the shift of communication into the digital domain, the number of documented potential conflict cases is increasing. Their technical prerequisites, in particular the accompanying data transmission and intermediate storage, also run the risk of violating certain property right boundaries in the analog age even if it merely replaces earlier (permissible) analog communication channels. Modern intellectual property law must therefore abandon its defensive position vis-à-vis an external drawing of boundaries, as by antitrust law, and must be proactively placed on a dogmatic basis that can take into account the modern social, economic and cultural functions of the potential objects of protection on its own.

Regulatory law in the narrower sense is that part of the legal system that is aimed at directly influencing the economic behavior of market players in sectors in which the general framework provisions, such as antitrust law, and individual measures based on them are not sufficient to ensure the conditions for functioning competition in the long term (cf. § 10 (2) sentence 2 TKG). These conditions may arise in particular in sectors that are dependent on network infrastructures with the character of a natural monopoly, as in the energy sector. In the future, it will be increasingly necessary to consider the extent to which digital platform services with significant network effects should also be subject to special regulatory supervision.

Regulatory law for the energy industry has now reached an extremely high level of complexity, which makes scientific penetration as regulatory law based on general principles difficult. Legislators have encouraged this development in the past by constantly increasing the number of relevant legal regulations. Nevertheless, there is still a need to work on basic concepts such as that of the network, which is a decisive element of regulation, but the shaping of which has been largely left to the courts by the legislature (on this, Wolf, EnWZ 2018, 387 et seq.; ders., in: Baur/Salje/Schmidt-Preuß, Regulierung in der Energiewirtschaft, 2nd ed. 2016, ch. 68, p. 761 et seq. ).

The digitalization of business is changing the framework conditions of the markets and opening up new types of opportunities and role functions for market participants. Artificial intelligence enables companies to implement algorithmically controlled high-speed strategies. Whereas in classic price competition the phase of advance and pursuit were noticeable to the consumer as selection-relevant offer differences, the non-algorithmically represented consumer is increasingly locked out of this negotiation process. Such algorithmically driven interaction processes can no longer be evaluated on the basis of conventional notions of competition, which were tailored to inhert human behavior tied to biological effort limits (on this, Wolf, Auf dem Weg zu einem algorithmisierten Wettbewerbsbegriff?, in Zimmer (ed.), Regulierung für Algorithmen und Künstliche Intelligenz, 2021, pp. 339ff.). For the same reason, it needs to be clarified to what extent consumers can be put on an equal technological footing and thereby continue to exercise their function as arbiters in competition. On the other hand, the digitized platform economy opens up a completely new field of activity for consumers that goes beyond their passive demand role. In a modern collaborative economy, they can perform an active service function themselves, together with other consumers or in cooperation with producers (collaborative consumption, coproduction, prosuming, sharing). This shift in roles requires a readjustment of the traditional contrasting concepts of company and consumer.

Competition law requires further development insofar as it, as part of an overall legal system, increasingly has to deal with the social and ecological significance of corporate market behavior. As a result of the digitalization of everyday life, the public spaces in which discourses on social values are conducted are being shifted to platforms dominated by companies with market power. In this respect, the containment of economic power through competition law also fulfills a function of safeguarding democracy. Nor can competition law ignore the need of society as a whole for ecological sustainability(cf. also Section 2 (1) (2) of the Austrian Cartel Act). Ecological impacts are to a large extent also a consequence of market activity and market participants are able to change their behavior before the legislator intervenes by regulatory means. Thus, to what extent can companies be prevented from torpedoing ecologically sustainable technologies through mergers or abusive practices, while on the other hand competition law does not unnecessarily slow down individual or collective sustainability efforts?

• Festbeigabe für Franz Jürgen Säcker, Berlin 2006, Herausgeber (zusammen mit Dr. iur. Katharina Vera Boesche und PD Dr. iur. Jens Thomas Füller)
• Fallbuch zum europäischen und deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht – case by case, 2008, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker
• Effizienzen und Europäische Zusammenschlusskontrolle. Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Integrationsfähigkeit einer „efficiency defence“ am Beispiel horizontaler Zusammenschlüsse. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur kritischen Präzisierung eines „more economic approach“, Baden-Baden 2009 (zugl. Dissertation)
• Integrierte Energieversorgung in geschlossenen Verteilernetzen – Zum Gestaltungsspielraum des Gesetzgebers zur Neuregelung des § 110 EnWG im Lichte des Dritten EG-Energiepakets, Frankfurt a.M. u.a. 2009, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker
• UWG und Markenrecht in Fällen, 2009, (Hrsg. und Autor) gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker (2. Aufl. für 2023 geplant)
• Kartellrecht in Fällen, 2010, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker (2. Aufl. für 2023 geplant)
• Konzessionsverträge im System des europäischen und deutschen Wettbewerbsrechts, Frankfurt a.M. u.a. 2010, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker und Dr. iur. Jochen Mohr

• Munich Commentary on European and German Competition Law, Vol. 1: European Competition Law, 3rd ed. 2020:
  • Art. 101 (3) TFEU - Exemption
  • Art. 101 (1) TFEU - Vertical Distribution Agreements
  • The Relationship between Competition Law and Unfair Competition Law
  • The Relationship of Competition Law and the Fundamental Freedoms to Intellectual Property Law
• Munich Commentary on European and German Competition Law, Volume 2: GWB, 3rd ed. 2020:
  • § SECTION 18 GWB
  • § Section 19 para. 1, para. 2 nos. 2-4 GWB
• Munich Commentary on European and German Competition Law, Vol. 3: Public Procurement Law I, 2nd ed. 2018:
  • § Section 108 GWB - in-house procurement (together with Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker)

• Munich Commentary on European and German Competition Law, Vol. 5: State Aid Law, 2nd ed. 2018.
  • Services of general economic interest (SGEI)
• European State Aid Law (Engl.), 1st ed. 2016.
  • Services of general economic interest
• Berlin Commentary on Energy Law, 4th ed. 2019, vol. 1:
  • § Section 110 EnWG
  • § 3 No. 24a and 24b
  • Art. 101 TFEU - Vertical agreements in the energy sector (since 2nd ed.)
• Berlin Commentary on Energy Law, 3rd ed. 2014.
  • Art. 102 TFEU in the energy sector
• Handbook on German-Russian Energy Law, 2010
  • The division of the relevant electricity markets
  • Connection and access regulation: non-discriminatory transparent access to electricity supply networks
• Baur/Salje/Schmidt-Preuß (eds.), Regulation in the Energy Industry, 2nd ed. 2015:
  • Closed distribution networks
  • Network concept and customer facilities

• Auf dem Weg zu einem algorithmisierten Wettbewerbsbegriff?, in: Zimmer (Hrsg.), Regulierung für Algorithmen und Künstliche Intelligenz. Vorträge auf dem Bonner Symposium der Wissenschaftlichen Vereinigung für das gesamte Regulierungsrecht am 7./8. September 2020, 2021
• Irreführung des ökologisch bewussten Verbrauchers durch Mogelpackungen und Downsizing, WRP 2021, 447-454 (zusammen mit Maria Psallidaki)
• Algorithm-Based Pricing in Online Retailing As Concerted Practice Covering the ‘Predictable Agent’ With Article 101 (1) TFEU, veröffentlicht über SSRN: Link1 Link 2 
• Behördliche Durchsetzung des Lauterkeitsrechts zur Optimierung des Wettbewerbsschutzes, WRP 2019, 283
• Algorithmengestützte Preissetzung im Online-Einzelhandel als abgestimmte Verhaltensweise – Ein Beitrag zur Bewältigung des „Predictable Agent“ über Art. 101 Abs. 1 AEUV, NZKart 2019, 2
• Rezension: Maximilian Lukas Wehage, Missbrauchsaufsicht über Wasserpreise und Wassergebühren nach deutschem und europäischem Kartellrecht, WuW 2019, 29
• Zur Anwendung des Kundenanlagenbegriffs gemäß § 3 Nr. 24a EnWG auf lokale Direktversorgungskonzepte, EnWZ 2018, 387

• Die Vermögenshaftung nach dem Haftungsverband der Hypothek und Grundschuld, in: Juristische Methodenlehre und Immobiliarsachenrecht, Tübingen 2015, S. 217-234
• Markenabgrenzungsvereinbarungen, Nichtangriffsverpflichtungen und Vorrechtserklärungen, NZKart 2015, 90-98
• Die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien durch die Mitgliedstaaten der EU aus der Sicht des europäischen Beihilfenrechts und der Grundfreiheiten, Collected Papers of the Law Faculty of the University of Split 2014, 165-186 (pdf)

• Das "Smart Grid" als regulierte technologische Innovation und Marktkonzept für die Energiewirtschaft, InTer 2013, 14-21

• Zu den verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen für eine kartellrechtliche Kontrolle von Gebühren, WuW 2013, 246-250

• Kartellrechtliche Grenzen der öffentlich-rechtlichen Gebührenerhebung, NZKart 2013, 17-25

• Verbandstarifverträge zwischen Tarifautonomie und Kartellrecht, JZ 2011, 1091-1102, gemeinsam mit Dr. iur. Jochen Mohr.

• Wettbewerbsrechtliche Bindungen der Fernwärmenetzbetreiber, RdE 2011, 277-286, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker.

• Unternehmensbegriff, Zuständigkeit der Kartellämter und Rechtsweg bei öffentlich-rechtlichen Leistungsbeziehungen, BB 2011, 648-654.

• Ausschreibungspflichten bei Selbstvornahme und interkommunaler Zusammenarbeit. Effektiver Wettbewerbsschutz durch ein funktionales Vergaberecht, VergabeR 2011, 27-45.

• Die Anschluss- und Zugangsregulierung: Diskriminierungsfreier transparenter Zugang zu den Stromversorgungsnetzen, Beitrag in: Handbuch zum deutsch-russischen Energierecht, 2010.

• Die Aufteilung der relevanten Strommärkte, Beitrag in: Handbuch zum deutsch-russischen Energierecht, 2010.

• The German Federal Court of Justice affirms the coherence of German and European Competition law and German Civil law concerning anticompetitive practices (Subcontractor II), 10 December 2008, e-Competitions, n°26362, www.concurrences.com.

• Anmerkung zu BGH, Beschl. v. 14.8.2008 – KVR – Stadtwerke Engen, ZWeR 2009, 232-244.

• The German competition authority rejects the failing firm defence and prohibits a merger between two hospital (Mariahilf / Asklepios), 6 June 2007, e-Competitions, n°24304, www.concurrences.com.

• The German competition authority prohibited the acquisition of the hearing aid business (GN ReSound / Phonak Holding), 11 April 2007, e-Competitions, n°23002, www.concurrences.com.

• Das Ende der „kleinen Netze“? - Konsequenzen aus dem Citiworks-Urteil des EuGH (Flughafen Leipzig) für den Objektnetztatbestand in § 110 EnWG, ZNER 2008, 123-132, gemeinsam mit Dr. iur. Katharina Vera Boesche.

• Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker (unter Mitarbeit von Maik Wolf), Kunst als politisches Medium. Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht, Menschenwürde und Kunstfreiheit im Zivilrecht, in: FS Rolf Birk, Tübingen 2008, S. 789-807.

• Einstweiliger Vollzug von Zusammenschlüssen im vorläufigen Rechtsschutz. Anmerkung zum Phonak-Beschluss des OLG Düsseldorf vom 8. August 2007, WuW 2008, 28-33, gemeinsam mit Dr. iur. Eckhard Bremer, LL.M. (Harvard) und Dr. iur. Christoph Wünschmann, LL.M. (London)

• Die Auswirkungen der Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu In-House-Geschäften auf Public-Private-Partnerships, WRP 2007, 282-298, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker.

• Rechtsprobleme der Mobilfunkregulierung im Hinblick auf § 30 Abs. 1 S. 1 TKG. Absenkung des Entgeltniveaus aufgrund freiwilliger Höchstpreisabsprachen?, K&R 2007, 20-26, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker.

• Der Handelsvertreter im Wettbewerb. Zur Beurteilung des Handelsvertretervertriebs nach Art. 81 Abs. 1 EG im Lichte aktueller Entscheidungspraxis, in: Boesche/Füller/Wolf, Festbeigabe für Franz Jürgen Säcker, Berlin 2006.

• Die Anordnung der aufschiebenden Wirkung der Beschwerde im Preisgenehmigungsverfahren nach § 23a EnWG, NVwZ 2006, 865-871, gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Franz Jürgen Säcker und Dr. iur. Ansgar Schönborn.

• Viel Lärm um kleine Netze. § 110 EnWG und die Behandlung von Objekt- und Arealnetzen nach den §§ 17, 20 EnWG und §§ 19, 20 GWB, ZNER 2005, 285-301, gemeinsam mit Dr. iur. Katharina Vera Boesche.